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chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Culture is a little like dropping an Alka-Seltzer into a glass − you don't see it, but somehow
it does something.
Hans Magnus Enzensberger  (Quoted by Hans Haacke, New York TImes, January 5th, 1987)
Culture has become the plaything of journalists and historians, the Barbie-doll of
sociologists, the Toys-'R'-Us of the cultural anthropologists. It is an idiot's delight.
Melvin Lasky 2002, p. 81
1-1-the culture - economy dialectic
Over the past decades, the popularity of culture as an explaining factor in economic
geography, economics, and management and organisation studies has grown steadily.
Slowly it has become more or less common practice to point at culture whenever more
traditional explanations have failed. At the same time the expanding toolkit of cross-
cultural psychology provided an ever-growing data set on (aspects of) culture. Hofstede
(1980) is probably the best-known and most influential example hereof. In the 1990s the
social sciences, geography included, experienced what is now called a 'cultural turn' (e.g.
Barnes 2001). Increasingly, culture was used to explain regional and (inter-) national
differences in, for instance, wealth and economic growth. Some twenty years earlier, in the
1970s, Marxist approaches in social science induced interest in the opposite relationship:
the economic 'mode of being' as an explanation for social and cultural difference.
The concepts of "culture" and "economy" have played a key role in (the development of)
social science. 'In much of twentieth century discourse, "culture" and "economy" have been
represented in juxtaposition, if not indeed as an outright contradiction of terms' (Kockel
2002b, p. 1). Especially in social scientific theorising "culture" and "economy" are (nearly)
dichotomous concepts. Social reality tends to be divided into two mutually exclusive
categories: culture, and economy (e.g. Castree 2004). This dichotomy co-determined the
organisation of social science itself: sociology studies society or culture, economics studies
the economy. The concept dichotomization and the (conjectured) relationships between
culture and economy represent a dialectic (see § 2.5 on the concept of "dialectic"): the
'culture - economy dialectic' (hereafter abbreviated CED).
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The CED is at least as old as social science; some (conceptually) related dialectics, often
difficult to distinguish from the CED itself, are, however, much older. The history of the
CED as a dialectic of social categories started in the 18th century with (among others)
Montesquieu, Vico and Smith. It continued throughout the 19th century  with Marx, Tylor,
Morgan, Durkheim and Simmel; the early 20th century: Weber, Tawney; and exploded in
the second half of the 20th century. Figure 1.1 and table 1.1 illustrate the late 20th century
rise of "culture" and its popularity (and that of the CED) in contemporary discourse.
figure 1.1: "culture" or "cultural" in book titles in WorldCat database by year of publication
All data relative to total number of books in WorldCat database published in that period.
note (*): the year 1900 is excluded because all undated publications are also filed under this year.
source: WorldCat database (www.oclc.org/worldcat), August 2004
table 1.1: "culture" and "economy" in titles and on the internet (June 2004)
Online Contents 1 WorldCat 2 Google 3
"culture" 4 197927 380898 50,8 m
    + "economy" 5 2925 12000 6,0 m
    relative (row 2 / row 1) 1,48 % 3,15 % 11,9 %
"concept of culture" 6 125 420 43500
notes:
(1) words or phrases in article titles in over 17000 scientific journals. www.oclcpica.org.
(2) words or phrases in book titles of over 42 million books. www.oclc.org/wordlcat.
(3) words or phrases in internet pages and documents. www.google.com. (m = million)
(4) including "cultures" and "cultural" in OLC and Worldcat search (not in Google search).
(5) including "economic" in OLC and Worldcat search (not in Google search); subset of row above.
(6) including "the culture concept" and "definition of culture" in OLC and Worldcat search (not in
Google search).
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While the CED is at least two centuries old and CED-based thought has been foundational
for many of the social sciences, its introduction into geography is of much more recent date.
Only in the second half of the 20th century, did the CED oust the traditional man -
environment dialectic, which was a defining characteristic of classical geography. With the
introduction of the CED into geography and the rising interest in culture in general, the
field of geography became increasingly dependent on fuzzy concepts (Markusen 1999;
Rodríguez-Pose 2001). The same is also true for the other social sciences, albeit that in
those the conceptual framework of the CED was already present at their 'births'.
"Culture" itself is probably the best example of such a fuzzy concept. With its increasing
popularity, the concept of "culture" became increasingly ambiguous and increasingly
contested. Cross-cultural psychologists, for example, measure the core value orientations
they regard to be the essence of culture, while post-modernists (and many others) claim that
culture is fundamentally immeasurable. It may be the case that 'the challenges of studying
culture have little to do with unique measurement constraints, and more to do with
persistent conceptual conflations that hamper our ability to produce consolidated
knowledge' (Jepperson & Swidler 1994, p. 369). Consequently, the scientific value of the
concept of "culture" (and of the CED) may be rather limited in its current state of chaos.
However, 'a project linking economic with cultural analysis (…) is supported by an
embarrassingly rich array of intellectual resources, which only the blinkers of conventional
economic thinking prevent us from fully using' (Peet 1997, p. 46). Therefore, a thorough
analysis of the CED, its concepts and theories, is needed.
1-2-the research project
This book is the result of a research project on the history, meaning and implications of the
culture - economy dialectic (CED). The focus of the project was on the (historical)
development of the relationships between the concepts (and − to some extent − also the
phenomena) of "culture", "economy" and "entrepreneurship". Its main question was not so
much a question about actual cultural influence on the economy or vice versa itself, but
about what it means to ask this kind of question and why this seems to be so important in
and to social science. There were a number of interrelated goals (or parts) in the research
project to answer this research question; most importantly: (part 1) to compare and analyse
the existing theories of the CED, (part 2) to review their empirical (dis-) confirmation, (part
3) to construct some kind of synthesis and, finally, (part 4) to consider the relevance and
implications of all of this to geography and social science in general.
Comparison and analysis of theories (part 1) starts with an analysis of the concepts used in
these theories. To compare and analyse, and certainly to attempt a synthesis (part 3),
theories have to be written is some kind of common language first. The same is required for
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testing the theories (part 2): without a common language, without a set of translation rules,
it is impossible to compare theories to empirical results. However, in the social sciences,
common languages are rare, especially when culture is concerned. Hence, conceptual
analysis is necessary to construct a common language for comparison, testing and synthesis
of the (theories of the) CED.
There are some additional arguments in favour of a conceptual analysis of the CED in
general and the concept of "culture" in particular. These are (2) the existing conceptual
contestation and confusion regarding the concept of "culture" (see §§ 1.1 and 1.2.1); (3) the
importance of the CED in the origins and disciplinary divisions of social science (see §§ 1.1
and 1.2.2); and (4) the strong relationships between language and culture (see § 1.2.2).
1-2-1-conceptual contestation and confusion
The abundance of theories and empirical studies on the CED has led to a growing
conceptual contestation and confusion, which is not necessarily damaging to the
productivity of a field or social science as a whole, but which is very damaging to its
theoretical foundations and to inter-theoretical communication. Concepts are used
differently in different fields and different theories, and 'the almost exclusive reliance by
social scientists on the use of terms derived from ordinary language usages results in an
extreme proliferation of the meanings in which the most commonly used words are
employed, thus producing a polysemantic jumble which appears to defy all normalizing
efforts' (Dahlberg 1978, p. 142). Hence, 'concept reconstruction is a highly needed therapy
for the current state of chaos of most social sciences' (Sartori 1984b, p. 50).
In 1952 Kroeber and Kluckhohn reviewed 168 definitions of "culture". This was years
before "culture" became a buzz-word and the number of definitions, operationalisations and
interpretations exploded (see figure 1.1). By now the word can mean almost anything. The
problem is nicely summarised by Bohannan (1973): 'We define culture by whatever
purpose we ascribe to it in our theorizing, and are hence allowed to continue on our way
without examining it' (p. 358). This in itself would not be an insurmountable problem if the
concept would be relatively unambiguous within the CED at least, but unfortunately this is
not the case. The CED can be split up in two parts: (1) the influence of culture on economic
development; and (2) the influence of the economy on culture. Both parts have been prey to
conceptual contestation and confusion as illustrated below.
The locus classicus for the first part, culture and economic development (see e.g.
Fukuyama 2001 for a brief introduction), is Weber's (1905) study on the relationship
between Protestantism and entrepreneurship. Dominating this part of the CED in the last
decades of the 20th century was empirical research based on Hofstede's (1980)
measurement of cultural differences in value orientations. Kockel's Regional culture and
economic development (2002a), an example of economic anthropology or ethnology, on the
other hand, more or less equates culture to informal economy. These three examples are all
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part of the research effort and literature on 'culture and economic development'.
Nevertheless, "culture" seems to mean religion in the first case, value orientations in the
second and is an extremely broad concept including informal economy in the last case.
Moreover, especially anthropologists and ethnologists tend to define "culture" so broadly
that it also includes institutions, which would imply that, for example, the literature on the
relationship between economic freedom and economic growth is part of the CED literature.
(On the other hand, institutionalists sometimes define "institutions" that broadly that the
concept includes culture.)
Research on the second part of the CED is strongly influenced by Marx's (1859) 'historical
materialism', but while the part of historical materialism most elaborated and most
emphasised by Marx himself only claimed that the mode of production (as a part of the
institutional arrangement of the economy) in a society determines (to some extent) the legal
and political institutions of that society, many of his followers have broadened historical
materialism to include all possible influences of the economy on culture. In the last
decades, researchers, some of them from a Marxist background, some not, have claimed,
for example, that wealth influences individualism (e.g. Lewis 1955; Franke, Hofstede &
Bond 1991), work-ethic (Bell 1974) and post-materialism (Harris 1973; Inglehart 1977). As
was the case with culture and economic development we can see that both "culture" and
"economy", although not all theories of the CED are phrased in these terms, are interpreted
very differently by different theorists.
To make matters even worse, the conceptual confusion surrounding the CED is reinforced
by the fact that some scholars refer to earlier and other research without considering the
differences in interpretation and/or operationalisation of the key concepts used. By now we
can safely conclude that the core concepts of the CED, "culture" and "economy", are used
and misused as buzz-words covering almost everything. As scientific concepts this has
made them nearly useless. This does not necessarily mean that the theories and empirical
research using these concepts are useless or meaningless, but merely that meanings have to
be established, analysed and compared more rigorously than has thus far been customary.
The fact that the concepts of the CED are used differently by different theorists in different
theoretical contexts makes translation rules necessary for meaningful communication, but
also makes final definitions impossible. Part of the goal of this study, therefore, was to
provide a common language and a set of translation rules to be able to compare different
theories and empirical findings within a single conceptual framework.
1-2-2-language, culture and social science
The third and fourth arguments for conceptual analysis of the CED (§ 1.2) were: (3) the
importance of the CED in the origins and disciplinary divisions of social science; and (4)
the strong relationships between language and culture. Both arguments will de dealt with in
detail later, but a brief explanation may be useful here.
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In the eighteenth century, two competing worldviews, Enlightenment and Counter-
enlightenment (or Romanticism), the first associated with reason, universalism and
"civilisation", the latter with passion, tradition and "culture", gave birth to both the CED
and to the − by now widely accepted − disciplinary divisions in social science. Especially
the division between economics and sociology (or between economic and cultural
geography) is the product of these two different worldviews (more on this in § 3.2.2). A
thorough (conceptual) analysis of the CED may reveal the rationale or lack thereof behind
these disciplinary divisions.
The fourth and final argument for conceptual analysis is based on Winch's (and others')
claim that studying culture itself is conceptual analysis (e.g. Winch 1958). "Culture" is
sometimes defined as meaning (e.g. Geertz 1973; Hall 1995; see also § 4.3.4) and the
conceptual categories a group of people uses to classify reality, may be the most defining
characteristic of its culture. Winch (1964), for example, asserts that 'in any attempt to
understand the life of another society, (…) the forms taken by such concepts − their role in
the life of the society − must always take a central place and provide a basis on which
understanding may be built' (p. 324; more fully quoted and explained in § 2.2.2).
Investigating another culture implies analysing the meaning and social role of core concepts
of/in that cultural group. (see also §§ 2.1.1 and 2.2.2) Hence, studying conceptual analysis
as a method for (a.o.) analysis of the history and theoretical implications of the CED (see §
1.2), may also result in a methodology for studying the influence of conceptual categories,
as manifestations of culture, on economic behaviour (and the other way around).
The fourth and ultimate part (or goal) of the research project is to investigate the value and
implications of the CED for social science, more specifically: to determine the
consequences of a (conceptually) cleaned up, integrated and − if possible − tested version
of the CED for social science. This part of the research question is especially relevant to
human geography as the CED is a relatively new conceptual framework in this discipline.
CED-based thought took over from traditional geographic thought in terms of the man -
environment dialectic only in the second half of the 20th century (also see above and §§
3.6.2 and 8.4.1).
These implications may be of rather diverse natures. Most obvious, of course, are the
implications for research on the CED itself, but as the CED is so strongly related to the
disciplinary division and core concepts of social science itself, the implications may run
deeper. If, for example, a thorough conceptual analysis of "culture" and "economy" does
not result in a clear and objective demarcation between these concepts, this might be an
argument for (inter-) disciplinary integration or a broader approach within (sub-)fields of
social science at least. More practical implications may have to do with questions about (the
possibility and methodology of) measurement of culture, economy and related categories,
or, especially relevant to human geography, with the spatial scales of the CED.
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1-3-reading this book
Although the reader could, of course, choose to read only parts of this book and to read
these parts in any possible order, there is a natural order in its contents. This is the order of
the research project itself and the order in which the book was written. The structure of the
book is illustrated in figure 1.2.
figure 1.2: the structure of this book
Lines represent main lines of thought on section level.
Purely introductory or summarising sections excluded; chapter 4 represented as a single section.
Chapter 2 describes the different approaches to conceptual analysis and concepts in
philosophy, linguistics and a number of other scientific fields. The goal and final result (in
§ 2.7) of this chapter is an integrative methodology for conceptual analysis in social
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science, grounded in the literature and applicable to the problem at hand. Chapters 3 to 5
apply the methodology developed in section 2.7 to (the concepts of) the culture - economy
dialectic (CED). Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the historical development and different
variants of the concepts and the dialectic itself, while chapter 5 is an attempt to (re-)
construct a common language or a set of translation rules, based on the preceding chapters,
for analysis and comparison of the theories of the CED. Chapter 6 attempts to
operationalise and measure some of the categories in the framework proposed in chapter 5
for testing in chapter 7.
Chapter 7 evaluates and compares the theories of the CED with the help of the common
language developed in chapter 5, with the ultimate goal of some kind of synthetic theory of
and on the CED in chapter 8. Regarding the latter, chapter 7 will deal with some empirical
test already published and add some new tests. It must be noted, however, that (this kind of)
testing itself is not the main goal here and that, therefore, this will remain incomplete.
Chapter 8, finally, deals with synthesis, with the evaluation of the implications thereof for
geography and social science in general, and with some further theoretical considerations
based on the findings of this study on the CED and social science.
1-3-1-a note on reference
Whenever the historical context of theories or ideas is important, it is preferable to refer to
the books in which these theories or ideas were formulated first by their original year of
publication. When writing about Vico's New science for example it does not make sense to
keep referring to it as Vico (1984), while the original publication in the first half of the 18th
century is what matters. Applying the standard 'Vico (1984)' reference would therefore
necessitate the addition of further dates, for example: Vico (1984[1725/44]). This however
would result in very long references in the text. The most obvious alternative and the option
chosen here, is to refer to books and articles by the date of their original publication. If
there are (completely) revised later editions that had considerable impact, this second date
is added. The before mentioned example of Vico's New science then will be referred to as
Vico (1725/44) as 1725 is the year in which the first edition was published and 1744 is the
date of the revised and more influential third edition. Unless noted otherwise it is always
the latest edition, which is referred to. Letters are referred to by the year they are written.
For example, Engels's letter to Joseph Bloch in Köningsberg of September 21st, 1890 is
referred to as Engels (1890). In the references at they end of the book the year of
publication of the edition used, if different form the first mentioned year, is added after the
name of the publisher. For example:
Vico, G. (1725/44), The new science of Gianbattista Vico: unabridged translation of the
third edition (1744) with the addition of "Practic of the New science", Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984
INTRODUCTION
23
Quotations in this book are as close as possible to the original. English, German, French
and Spanish quotes are given in the original language. Quotes in other languages are
translated into English. Italics in quotes are copied. What is printed in italics here was
printed in italics in the original. What is not printed in italics here was not in the original.
Quotations from classical texts of which many editions are available refer to paragraph
numbers (if available) rather than page numbers.
1-3-2-symbols, formalisations and abbreviations
In some parts of this book formalisation is used to rigorously summarise theories or
arguments presented in the text. These formulas are not part of the basic argumentative
structure of the book, but are used as a tool to help comparison and synthesis of theories
and arguments. Table 1.2 specifies set-theoretical, logical and special symbols that are not
introduced in the text and are used throughout the book. All other symbols used are
introduced, explained and (generally) defined in the sections were they are used first. (The
symbols used in chapters 2 to 4 are introduced in chapter 2; the symbols used in chapters 6
to 8 are introduced in section 5.2 (mostly in box 5.1).)
table 1.2: symbols used throughout the book
x =def. y x is defined as y
{…} set
*…+ ordered set
∈ element
⊂ subset
∪ union
∩ intersection
∀x […] all x such that …
∃x […] there is a (at least one) x such that …
{ x | … } the set of x such that …
∧ and
∨ or (inclusive)
¬x not x
x → y if x then y
x ↔ y if and only if x then y (or vice versa)
Most of the formulas presented make some use of set-theoretical notions. (Most of the −
relatively rare  − logical formulas are based on sorted first order logics with identity.)
Ordered sets are especially important in the first part of the book. The difference between
'normal' sets and ordered sets is that in the latter type a change in the order of elements
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changes the set. For example, the set of numeric symbols {0,1,2,…,8,9} is not dependent
on the actual order of these numbers and is, therefore, not an ordered set. The most
elementary form of an ordered set is an ordered pair. The variables in the relationship x>y,
for example are an ordered set *x,y+. As x>y is different from x<y, *x,y+ differs from
*y,x+. Ordered sets are used in this book mainly to formalise the ordered structure of
'things'. If it is assumed, for example, that all objects are essentially a combination of shape
S and substance U, this could imply a definition: "object"=def.*S,U+. The specific type of
object "book" then could be defined something like: "book"=def.*bound_sheets, paper+.
Order is important in this example to represent internal structure in the definition of an
object and its species (e.g. "book").
Two of the most basic symbols in set theory are ∈ denoting set membership and the subset
symbol ⊂. x∈A means that x is an element of set A. For example, 1 is an element of the
before mentioned set of numeric symbols. A⊂B symbolizes that A is a subset of B. This
means that all elements of A are also elements of B, but not necessarily the other way
around. For example, {1,2,3} is a subset of the set of numeric symbols. The symbols ∪ and
∩ represent the set-theoretical operations of union and intersection respectively. The union
of two sets is the set of all elements that are in at least one of these sets; the intersection is
the set of all elements that are in both. For example, {a,b}∪{b,c}={a,b,c} and
{a,b}∩{b,c}={b}.
The other symbols presented in table 1.2 are logical symbols. The symbol ∀ is the universal
quantifier. It is used in logical formulas to introduce variables. For example, the formula
∀x[Bx] should be read as 'all x-s are B'. ∃ is the existential quantifier. Its use and meaning
ares similar to that of ∀: ∃x[Bx] means 'there is a (at least one) x that is B'. The notation
{x|…} is superficially somewhat similar to quantifiers, but it is used to specify the
conditions for set membership rather than for introducing variables. (It may, however, be
used to introduce a set.) For example, {x|Ax} is the set of all things that are A.
∧ and ∨ mean 'and' and 'or' respectively. Hence, ∀x[Bx∨Cx] means: 'all x-s are B or C or
both' and ∃x[Bx∧Cx] means that there is at least one x that is both B and C. The symbol ¬
is used for negation. ∀x[¬Bx] then means that all x-s are not B. → and ↔ are used to
symbolize logical implication. For example: ∀x[Bx→Cx] is the symbolic equivalent of 'for
all x-s, if these are B, then they are C', or shorter: 'all x-s that are B are C'. The difference
between →, the conditional, and ↔, the biconditional, can de interpreted as a difference in
the 'direction' of the implication. ∀x[Bx→Cx] implies that all things that are B are also C,
but not vice versa. Hence, things can be C without being B. On the other hand, in case of
∀x[Bx↔Cx], all things B are C and the other way around, which may make B and C more
or less equivalent. In normal language statements on logical implication, the biconditional
"if and only if" is often abbreviated "iff".
Formulas are numbered by chapter and coded T for theories and hypotheses or D for
definitions. D2.3 is the third formal definition in chapter 2. However, the number of some
formal definitions and/or theories is marked by an asterisk: D2.4*. The asterisk means that
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this formalisation is not the final version of the definition (or the final formalisation of that
theory). It will be adapted (or refuted) later in the text. If a number of a formula is indexed R
it is repeated.
Double quotation marks ("…") are used only to refer to concepts only. Hence "culture"
refers to the concept of "culture", not to the phenomenon of culture. In all other cases single
quotation marks ('…') are used.
Throughout this book recurring terms are often abbreviated. These abbreviations are
mentioned in the text. The "culture - economy dialectic" is generally abbreviated CED.
Most other abbreviations are only used in a single chapter or (sub-) section (such as CA for
"conceptual analysis" in chapter 2) and are introduced in these chapters or (sub-) sections.
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chapter 2
ON CONCEPTS AND
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
John 1:1
A good word is like a good tree whose root is firm, and whose branches are in the sky; it
gives its fruit at every season by the permission of its Lord. (…) And the likeness of a bad
word is as a bad tree, which is felled from above the earth, and has no staying place.
Quran 14:24-26
2-1-introduction
In the introduction to this book it was stated that its focus is on the conceptual and
theoretical history of the culture - economy dialectic. One of the research goals is to explain
what is or was meant by questions and statements about the relationships between culture
and economy. Hence, part of this book is (a form of) concept(-ual) analysis (CA). However,
there is no single field, theory or methodology of CA. Rather, there is a whole gamut of
different approaches related to concepts and the elucidation of their meaning. This chapter
is intended to give a brief (or at least as brief as possible) overview of these fields and sub-
fields of CA resulting in some kind of synthesis which will provide the methodological
framework for (some) later parts of the book. Hence, this chapter's ultimate goal is to
construct a general model of concepts and a methodology of CA in social science.
Like all human behaviour, science is a linguistic effort. Without language there would be
no science. Language provides the building blocks for science. Concepts and grammar
(semantics and syntax) are the bricks and mortar of language. Sometimes, however, these
bricks seem to be made out of jelly. CA is the elucidation of vague, but often very common,
concepts. Famous early predecessors of conceptual analysis, Socrates and Plato, for
example, discussed (mainly) ethical concepts, such as "goodness", in an attempt to find
objective descriptions or definitions of these concepts. (Section 2.2 deals with the history of
conceptual analysis.)
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Conceptual clarity is necessary to enable reasonable communication within (social) science:
'A good word is like a good tree whose root is firm, (…) it gives its fruit at every season'
(Quran 14:24). The 'bad trees', on the other hand, are the all too ambiguous concepts that
cause misunderstanding and other problems in science and philosophy. Wittgenstein
argued, for example, that (a lot of) philosophical problems originate from erroneous use of
language: 'Denn die philosophischen Probleme entstehen, wenn die Sprache feiert'
(Wittgenstein 1953, § 38). The same is (to a large extent) true in (social) science.
In the introduction to this book (§ 1.2), three arguments for a conceptual analysis of the
culture - economy dialectic (CED) were mentioned. The first of these (the abundance of
theories and empirical operationalisations led to a growing conceptual contestation and
confusion; see § 1.2.1) is most strongly related to Wittgenstein's argument. The second and
third arguments (2: the CED and its history played an important role in the history of the
social sciences; and 3: studying culture may imply studying (the social roles and meanings
of) concepts; see § 1.2.2) were of a very different nature. The second points at a conceptual
evolution in the CED and is dealt with in subsubsection 3.2.2.
The third argument is related to the very complex problem of the relationships between
culture, language and reality. This chapter studies conceptual analysis as a method for the
analysis of the CED. However, conceptual analysis is not mere methodology. Language,
rules, meaning and culture are closely linked. Studying culture implies studying language
(e.g. Winch 1958). '[L]anguage affects and reflects culture just as culture affects and
reflects what is encoded in language' (Fantini 1995, p. 145). Similarly, language reflects
reality just as reality is perceived through the categories of our language. Before focusing
on conceptual analysis and the concept of "concept" itself (in subsection 2.1.2), it may,
therefore, be useful to look at the complex relationships between language, culture and (the
perception of) reality.
2-1-1-language, culture and reality
Social reality is conceptually structured. We perceive, understand and classify social reality
through our conceptual categories. 'Language, in fact, both reflects and affects one's world
view, serving as a sort of road map to how one perceives, interprets and thinks, and
expresses about the world' (Fantini 1995, p. 144). Mediated by our concepts, it is our
culture that thinks in us (Gellner 1992).
The − by far − best known theory on the influence of language on our perception of reality
is the Sapir-Whorf thesis (SWT). SWT is a form of conceptual relativism, but not the first
or only form. Conceptual relativism claims that different groups have different languages
with different concepts and, therefore, different interpretations and/or perceptions of reality.
Conceptual relativism or related ideas can be found in the work of (among others) Locke,
Hamman and Herder (see e.g. Aarsleff 1982;1988) and Kant (1781/7), who claimed that
perception without concepts is blind. The most important predecessor of SWT, however,
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was Wilhelm von Humboldt. According to Humboldt, who was strongly influenced by
Herder, language gives shape to the intellectual life of nations and societies. Language is
not just a means of communication, language is thought; our language determines the
conditions of our life. (Humboldt 1836; 1836-9; Hennigfeld 1976; Aarsleff 1982; 1988)
SWT was (re-)introduced by Sapir and Whorf in the early 20th century, but some scholars
claim that Nietzsche and/or Korzybski forrwarded a similar thesis earlier (e.g. Hennigfeld
1976; Pula 1992). Sometimes, especially by anthropologists, Boas is mentioned as one of
the fathers of SWT as well (e.g. Hill & Mannheim 1992).
SWT can be summarised pretty well by these two quotes from its founding fathers:
[T]he 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the
group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the
same social reality. (Sapir 1929; p. 209)
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types
that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of
impressions which has to be organised by our minds − and this means largely by the
linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organise it into concepts, and ascribe
significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement that holds throughout
our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of
course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk
at all except by subscribing to the organisation and classification of data which the
agreement decrees.  (Whorf 1956, p. 213)
SWT consists of two parts: (1) linguistic determinism and (2) linguistic relativity.
Linguistic determinism is the hypothesis or theory that the language we use determines (to
some extent) how we perceive the world and how we think about it:
English and Chinese are simply two different ontological systems. To learn a foreign
language is to study a different ontology. Therefore, to communicate with an alien culture is
not to absorb the truths it discovered, but to learn to see or think of the world in a different
way. (Zhifang 2002, p. 169)
Perception starts with and is determined by conceptualisation: 'In the beginning was the
Word, (…) and the Word was God' (John 1:1). In the strong version of the theory of
linguistic determinism, language determines perception and thought; in the weak version
language merely influences these. Linguistic determinism is the most contested part of
SWT. Lucy (1997) categorises and reviews the empirical research on (this part of) SWT
and concludes that more and better research is needed. Recently Davidoff (2001) found
some evidence for the strong version of linguistic determinism.
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SWT claims that we perceive culture and economy, because we have these concepts
"culture" and "economy". Other languages with other classifications are possible, have
existed, and still exist. The CED itself may be the product of our conceptual classification
not of some distinction that is really 'out there'. The CED is a product of Western thought
and language, not a universal phenomenon and/or scientific problem. The Japanese
language, for example, does not have an equivalent of "culture" (although, according to
Mishima (1984), iki, furyu, miyabi and do all come near to some interpretations of
"culture", but neither can be used in compound terms as is common practice with
"culture").
According to linguistic relativity, categories, concepts or classifications are unique to
specific languages. Language divides or classifies reality in arbitrary concepts or categories
and there is no limit to the number of possible classifications. Hence there is no limit to the
conceptual diversity among languages. Cultural differences between conceptual
classifications have been studied by numerous scholars (e.g. Whorf 1956; Brown 1958;
Hunn 1982; Lakoff 1987; Waxman 1991; Clark 1991; Anglin 1995).  Wierzbicka (1991)
found that even truisms are culture specific. Concepts are, however, not just different
between cultures, but '[c]oncepts are heavily determined by cultural tradition' (van Loocke
1999, p. 4). Some scientists (e.g. Hill & Mannheim 1992; Grucza 2000) reject the
distinction between language and culture altogether. Different ways to classify reality
and/or experience are often determined by differences in practical utility and cultural
significance (Anglin 1995): 'Of the indefinitely large number of concepts that humans are
capable of forming, words are coined for those conceptual categories and distinctions that
are functionally important enough for people to communicate about with each other' (p.
176).
SWT did not finish with Sapir and Whorf of course (see e.g. Hill & Mannheim 1992 or
Hunt 2001 for an overview of more recent work on SWT) and there are some theories
related to SWT within philosophy. Linguistic relativity is related to Davidson's (1974)
'conceptual schemes'. ''Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut
up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description' (Putnam
1981, p. 52; see also Goodman 1972). Linguistic determinism is (a.o.) related to Hanson's
(1958) claim that perception is theory-laden, Foucault's (1969) discursive construction of
social reality and social constructivism (in general). The term 'social constructivism' was
coined by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Early predecessors were (a.o.) Berkeley's (1710)
idealism and Marx and Engels (1846/1932) on the influence of ideology on social reality.
Constructivism generally claims that science constructs the perception and representation of
reality. However, some constructivists go one step further and make the ontological claim
that science constructs reality itself.
SWT has drawn much critique. In particular linguistic determinism is fiercely contested
(e.g. Bunge 1974; Pinker 1994; 1997). Bunge (1974) claims that language does not
influence perception or thought, but that language is ontologically neutral, although some
languages (ordinary / natural languages especially) are not rich enough to express certain
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ideas about reality. Strangely, Pinker's (1994) widely acclaimed critique of SWT does not
deal with any other languages (or cultures) than English (e.g. Wierzbicka 1997) and should
on this ground alone be rejected as a serious contribution to the debate.
As conceptual classifications are determined by practical utility and cultural significance
(Anglin 1995), they are subject to change. Concepts are subjective and changing tools to
deal with a complex world. There are evolutionary paths from manual skills to the concepts
in (of) language(s) (Arbib & Rizzolatti 1999). Our concepts are the result of an
evolutionary process of adaptation to changing circumstances (e.g. Slurink 2002). This,
however, does not imply that our conceptual structure is always and necessarily the best
possible representation of reality (of the time). Concepts are developed as representations of
reality in order to increase fitness, not to create a mirror of the environment (Peschl 1999).
Moreover, as circumstances change permanently, we are always one step behind. And to
complicate things even further, circumstances do not only vary over time but also over
space and over social groups. Evolutionary change is not teleological. It is a process
dependent on reproductive success. Conceptual evolution, similarly, is dependent on the
(re-) productive success of concepts and/or conceptual structures. Conceptual evolution
does not lead to more objective or truthful conceptual representations of external reality; it
only advances those concepts that are most (re-) productive in theoretical developments and
practical applications.
The question, of course, is how to build a (social) science on a subjective and changing
conceptual foundation. There are two basic strategies available to deal with this problem.
The first is to restrict theorising to a model of reality instead to reality itself. This is the path
chosen by mainstream economics. However, if science is to make claims about the real
world rather than some mathematical model, this does not seem to be the most appropriate
or (even) obvious path. The second strategy starts with recognition of the fact that our
conceptual representation of reality is (necessarily) far from perfect, and with a critical
evaluation of the concepts we use and how these concepts shape our interpretation of
reality. This second strategy implies that every research project should start with conceptual
analysis.
2-1-2-on words and concepts
Conceptual analysis (or concept analysis) is the analysis of concepts. However, the concept
of "concept" itself is far from clear:
[T]here is considerable disagreement about what exactly a concept is. Psychologists tend to
use 'concept' for internal representations, for example, images, stereotypes, words that may
be vehicles for thought in the mind or brain. Logicians and formal semanticists tend to use
it for sets of real and possible objects, and functions defined over them; and philosophers of
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mind have variously proposed properties, 'senses', inferential rules or discrimination
abilities. (Rey 1998, p. 505)
"Concept" is a member of a set of related concepts that also includes (a.o.) "word" and
"term". Words as lexical items 'are triplets of phonological structure, syntactic structure,
and meaning' (Jackendoff 2002, p. 51). Elsewhere Jackendoff speaks of 'long term memory
associations' instead of 'triplets' and of 'conceptual features' as synonymous to 'semantic
features' (2002, p. 130). A word then, is just a convenient label for a concept. The concept
is the meaning of a word. The difference is illustrated nicely and very interestingly in
Motter et al. (2002), who defined two words similar if they represented more or less the
same concepts and mapped these connections between words in the English language. They
found that 'one only needs three steps on average to connect any two words in the 30.000-
words dictionary' they used and that 'in fact, less than 1% of the words require more than
four steps to be reached from any given word' (p. 065102-2).
Concepts have been studied form various, very different, perspectives. Pathak (2000), for
example, distinguishes eight types of research on concepts, some of which are subdivided
even further. The bulk of the research on concepts, however, can be divided up into three
main types or fields: (1) philosophical research, (2) research on concepts in social science,
and (3) concept analysis for improvement of knowledge and information exchange, as in
nursing or computer science. These three research fields are, however, closely linked.
Different goals and different sets of concepts for analysis may result in different concepts
of "concept" and different interpretations of the concept of "concept" may induce different
approaches in studying them. Roughly speaking, concepts of "concept" are positioned on a
scale from very general to very specific. Most general are the interpretations of "concept" in
psychology and most of philosophy. For example, Laurence and Margolis 'take concepts to
be sub-propositional mental representations' (1999, p. 4). Hence, anything in our thought
smaller than a (short) sentence is a concept. Even more abstract, Barsalou et al. claim that
'concepts are models for types of individuals in world models' (1993, p. 23). (More about
the different philosophical theories on the nature of concepts in § 2.2.3.) A little bit less
general are definitions of "concept" as applied in concept analysis in social science and
concept analysis for information exchange. Sartori (1984b), for example, defines concepts
as the basic units of thinking and claims that: 'It can be said that we have a concept of A (or
of A-ness) when we are able to distinguish A from whatever is not-A' (p. 74). Concepts are
nouns or sometimes adjectives or verbs (or, even more rarely, compounds of these with a
meaning different from their parts) referring to something in extra-linguistic reality.
Dahlberg (1978), working in the same field as Sartori, suggests regarding concepts as units
of knowledge, rather than as units of thought. However, the standard definition of
"concept" with respect to social science terminology is established in ISO 1087 (see §
2.3.1), where a concept is (defined as) 'a unit of thought constituted through abstraction on
the basis of properties common to a set of objects' (def. 3.1).
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Very specific are the notions of "concept" as applied in conceptual history
(Begriffsgeschichte) and management fashion research, fields that are not recognised by
Pathak (2000) (and most other scientists and philosophers of language and concepts) as
belonging to the concept research field. The specific interpretation of "concept" in these
fields is, of course, related to the very specific types of concepts studied. According to
Koselleck (1972), the leading figure in conceptual history, concepts are not just words:
concepts, or better geschichliche Grundbegriffe, are social factors with systematically
ambiguous meaning. Similarly, the philosopher and anthropologist Gellner (1992)
interprets concepts as socially shared compulsions. Concepts as social factors do not only
describe social and political reality, but partly also (re-)produce it. Concepts are
systematically ambiguous in the sense that they, contrary to other words, cannot be
disambigued by a certain context. Concepts are ambiguous, whatever the context (see §
2.4.1). Gallie (1956) regarded many concepts in (a.o.) social and political philosophy to be
essentially contested. These concepts are necessarily ambiguous because of their function
in philosophical and scientific debates.
In management fashion research, the concept of "concept" has a similar (but not identical)
specific meaning. However, the term "concept"' is not used very often. The term
"management concept" is more or less synonymous to "management fashion" and to
"management theory". These three different terms only differ according to which part of the
phenomenon they emphasise. A concept (in this sense) is term, theory (content) and context
(which includes the fashion perspective). As in conceptual history, management concepts
are social factors and are systematically ambiguous. (e.g. Abrahamson 1991; 1996; Benders
& van Veen 2001) (see § 2.4.2) The theory-ladenness and ambiguity of concepts in these
more specific interpretations was advanced earlier by a number of analytical philosophers,
including Popper (1935), Hempel (1952) and Wittgenstein (1953), although Hanson (1958)
was probably the first to actually use the term "theory-laden". Popper argued that concepts
are references to extra-linguistic reality within a theoretical framework and that, therefore,
all concepts are theoretical. According to Hempel, concept formation and theory formation
'constitute virtually two different aspects of the same procedure' (1952, p. 2).
In a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of management concepts ten Bos (2000)
argues in favour of the fashion-perspective usually adopted in the management fashion
literature and against a more utopian perspective (as in definitional analysis). He claims that
concepts, and the theories they are labels of, should be seen as fleeting fashions, not as
utopian final truths. This fits nicely within the evolutionary perspective on concepts (in
general) mentioned above. Concepts should be seen as part of their temporal and social
context. In most approaches to conceptual analysis this is, however, hardly the case.
Moving from the very general to the very specific, the concept of "concept" becomes less
of a ontologically neutral building block of thought and language, and more of a theory-
laden and reality-shaping social phenomenon. The position most of analytic philosophy
may be characterised as somewhere in the middle. The perspective chosen depends on the
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goals of the analysis but also affects its outcomes. For studying language in general (within,
for example, a psychological or cognitive framework), the most general perspective is
probably the most appropriate. For studying the influence of political history on the
changing meaning of concepts and the other way around, the very specific perspective of
Begriffsgeschichte is more fitting. The question is: where does (and/or should) concept
analysis in social science fit in?
The language of social science contains words of various types. It includes various
connectors and prepositions, which usually have very clear meanings. Accordingly, these
are not the subject of concept analysis. The concepts studied, on the other hand, are mostly
nouns (or sometimes adjectives or verbs) describing complex social phenomena. The
website of the Committee on Concepts and Methods of the International Political Science
Association (IPSA) (www.concepts-methods.org) hosts a bibliography of 86 social and
political science concepts (last checked in March 2005), all of them nouns, all of them
describing social phenomena or ideas (instead of things).
Social science concepts are strongly theory-laden. They are usually introduced as a part of a
theory and are often even the catchwords of theories. In a sense, social science concepts are
not just theory-laden, but theories in themselves. As theoretical concepts, social science
concepts shape our perception of social reality. By implication, social science concepts are
social factors. Moreover, social science concepts seem to be systematically (or essentially;
Gallie 1956) ambiguous. (However, whether the ambiguity of these concepts is truly
systematic or a curable consequence of sloppy use of language, is a point for discussion.)
Hence, social science concepts are very similar to the concepts studied in
Begriffsgeschichte and management fashion research. Like management fashions and
geschichliche Grundbegriffe, social science concepts are ambiguous, theory-laden social
factors.
2-1-3-this chapter
The division into sections of this chapter is partly based on the interpretations of the
concept of "concept" described above and partly on the degree of isolation. The latter refers
to the subject of the philosophies and theories presented. The first sections deal with the
analysis of isolated concepts, later sections deal with pairs and systems of concepts.
Section 2.2 describes the history and concepts of conceptual analysis in philosophy. The
application thereof on a number of fields and the (formal) methods used are the topic of
section 2.3. This division coincides with that in the section above: 2.2 deals with very
abstract concepts; section 2.3 with the more intermediate conception of "concept" in (a.o.)
the social sciences. Theories of concepts as social factors or theories, such as
Begriffsgeschichte and management fashion theory are explained in section 2.4. These
theories also share their strong emphasis on the temporal context of concepts.
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The other sections of this chapter − as mentioned − relax the isolation of concepts. Section
2.5 deals with pairs of opposing concepts in dialectics, deconstruction and similar theories.
Section 2.6 describes approaches to analyse conceptual systems or structures, languages
and ontologies. The concluding section 2.7 is an attempt to reach some kind of synthesis in
a general methodology of conceptual analysis.
2-2-conceptual analysis in philosophy
Conceptual Analysis (CA) as a current in (analytic) philosophy emerged in Cambridge
(UK) during the first half of the twentieth century. Its main representative was Moore.
Important influences were Locke, Kant and Frege's analysis of numbers. The movement
spread to Oxford with Ryle and Austin and from there to the United States. Heavily
criticised by (a.o.) Quine (in what was itself a brilliant conceptual analysis of the concept of
"analyticity"), it was more or less extinct by the end of the 1970s.
Language has been a subject of philosophical inquiry since earliest times. How
philosophers in different periods dealt with language, however, changed considerably.
Besides analytical philosophy, several other fields both in and outside philosophy dealt and
deal with language, concepts and meaning. This section deals with conceptual analysis as
part of analytic philosophy (§ 2.2.1), with other philosophical currents dealing with
language and meaning (§ 2.2.2) and gives a (very) brief overview of philosophical ideas on
concepts, meaning, definition, etc. (§ 2.2.3).
2-2-1-a short history of conceptual analysis
The early history of CA started in Greek Antiquity. According to Aristotle (Metaphysica),
Socrates was the first who practised conceptual analysis. Socrates, however, was only
interested in ethical concepts. His most important student, Plato (the Republic, Phaedrus,
Eutyphro), also attempted to analyse non-ethical concepts (although the main focus
remained on ethical concepts). According to Plato, less common concepts had to be
understood as species or parts of more common concepts and more common concepts had
to be taken apart into their less common parts. Plato and his most important student,
Aristotle, asserted that definitions had to be discovered in some absolute metaphysical
realm. Words had a true meaning that should and could be discovered.
The main question about concepts after Antiquity, in the Medieval period, was not so much
on meaning or analysis, but on the metaphysical nature of concepts. Following Plato and
Aristotle, 'realists' believed that concepts as universals actually exist independently of the
things represented by those concepts. 'Nominalists', on the other hand, believed that
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universals are nothing but names and that only the objects they refer to actually exist. (e.g.
Moreland 2001; see also § 5.2.3)
There is no easy demarcation of a second start (after Antiquity) of the problematisation of
the meaning of concepts, of conceptual analysis, but there are some important predecessors
of modern conceptual analysis in the centuries following the Middle Ages. One of the first
of these may have been Francis Bacon, one of the founding fathers of empiricism and the
modern scientific worldview. Bacon (1620) distinguished four types of 'idols', false
preconceptions or falacious tendencies of the human mind, the third of which was the idola
fori (the idol of the marketplace). The idola fori is the confusion arising from the
overestimation of the objectivity and rigor of language. Concepts are used sloppily, while
often the contrary is expected or assumed, which makes language misleading.
One of the goals of Leibniz (and many of his contemporaries) was the construction of a
general theory of language including logic, semantics, syntax and pragmatics. Leibniz
wanted to construct a language based on one-to-one relations between symbols or signs and
simple concepts. He never achieved this goal. Leibniz's most important contribution to CA
may have been his claim that a concept is clear if it enables us to recognise the objects
falling in its categor; in other words, when it provides clear boundaries of that category
(Leibniz 1684).
Most influential on 20th century CA within analytic philosophy were, probably, Locke and
Kant. Locke (1690) argued that complex general ideas had to be decomposed in sets of
more simple ideas. Kant (1781/7) distinguished analytic from synthetic propositions. The
first being true (or false) by virtue of their conceptual (and logical) content alone; the latter
being true (or false) by virtue of conceptual content plus some non-conceptual element.
(For more on Kant's considerable influence on analytic philosophy see e.g. Hanna 2001.)
Although it is usually claimed that analytic philosophy started with Moore, it seems to be
justifiable to include Frege. Especially Frege's (1879) Begriffsschrift (a system of symbolic
logic), his analysis of mathematical concepts (especially numbers) (1884)  and his
distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference) of a concept (1892) were
profoundly influential. The founding father of modern CA was the Cambridge-based
philosopher Moore. Moore believed that philosophical problems do not arise from the
world or from science but from the works of other philosophers, especially from the
intentions of these works (Moore 1942a). The main goal of Moore's philosophy (1922;
1959) was, therefore, the analysis of ordinary language. His method of CA consisted of
three parts: (1) inspection: the researcher studies the concept and tries to explain it as
clearly as possible; (2) decomposition: clarification by decomposition of the concept in its
composing parts (compare Locke, above); and (3) delimitation: specification of the limits or
boundaries of the concept. The second part hereof seems to be the most important (Moore
1942b) and usually took the form of a traditional definition per genus et differentiam
specificam (a specification of the broader type (genus) and what distinguishes the concept
from this broader type (species)).
ON CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
37
Next to Frege and Moore, the most important figures in early analytic philosophy were
Russell and Wittgenstein, also Cambridge-based. Russell deemed ordinary language unfit
for science or philosophy. Ordinary language is too vague, too confused and too full of
errors to make it possible to correctly express fundamental philosophical truths. By careful
analysis, some of these problems, however, may be cured. With Whitehead, Russell wrote a
rigorous analysis of mathematical concepts, the Principia Mathematica (Whitehead &
Russell 1910-3).
The early Wittgenstein (1922) set out to show the limits of language. According to
Wittgenstein, language distorts and limits thought and, in doing so, limits reality: 'Die
grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt' (5.6). Language, however, not
only limits, but is limited itself; that is, its meaningful use is limited. Wittgenstein asserted
that a lot of, especially philosophical, language use was (and is) senseless:
Die meisten Sätze und Fragen, welche über philosophische Dinge geschrieben worden sind,
sind nicht falsch sondern unsinnig. Wir können daher Fragen dieser Art überhaupt nicht
beantworten, sondern nur ihre Unsinnigkeit feststellen. Die meisten Fragen und Sätze der
Philosophen beruhen darauf, daß wir unsere Sprachlogik nicht verstehen. (4.003)
On definitions, Wittgenstein claimed that these are rules for translation: 'Definitionen sind
Regeln der Übersetzung von einer Sprache in eine andere' (3.343).
The most  important centre of early analytic philosophy outside Cambridge was Vienna. In
Vienna, a group of philosophers and scientists regularly met in the Wiener Kreis. (The best
introduction to their philosophy is available in Ayer 1936.) The (probably) most important
member of the Wiener Kreis was Carnap. Carnap wrote about the Wiener Kreis: 'In our
discussions in the Vienna Circle it had turned out that any attempt at formulating more
precisely the philosophical problems in which we were interested ended up with problems
of the logical analysis of language' (Carnap 1963, p. 55). Carnap (1928) warned for
Sphärenvermengung, the neglect of distinctions of logical types of concepts. On his book
Logische Syntax (1934), he later wrote that 'many philosophical controversies actually
concern the question whether a particular language form should be used' (1963, p. 54), and
that 'Language analysis, in our view the most important tool of philosophy, was first
systematized in the form of logical syntax; but this method studies only the forms of the
expressions, not their meanings. An important step in the development of language analysis
consisted in the supplementation of syntax by semantics, i.e., the theory of the concepts of
meaning and truth' (Carnap 1963, p. 60).
Two attacks ended the early period of analytic philosophy and CA. The first was the
paradox of analysis (Langford 1942), the second were the two dogmas of empiricism
(Quine 1951; dogma 1: the analytic - synthetic distinction; dogma 2: the assumption that all
statements may be reduced to statements about immediate experiences). Langford (1942)
introduced the term "paradox of analysis" (although the idea was older) for a major
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problem in the theory of CA: for an analysis to be correct, both concepts (the analysandum
and the analysans) must be completely identical. Hence CA is tautological, trivial and non-
informative and epistemologically useless (or shorter: analyses are either trivial or wrong).
Important reactions to Langford include those by Black (1944) and White (1945). Moore
himself, at whom Langford's attack was primarily aimed, recognised the paradox but had
no solution. Several solutions of the paradox have been proposed. Most, however, are not
very successful. Hanna (1998), for example, offers a solution based on the work of Kant.
He claims that an analytic definition of a concept offers important novel noetic information
but no semantic information, hence that an analysis is informative after all. (Carnap
suggested a solution of the paradox based on the notion of "intensional isomorphism",
which is dealt with in subsection 2.2.3.)
Far more damaging than the paradox of analysis was Quine's (1951) analysis of the concept
of "analyticity". The shortest possible definition of "analytic" probably is "true by definition
plus logic". Quine claimed that analyticity is based on synonymy and that every analysis of
synonymy ends in circularity. As analyticity cannot be analysed it is not a useful analytic
concept, neither is there an empirical clarification of the distinction between analytic and
synthetic statements. Hence, the concept of "analyticity" (and CA with it) has to be
abandoned. (On the problem of analyticity see also Bealer 1998.) Moreover, concepts
cannot be analysed apart from the broader structure they are part of. Concepts derive their
meaning from the (theoretical) structure and the social group they belong to. According to
'confirmation holism' (also known as the 'Quine-Duhem thesis'), theories can only be tested
and confirmed (or refuted) as a whole.
Grice and Strawson (1956) answered Quine's attack with 'a defence of a dogma'. They
claimed that the deep-rooted use of the distinction in philosophy alone provides enough
reason not to abolish it. Moreover:
Quine requires of a satisfactory explanation of an expression that it should take the form of
a pretty strict definition but should not make use of any member of a group of interdefinable
terms to which the expression belongs. (…) It would seem fairly clearly unreasonable to
insist in general that the availability of a satisfactory explanation in the sense sketched
above is a necessary condition of an expression's making sense. It is perhaps dubious
whether any such explanations can ever be given. (p. 148)
As Grice and Strawson asserted that an explanation in the strict sense as assumed by Quine
may be impossible, they also answer Langford, who based his paradox on the same strict
interpretation. As Quine's analysis of the concept of "analyticity" and Langford's paradox
are based on a very strict (classical) interpretation of analysis, it may be the case that they,
rather than refuting analyticity itself, refuted this strict interpretation. A less strict
interpretation of analysis is needed: 'The fact, if it is a fact, that the expressions cannot be
explained in precisely the way Quine seems to require, does not mean that they cannot be
explained at all' (Grice & Strawson 1956, p. 149).
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After Langford and Quine, philosophy of language moved into new directions. These
changes were reinforced by the publication of Wittgenstein's Philosophische
Untersuchungen (1953). The later Wittgenstein was (a.o.) influenced by American
pragmatism (see § 2.2.2). According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word is its use (§
43). Concepts derive their meaning from rules guiding their use. Knowing a concept is not
knowing its definition but being aware of its role in thought and communicative practice.
Inspired by Wittgenstein, Kuhn (1962) later asserted that someone understands or has a
concept if he understands theories in which that concept is used and/or can reason with that
concept.
Wittgenstein introduced the concept of "language-game". The concept refers to the use of
language in a specific context. Its main merit was to focus the attention of linguists and
philosophers on the context of language use: the socio-cultural group a specific word or
sentence is used by, the background of the members of this group, the characteristic
situations in which the word or sentence is used, and so forth. Although extremely
influential, Wittgenstein was not part of the movement of CA itself. This movement moved
from Cambridge to Oxford, where Ryle, Austin and Strawson were the most important
names in the second phase of analytical philosophy. They were heavily influenced by
Moore and Wittgenstein and believed that most philosophical problems are caused by a
limited insight in the workings of language.
According to Ryle (1932), philosophical analysis of ordinary language may clarify human
thought by eliminating misleading and/or wrong linguistic forms. Philosophers should not
study meaning, but why certain combinations of expression make no sense. A special case
of such a senseless expression is the category mistake. Ryle (1949) claimed that concepts
belong to categories and that concepts from different categories should not be confused.
Philosophical confusion grows from category mistakes, misapplication of categorically
different terms. In his most famous book, The concept of mind (1949), Ryle exposed a
category mistake by dualists, who see the psychical and the physical as belonging to the
same category of substance.
Austin, an admirer of Moore, published very little during his lifetime. Austin was mainly
interested in ordinary language. His main concern was: what to say when. Austin was
convinced that (1) ordinary language contains all the distinctions people found necessary to
make; hence, ordinary language is a far more powerful and subtle tool than usually
recognised; (2) philosophers misuse language; and (3) philosophical progress is possible by
careful examination of the vocabulary in which a problem arose (Austin 1961, 1962).
Strawson (1959) asserted that the analysis and description of concepts should be
complemented by a more general metaphysical research program, that describes the most
fundamental characteristics of the conceptual system of ordinary language.
Wittgenstein's (1922) idea of definition as translation influenced Quine and through him
(a.o.) Sellars and Davidson. Quine's (1960) 'radical translation' is translation of concepts
without knowing the language to be translated. Radical translation, like first language
learning, can only − and therefore, must − be based on observed linguistic behaviour.
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Traditionally, concepts are seen as referring to extra-linguistic objects. However, Sellars
(1963) explains that the only way to explain a concept is to compare the role of that concept
in its language or conceptual framework with another, similar concept in a known language
(known to the interpreter). A concept is a linguistic classification that can only be explained
in or with the help of other linguistic classifications or sets of categories. All description,
explanation, or definition is linguistic. Concepts cannot be described extra-linguistically.
Hence, (1) concepts are not learned in isolation, but as part of a language; and (2) CA is
translation (Sellars 1963, see also Brown 1986). Sellars disputes 'the myth of the given':
there is no intrinsically basic language. Every language can be a 'first language'. As this
implies that there are as many possible 'first languages' as there are languages (in general),
there can be no absolute translation of concepts.
As concept analysis is translation, not reference, studying concepts or studying conceptual
systems (or frameworks or cultures) implies learning a second language (often abbreviated
as L2 learning). (Similar ideas have been expressed by (a.o.) Winch (1958) and Gadamer
(1960) (see § 2.2.2).) However, L1 (first language) concepts are extremely influential in the
interpretation of similar L2 concepts. 'When writing or speaking the target language (L2),
second language learners tend to rely on their native language (L1) structures to produce a
response' (Bhela 1999, p. 22). A L2-learner learns this language partly in terms of the
meanings already learned in L1 (Carroll 1964; Albert & Obler 1978 and Larson-Freeman &
Long 1991), and all L2 learners begin by assuming that for every word in L1 there is a
single translation equivalent in L2 (Blum-Kulka & Levenston 1983). In L2 practice this is
reflected in 'concept mediation', the (empirically confirmed) theory that there are no direct
links between L1 and L2, but that L2-speaker think of the word in own language, try to
specify its meaning (step 1: concept activation) and then try to find the appropriate word in
L2 for this meaning (step 2: word retrieval) (e.g. Kroll & Stewart 1994, la Heij et al. 1996,
de Groot & Poot 1997).
As was Sellars, Davidson was deeply influenced by Quine. He based his theory of 'radical
interpretation' (1973) on Quine's 'radical translation'. However, he contended that
translation is insufficient to understand a language. Radical interpretation is the
interpretation of linguistic behaviour of a speaker without knowing anything about his
language, beliefs, meanings, etc. The core problem of radical interpretation is that it is
impossible to understand the meaning of utterances, without understanding the speakers
language, beliefs, meanings, etc. and vice versa (see also Davidson 1967). The only way
out of this 'hermeneutic circle' (see § 2.2.2) is to assume that the speaker has the same
language, beliefs, meanings, etc. and slowly adapting this assumption to newly learned
ideas about the speakers actual same language, beliefs, meanings, etc. until some kind of
equilibrium is reached.
Davidson's radical interpretation is more or less contradicted by Jackendoff's (1991)
'conceptual semantics', which asserts that there is a conceptual structure, a form of mental
representation, 'that is common to all natural languages and that serves as the 'syntax of
thought'' (p. 10) and by Wierzbicka's (e.g. Goddard & Wierzbicka 1994; Wierzbicka 1997)
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claim that there are approximately 60 semantic primitives or lexical universals that are
common to all languages and to which all concepts can be reduced. Corson (1995), on the
other hand, even outpaces Davidson, claiming that languages are so different that
meaningful communication is more or less impossible.
To Quine's 'two dogmas', Davidson's added a 'third dogma of empiricism' (1974). This third
dogma entails the notion that conceptual and empirical knowledge cannot be distinguished
because we cannot distinguish the 'subjective' contribution to knowledge coming from
ourselves from the 'objective' contributions coming from the world. Attitudes, beliefs,
perceptions, etc. are causally, semantically and epistemically linked to objects and events in
the world, which makes is impossible to distinguish these 'objectively'.
By the 1970s, CA was extremely unfashionable in philosophy and linguists were primarily
dealing with syntax. CA, however, by this time spread to the social sciences and beyond
(see § 2.3). However, the philosophy of language remains one of the most important fields
within modern philosophy and some language philosophers still dare to do CA. Very
recently, for example, Jackson (1998) defends a modest role for CA:
Conceptual analysis is not being given a role in determining the fundamental nature of our
world; it is rather, being given a central role in determining what to say in less fundamental
terms given an account of the world stated in more fundamental terms. (p. 44)
2-2-2-concepts and meaning outside analytic philosophy
Language, concepts and meaning have been studied from a variety of perspectives. Within
philosophy, analytic philosophy hardly has a monopoly on language and outside philosophy
there is a whole scientific field studying language: linguistics. The most basic division of
the field of linguistics is that in syntax (or syntactics), semantics and pragmatics. Syntax
studies grammar; semantics focuses on meaning; and pragmatics is the study of the (actual)
use of language. A further, strongly related field is semiotics, the study of 'signs'. As
language is a specific use of specific symbols, linguistics may be considered part of
semiotics.
Modern semiotics was founded by Peirce and de Saussure, but was superseded by, for
example Plato, who wondered (in Kratylos) whether words have a natural or necessary
form that is linked to their meaning or are merely conventional signs, and by Aristotle and
Augustine. Peirce wanted to study signs and symbols from a philosophical perspective. De
Saussure was specifically interested in language as a system of signs. The central problem
of semiotics is the question regarding how one thing can mean another, how a sign x can
induce a person to think about y. Semiotics is an extremely broad field, as almost anything
can be interpreted as a sign. Peirce defined the concept of "sign" in a letter to Lady Welby
of December 1908: 'I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else,
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called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its
Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former' (in: Ogden &
Richards 1923, p. 288).
Of the before mentioned sub-fields of linguistics, semantics, as the study of meaning, is
closest to CA. Semantics, however, generally studies the nature of meaning on a deeper
level and is not so much concerned with actual (specific) concepts. Semantics is divided
into pure, applied and formal semantics. Pure semantics studies artificial (formal)
languages, while applied semantics studies sentences and words in natural languages.
Formal semantics is a formalized systematic approach in studying and describing the
object-language (the language studied). Within semantics a number of competing theories
have been developed. Conceptual Role Semantics (often abbreviated as CRS), for example,
asserts that the meaning of a concept is the role of that concept in the perception, thought
and decision-making-processes of the user of the concept. Possible World Semantics
(PWS) assumes that meaning is related to functions from possible worlds to individuals.
Situation Semantics claims that concepts and propositions refer to states of affairs.
The most important current, apart from analytic philosophy, that dealt with language is
probably hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is a tradition of textual interpretation that started
when Protestants had to interpret the Bible themselves (rather than uncritically following a
priest). Schleiermacher founded modern hermeneutics in the early 19th century. His goal
was to understand a text as well as the author(s) did. One of the core ideas of hermeneutics
is the 'hermeneutic circle' (compare Davidson in the preceding subsection). The
hermeneutic circle is the phenomenon that to understand part of a text it is necessary to
understand the whole and vice versa. Dilthey enlarged the original subject of hermeneutics
(the Bible) considerably when he set out to study the whole of culture. Other important
adherents to hermeneutics include Heidegger and Gadamer. According to Gadamer (1960)
all meaning is context-dependent. Understanding is not just a relation between object and
(knowing) subject but also between 'horizons', conceptual and cultural frames of reference.
As it is impossible to step outside one's horizon, understanding implies the integration of a
strange horizon with one's own (compare Davidson in the preceding subsection).
Winch, a student of Wittgenstein, combined (possibly unconsciously) the later Wittgenstein
and hermeneutics in a kind of 'analytic hermeneutics'. Winch himself influenced (a.o.)
Habermas. In particular Wittgenstein's idea of concepts as rules influenced Winch deeply.
The identification of concepts demands the recognition of the regularities of human
behaviour and interaction. These regularities are the result of rule-following instead of
laws. Rules themselves are laid down in concepts and meanings. 'For Winch the social is
the meaningful and the meaningful is the rule-governed' (Lyas 1999, pp. 28-29). In Winch's
opinion (1958; 1964), the core of social science is the determination of the nature of social
phenomena, which is (also) the terrain of philosophy. Studying social phenomena, studying
other cultures especially, implies studying the meaning of these phenomena within those
cultures, studying the concepts constituting that culture. 'Instead of viewing concepts as
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theories which explain actions, Winch asks us to treat them as constituting the terms within
which people carry on their lives. (…) understanding a way of life and understanding a set
of concepts are one and the same thing' (Sharrock & Anderson 1985, p. 121). Or in the
words of Winch himself:
What we may learn by studying other cultures are not merely possibilities of different ways
of doing things, other techniques. More importantly we may learn different possibilities of
making sense of human life, different ideas about the possible importance that the carrying
out of certain activities may take on for a man, trying to contemplate the sense of his life as
a whole. (Winch 1964, p. 321)
Winch (1964) distinguishes a small number of basic problems or 'limiting concepts' which
every society has to deal with.
I have wanted to indicate that forms of these limiting concepts will necessarily be an
important feature of any human society and that conceptions of good and evil in human life
will necessarily be connected with such concepts. In any attempt to understand the life of
another society, therefore, an investigation of the forms taken by such concepts − their role
in the life of the society − must always take a central place and provide a basis on which
understanding may be built. (p. 324)
Almost a century before Winch, a completely different philosophical current dealt with
concepts and meaning as well. Peirce, one of the before mentioned founders of semiotics,
was also the founding father of the philosophical movement of pragmatism. The pragmatist
James (e.g. 1907) took as his starting point the idea that it is impossible to determine the
nature of philosophical and psychological terms. It is not very useful to try to define
concepts such as "truth" or "consciousness", rather we should show how these concepts are
actually used. This is the essence of pragmatism. Its goal is to clean up the philosophical
vocabulary. Peirce himself corresponded from 1903 onwards with Lady Welby, who
introduced significs. Welby introduced Richards and Ogden to Peirce's work, which
resulted in their book The meaning of meaning (1923), which was most influential half a
century later in CA in social and political science (see § 2.3). Ogden later translated
Wittgenstein, and Welby also corresponded with Russell, which illustrates an interesting
web connecting (ultimately) almost everyone mentioned in this chapter.
Significs was intended as the scientific study of acts of communication. Welby's main goal
seemed to have been the improvement of communication by ending misunderstandings.
The starting point for the movement of significs was Welby's trichotomy: sense, meaning,
significance (e.g. Welby 1896). Sense is the initial, unanalysed, effect of a sign on the
mind; meaning is the effect in the mind of the interpreter intended by the producer of the
sign; and significance is the full effect a sign possibly would have in any mind. Based on
this trichotomy and strongly related to Frege's distinction of Sense and Bedeutung (see
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above), Ogden and Richards (1923) proposed a trichotomy of symbol, thought and referent
(see figure 2.1). (Sowa (2000, p. 192), however, claims that Aristotle (in on Interpretation)
was the first to make this distinction.) Thought and symbol are causally related, as are
thought and referent, Ogden and Richards claimed. But, 'between the symbol and the
referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one' (p. 11).
As mentioned above, Ogden & Richards would have considerable influence half a century
later, but significs did not end with them. The movement of significs gained some strength
in the Netherlands, where it gave birth to Signific Concept Analysis (SCA). Its most
important Dutch followers were mathematician Brouwer, Mannoury and the methodologist
de Groot. However, with a notable exception of de Groot's work in SCA, significs was dead
by the 1960s (e.g. Schmitz 1991).
figure 2.1: Ogden & Richard's meaning triangle
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(figure adapted from Ogden & Richards 1923, p. 11)
While Welby despised definitions, SCA is based on definition. The term "Signific Concept
Analysis" was coined by Mannoury (Visser 1999), but its theoretical content was mainly
the product of de Groot (e.g. de Groot & Medendorp 1986; 1988). De Groot and
Medendorp specified eight rules for SCA. The first states that only nouns (or nominalisible
verbs or adjectives) can be subjects of SCA; the fourth demands consultation of dictionaries
and specific (for that concept) conceptual analyses already published; the fifth advises
dealing with the historical or etymological roots of words; the seventh warns about
metaphors; and the eighth advises consideration of the relevance of context. In explaining
these rules, de Groot and Medendorp state that 'The attainment of the ultimate goal –
consensus of experts of different orientations – is furthered best by designing primarily a
mantle definition in which particular conceptions can be encompassed as special cases'
(1988, p. 261).
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Besides hermeneutics, pragmatics and significs, there have been some more or less isolated
figures in the recent history of philosophy who dealt in some way with CA. Most them had
very little (or maybe even none whatsoever) influence on the main currents of CA and
philosophy of language. Fries and Nelson, for example, practised a kind of CA in a Kantian
tradition (e.g. Yolton 1961). Fries and Nelson believed that 'concept analysis' is more than
just lexicography or specifying definitions because (1) it uncovers implicit or hidden
presuppositions and meanings (which may differ from the intended meaning); and (2) it
does not analyse meaning, but (an ideal) meaning is offered through analysis. Lovejoy and
Foucault were more interested in the historical context of concepts (see also § 2.4.1).
Lovejoy (1948) regarded himself some kind of physician of philosophy. He set out to
reduce ideologies, systems, and -isms to their fundamental particles. Foucault (e.g. 1966)
most strongly emphasised the historical context of concepts. Based on (a.o.) Foucault, A.
Davidson (not D. Davidson dealt with above) claims that the nature of (some) philosophical
problems is determined by the historical conditions of their genesis. 'We will not fully
understand the concepts used in the dialectic of philosophical argumentation unless we
practice a certain form of historical analysis' (Davidson 1984, p. 107).
2-2-3-meaning, definition and reference
The preceding subsections briefly reviewed the historical development of types and variants
of conceptual analysis. The focus was more on the development and currents than on the
concepts, theories and techniques of CA, however. This subsection is intended to fill the
gap and deals with notions such as "meaning", "definition", and "reference".
Meaning is probably central to CA. However, the concept and nature of "meaning", like the
concept of "concept" itself (see § 2.1.2) is highly contested. Several competing theories of
meaning exist. Meaning as truth is the theory of meaning of classical analytic philosophy.
The basic idea, introduced by Frege (1884), is that the meaning of a declarative sentence
can be given by specifying its truth-conditions. A serious drawback is that there are
infinitely many truth-conditions: "p" is true if at least p is the case, but also if p∧q is the
case, whatever is q. Grice (1957) contended that meaning is intention. The meaning of an
utterance is the intention of the utterer. According to Wittgenstein the meaning of a concept
is the rule for its use. Dummett and Davidson claim that meaning is understanding. And the
verification theory of meaning asserts that meaning is proof.
Next to theories about what concepts mean, there are theories about what concepts refer to.
Possible candidates are extensions (e.g. Goodman 1951/66; Quine 1960); intensions (e.g.
Montague 1974); a combination thereof (e.g. Carnap 1946); and common properties (e.g.
Dretske 1981, Millikan 1984, Fodor 1990). The extension - intension dichotomy is related
to Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung and to Ogden and Richards symbol and referent, but these
distinctions are far from identical. The extension of a concept is the set of instantiations of
that concept, the set of 'things' to which the concept applies. Formally, an intension is a
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function that maps a possible world to the extension of the concept in that world. Intensions
are often interpreted as sets of properties a 'thing' must have to belong to the extension of
that concept (e.g. Sartori 1984b), hence, to be an instantiation of that concept. In this
interpretation, the before mentioned second and fourth candidate for reference coincide.
According to Quine (1951), there are no intensions. Intensions are nothing but
psychological entities intervening between language and reference. There is no place for
intensions in a purely scientific or logical approach to meaning and semantics. Quine's
position is rather problematic when non-extensional concepts are concerned, although
Quine would probably not allow non-extensional abstract concepts in scientific language.
That, however, would make (social) science (as we know it) impossible as the social and
political sciences are packed with non-extensional concepts (e.g. Sartori 1984b; Gerstlé
1989). Concepts such as "culture", "society" or "democracy" have no extensions. Dutch
culture is not a member of the extension of "culture" but of the different concept of "a
culture". And: 'a culture is no mere subset of culture, but a different order of abstraction
entirely' (Bohannan 1973, p. 358). Similarly, American democracy (if existing) is not a
member of the extension of "democracy", but of "a democracy". The concepts "culture" and
"democracy" do not refer to actual cultural groups or democratic states, but to bodies of
ideas and theories. Claiming that Dutch culture and American democracy are members of
the extensions of "culture" and "democracy" respectively is very much like claiming that
five centimetres is a member of the extension of "length". The relationship between Dutch
culture and "culture" is more or less like that between five centimetres and "length": the
first is a specific value of the latter, not an instantiation. (On quantitative concepts see also
Hempel 1952.)
Ideas about concepts, meaning and reference are integrated in a number of theories.
Laurence and Margolis (1999) distinguish five of these theories, but more can be
distinguished.
The Classical Theory of Concepts (CTC) was probably first introduced by Locke (1690). It
holds that concepts are 'structured mental representations that encode a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for their application, if possible, in sensory or perceptual terms'
(Laurence & Margolis 1999, p. 10). Complex concepts can be analysed into less complex
concepts and finally be reduced to sensory data and logic. CTC presupposes that our
'intuitive categorization judgments will correspond precisely with simple clusters of
properties' (Ramsey 1992, p. 61) and that  'we have tacit knowledge of the 'essence' of
abstract concepts, that the essence is a small set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and
that we can uncover this knowledge by appealing to our intuitive categorization judgments'
(Ramsey 1992, p. 62).
Several objections to CTC have been put forward. First of all, there are hardly any
uncontroversial definitions. 'Definitions have proven exceptionally difficult to come by,
especially if they have to be couched in perceptual or sensory terms in accordance with
empiricist strictures' (Laurence & Margolis 1999, p. 14). Other objections are related to the
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problem of analyticity (see § 2.2.1), conceptual fuzziness, and the fact that we can have and
use concepts without being able to specify their definitions.
The Neo-classical Theory of Concepts (NTC) assumes that concepts have partial definitions
only. The partial definitions specify the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for their
application. 'Concepts may have a definition after all, or at least a partial definition; it's just
that the definition involves tacit rules that are extremely difficult to articulate' (Laurence &
Margolis 1999, p. 54).
The first real alternative to CTC was the Prototype Theory of Concepts (PTC). PTC was
based on Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of family resemblances (e.g. Medin & Smith 1985).
He developed this idea in trying to explain the meaning of the concept of 'game'. According
to Wittgenstein 'der Begriff "Spiel" ist ein Begriff mit verschommenen Rändern' (§ 71).
Instantiations of a family resemblance have some properties of a set of prototypical
properties, but not necessarily all of them.  PTC is affirmed by Millikan's (1998) conclusion
that extensions of concepts are not determined by their description, but that small children
develop concepts as referents pointing at unique natural objects. Moreover, PTC underwent
extensive empirical testing. Rosch (1973) and Smith and Medin (1981) found that people
need more time to think about the appropriateness of a concept, for classification of an
object, for cases that are further away from the prototype. Rosch (1973) and Rosch and
Mervis (1975) found that people are able to rank cases in order of typicality regarding the
appropriateness of specific concept. Barsalou (1987), however, found that these 'typicality
rankings' are significantly different between different people and change over time rather
quickly (sometimes even within a single month).
PTC does not solve all the problems related to CTC. It is, moreover, not very useful for
theories of CA: 'The fact that people are quicker to say that robins rather than penguins are
birds may tell us something about people's representations of [bird], but nothing about the
definition of the concept [bird] itself, that is, what is in fact required to satisfy that concept
(…)' (Rey 1998, p. 513). (see also Ramsey 1992)
From the empirical research in PTC, the Exemplar Theory (ETC) developed. Unlike PTC
that claims that concepts refer to single prototypes, ETC assumes that concepts refer to all
known cases.
A number of mixed theories, Dual Theories of Concepts (DTCs), have been proposed.
Some are combinations of CTC and PTC, others combine other theories (such as PTC and
the Theory Theory of Concepts (TTC); see below). An example of a DTC as a combination
of CTC and PTC can be found in the work of Pinker and Prince (1999), who found that
prototype and classical models of concepts are complementary. They concluded this after
researching English verbs. What they found was that regular verbs are classical, while
irregular verbs are prototype concepts.
The Theory Theory of Concepts (TTC) assumes that 'a concept's identity is assumed by its
role within a theory' (Laurence & Margolis 1999, p. 45) and that the meaning of a concept
(or scientific term) is dependent on the successive theories in which it is used (e.g. Bartels
1994). The idea is related to Quine's (1951) 'confirmation holism' and to Popper's (1935)
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and Wittgenstein's (1953) idea of the 'theory-ladenness' of concepts. Concepts are regarded
as theoretical terms and changes in concepts are interpreted as and compared to changes in
theories. Like all the other theories above (and the one below), TTC does not explain how
people are able to have and use a concept without being able to define it. Another problem
is that people with completely different convictions and worldviews still may share some
(or even many) concepts, which would be impossible (or extremely unlikely at least) if
concepts derive their meaning from the broader framework they are part of.
Conceptual Atomism (ATC), finally, assumes that concepts are primitive. It seems,
however, rather absurd to assume that the concept of "disk drive" is innate. Moreover, if
concepts are innate, many of the psychological effects described above cannot be
explained.
Besides the rather theoretical or philosophical questions regarding meaning, reference and
the concept of "concept", philosophers dealt with the concept and idea of "definition". The
idea of "definition" itself is strongly related to CTC (see above). Definitions are
explanations of the meaning of a word. Several types of definitions can be distinguished:
(1) a stipulative definition is a proposal about the use of a word (a stipulative definition,
therefore, cannot be wrong, but it can be unpractical); (2) a lexical definition is a report on
the actual use of the word in a specific group; (3) a precising definition is an attempt to
reduce vagueness; (4) a theoretical definition is a proposal about the understanding of the
meaning of a word in a specific theoretical context; (5) a persuasive definition is an effort
to influence attitudes by attaching emotive contents to the meaning of a word; (6) an
operational definition is a mix of a stipulative and a theoretical definition in the context of a
specific scientific problem; (7) a contextual definition is a definition of a concept by its
function in a specific context (it is, for example, rather difficult to define "the" otherwise
than contextually; e.g. Whitehead & Russell 1910-3).
Philosophers disagree about what it means to define. Whitehead and Russell (1910-3)
regarded definitions as 'mere typographical conventions' (p. 11). Nevertheless Whitehead
and Russell did not think definitions are trivial. Definitions (1) show that the defined
concept is important within a specific theoretical framework; and (2) can be used to analyse
previously unclear concepts. To Carnap (1947) definitions are rational reconstructions of
imprecise concepts; definitions are used to explain and clarify. Quine (1951), on the other
hand, claims that definition is based on synonymy rather than explication. Etymologically,
"to define" means "to delimit". 'Thus definitions serve to fix boundaries' (Suppe 2000, p.
76). Although philosophers disagree on what exactly it means to define, most of them agree
that defining is notoriously difficult. Bohnert (1963), for example, writes that 'we must not
assume that just because we use a word successfully we have some neat, fixed mental
something that corresponds to it and that we merely need to sit down and analyze to arrive
at a full definition' (p. 430).
Different philosophers specify different criteria for definitions, sometimes depending on the
context. Ramsey (1992), for example, contends that definitions in CA should be relatively
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simple and must not admit intuitive counterexamples. Generally it is required for
definitions that the definiendum (what has to be defined) has (exactly) the same meaning as
the definiens (the equivalent of the definiendum supplied in the definition; the text of the
definition). Carnap (1947) disagrees: 'some sort of correspondence between the two
concepts, in such a way that the latter can be used instead of the former' (p. 8) is sufficient.
What most philosophers agree about is that definitions should be non-informative. That is,
definitions may not give new information (e.g. Whitehead & Russell 1910-3). Definitions
must satisfy two criteria: (1) eliminability and (2) non-creativity (Leśniewski 1931; Suppes
1957). These criteria demand that new symbols or meanings introduced by definitions do
not result in new theories and can be eliminated without any theoretical consequences.
(Formal definitions of eliminability and non-creativity are specified in box 2.1 at the end of
this subsection.)
An additional criterion for (useful) definitions can be derived from Quine's (1968)
'ontological relativity':
What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality,
but circularity. A question of the form 'What is an F?' can be answered only by recourse to a
further term: 'An F is a G'. The answer makes only relative sense: sense relative to an
uncritical acceptance of 'G'. (p. 204)
In other words, and applied to definitions, a definition is meaningless if its definiens uses
terms that are as vague or ambiguous as the definiendum.
Sometimes definitional analysis is confused with logical implication. Carnap (1946; 1947;
see also Linsky 1949) used the concept of "intensional isomorphy" (or "intensional
isomorphism") to explain the difference. He claimed that the statement A=def.B (definitional
identity of predicates) is not intensionally isomorphic to ∀x[Ax↔Bx]. Statements are
intensionally isomorphic iff the relations between and the intensions of the concepts in both
statements are the same. This is not the case here due to the fact that the syntactic structure
of both statements differs and there is, for example, no x in the first statement. The
relationship between the definitional analysis "A=def.B" and the logical biconditional
"∀x[Ax↔Bx]" is not a relationship of identity; it is a conditional of the following form:
T2.1 (A =def. B) →  ∀x [Ax ↔ Bx]  .
Note that the relationship is a conditional. Why it is not a biconditional, is easily illustrated
with an example. Let A mean "equilateral triangle" and B mean "equiangular triangle". We
now have a situation wherein ∀x[Ax↔Bx] is true (in Euclidean space) while A=def.B is
not. The relationship, however, is a biconditional if necessarily (symbolised by )
∀x[Ax↔Bx]:
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T2.2 (A =def. B) ↔ ∀x [Ax ↔ Bx]  ,
provided that necessity is interpreted as "in all possible worlds". As there are non-Euclidean
spaces conceivable in which an equiangular triangle is not equilateral (or the other way
around) both A=def.B and ∀x[Ax↔Bx] are false.
box 2.1: formal definitions of eliminability and non-creativity
2-2-4-summary and conclusions
Conceptual analysis (CA) in philosophy is over two millennia old. Nevertheless, its main
theoretical development, its blossoming and its going out of fashion all took place in the
20th century. Starting with Moore, analytic philosophers claimed that philosophical (and
many scientific) problems are the consequences of how we use language. Philosophy,
therefore, should analyse language primarily. The initial ('classical') approaches to concepts
and CA in analytic philosophy were, in following decades, refuted by psychological
research (§ 2.2.3) and philosophical analysis itself (§ 2.2.1). Philosophers and linguists
became increasingly aware of the complexities of concepts and conceptual analysis. During
the 20th century, analytic philosophy was not the only field interested in concepts and CA.
Several other disciplines and philosophical currents dealt with concepts and meaning,
including semiotics and semantics, heuristics, and significs (§ 2.2.2).
One of the most basic ideas that seems to be present in all (or most, at least) of the theories
and philosophies described above − although the terms or labels used vary among
philosophers and theories − is that concepts d are associated to triplets of term u, meaning
n and referent s: *u,n,s+. One could, however, argue that the referent itself is not
part of the concept, and that a concept is an ordered couple of term u and meaning n and
has a referent s, which could result in a first definition of concepts:
There is a theory T and a definition D containing a new symbol ("new" here meaning
"not yet in T "). Then:
definition D satisfies the principle of eliminability iff:
∀p [ (T  p ∧ JVUZ`T(D,p) → ∃q [ T  q ∧ ¬JVUZ`T(D,q) ∧ (T ∪ D)  (p↔q) ] ]  ,
in which p and q are propositions and "JVUZ`T(D,p)" means "p contains the new symbol
used in D ". And similarly:
definition D satisfies the principle of non-creativity iff:
∀p [ ( ¬JVUZ`T(D,p) ∧ T  (D→p) ) → T  p ]  .
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D2.1* d =def. *u,n+  .
This definition will be the starting point for an attempt to construct a general model of
concepts based on the literature reviewed in this chapter and intended to provide a
theoretical foundation for a methodology of conceptual analysis in social science. Section
2.7 presents this model and the associated methodology.
Of the two elements of D2.1*, only meaning n seems to be problematic. Especially
subsection 2.2.3 dealt with different theories about meaning and how to determine it. As
meaning, in many theories, is the intermediate between term u and referent s, theories
about reference codetermine theories of meaning and vice versa. A number of theories on
concepts, meaning and reference were described in subsection 2.2.3. The most important
were the classical theory (CTC) and the prototype theory (PTC). The first assumes that
concepts can be neatly defined by a (relatively small) set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. In practice this, however, has proven to be very difficult. The prototype theory,
on the other hand, claims that only partial definitions are possible and that these partial
definitions refer to sets of necessary conditions, of which only a subset must be fulfilled for
the correct application of the concept. Both CTC and PTC and the other concept theories
mentioned, however, come with a number of other theoretical problems yet unsolved.
Nevertheless, whatever concept theory chosen, D2.1* still holds. It is only in determining
the nature of n that these theories matter (see § 2.7.1).
A number of philosophers, including, for example, Wittgenstein, Winch and Gadamer,
pointed at the importance of the (linguistic) context of concepts. According to Wittgenstein
the meaning of a concept is the rule for its use within a language-game. Gadamer asserted
that the meaning of concepts as parts of text is determined by the linguistic context, the
conceptual framework, of the author. Hence, besides to referents s, concepts are also
somehow related to linguistic context p (language-game, conceptual framework, etc.).
Slowly, the picture becomes more complicated. Most of the theories dealt with in this
subsection, however, have something in common: they are based on a very abstract concept
of "concept" and deal only with relatively simple concepts, such as natural kinds.
Nevertheless, even these seem to defy analysis or definition.
Arguably, the world does not supply determinate answers: all kinds in the world may have
vague boundaries, any precise delimitation of which may depend on human decision. But
this does not imply that all applications of concepts are up to human decision, much less
that there are no defining essences of the phenomena they pick out. (Rey 1998, p. 508)
The following sections deal with gradually increasingly more complex concepts. Section
2.3 and 2.4 focus (a.o.) on scientific and political concepts. Section 2.5 and 2.6 deal with
concepts in context.
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2-3-applied conceptual analysis
Concept theories and conceptual analysis (CA) in philosophy and psychology almost
exclusively deal with relatively simple ordinary language concepts. The concepts that most
need analysis in most scientific fields, however, are very complex and in many other respects
very different from ordinary language concepts. Scientific terminology is a kind of semi-
formal language to which the theories of ordinary language do not necessarily apply.
Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of meaning as use, for example, is discarded by Sartori (1984b)
on the grounds that the meaning of scientific terms and concepts is not determined by their
actual use, but by what the concept was intended to mean at its introduction. Similarly, Sartori
(1984a) puts aside Quine's (1951) suggestion that the unit of empirical significance is a theory
(or even science) as a whole, as 'outrageously unhelpful advice' (p. 9).
Since the 1970s, forms and variants of CA have been applied in a number of fields. The
application in different fields can be nicely illustrated by classifying all articles published in
international scientific journals in the period 1980 - 2003 (and registered in the Online
Contents database; see www.oclcpica.org), having in their title one of the following
phrases: "conceptual analysis", "concept analysis" or "analysis of the concept", by scientific
field. (An alternative, more theoretical oriented, and not quantified, classification can be
found in Pathak 2000; see also §2.1.2.) The results of this classification are represented in
table 2.1:
table 2.1: percentage of articles on / in conceptual analysis by scientific field
philosophy and (philosophical) linguistics 5.5 %
nursing and medicine 37.1 %
  , nursing 35.0 %
  , medicine 2.1 %
social, political and behavioural sciences 24.8 %
  , political science 7.1 %
  , social sciences 7.9 %
  , psychology 9.8 %
computer and information science 18.3 %
  , Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) 11.0 %
  , other / unspecified 7.3 %
education 7.7 %
natural sciences 3.5 %
arts 3.2 %
total 100 %
The table shows that the bulk of articles on or in CA came from a relatively small number
of fields. Nursing is by far the most active field in CA. When only articles applying CA to
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specific concepts are counted, the share of nursing even rises to 47%. Interestingly, CA in
nursing and education share a common background in the work of Wilson (1963). CA in
nursing will be dealt with in subsection 2.3.2 (the relatively small field of CA in education
is ignored here; see Frein 1998 for an overview). In the 1970s concern about the rather
ambiguous terms and concepts in the social and political sciences grew. This resulted in
(a.o.) a Unesco report (Riggs 1981) and a number of related research projects on
terminology, international classification, knowledge organisation, and concepts in the social
and political sciences themselves. Subsection 2.3.1 gives a brief overview of CA in these
fields. The third 'major player' in CA is computer and information science. Most of the
articles on CA published in this field are about Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), a
mathematical technique used to map conceptual structures. FCA and most of the remainder
of CA in computer and information science is related to fields such as knowledge
representation and artificial intelligence. The goal of these types of CA, if that is what they
are, usually is the summary and representation of a set of concepts and related knowledge
in a specific field in a rigorous and formal structure. As these techniques do not focus on
single concepts but on conceptual structures, they are dealt with in subsection 2.6.2.
However, some publications from these and other fields do also deal with single concepts
and present formal methods of CA. Subsection 2.3.3 deals with the most important formal
tools suggested to be applicable in CA.
CA in other fields is relatively rare and will be mostly ignored here. An example of CA in
the arts is Galle's (1999) analysis of 'design as intentional action'. CA in the natural sciences
is often related to taxonomy or classification of natural objects (such as (the boundary
between) hills and mountains; e.g. Smith & Mark 1999; Varzi 2001).
2-3-1- terminology and CA in social and political science
CA and terminology research in social and political science arose in the 1970s as a reaction
to the increasing conceptual confusion caused by the continuous introduction of new terms
and new meanings for existing terms. As Dahlberg (1978) puts it: 'the almost exclusive
reliance by social scientists on the use of terms derived from ordinary language usages
results in an extreme proliferation of the meanings in which the most commonly used
words are employed, thus producing a polysemantic jumble which appears to defy all
normalizing efforts' (p. 142). Hence, 'concept reconstruction is a highly needed therapy for
the current state of chaos of most social sciences' (Sartori 1984b, p. 50).
In 1970 Riggs and Sartori founded the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological
Analysis (COCTA), which is a part of both the International Political Science Association
(IPSA) and the International Sociological Association (ISA). Discussions within COCTA
resulted (a.o.) in the before mentioned Unesco report: Interconcept report (Riggs 1981) and
in Social science concepts: a systematic analysis, edited by Sartori (1984). Besides Cocta
and Interconcept / Unesco, the International Standards Organisation, Technical Committee
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No. 37 (ISO/TC37) had been working since the end of the 1960s on a number of standards
in terminology research. These are ISO 860, a proposed methodology for dealing with
differences and development of concepts and terms, published first in 1968; ISO 704 on the
establishment of conceptual systems, published first in 1987; ISO 1087, which applies ISO
704 to its own field, hence, presents an official vocabulary for terminology research,
published first in 1990; and ISO 10241 on international terminological standards, published
first in 1992. (For an overview of the history and contents of these standards see
Effenberger 1995.)
The Interconcept project was started by Unesco in 1977 as an answer to a perceived
'fundamental need' for the social sciences: a 'term bank'. Interconcept (Riggs 1981)
specifies guidelines for creating glossaries rather than for CA of individual terms.
Interconcept glossaries have to satisfy a number of criteria. Its introduction, for example
and not very surprisingly, should state the logic and method used, if different from the
before mentioned ISO standards. The main text of an Interconcept glossary consists of
'records'. A record provides information about a concept, mainly about its notation and
definition.
Terminology research and CA in social and political science are heavily influenced by
Ogden and Richard's the meaning of meaning (1923) (see § 2.2.2). Ogden and Richard's
meaning triangle of symbol, thought and referent (figure 2.1) was transformed by Sartori
(1984b, p. 23) into figure 2.2 (left), which Sartori regarded the most usable starting point
for CA.
figure 2.2: Sartori's (left) and Dahlberg's (right) meaning triangle
(figures adapted from Sartori 1984b, p. 23 and Dahlberg 1978, p. 144)
This figure suggested to Sartori his two basic questions: (1) how do meanings relate to
words and (2) how do meanings relate to referents. To Sartori, meaning, intension or
connotation of a term or concept 'consists of all the characteristics or properties of that term'
and 'referents are the real-world counterparts (if existent) of the world in our head' (p. 24).
Like Ogden and Richards, Sartori did not recognise a direct link between term and referent.
However, Sartori's triangle was further developed by (a.o.) Dahlberg (1978), who did
referent
designation
denotation
predication
referent
(object)
term
(word)
meaning
verbal form
characteristics
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include a direct link between term (verbal form) and referent (see figure 2.2 − right), and
was formalised by Kuznetsov (1999).
Sartori (1984b) distinguished a number of problems in CA in social and political science.
The most important are (1) vagueness, fuzziness and ambiguity; (2) homonyms and
synonyms; and (3) opacity, the phenomenon that some social science terms are non-
extensional (see also Gerstlé 1989 and § 2.2.3). Sartori illustrates some of these problems in
a number of Venn-Euler diagrams, here presented in figure 2.3:
figure 2.3: definitions as intensional Venn-Euler diagrams
(figure adapted from Sartori 1984b, p. 47)
In these figures, the circles represent sets of characteristics of (all) known cases to which
the term of concept is applied. In cases a and b, there is a common centre, although in b not
all cases overlap with this common centre. It is not very difficult to come up with a
definition in case a, but this becomes more difficult in case b. Cases c and d are far more
complicated. There is no common centre whatsoever in cases c and d, but at least in c there
is some overlap, enabling some kind of prototype-definition. Definition in case d is
completely impossible (except when you allow disjunctive definitions). In case d it
probably is better to speak of different concepts with the same term or label. Hence d is a
case of homonymy.
To deal with the difficulties regarding CA in social and political science, Sartori (1948b)
suggested a number of rules that became more or less paradigmatic:
Rule 1: Of any empirical concept always, and separately check (1) whether it is ambiguous, that
is, how the meaning relates to the term; and (2) whether it is vague, that is, how the meaning
relates to the referent. (p. 28/63)
Rule 2a: Always check (1) whether the key terms (the designator of the concept and the entailed
terms) are defined; (2) whether the meaning declared by their definition is unambiguous; and
(3) whether the declared meaning remains, throughout the argument, unchanged (i.e.,
consistent). (p. 36/63)
(a) (d)(c)(b)
r
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Rule 2b: Always check whether the key terms are used univocally and consistently in the declared
meaning. (p. 36/63)
Rule 3a: Awaiting contrary proof, no word should be used as a synonym for another word. (p.
39/63)
Rule 3b: With respect to stipulating synonymies, the burden of proof is reversed: What requires
demonstration is that by attributing different meanings to different words we create a
distinction of no consequence. (p. 39/64)
Rule 4: In reconstructing a concept, first collect a representative set of definitions; second, extract
their characteristics; and third, construct matrixes that organize such characteristics
meaningfully. (p. 41/64)
Rule 5: With respect to the extension of a concept, always assess (1) its degree of boundlessness,
and (2) its degree of denotative discrimination vis-à-vis its membership. (p. 43/64)
Rule 6: The boundlessness of a concept is remedied by increasing the number of its properties;
and its discriminating adequacy is improved as additional properties are entered. (p. 43/64)
Rule 7: The connotation and the denotation of a concept are inversely related. (44/64)
Rule 8: In selecting the term that designates the concept, always relate to and control with the
semantic field (to which the term belongs) – that is, the set of associated, neighboring words.
(p. 52/64)
Rule 9: If the term that designates the concept unsettles the semantic field (to which the term
belongs), then justify your selection by showing that (1) no field meaning is lost, and that (2)
ambiguity is not increased by being transferred into the rest of the field set. (p. 53/64)
Rule 10: Make sure that the definiens of a concept is adequate and parsimonious: adequate in that
it contains enough characteristics to identify the referents and their boundaries; parsimonious
in that no accompanying property is included among the necessary, defining properties. (p.
56/64)
2-3-2-CA in nursing
It may come as a surprise that nursing is most prolific in CA. This may, however, be related
to the importance of (a.o. diagnostic) concepts and communication of these concepts in
nursing. In the transference of information on the condition of patients, it is essential that
those taking part in communication have the same, or at least similar (definitions of)
concepts.
CA in nursing is firmly based on Wilson (1963). Wilson was a philosopher of education,
who was strongly influenced by analytic philosophy, especially by ordinary language
philosophy. Morse (1995) distinguishes four CA methodologies in nursing and adds a fifth
based on Bolton (1977). Hers is the only explicitly non-Wilsonian method. The
paradigmatic CA methodologies in nursing, however, are Walker and Avant's (1983) and
Rodgers's (1993) evolutionary adaptation thereof. Walker and Avant summarise Wilson's
eleven-step method of CA in eight steps:
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1. Select a concept.
2. Determine the aims or purposes of analysis.
3. Identify all uses of the concept that you can discover.
4. Determine the defining attributes.
5. Construct a model case.
6. Construct borderline, related, contrary, invented, and illegitimate cases.
7. Identify antecedents and consequences.
8. Define empirical referents. (p. 39)
The goal of Walker-and-Avant-style CA is a prototypical model case. Rodgers (1993)
suggested an evolutionary approach of concept development that also deals to some extent
with context. Its goal, however, is the same: a prototypical model case. Morse (1995)
argues that these Wilsonian methods are based on too simple concept theories. CAs of
nursing concepts based on either Walker and Avant (1983) or on Rodgers (1993) pay
insufficient attention to conceptual complexity and context, which results in obvious results
and little practical value. Morse suggests a three-step method of concept development: (1)
identification of attributes (based on an exemplar); (2) verification of attributes (with the
help of Bolton's (1977) 'rules of relation'); and (3) identification of instantiations of the
concept.
Although a number of nursing scientists criticised the Wilsonian approaches (e.g. Wuest
1994; Morse 1995; Hupcey et al. 1996; Morse et al. 1996), a quick glance over the methods
used in recent CA applications in nursing, still shows that Walker and Avant (1983) and, to
a lesser extent, Rodgers (1993) dominate the field.
2-3-3-formal methods of / in CA
Formal methods of CA (in a very broad sense) have been developed in early 20th century
philosophy and are still being developed in sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence and
computer science, such as knowledge engineering and conceptual modelling. The most
important tools are variants or adaptations of symbolic logic, especially first-order logic
(FOL). Symbolic logic and set-theory (which is basically FOL plus the ∈-symbol) are
among the oldest tools of conceptual analysis. Mathematical concepts were analysed
logically by Frege (1884) and Whitehead and Russell (1910-3). More recently, formal
ontology (e.g. Smith & Künne (eds.) 1982; Smith & Mulligan 1983), which was inspired by
Husserl (1900-1), and analytical metaphysics (e.g. Bunge 1977) have applied symbolic
logic (FOL mainly) in conceptual elucidation.
Conceptual Graphs (CG) were introduced by Sowa (1984) as an alternative system of logic
based on the existential graphs of Peirce (1909/33). (For a relatively short introduction, see
Sowa 1992; on the relationship between CG and FOL see e.g. Wermelinger 1995; Amati &
Ounis 2000.) CG is intended to elucidate conceptual structures: sets of interrelated
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concepts. The purpose of CG 'is to express meaning in a form that is logically precise,
humanly readable, and computationally tractable' (Sowa 1992, p. 3). However, CG is also
applicable in definitional analysis. A third formalisation technique in CA is description
logic (DL) (e.g. Brachman & Levesque 1984; Donini et al. 1991; Bettini 1997).
To illustrate (the differences between) CG, FOL and DL, consider the following example: a
garden can be defined (incompletely!) as a cultivated parcel of land. This can be formalised
in FOL, CG and DL as:
D2.2FOL ∀x [ garden(x) ↔ ( parcel-of-land(x) ∧ cultivated(x) ) ]
D2.2CG (λx) [GARDEN: x] = [CULTIVATED] ← (STAT) ← [PARCEL-OF-LAND: x]
D2.2DL garden := parcel-of-land ' ∃ state.cultivated
The main difference between CG and DL, on the one hand, and FOL, on the other, is that in
FOL every predicate has to refer directly to the logical object x. In other words: the FOL
formalisation can be read as: 'every x is a garden if and only if x is a parcel of land and x is
cultivated'. The CG and DL formalisations makes it possible to describe states (STAT /
state) of predicated objects and can be read as 'x is of the type (or x is a) 'garden' if x is a
parcel of land that is in the state of cultivation'. In a way CG and DL allow predicates to be
further predicated, which is impossible in FOL. Contrary to FOL, CG and DL also allow
quantitative qualification of predicates and other numeric variables. However, FOL can be
expanded into alternative systems of logic (higher-order logics for example) which do
allow these same possibilities while staying more rigorous and closer to set-theory than CG
or DL.
In CA, however, all formalisations have their limits. As Quine (1968) pointed out (and
quoted before in § 2.2.3): 'A question of the form 'What is an F?' can be answered only by
recourse to a further term: 'An F is a G'. The answer makes only relative sense: sense
relative to an uncritical acceptance of 'G'' (p. 204). Hence, the applicability of FOL as a CA
tool is dependent on the reducibility of the concepts, which are to be analysed, to more
basic concepts, which are already defined or are even part of the structure of FOL itself. As
an analytical tool, therefore, logic and set-theory are extremely useful in the analysis of
concepts, which are reducible to sets, such as part-whole relations in formal ontology (e.g.
Smith 1996) or demographic events such as population changes (Brons 2001). However, if
such a reduction is not possible it is less likely to be as powerful a tool as one might wish.
This too is illustrated by the examples above: the formalisations seem to add little
clarification to the ordinary language description provided first.
The problem is that logics are rather 'poor' meta-languages (languages used to describe
concepts in the object-language), while Tarski (1935) proved that to analyse a concept
satisfactorily (in his case: 'truth') the meta-language must be substantially richer in
expressive power than the object-language. This, however, implies that a full conceptual
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analysis of most social scientific concepts is virtually impossible, since there is no
expressively 'richer' language available than the ordinary language these concepts are from,
while, on the other hand, ordinary language lacks the rigor needed for sharp description and
definition.
Nevertheless, the application of FOL in CA may induce surprising results. Conceptual
analyses are theoretical statements and when formulated in ordinary language, it is often
difficult to grasp all the implications of such a statement. Recent research in the logical
formalisation of social scientific theories has affirmed this point. For example, Bruggeman
(1996) and Péli (1997) found that Hannan and Freeman's (1977; 1989) theory of
organizational ecology included several logical fallacies, while, on the other hand, Kamps
(1999) discovered that the premises of a specific theory presented in Zetterberg (1965) have
more implications than foreseen in the original (ordinary-language) theory. Generally,
'logical formalization helps to make theories consistent, their arguments conclusive, their
presentation parsimonious, their definitions clear and distinctive, and their conceptual
framework transparent' (Péli, Pólos & Hannan 2000, p. 195).
2-3-4-summary and conclusions
CA has been applied in a number of scientific fields; especially in nursing, social and
political science and computer and information science. Concepts in social and political
science and in nursing are rarely the simple concepts assumed by conceptual analysis (CA)
in philosophy. Rather, these are complex scientific terms referring mostly to social
phenomena instead of concrete objects. Nevertheless, CA in social and political science and
nursing is attempted by application of a relatively small set of rules. Most of the theories of
applied CA focus strongly on synonyms, homonyms and other concepts related to the
analysandum. A concept d is regarded to be an element of a set t of related concepts (such
as the before mentioned synonyms and homonyms) that should be clearly distinguished
from d and from each other. t must be distinguished from the linguistic context or
conceptual framework p. The first refers to the set of synonyms, homonyms and other
similar concepts, the second to the language-game, or conceptual framework the concept d
is part of.
In several fields it has been attempted to use formal tools in CA. While this may be very
useful in order to get more rigorous, more transparent and less ambiguous results, it comes
with some problems of its own. Different styles of formalisation may result in different
analyses, and moreover, formalisation is most helpful in analyses of concepts that can be
(partly) reduced to logical or set-theoretical concepts. Hence, though helpful, formal logic
is no wonder drug.
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2-4-concepts, ideas and fashions
The previous sections dealt mainly with rather abstract concepts (§ 2.2) and theoretical
terms and concepts (§ 2.3). However, as was explained in subsection 2.1.2, some scientific
fields deal with concepts as 'social factors' or 'theories'. The notion of "concepts as theories"
may seem similar to "theoretical concept", but there is an important difference: the latter
regards concepts as parts of theories, while the first sees concepts as theories themselves.
There are two scientific fields dealing explicitly with concepts as 'social factors' or
'theories'. These are conceptual history, especially Begriffsgeschichte (§ 2.4.1), and
management fashion research (MFR) (§ 2.4.2). The historical approach to CA is
predominantly German. Begriffsgeschichte, (translated alternatively as "history of
concepts", "conceptual history", and "historical semantics") is a current in the history of
ideas and/or intellectual history, which studies the products of (the) human mind(s),
especially those related to politics. Management fashion research (MFR) is a research field
with rather little reference to concepts, but in a sense studying concepts nevertheless. The
object of study of MFR are 'fads and fashions' in management theory.
Begriffsgeschichte and MFR share their focus on the temporal and social contexts of
concepts. Concepts are theoretical entities specific to specific social groups and specific
times. Hence, concepts change and different groups use different concepts. Concepts,
including key words, have a social life of their own (Williams 1976). Often, conceptual
differences reflect differences in worldview (or theoretical affiliation) between groups
(such as scientific fields or communities). Therefore, many concepts are necessarily
ambiguous (see also § 2.1.2). Gallie described more or less the same phenomenon in his
'Essentially contested concepts' (1956). Essentially Contested Concepts (ECCs) (such as
"democracy" or "work of art") belong (mainly) to fields such as aesthetics, political and
social philosophy and the philosophy of religion. ECCs are complex concepts in that they
are composed of several parts or features. Competing versions of the ECC refer differently
to the importance and contributions of these composing parts or features; hence, ECCs are
variously describable. Generally, ECCs are derived from some original historical exemplar.
The contested nature of these concepts is essential to the debates they are used in. The
parties recognise the contestation, but all claim their interpretation is the only right one. A
definition of an ECC is necessarily normative (and political) as it captures the interpretation
of a single group only.
2-4-1-history of concepts and ideas
Intellectual history and history of ideas (HoI) study patterns of thought, concepts,
categories, classifications, etc. in earlier ages. Although there is a strong emphasis on the
history of political ideas in these fields, its scope has been wider. The difference between
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intellectual history and HoI is that the first focuses on the ideas in (of) a period and the
latter on the history of an idea through periods. HoI is practised more in continental Europe,
intellectual history more in English-speaking countries. Sub-fields of intellectual history
and/or HoI (or fields related thereto) include German Begriffsgeschichte and French history
of mentalités. (Mentalités are the collective symbols, concepts and representations of a
society or part thereof.) HoI as a current in the field of history has to be distinguished from
specific histories of ideas of / in scientific fields, such as the histories of geographical or
economic thought, although the latter could be regarded as special cases of the former. In
general HoI studies far more specific ideas than whole scientific fields.
The most important theoretical contributions to HoI were those of Skinner, Pocock and
Foucault. Skinner (1969, 1978) criticized, in what became known as the 'Cambridge
revision', the 'contextualism' and 'textualism' (his terms) in historical analysis. The first,
contextualism, explains concepts and ideas referring to the socio-economic conditions at
their genesis; the second, textualism, presumes that concepts can be explained from texts
alone and that historical texts all answer questions that have stayed more or less the same
during history. According to Skinner, both are wrong. Contextualism is wrong because the
meaning of a concept or the intention of an idea should be analyzed independently from its
genesis (and one should study meaning before genesis). Textualism, on the other hand, is
wrong because it tries to derive more from a text than is in it. There are no eternal, constant,
unchanging questions. Each time has its own specific problems and questions. Hence,
Skinner rejects the idea that we can 'learn from history'.
Pocock (1960, 1975) was strongly influenced by the philosophy of language (§ 2.2). In
classical (early) philosophy of language, language and terminology were mostly regarded
as more or less (politically) neutral instruments (the rare exceptions include Marx & Engels
1846/1932). Pocock disagreed with this. Language determines the margins of (political)
thought. Language determines what can be thought (see also § 2.1.1). Hence intellectual
historians should study language (use) in periods before studying the ideas of that period.
Studying the nature of political thought in a period is advanced more by researching the
meaning of and relations between concepts than by trying to understand the intentions of
authors (which is, moreover, impossible without understanding the language of the period
first).
Like Pocock, Foucault (1966, 1969) regards language, or 'discourse' as he calls it, as
pivotal. A core concept of Foucault's (1966) thought is "épistème". Épistèmes are relatively
constant (over longer periods) structures in the discourse. Épistèmes structure reality,
determine how we experience reality, how we classify objects in (parts of) reality, and what
things in (parts of) reality we perceive. Language is the instrument an épistème uses to
enforce this structuring of reality. Defining characteristics of Épistèmes and discourses are
what they exclude, for example, as taboo, madness and/or untruth, rather than what they
include. Hence, to study an épistème one must start at the excluded. This focus on exclusion
points at the fact that language, discourse and épistème are not passive aspects of socio-
historical reality, but are expressions of power.
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Conceptual history or historical semantics originated in the 19th century but became a
systematic field within history only fairly recently (den Boer 2001a). The first who
mentioned − as far as now known − the idea that the meaning of concepts changes was
Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian war (5th century BC). Far more recently,
Lovejoy (e.g. 1948) described the history of some key concepts, which he analyzed and
defined rigorously (see also  2.2.2). Lovejoy probably coined the term "history of ideas".
An important predecessor of conceptual history as a field within history is a similar sub-
field within philosophy. Philosophical conceptual history is mainly intended to improve
and/or clarify the terminology or linguistic toolkit of philosophy. The approach is typically
German and had very little impact on the field of history. Its most important product is the
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Ritter et al. (eds.) 1971ff). Even before the
introduction of Begriffsgeschichte in the early 1970s, German historians dealt with
conceptual history. Niederman (1941), for example, published a still widely referred to
history of the concept of "culture". However, only after Koselleck (e.g. 1972; 1978; 1979)
founded the new field, conceptual history really took off.
Begriffsgeschichte is a mix of HoI and social history. It had considerably more impact than
the conceptual history in philosophy. Yet this influence was still mostly limited to German-
speaking countries and other countries that are − to some extent − in the German sphere of
influence, such as the Netherlands (e.g. Freeden 1997; den Boer 1998). With the relatively
recent publication of an English-language introduction to Begriffsgeschichte (Hampsher-
Monk, Tilmans & van Vree (eds.) 1998), this, however, may change in the near future. The
most important work in Begriffsgeschichte, without a doubt, is the eight volume
Geschichliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialer Sprache in
Deutschland  (Brunner, Conze & Koselleck (eds.) 1972-98), which was finished recently
and which proved to be a very useful source book for chapter 3. The starting point of the
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe is the idea of the Sattelzeit (e.g. Koselleck 1979; 1987). The
Sattelzeit is the period of social transformations caused by the industrial revolution and
political change (see also § 3.2). The German Sattelzeit was from 1750 to 1850; in France it
started earlier, in 1680. The period, and its associated change may − more or less − coincide
with the transfer from Foucault's (1966) classical to postclassical or modern épistème. Den
Boer (2001a), however, is very critical about this temporal delimitation. In his opinion, the
temporal boundaries are based on rather vague arguments. Moreover, the idea proved to be
self-confirming and leading to circular reasoning.
Begriffsgeschichte has not been applied exclusively to German conceptual history. The
Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1920 (Reichardt &  Schmitt
(eds.) 1985ff) deals with similar concepts in France, as the title suggests, but in a wider
period. Recently a Dutch project in Begriffsgeschichte started, resulting in a number of
books, including one on the history of the concept of "beschaving" (civilisation) (den Boer
(ed.) 2001).
Although Begriffsgeschichte is now the dominant form, conceptual history has been applied
more widely, regarding scope and period.  Klaes (2001), for example, gives some examples
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of conceptual history within economics and reviews the possible contribution of
Begriffsgeschichte hereto.
Disregarding its types and variants, there are some common concepts and problems in
conceptual history. An important distinction is that between 'semasiology' and
'onomasiology'. Semasiology is the study of the changing meaning of a specific concept or
term. Onomasiology is the study of the different words (terms, labels) used throughout
history with similar or overlapping meanings. A potential danger to all kinds of conceptual
history is the 'etymological phalacy' (Lyons 1981): the assumption that the 'original', oldest
known, meaning of a word is, necessarily and because of fact, its correct meaning. The fact
of the matter is that 'most words in the vocabulary of any language cannot be traced back to
their origin. (…) All the etymologists can tell us, depending upon evidence, is that such and
such is the form or meaning of a particular word's earliest known or hypothetical ancestor'
(Lyons 1981, p. 55).
2-4-2-management fashions
Although the similarities between conceptual history and management fashion research
(MFR) may not seem to be obvious, they are there nevertheless. Both fields study a type of
concepts that function as flags to their users, concepts that are strongly theoretical and that
are essentially ambiguous and contested. Both fields focus on the temporal and social
context of concepts: conceptual history by studying the social causes and effects of
conceptual change, MFR by adopting a fashion approach.
Management fashions, or sometimes contemptuously called management fads, are concepts
designating trends in management. Abrahamson (1996) defines a management fashion as 'a
relatively transitory collective belief, disseminated by management fashion setters, that a
management technique leads rational management progress' (p. 257). Abrahamson (1991;
1996) set the stage for a new field of research in which concepts have been studied with
very little influence from or contact with the fields dealt with in the previous sections. This
might be (at least partly) due to the fact that the term preferred is "management fashions"
and not "management concepts" (although some exceptions to this rule exist) and
consequently that the perspective adopted in these studies is that of fashion instead of
language.
The fashion perspective of management fashion research (MFR) is reflected in the focus on
the processes of creation and dissemination of management fashions. Abrahamson (1996)
dealt with the 'management fashion setting process'. Management fashion setters are, for
example, consultants, management journals and management gurus. However, 'most
management innovations may be created by managers' (Abrahamson, 1996, p. 266). Based
on studies in the publishing industry, he distinguishes four stages in the management
fashion setting process: (1) creation, (2) selection, (3) processing, and (4) dissemination. In
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the first stage, new practices, techniques and ideas are developed (or old ones are revived).
Abrahamson, however, pointed out that 'new' fashions are not necessarily actually new:
'fashion creation may involve either inventing management techniques that only appear to
be improvements or rediscovering / reinventing old management techniques that were
invented previously and forgotten' (265-266). In the second stage, management fashion
setters select from this supply a small number of techniques which they adapt in the third
stage to market demand. Finally, in the fourth stage, fashion setters attempt to disseminate
the new fashion.
Although managers take part in the management fashion setting process, their prime role is
as users and applicators of management fashions. In this role, they have to be convinced of
the benefits for their company and of the rationality and innovativeness of the management
fashion. Stakeholders expect managers to manage their organizations and employees
rationally (e.g. Rogers, 1995; Abrahamson, 1996). Besides rationality, Sahlin-Andersson
(1996) distinguishes two other 'editing rules' in the creation of management fashions:
context and formulation. A concept develops in a certain context. This, however, is not
always fully acknowledged. Often unnoticed, for example, is the incorporation of national
preferences in management concepts. A management concept has to be formulated in
general terms. There is, however, considerable variation in the degree of clarity, detail, and
interpretative viability.
Convincing managers is the main goal of the third (and fourth) stage of the fashion setting
process. In this stage the fashion is processed into a appealing proposal for organizational
improvement. 'It must, therefore, articulate (a) why it is imperative for managers to pursue
this goal and  (b) why this technique provides the most efficient means to attain these goals'
(Abrahamson, 1996, pp. 267-268). Arguments for adopting the fashion are usually
supported with a number of successful examples (prototypes).
Røvik (1998) studied the argumentative texture of fashion-setting texts. These texts usually
promise enhanced performance after adoption and bankruptcy in case of non-adoption. The
fashion or concept is presented as an easily understandable and universally applicable
commodity with a catchy title. Moreover the fashion or concept is presented as timely,
innovative and future-oriented. Finally, management fashions or concepts have to leave
room for interpretation (Benders & van Veen, 2001). Interpretative viability or conceptual
ambiguity is necessary for being applicable in many situations.
Notable in management fashion research is the strong attention to the context of
management fashions, often even to the extent of the context being part of the fashion or
concept. Context is regarded as an essential part of a management concept or fashion and
without a thorough understanding of this context, it is not possible to understand the
concept or fashion. This strong attention to context is more or less implied by the fashion
perspective, which strongly focuses on temporal context, the genesis (creation) and
dynamics (rise and fall) of concepts (fashions). Non-temporal context, however, is also
taken into account, as Sahlin-Andersson (1996), for example, points at cultural and
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linguistic context. This last type of context posits the fashion or contexts within a broader
framework or system and is (hence) called systemic context. Hence, a management fashion
MF can be defined as a triplet of d*, systemic context y and temporal context i:
D2.3 MF =def. *d*,y,i+  .
The different characteristics of management fashions or (/as) concepts mentioned above
(and in the MFR literature) can be distributed between these three elements. The first, d*
could be called 'pure concept' (or something similar). It includes the label, term or title of
the fashion, the solution offered and a prototype or example. The second element, y  is the
systemic context of the fashion. It includes language, formulation and logic (or rationality),
but also a description of the actual problem (to be solved by this management concept) and
a reference to the socio-cultural context. The third and final element is the temporal context
i, which includes the creation (or rediscovery), dissemination, (re- / de-)
institutionalisation, and (eventual) decline of the concept.
The elements of D2.3 could alternatively be described as concept, theory and fashion
respectively. This points to the most interesting fact about MFR: that its subjects are
concepts, theories and fashions all in one. The same, however, could be claimed about
concepts in social and political science. Concepts such as "society" and "democracy" are
not just labels for things in some 'external reality'. These concepts refer to and label theories
on social reality and political structure. Most interesting, however, about MFR is its fashion
perspective. Ten Bos (2000; 2002; see also § 2.1.2) defends this fashion perspective against
utopian perspectives. The difference is that a fashion perspective assumes fleetingness:
fashions come and go. The utopian perspective on the other hand, propagates final truths
and ultimate solutions. The fashion perspective might not just be useful in MFR, it may
also provide a more modest, but also more realistic, starting point for CA in social science.
Concepts should be regarded as fashions rather than as aternae veritates  (Nietzsche 1878,
§ I.11; see also § 5.1).
2-4-3-summary and conclusions
Conceptual history and MFR share a strong interest in the temporal and social context of
concepts. Concepts are dependent on their socio-historical context and vice versa. MFR
even considers context to be part of a concept (management fashion). In subsections 2.2.4
and 2.3.4 it was concluded that context was important in the determination of the meaning
of a concept. A concept d was held to be an ordered couple of term u and meaning n
(D2.1*) that is somehow related to its referent s, linguistic context p and set(s) of
synonyms, homonyms and other similar concepts t. Conceptual history and MFR add the
temporal context, the history of the concept i and a wider notion of context y, such that
p ⊂ y and t ⊂ y. More importantly, MFR suggests that concepts do not just have
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context, but that the context(s) is (are) essentially part of the concept. As management
fashions were defined as *d*,y,i+ (in D2.3) and d* includes term u and a description of
the fashion or concept which is somewhat similar (but not completely identical) to meaning
n, D2.1* and D2.3 could be combined into:
D2.4* d =def. *u,n,y,i+  ,
or, assuming that y  consists of p and t:
D2.5 d =def. *u,n,p,t,i+  .
MFR offers one more valuable insight for CA by means of its fashion perspective.
Traditionally, CA is more or less 'utopian' in the sense that it aims at final solutions, final
analyses or definitions of concepts. The fashion perspective points at the fact that concepts
come into and go out of fashion. Concepts change and disappear and new concepts are born
all the time. Moreover, fashion is a social process dependent on group dynamics and social
processes of dispersion. If concepts are fashions, there are no final solutions in CA. This
same conclusion was reached by Gallie, for example, but in a very different argument.
Gallie claimed that many concepts are essentially contested because different groups (or
theories) differently value the different composing parts or features of these concepts. In
cases like these, CA cannot result in final solutions, but it can provide a common language
in which the different interpretations can be translated. It can provide the translation rules
necessary for comparison and reasonable communication.
The following sections relax the isolated nature of concepts in traditional CA. Sections 2.5
and 2.6 deal with concepts within wider frameworks, with concepts as parts of linguistic
context p and with p as a constitutive element of concepts. Finally, section 2.7 attempts to
construct a synthetic model of concepts and a methodology for CA in social science based
on the ideas presented in this chapter.
2-5-polarity, dialectics and deconstruction
The preceding sections dealt with the analysis of individual or isolated concepts only.
However, the focus of this research project is not on an isolated concept, but on a pair of
concepts and the relationship(s) therebetween: "culture" and "economy". In the title (and
text) of this book, this pair of concepts is called a "dialectic". A dialectic is a pair of
concepts (or phenomena) that are conceived to be binary opposites but that do in fact
interact and/or overlap. The culture - economy dialectic (CED) is hardly a special case.
Throughout the history of CA, concepts have been classified mostly by dichotomies (e.g.
ON CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
67
Sowa 2000). Moreover, binary oppositions seem to play an extremely important part in
human thought (e.g. McKellar 1957; Gombrich 1959/77, p. 314; Riegel 1973; Needham
1980; Maybury-Lewis and Almagor (eds.) 1989). However, while many scientists
recognise the importance of dialectical thought, concept dichotomization or dual
organisation (to name but a small selection of labels suggested for the phenomenon), 'even
at the start of the twenty-first century little is known about the nature of dialectical thinking
and its effects on basic reasoning, judgment, and decision-making processes' (Peng & Ames
2001, p. 3634)
In this section the origins of dialectical thought (§ 2.5.1), the answer of modern Western
philosophy (§ 2.5.2) and its relationship to the CED (§ 2.5.3) will be explained.
2-5-1-polarity and the origins of dialectical thought
Dialectical thought, if not universal, is an extremely widespread phenomenon (e.g.
Maybury-Lewis 1989). Moreover, it has a very long history. The division of ancient Egypt
in lower and upper parts with different pharaohs, for example, was not based on
geographical or historical reasons (alone) but on philosophical and cosmological ones. The
idea that each totality is composed of pairs of opposites was essential to ancient Egyptian
thought and therefore, Egyptian kingship had to be dualistic (Frankfort 1948).
Dialectical thought also strongly influenced early Greek thought. Heraclitus, for example,
argued (a.o.) that everything is the product of dialectical opposition and according to
Protagoras 'there are two sides to every question, exactly opposite to each other' (Diogenes
Laertius IX 51 / 74 A 1). In fact, almost all Greek speculative philosophy was based on two
logical forms: polarity and analogy (Lloyd 1966). Objects were classified either as different
(polarity) or identical (analogy). The distinction was (usually) interpreted and applied very
strictly: if two objects were perceived to be similar, it was assumed they were similar in
every respect. Interestingly, the mutually exclusive but together all-encompassing
categories of analogy and polarity function as a polarity themselves, but on a higher level.
In a sense, it is a meta-polarity.
Greek and similarly dialectical Jewish thought evolved in Europe into Medieval Christian
thought, but − according to Jung (1954) − also into alchemy. Alchemy is not just gold-
making as usually believed, but much more a system of thought based on the mysterium
coniunctionis. The goal of Alchemy is to dissolve binary oppositions (sometimes grouped
into a quaternio: two crossing binary oppositions) into the mysterium coniunctionis.
Similarly, in Medieval Christian thought, binary opposites were supposed to be dissolved in
the coïncidentia contradictorum, in God (e.g. Cusanus; Bruno).
Dialectical thought is not unique to the West. It was present, for example, in ancient China
(Taoism) and Persia (Zoroastrianism) and still can be found in different cultures all around
the world (e.g. Maybury-Lewis & Almagot (eds.) 1989). According to Needham (1980)
there is 'a universal tendency to think in twos' (p. 229). The importance of dialectical
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opposites or binary pairs in human thought poses the question about its origins. Several
answers to this question have been suggested. Hallpike (1979), for example, assumed that
binary thought was induced by the 'twoness of reality' (p. 234). In other words, it is not
thought that is composed of pairs of dialectical opposites, but the world itself. The fact that
upon inspection many examples of dialectical thought prove to exist in thought alone
refutes Hallpike's theory. Hence, another answer to the question is needed. Lloyd's (1966)
answer to the question about the origins of dialectical thought is of a very different nature.
According to Lloyd (1966), antithesis is the simplest form of classification and it is this
simplicity which guaranteed its popularity. Mayburg-Lewis (1989) further developed this
argument:
'The attractiveness of dualistic thinking lies, then, in the solution it offers to the problem of
ensuring an ordered relationship between antitheses that cannot be allowed to become
antipathies. It  is not so much that it offers order, for all systems of thought do that, but that
it offers equilibrium. Dualistic theories create order by postulating a harmonious interaction
of contradictory principles.' (p. 13)
Still, this theory seems to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, thinking in two is the simplest form of
classification and can be harmonious, but a system of three (or any other small number) is
not much more complicated and not necessarily less harmonious. If simplicity and harmony
alone explain the phenomenon, there should at least be some cultures that opted for the very
slightly less simple three- or four- category systems. There seem to be none.
Thinking in opposites or binary concepts may have to do with sex. Baring and Cashford
(1991) claim that the human tendency to think in oppositions is the result of the
replacement of the Mother god by a Father god. This happened in Babylonian religion, for
example, around 2000 B.C. The Goddess was associated with nature as a chaotic force to
be conquered. The male God was its opposite: the conquering force. According to Baring
and Cashford, the whole of Judeo-Christian thought is strongly influenced by this legacy of
Babylonian mythology:
particularly the opposition between creative Spirit and chaotic Nature, and also the habit of
thinking in oppositions generally. We find this, for instance in the common assumption that
the spiritual and the physical worlds are different in kind, an assumption that, unreflectively
held, separates mind from matter, soul from body, thinking from feeling, intellect from
intuition and reason from instinct. When, in addition, the 'spiritual' pole, of these dualisms
is valued as 'higher' than the physical pole, then the two terms fall into an opposition that is
almost impossible to reunite without dissolving both of the terms. (p. xii)
An alternative explanation, but still based on the male - female dichotomy, is given by
Barth (1992). Barth suggests that concept dichotomization, as she calls the phenomenon, is
related to ancient thought about the logic of ordered couples (see § 1.3.2). The modern
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interpretation thereof was introduced at the end of the 19th century by Peano, while earlier
ordered couples were interpreted in terms of poles or sexes. The effect of this kind of
ordering is that:
since there are not as many as five poles on a magnet, or five sexes, it is natural for people
who use these representational means to develop the assumption that all binary relations
that are not-trivially transitive and that form linear or partial orderings must be of a lesser
ultimate reality. They will be, and have noticeably been, tempted to consider a dualistic
conceptual ordering of all the phenomena in the universe as philosophically more
fundamental than transitive comparative ordering (…). (p. 67)
Although dialectical thought is not unique to the Western traditions, but seems to be a
universal human tendency, there are differences in how people deal with opposites and the
contradictions they produce. In Western thought these contradictions need to be (dis-)
solved as in dialectics or in deconstruction; in Chinese (or even Eastern in general) thought
contradictions are much more accepted (e.g. Peng & Nisbett 1999; Peng, Ames & Knowles
2001).
2-5-2-dialectics and deconstruction
Dialectical thought dominated Western philosophy throughout Antiquity and the Middle
Ages. In the 18th century, however, Kant introduced a third, intermediate category
connecting the first and second. The resulting trichotomy evolved into the 'thesis, antithesis
and synthesis' of early 19th century German dialectics. Here, especially in the work of
Hegel (1807; 1812-6), thinking in binary oppositions reached its peak, but also, in a sense,
its dissolution. According to Hegel, opposites, thesis and antithesis, are dissolved and
reproduced on a higher level (aufgehoben) in their synthesis. Hegel's students, and to some
extent Hegel himself too, however, sometimes constructed binary oppositions into reality,
later to dissolve (aufheben) them in another successful application of 'dialectical logic'.
The concepts of "dialectic" and "dialectics" should be distinguished carefully. As
mentioned above, the first refers to a pair of concepts (or phenomena) that are conceived to
be binary opposites, but that do in fact interact and/or overlap, to a reciprocal relationship,
an interaction or a conflict. The second can be the plural of the first, but generally refers to
a family resemblance of theories on thought and reality based on change, opposition and
conflict (confusingly, the latter is sometimes also called "dialectic" rather than "dialectics").
As recognised by Hegel, dialectics started with the before mentioned Heraclitus: 'Hier
sehen wir Land; es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht in meine Logik aufgenommen'
[habe] (Hegel 1833, p. 320). Heraclitus argued that all things change continuously: 'We step
and do not step into the same rivers; we are and we are not' (fragment 49a); and that all
perception is relative: 'The way up and the way down is one and the same' (fragment 60).
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Although Heraclitus' dialectics was mainly a theory on nature and material reality and the
perception thereof, the idealist Hegel applied it to thought and ideas. Later, Engels
reapplied it to material reality in Anti-Dühring (1877-8) and Dialektik der Natur (1873-
83/1925). Dialectics, however, is not limited to Heraclitus, Hegel and Engels. A staggering
number of philosophical theories have been labelled dialectic. Bhaskar (1993) distinguishes
five types of dialectics based on their subjects alone (ranging from ontology to practice).
Within any of these types there are many competing philosophies and interpretations.
Inspired by (some form of) dialectics, Piaget (1974) suggested that there are two types of
contradiction: (1) real contradictions, which result from errors in reasoning; and (2) natural
contradictions, which result form disequilibria in knowledge: 'un point de vue trop peu
défendu: qu'elle ne consitute ni une nécessité interne de la pensée, ni un accident dû à de
simples défauts de formalisation, mais qu'elle est l'expression de déséquilibres initialement
inévitable dus au manque d'ajustement réciproque entre les facteurs positifs et négatifs' (p.
5). In Piaget's version, dialectical synthesis is re-equilibration. Despite the bewildering
number of dialectical theories and philosophies, none of these seems to have developed into
a consistent theory of the analysis and synthesis of contradictions.
In the 20th century, dialectical thought became particularly strong in structuralism, applied
originally to language by de Saussure (1916), but later also to culture. Lévi-Strauss (1958)
analysed culture as models of binary oppositions. Levi-Strauss regarded binary oppositions
as the logic of the human mind, structuring reality in their image. Post-structuralism and
especially deconstruction (Derrida 1967) opposed the hierarchical aspect of much of
dialectical thinking. In almost all cases one of the binary opposites is supposed to be
superior to the other. Culture, for example, is often seen as superior to nature. These
hierarchies are, through chains of connotations, linked to the original hierarchical
relationship between the male and the female. The goal of deconstruction is to demolish or
reverse these hierarchies.
Dialectics and deconstruction are the main (Western) answers to dialectical thought. These
are different answers, however. The goal of dialectical analysis is (usually) to show that an
opposition or contradiction is not an opposition or contradiction at all, that the perceived
opposites are very difficult to distinguish, melt into each other, overlap, interact. The goal
of deconstruction is merely to unmask hierarchies in binary oppositions and sometimes to
replace these with different hierarchies, not necessarily to dispose of the binary opposition
itself.
2-5-3-summary, conclusions and the origins of the CED
There is a strong tendency in human thought to classify reality in pairs of opposing
concepts. Dialectical thought can be found in all times and all cultures. The phenomenon is
most influentially explained by reference to the male - female dichotomy, which, through
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connotations, is assumed to have given birth to many other specific dichotomies and
dialectical thought itself. However, dialectical thought is a product of the mind, not of
reality and may, therefore, deceive us. Philosophy and science came up with a number of
ways to deal with these conceptual dichotomies. The first was dialectics, which − as a
philosophical theory − aimed at the dissolution of dialectics as pairs of opposed concepts.
The second was deconstruction, which focused on the relationship between the composing
concepts of dichotomies or dialectics. Often one of these concepts is considered to be more
important or more fundamental. Deconstruction attempts to reverse or remove these
hierarchies. Neither dialectics nor deconstruction provided a consistent theory on how to
reach these goals.
Interestingly, the CED itself seems to be related to the origins of dialectical thought itself.
The culture - economy dialectic is connected to the male - female dichotomy through a
relatively small number of links. Figure 2.4 summarises two related chains of connotations
starting from the most basic dichotomies of the male and the female, order and chaos and
spirit and body (compare Baring & Cashford above):
figure 2.4: series of binary oppositions
The first step in the chains of connotations represented in figure 2.4 is the introduction of
two pairs: "order" - "chaos" and "spirit" - "body". "Order" and "spirit" (or "mind") are (or
were) generally regarded to be male; "chaos" and "body" were female. These two pairs, in
their turn, gave rise to the CED and the related man - environment dialectic (MED) that
became the subject of geography. "Reason" was associated with "order" and "spirit" and,
therefore male; "passion" was related to "chaos" and "body" and, therefore, female. Similar
chains of connotations can be found on the other side of the figure.
male ∼ female
order ∼ chaos spirit ∼ body
culture ∼ naturereason ∼ passion
economy ∼ culture
man / society ∼ environmentcivilisation ∼ culture
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It is important to note that "culture" is represented in figure 2.4 both on the 'male' and the
'female' sides of the conceptual pairs. This seems to be contradictory, but it is not. Although
the labels are the same, these are not the same concepts, they have entirely different
meanings, which becomes clear when you take their connotational chains into account.
Culture as the opposite of (reasonable) civilisation is the social equivalent of passion;
culture as opposed to nature is the human order imposed upon chaotic nature.
The conceptual evolution of the CED and the different paths therein are further dealt with
in chapter 3. The next section deals with concepts as parts of ontologies, languages or
conceptual frameworks. Together with conceptual dichotomies these are part of the
linguistic and/or ontological context p of a concept.
2-6-language and ontology
Concepts are not isolated 'objects'; they are parts of conceptual structures, frameworks or
languages. These form their linguistic and ontological context of the concepts. Concepts are
not meaningful in themselves; they only have meaning within this wider context.
Particularly scientific concepts 'have to be interpreted in the light of an implied social
ontology' (Gittler 1951, p. 365). Hence, it is not just the (meaning of the) concept itself that
should be analysed, but also its linguistic and/or ontological context. Although traditionally
regarded as part of metaphysics and dealing with 'existence', ontology is also the
philosophical and scientific field that deals with conceptual frameworks. Subsection 2.6.1
focuses mainly on ontology as a tool for specification of conceptual structures or
frameworks. This kind of ontology is mainly practised in fields like artificial intelligence
(AI) and knowledge representation (KR). In these same fields a formal technique for
analysing or mapping conceptual structures, Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) (see also §
2.3), was developed. FCA will be explained briefly in subsection 2.6.2.
2-6-1-metaphysics and ontology
Metaphysics is generally interpreted as the study or philosophical theory of what is beyond
nature and experience, of some more fundamental structure of reality. The term was coined
in the first century BC by Andronicus of Rhodes as the title for a collection of fourteen
books by Aristotle on subjects such as reality, existence and causality. The title for these
fourteen books, µετf τf ϕυσικ_, meaning 'after the physics' merely meant that these books
were placed after Aristotle's books on physics. In the early 18th century Wolff proposed to
divide metaphysics in four parts: (1) ontology, the study or theory of being or existence; (2)
cosmology, the study or theory of the world; (3) rational psychology, the study or theory of
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the spirit and/or soul; and (4) rational theology, the study or theory of God. Since Wolff,
"ontology" is usually defined as 'the study of being'.
Although the term "metaphysics" became deeply embedded in philosophical terminology, it
hardly has a fixed meaning. Bunge (1977), for example, distinguishes ten different
interpretations of "metaphysics". Bunge himself suggests that 'metaphysics is general
cosmology or general science: it is the science concerned with the whole of reality' (p. 5).
This implies that all scientific effort is ultimately grounded in some metaphysical theory
(e.g. Russel 1948; Lakatos 1969; Harvey 1969; see also Seager 2000). Metaphysics as the
study of 'ultimate reality', however, is not what concerns us here. What does concern us is
the fact that 'metaphysics can help solve pseudoquestions that arise in science and originate
in misconceptions. (…) Metaphysics can dig up, clarify, and systematize some basic
concepts and principles occurring in the course of scientific research and even in scientific
theories (…)' (Bunge 1977, p. 23). This 'digging up', 'clarification' and 'systematisation' is
the goal of scientific or applied ontology.
Traditionally, philosophical or existential ontology (EO) was the study asking 'What things
exist?' In recent decades the concept of "ontology" was associated with new fields and new
questions. The key question in ontology in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Knowledge
Representation (KR) is: 'What things should we represent?' This is the field of
representational ontology (RO). (e.g. Guarino 1995; Uschold & Grunninger 1996)
Koepsell (1999) claims that 'many real world problems do result from unclear ontologies',
and that the goal of applied ontology is to remedy this 'by careful study of the categories of
the social world' (p. 220). Applied ontology (AO) is often intended to specify the conceptual
framework or language of a specific scientific field. (e.g. Singh 1982; Uschold et al. 1997;
Smith & Mark 1999; Zúñiga 1999; Brons 2001) AO is closely related to scientific ontology
(ScO), although there are important differences. ScO is closer to traditional ontology (EO)
or metaphysics, while AO is more closely related to RO. 'The analysis we expect from
scientific ontology concerns, in particular but not exclusively, the ontological categories
and hypotheses that occur, either in a heuristic or in a constitutive capacity, in scientific
research' (Bunge 1977, p. 10).
Social ontology (SO) studies what ultimately makes up social reality. As such it seems to be
a special type of EO. However, SO could also be interpreted as the ontology of the social
sciences. Hence, like ScO, SO is a mix of EO and AO. (e.g. Searle 1969; 1995; Thomasson
1997; Weissman 2000)
Formal ontology (FO), finally, is the study of formal categories such as parts and wholes,
introduced by Husserl (1900-1) (see also § 2.3.3). FO has to be distinguished from
formalisation in ontology, which is increasingly applied in all the before mentioned fields.
(e.g. Smith & Mulligan 1983; Smith 1996)
The above distinctions may seem 'harder' than they are in practice. Some modern
ontologists publish work in more than one, some even in all (Barry Smith, for example), of
these fields.
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The concept of "ontology" does not only refer to scientific or philosophical fields or
theories but also to what (some of) these fields study. An ontology is defined by Gruber
(1993) as a 'specification of a conceptualisation' (p. 200). Similarly, Uschold and Gruninger
(1996) think of an ontology as 'an explicit account of a shared understanding in a given
subject area' (p. 93). An ontology is a specified set of concepts, a conceptual structure or
framework, a language. Ontologies, in this sense, are necessary for communication. The
relationship of a concept to an ontology is both that of member to set and that of case to
context. Within CA then, an ontology is the linguistic context p of a concept and ontology
as a tool should (help) specify this linguistic context. Although both Gruber's and Uschold
and Gruninger's definitions of "an ontology" are published in articles on RO, the type of
ontology closest to this goal is AO. In practice, RO and AO seem to be closely related, the
main difference being that RO is normative, while AO is descriptive.
There is no standard methodology in AO, nor is there in any of the other types of ontology
(e.g. Uschold & Grunninger 1996; Rosenberg 1997). The most basic rule in ontology is
probably 'Ockham's razor': Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem ('entities
should not be multiplicated more than necessary'). (Although attributed to the 14th century
philosopher Ockham, it has not been found in this form in any of his works.) Ockham's
razor is the methodological rule in ontology that one should not assume more entities than
necessary and that one should prefer the ontology that contains the smallest number of
categories or types of entities:
Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a
scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable,
the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can
be fitted and arranged. (Quine 1948, pp. 35-36)
Bunge (1977) proposed ten rules for ScO, which could also apply to AO. However, Bunge's
rules seem to be a bit obvious. His most important (most relevant in AO) rules are: (1)
formalise everything (in logical, set-theoretical or other mathematical notation); (2) avoid
words with an ambiguous meaning; (3) be rigorous and exact; (4) use objective terms only;
(5) be systematic; (6) test for coherence but also for compatibility and contiguity with
contemporary science. The most important of Bunge's rules is the first: formalisation. Most
of the others will apply automatically in formal analyses. Bunge was, however, not alone in
arguing in favour of formalisation in ontology and/or CA. Rather on the contrary. The
defenders of formalisation also include, for example, Russell, who came up with the rule
that 'Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities'
(1914, p. 115). A final important methodological rule can be derived from Quine's (1968)
principle of ontological relativity (see § 2.2.3): in ontological research more ambiguous
terms or concepts have to be defined in less ambiguous or preferably even unambiguous
terms.
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2-6-2-formal analysis of conceptual structures
Related to RO, a formal mathematical technique for mapping and analysing conceptual
structures was developed in artificial intelligence (AI) and knowledge representation (KR).
This technique is called Formal Concept Analysis (FCA). FCA was developed by Wille
(1982) as an application of ordered set and lattice theory. (For a brief non-mathematical
introduction to FCA, see: Wolff 1994; for its mathematical foundations, see: Ganter &
Wille 1999.) FCA is based on the philosophical idea of a concept having an intension and
an extension (see § 2.2.3). The intension is the set of attributes necessarily true of an object
for a certain concept to apply; the extension is the set of all the objects to which that
concept applies. Based on this idea, Wille introduces the formal context of a set of
concepts. The formal context is a table summarising the extensions and (rather simplified)
intensions of a set of concepts. Table 2.2 gives an example.
table 2.2: formal context (example)
bi
rd
fis
h
w
al
ks
sw
im
fli
es
pike X X
duck X X X X
robin X X
penguin X X
chicken X X X
flying fish X X X
From this formal context a line diagram, the concept lattice, can be calculated that reflects
the structure of the concepts in the formal context. Such a diagram consists of circles and
lines and the names of the attributes in the given context. Information from this diagram
can be read following the rule: 'An object g has an attribute m if and only if there is an
upwards leading path from the circle named by 'g' to the circle named by 'm'' (Wolff 1994,
p. 431). (Note that there is mention of an upwards leading path, not of a single line
segment.) The concept lattice of the formal context in table 2.2 is drawn in figure 2.5.
FCA is most useful in mapping the effects of changes in conceptual structures. Adding or
deleting concepts from the formal context can result in dramatic changes in the lattice. In
the example above, deleting the penguin and the flying fish, for example would combine
the robin, 'bird' and 'flies' in a single point. Besides mapping conceptual structures, FCA
could also be used to map 'intensional structures'. Constructing a formal context based on
different definitions of more or less the same concept would result in a lattice that
graphically represents the different interpretations of that concept and how these are related
to each other.
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figure 2.5: concept lattice based on table 2.2 (example)
Intensional structure could also be mapped with the help of the statistical technique of
(hierarchical) cluster analysis. FCA, however, comes with an advantage. Contrary to cluster
analysis, FCA shows the genus - species relationships between the different concepts
mapped.
Although FCA may be useful either to map the linguistic context of a concept, the
conceptual structure, or to map the diverse interpretations of that concept itself (its
intensional structure), one serious objection has to be made to FCA. This objection is that
FCA only works with extremely simplified intensions. Intensions of all concepts in the
structure have to be summarised in a relatively small number of dummy variables. This,
may, however, in many cases prove to be very difficult, and moreover, result in a
substantial loss of information. (See § 4.4.2 for an application of FCA to the concept of
"culture" as an example of the problems mentioned here.)
2-6-3-summary and conclusions
Ontology is related to CA in (at least) two ways. Firstly, an ontology as a 'representation of
a conceptualisation' (Gruber 1993, p. 200), as a conceptual framework, is the p in D2.5,
repeated here:
D2.5R d =def. *u,n,p,t,i+  .
Secondly, ontology and CA both study concepts and may, therefore, be strongly related
methodologically. The three most important methodological rules of ontology are (1)
Ockham's razor (do not introduce more entities than necessary); (2) formalisation; and (3)
define more ambiguous terms or concepts in less ambiguous or preferably even
unambiguous terms.
bird flies walks swims
robin
chicken
duck
fish
pike
flying fish
penguin
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Like ontology, FCA studies (and maps) conceptual frameworks or parts thereof. FCA is a
formal mathematical tool used for mapping conceptual structures, frameworks or
ontologies. It is especially useful to determine the relationships between different (groups
of) concepts and to assess the effects of changes in conceptual frameworks. It could,
moreover, be used as a formal tool in mapping the intensional structure of a set of
semasiologically and onomasiologically (see § 2.4.1) related concepts, a set of synonyms
and homonyms t.
The next and final section of this chapter summarises the ideas on the analysis of the
concept of "concept" presented in the preceding sections, elaborates on this and finally,
presents some methodological guidelines for CA of the CED and in social science in
general.
2-7-a synthetic model and its application
In this final section of chapter 2, a synthesis into a single model of concepts for CA of the
theories and philosophies on concepts and conceptual analysis (CA), dealt with in the
previous sections, is presented. The goal of this chapter, and this section especially, is to
construct a methodology that is based on the CA literature, that is applicable to concepts in
social science and that can be used as a method for the analysis of the culture - economy
dialectic (CED) in following chapters. Sartori's (1984b) influential CA methodology (§
2.3.1) started with an analysis of the concept of "concept". Similarly, here an analysis of
"concept" provides the foundations for a theory and methodology of CA. This analysis
proceeds by constructing a model of concepts by specification and definition of its
composing parts. The model, therefore, can be regarded as an ontology of parts or elements
of concepts. Hence, the methods most applicable in building this model are those related to
ontological research and ontology building as specified in subsection 2.6.1 (formalisation,
Ockham's razor, etc.). The final parts of this chapter, subsections 2.7.2 and 2.7.3, consider
the application of the model to CA in social science and to the analysis of the CED,
respectively.
2-7-1- a general model of concepts for CA
In subsections 2.2 and 2.3 a number of 'meaning triangles' were discussed. These meaning
triangles are attempts to specify the basic components of concepts. Ignoring the details and
differences in terminology in the different versions, meaning triangles assume that for every
concept d there is an ordered triplet of term u, meaning n and referent s in which
meaning somehow connects the term to the referent: *u,n,s+. The referent s, however,
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is (generally) not regarded to be part of the concept itself, but of the extra-linguistic reality
the concept refers to, which would imply that a concept is *u,n+ and has s.
Alternatively, Jackendoff (2002) defines a word as a 'triplet of phonological structure,
syntactic structure, and meaning' (p. 51; see also § 2.1.2). If phonology and syntax are
summarised as "term" we end up with the same result:
D2.1*R d =def. *u,n+  .
Of these two elements, only meaning n needs further analysis (u is a singleton). Meaning
is usually the ultimate goal of CA. Meaning n is what connects the term u to the referent
s. Meaning determines whether the term u is applicable to an object x; whether x belongs
to the extension 2 of the concept d; and if so, to what extent. If the extension 2 of d is
defined as the set of all 'things' to which d applies (the set of instantiations of d) and the
intension 6 of d is defined as the set of properties, qualities, characteristics or attributes a
'thing' must have (and/or must not have) for d to apply (see also § 2.2.3), meaning n can
be defined as:
D2.6 n =def. *f,6,D+  ,
in which D is the set of weights of the elements of 6 and both are ordered sets, such that:
D2.6a ∀i [ i∈6 ↔ ∃w [ w∈D ∧ ^LPNOZ(w,i) ∧ 0≤w≤1] ]  ,
in which the two-place predicate ^LPNOZ means that w is the weight of i (in other words:
each element of the intension 6 has a weight w and D is the set of these weights, such that
6=*i1,i2,…in+ and D=*w1,w2,…wn+ in which w1 is the weight of i1, w2 is the weight of i2,
etc.) (Note that it could be argued that the intension of a concept is *6,D+ rather than 6,
which would suggest to write D2.6 as n =def. *f,*6,D++, but for the argument presented
here this, however, bears little relevance.);
and in which f is a (mathematical) function that specifies how 6 and D (or *6,D+)
determine (-s) the extent or degree to which a concept d is applicable to an object x (which
is the same as the extent or degree to which an object x is a member of the extension 2 of
d), which can be 1 (d applies) or 0 (d does not apply) in the case of classical concepts or
anything in between in the case of prototypical concepts (see § 2.2.3). f and D can be
accommodated to define the meaning of both these types of concepts. The general form of
f is:
Σ
i∈6 ∧ i(x) wi
ΣD2.6b f =def. g
i∈6 wi
 ,  such that:  0 ≤ f ≤ 1  ,
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in which Σ/i∈6∧i(x) wi (the numerator) is the sum of the weights w of the elements of the
intension 6 that are also properties of the object x (i(x)) and hence, the fraction between the
parentheses − here further abbreviated "ξ" − measures the extent to which 6 and the set of
properties of x overlap. In the case of classical concepts, all weights w (elements of D) are
1 and the function g(ξ) returns either 1 if ξ = 1 and 0 otherwise. In the case of prototypical
concepts, weights w have values between 0 and 1 and g(ξ) can return any value between 0
and 1, but there may be a threshold that determines that g(ξ) = 1 iff ξ ≥ threshold and g(ξ)
= 0 otherwise.
To summarise D2.6 to D2.6b as briefly as possible: the meaning of a concept is a set of
conditions and rules (based on weighted properties) a 'thing' must conform to, to be an
instantiation of that concept. Properties, however, are concepts themselves. Hence,
meaning is a set of concepts and relationships (weights, functions, etc,) between these
concepts and their (potential) instantiations:
D2.7 n =def. *0M,?M+  .
The main problem with this (kind of) definition (D2.6 to D2.6b especially) is that it is based
on a rather atomistic notion of properties. Like most (possibly all) other concepts, property
concepts are often (if not always) fuzzy, ambiguous and/or contested. Moreover, concrete
'things' have infinitely many properties that can be infinitely divided in more specific or
more detailed properties. There is no rock bottom: there are no final, primitive or given
properties (see also Sellars 1963 and §2.2.2).
If properties, either as attributes of a particular 'thing' or as elements of an intension of a
concept, are unclearly bounded and defined, it is impossible to (unambiguously) specify
=x, 6, D, 0M or ?M which would make the above impossible to apply. At least it would
make it impossible to specify *0M,?M+ completely and (completely) unambiguously.
Therefore, any specification of *0M,?M+ is contingent upon the set of concepts that makes
up the language and the world (see § 2.1.1) of the analyst. Nevertheless, these contingent
specifications may − to some extent − clarify the concept if the specifications are at least
less ambiguous than the concept analysed itself (see § 2.2.3 on 'ontological relativity').
The meaning triangles and Jackendoff's definition do not offer the only possible description
of the elements of a concept. Most descriptions, however, more or less coincide with the
*u,n+ interpretation or add a single element. Subsection 2.4.2 describes the most
important exception. Management fashion research, hardly influenced by linguistics and
philosophies of language, studies management fashions or management concepts, which
can be interpreted as (ordered) triplets of 'pure concept' d*, 'systemic context' y and
'temporal context' i:
D2.3R MF =def. *d*,y,i+  .
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The 'pure concept' is rather similar to d as defined above and is composed of the label or
term u of the management fashion and the practices labelled thereby, which could be
interpreted as its meaning n. As management fashions are normative rather than
descriptive concepts, they refer to what should be, not to what is. Nevertheless, D2.6 to
D2.6b are applicable here, provided that the extension referred to is a (set of) theoretical (or
hypothetical) prototype(s). Hence, d* is *u,n+ and, as subsection 2.4.2 claimed that what
is true of management fashions is true of concepts in general, combining D2.1* and D2.3
results in:
D2.4*R d =def. *u,n,y,i+  .
The temporal context i of a concept d is its conceptual history (see § 2.4). i consists of
the (ordered) set of semasiologically (same term, different meanings) and
onomasiologically (different terms, similar meanings) interrelated concepts 0H that d
belongs to (d∈0H); and the (ordered) set of relations between these interrelated concepts
?H:
D2.8 i =def. *0H,?H+  ,
which means, that i should be interpreted as a (system of) interrelated chronological
chain(s) of concepts *d1,d2,…,dn+ with different meanings *n1,n2,…,nn+, different
systemic contexts and different terms, ultimately leading to d itself.
The systemic context y of a concept d is the 'system' of theories, languages, terminologies
and/or language games (etc.) it is used in and/or refers to (see §§ 2.2 to 2.4 and § 2.6), the
binary oppositions it is part of (see § 2.5), and the (social) groups it is used by (see § 2.2).
y is rather similar to i, in the sense that y, like i, specifies a set of related concepts
*d1,d2,…,dn+; however, y also specifies the theoretical, ontological and socio-cultural
context of d. Hence, y consists of two parts: (1) the terminological context, the set t of
concepts related to d such as synonyms, homonyms and other onomasiologically or
semasiologically similar concepts, and (2) the theoretical, ontological, (socio-)linguistic
and/or socio-cultural context p in which d itself is used (or which d is part of).
Substituting p and t for y in D2.5* then results in:
D2.5R d =def. *u,n,p,t,i+  ,
in which the terminological context t can be defined, similarly to D2.7 and D2.8, as
D2.9 t =def. *0S,?S+  ,
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in which 0S is the (ordered) set of onomasiologically and semasiologically related concepts
d  belongs to (d∈0S); and ?S is the (ordered) set of relations between these concepts. If
some older forms of concepts are still in use, which is generally the case, 0S and 0H
overlap considerably. 0H and 0S both specify sets of onomasiologically and
semasiologically related concepts including d itself. An important difference (besides the
fact 0H and 0S merely overlap and do not generally coincide) between i and t is that in
the former concepts (the elements of 0H) are ordered (related) historically or evolutionary,
while there is no 'natural' order of the elements of 0S.
p refers to the context in which d is used. p can refer to a theory; a conceptual framework,
ontology or language; a (conceptual) dialectic or dichotomy; a scientific community; a
socio-cultural group; or a combination of any of these. Conceptual frameworks, ontologies,
languages, theories, etc. can all be interpreted as sets of concepts and relationships between
these concepts: *0O,?O+. And if the defining characteristics of a group, disregarding the
fact whether it is a socio-cultural group or a scientific community, is its language or
conceptual framework, as is suggested by, for example, Winch (and others; see § 2.2.2),
these can be defined as *0O,?O+ as well. Therefore, ontological and (socio-) linguistic
context p is a set of concepts and relationships *0O,?O+. However, these ordered couples
*0O,?O+ (languages, theories, socio-cultural groups, etc.) generally have names or labels,
or could be labelled at least. A complete definition of p then would be a triplet:
D2.10 p =def. *m,0O,?O+  ,
in which m is the name or label of the language, theory, language-game, socio-cultural
group, scientific community, etc. that p refers to (or in other words, d is used in). Like 0H
and 0S, 0O includes d (d∈0O). However, the other elements of 0O specify the other
concepts used in the same ontological and/or (socio-)linguistic context. Hence, contrary to
the elements of 0H and 0S, the elements of 0O are not related onomasiologically or
semasiologically, but by the fact that they are used in the same ontology or language or by
the same social group. In practice, specifying all of the concepts, all the elements of 0O is
not very useful. It is generally only the label m that CA is interested in. A full specification
of a language or theory that d is part of would be a painstaking effort that would add little
to the analysis. Hence an analysis of p is generally limited to the specification of m.
(However, if m is relatively unknown, a short description of p may be necessary.)
Inserting D2.7 tot D2.10 results in:
D2.5a d =def. * u, *0M,?M+, *m,0O,?O+, *0S,?S+, *0H,?H+ +  ,
which shows that a concept is a set of sets (of sets) of (other) concepts and relationships
therebetween. CA, therefore, is translation of the concept to be analysed in sets of further
concepts (see also § 2.2.1). This set theoretical definition of concepts implies that two
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concepts are the same concept only if these sets coincide; hence, if all elements (of the
elements) of d1 and d2 are (completely) identical:
T2.3 ∀d1,d2  [ d1 = d2 ↔ ∀x [ ε(x,d1) ↔ ε(x,d2)] ]  ,
in which ε(x,d) means that x is an element or value (of an element) of an element of d.
T2.3 implies that, for example, d1 and d2 with the same term and the same meaning but
used by different social groups are different concepts. Moreover:
T2.4 for all two natural language concepts d1 and d2 :
∀x [ ( ε(x,d1) ∧ ¬ε(x,d2) ) → ∃y [ y≠x ∧ ε(y,d1) ∧ ¬ε(y,d2) ] ]  ,
which can be summarised in ordinary language as 'differences never come alone'. For any
two concepts that differ in any respect, there is at least one more difference between the
two. Even in the case of synonyms the difference is not limited to distinctive terms or
labels. The two variants have different conceptual histories and different connotations and
are used in different contexts. (Note that, while all other formulas presented above are
analytical statements, T2.4 is, although obvious, not analytical, but an empirically testable
hypothesis.)
D2.5a and T2.4 reconfirm Quine's conclusion that concepts derive their meaning from the
theoretical and socio-linguistic setting they are used in and that the unit of analysis is a
language as a whole rather than a single concept (see § 2.2.1). As Sartori asserted, this is
'outrageously unhelpful advice' (see § 2.3), however. Nevertheless, the model developed
here can be used as a framework for actual CA, as will be shown in the next subsection.
2-7-2-application of the model
Unfortunately, application of the model presented above in CA in social and/or political
science is far less exact or rigorous than the formal model may suggest. CA is not an exact
science, but the application of this model may provide some structure to it at least. The
model suggests some rules for CA, which can be summarised in a two-stage methodology.
The first stage is the mapping stage; the second is the reconstruction stage. The mapping
stage aims at the description of the elements (of the elements) of the analysandum; it is the
goal of the reconstruction stage to provide translations rules or definitions depending on the
type of concept(s) to be analysed.
CA obviously starts with the identification of the analysandum b, the concept or concepts
d to be analysed. CA does not have to be an analysis of a single concept, but if sets of
concepts are analysed, one has to be clear about how the concepts in this set are related and
why the set has to be analysed as a whole. Hence, the analysandum b is a set of first-level
concepts 0A and relationships ?A:
ON CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
83
D2.11 b =def. *0A,?A+  ,
If the analysandum is a single concept, b is a singleton *d+; if for example, a binary
opposition is analysed (see § 2.5), b is a set **d1,d2+,Rbin.op.+. As concepts in binary
oppositions have a history as a pair and (partly) derive their meaning from the opposition,
analysis of the pair is generally preferable to analysis of only one of its elements. It is
important to note that in many cases the relationship between d1 and d2 contains more
information than the bare fact that they are part of a binary opposition (or some other kind
of linguistic framework). In these cases, the relationship itself may be a third concept. If,
for example, d1 and d2 are binary opposed concepts referring to events that are causally
related such that a d1-event causes a d2-event, the relationship between d1 and d2 consists
of three parts: Rbin.op., their relationship within a theory about the causal relationship Rtheory,
and the concept of "causation". Hence, b = **d1,d2,"causation"+,*Rbin.op.,Rtheory++.
In case of the CED, the two labels of d1 and d2 are clear as they are implied in the term
"culture - economy dialectic". The term "dialectic" refers to the binary opposition between
these terms, but does not unambiguously specify the (theoretical) relationships between the
referents of d1 and d2. Hence:
D2.12 bCED = **"culture","economy",drelation+,*Rbin.op.,Rtheory++  ,
in which Rbin.op. links "culture" and "economy" directly, and Rtheory links "culture" and
"economy" to the intermediate drelation.
After identification of the analysandum, the analysans is described in the mapping stage.
The mapping stage gives a complete overview of what different versions and variants of the
concept do and did mean and by whom they are and were used in what contexts. It provides
a 'map' of the conceptual field, the field of (possible) meanings and/or referents of the
different versions and varieties of the concept. The mapping stage reveals its regions
(concepts and clusters thereof) and roads (relationships between concepts).
D5(a) and D2.7 to D2.10 imply that concepts have to be analysed as members of sets of
interrelated (and usually overlapping) concepts (0M, 0H, 0S and 0O) as is summarised in
table 2.3. However, all of these members are concepts themselves and are, therefore,
themselves elements of (further) sets 0M, 0H, 0S and 0O that (may) overlap with 0M, 0H,
0S or 0O of the initial d, but do not necessarily coincide. Hence, in CA practice, a number
of levels in the analysis should be distinguished. First-level analysis is the specification of
*u,n,p,t,i+ of the initial d, the first-level concept; second-level analysis is the
specification of *u,n,p,t,i+ of the second-level concepts, all the other elements of the
sets 0M, 0H, 0S and 0O, specified as parts of the n, i, t and p of the initial d; and so
on. Although in theory the number of levels is infinite, in practice we are not very much
interested in these higher-level analyses. Generally, CA can be limited to the specification
of *u,n,p,t,i+ of the first level concept and *u,n,p+ of the second-level concepts.
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In practice, this means that CA is the specification of a set of second level concepts (or in
fact four of these sets: 0M, 0H, 0S and 0O) and the us, ns and ps of these concepts.
(Note that determining m is usually sufficient in the specification of p.)
table 2.3: conceptual analysis as the specification of conceptual elements
analysandum analysans (specification of …)
u term, label (none)
n meaning *0M,?M+ intension, essential properties, etc.
p ontological and (socio-)
linguistic context
*m,0O,?O+ (labels or names of) contexts of use, language
game(s), language(s), etc.
t terminological context *0S,?S+ synonyms, homonyms, similar concepts, etc.
i historical context *0H,?H+. earlier versions and variants
Because d is an element of 0H and 0S and p specifies the (socio-)linguistic and
ontological contexts the elements of 0H and 0S are used in, specification of the different
elements of d will result in considerable redundancy: the same concepts will show up over
and over again (as elements (of elements) of 0H, 0S and 0O). If a specification of m is
sufficient to describe p, the specification of the us, ns and ms of the elements of 0H and
0S will include all elements of elements of d, with only limited redundancy and in a more
systematic framework (see table 2.4). CA then consists of historical and intensional
mapping: the specification and analysis of i and t respectively. Both mappings specify
sets of concepts, the meanings and contexts thereof and the relationships therebetween, but
the historical mapping aims at explaining the origins and evolution of the concept, while the
intensional mapping is intended to clarify the differences in meaning and use of the concept
and related concepts.
table 2.4: the mapping stage
historical mapping intensional mapping
i t
0 0H = *dH1,dH2,…,dHn+ 0S = *dS1,dS2,…,dSn+
? ?H ?S
u *uH1,uH2,…,uHn+ *uS1,uS2,…,uSn+
n *nH1,nH2,…,nHn+ *nS1,nS2,…,nSn+
m *mH1,mH2,…,mHn+ *mS1,mS2,…,mSn+
If the internal structure of a concept is − more or less − holistic as implied by T2.4, there
does not seem to be a natural order in the specification (or analysis) of the elements of a
concept and therefore, in the order of historical and intensional mapping. Any change
results in other changes; all aspects of the concepts are somehow (either directly or
indirectly) connected. Although T2.4 does not say anything about the kinds of relationships
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that determine the holistic nature of the internal structure of a concept, generally one could
claim that all of the elements of d determine each other. There is an element, however, that
far more strongly determines the others than they determine it. This is the conceptual
history i. Difference in term u or meaning n cannot cause difference in past history, but
past history can and does co-determine the other elements of d. This suggests, that CA as
specification of the elements of d should start with the specification of i, hence with
historical mapping.
Historical mapping is chronological; intensional mapping has no 'natural' order but should
reflect the intensional structure of the concept. This intensional structure is basically a map
of the different clusters of concepts that are more similar to each other than to other
clusters. Intensional structure can be mapped by means of cluster analysis or Formal
Concept Analysis (see § 2.6.2). These techniques can be used to cluster (order) the elements
of 0S by their properties. For example, the elements of 0S could be clustered by the
concepts used in their definitions (the elements of 0M of the elements of 0S), or by their
ontological or (socio-)linguistic context (the ms of the elements of 0S) or (preferably) both.
The result of such analyses would be a map showing which concepts (elements of 0S) are
more similar in meaning and which are more different and in which contexts all of these
concepts are used.
In the second stage, that of reconstruction, the set(s) of interrelated concepts that was
(were) the result of the mapping stage is (are) the starting point(s). The central question in
the reconstruction stage is what measures could and should be taken to minimise confusion
and ambiguity in the use of the terms in the mappings. However, 'minimising confusion and
ambiguity' does not necessarily mean 'providing a single definition'. In many cases, for
example when the analysandum is an 'essentially contested concept' (see § 2.4), the goal of
reconstruction is to supply the translation rules necessary to compare the different versions
of the concept and (in this way) to enable (more) reasonable communication between the
(social) groups and theories using these different versions. For example, in case a single
term u is used for multiple meanings in a single context p, it is generally advisable to
introduce new terms. On the other hand, in case multiple terms u denote the same meaning
in a single context p, it might be better to choose one term. In summary: conceptual
reconstruction is the re-categorisation of the 'conceptual field'.
Conceptual reconstruction, as intended here, deviates strongly from standard practice in
social science. 'The coining of new terms for new concepts is (…) considered, by most
social scientists, to be pretentious and to be a sign of unseemly egotism on the part of the
innovator' (Riggs 1981, p. 13). Nevertheless, concept reconstruction may provide (part of) a
more rigorous ontology for a scientific field, a more stable foundation for building new
theories, and a common language for comparing and evaluating current and earlier theories
in the field.
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2-7-3-the analysis of the CED
In the following chapters, the method proposed here will be applied to the (concepts of the)
culture - economy dialectic (CED). The ultimate objective of the analysis of the CED is to
compare, evaluate and integrate its different theories and variants. Because of the nature of
the CED as a set of very different theories from very different (philosophical, conceptual,
etc.) backgrounds, the goal of CA in this study is not to provide final definitions of
"culture", "economy" and the relationship therebetween (which would be neither possible
nor very useful), but to provide a common language to enable translation, comparison and
integration of the many theories of the CED.
The basic form of the CED is that there is some kind of cultural phenomenon that is
somehow related to some kind of economic phenomenon. Hence, the object of analysis was
identified above as:
D2.12R bCED = **"culture","economy",drelation+,*Rbin.op.,Rtheory++  .
It is nearly impossible to analyse elements of dCED in isolation. However, an analysis of
drelation demands at least some clarity on the concepts of "culture" and "economy". Hence, it
seems obvious to focus on "culture" and "economy" before dealing in depth with the
relationship(s) therebetween. Moreover, drelation may be the most complicated element of 0C
as it refers to complex theories of social phenomena. Chapters 3 to 5 deal with the mapping
stage and the reconstruction stage in the analysis of i and t of "culture" and "economy".
Chapter 6 focuses on operationalisation and measurement of the reconstructed concepts.
The main objective of this research project, however, is not the analysis of these concepts,
but of their relationship, both the relationships between the concepts, ?C, and the
relationships between the referents of the concepts, drelation. Both will be dealt with briefly
in chapters 3 and 5, but will be put centre ground in chapter 7. Chapter 8, finally, will
review the results of the analysis and attempt to assess the relevance of these results to
social science.
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chapter 3
CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF
CULTURE AND ECONOMY
The history of the idea of culture is a record of our reactions, in thought and feeling, to the
changed conditions of our common life.
Raymond Williams 1959, p. 295
(…) civilization itself is the most sensational of departures and the most romantic of
rebellions. By dealing with the unsleeping sentinels who guard the outposts of society, it
tends to remind us that we live in an armed camp, making war with a chaotic world, and
that the criminals, the children of chaos, are nothing but the traitors within our gates.
G.K. Chesterton 1901, pp. 122-123
3-1-introduction
The culture - economy dialectic (CED) belongs to the most fundamental categories of
social science. It has co-determined the disciplinary divisions within social science and
generated a body of theories on causal relationships in either or both directions.
Nevertheless, the CED is surrounded by much conceptual contestation and confusion. The
meanings of the terms in the CED differ widely among theories and scientific disciplines,
but none of these meanings seems to be presented in an explicit and unambiguous form and
different conceptualisations and operationalisations are mixed into an incomprehensible
mess. Hence, conceptual analysis is necessary to shed some light on the CED. (see also §
1.2)
This chapter presents the first, historical part of the mapping stage of conceptual analysis
(CA), as proposed in subsection 2.7.2. The mapping stage entails the specification of two
overlapping sets of concepts: one representing the conceptual history of the CED, i, the
second representing the different usages of the terms and concepts (and related terms and
concepts) of the CED, t. As explained in section 2.7, conceptual mapping of a concept or a
conceptual pair as is the case here should start with conceptual history i, which is the
focus of this chapter. The specification of t, the intensional mapping of the concepts, will
be dealt with in chapter 4.
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In conceptual history, both the onomasiology (focus on meaning) and the semasiology
(focus on the term) (see § 2.4.1) are important. Conceptual analysis deals both with
concepts having similar meanings but different terms or labels, and with concepts having
the same term or label and a different meaning. These onomasiologically and
semasiologically related concepts are the key concepts of the CED.
Baring and Cashford (1991) and Barth (1992) have suggested that the human tendency to
think in binary oppositions (or 'concept dichotomization' as Barth calls it) is related to the
fact that there are two sexes: male and female (see § 2.5.1). In Babylonian mythology,
Chinese philosophy (yin and yang) and Western thought, the male and female are closely
linked (by connotation) to other concepts. Table 3.1 gives some examples:
table 3.1: connotations of the male and female (examples)
male female
spirit / mind body
order chaos
light dark
active passive
reason passion
culture nature
As explained briefly in subsection 2.5.3 this male - female dichotomy is strongly related to
the CED. In fact, there is a direct route from the male - female dichotomy to the CED and
to the related culture - nature dichotomy. Several of the connotations in table 3.1 are
intermediate stages in this route, as was shown in figure 2.4 (in § 2.5.3). In studying the
conceptual history of the CED the best starting point may be somewhere in the middle of
that figure. One could start at the male - female dichotomy at the top of the figure (and at
the beginning of the chain), but this dichotomy is far too general to be of much interest. The
distinct historical development of the CED started with the opposition of reason and
passion. Hence, that is were the historical analysis in this chapter starts.
Besides "reason" and "passion", figure 2.4 points out a number of other key concepts in the
CED, of which "civilisation", as an intermediate between reason and economy, and of
course, "culture" and "economy" themselves are the most important. The CED, however, is
also strongly related to the culture - nature dichotomy, in which "culture" represents the
male side of the dichotomy or dialectic rather then the female side. Key concepts in this
route, besides "culture" and "nature" are "society" (or more vaguely: "man" or "mankind";
note that the concept of "man" is not used to refer to male persons but to people as a
collective whole) and "environment". All of these concepts will be analysed in this and the
following chapter (but not equally extensively).
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This chapter deals with the historical and intensional mapping of the concepts of "culture"
and "economy" (and their most important onomasiological predecessors). After this
introduction, section 3.2 begins of with the reason - passion dialectic (and related
dialectics), the rise of social science and the introduction of the concept of civilisation.
Section 3.3 gives a brief historical overview of the semasiology and onomasiology of
"culture", after which section 3.4 deals with the opposition of the new concepts of
"civilisation" and "culture" and the conceptual dissolution thereof. The latter resulted in the
introduction of "economy" in the CED, which has as semasiological history of its own.
Section 3.5 deals with this semasiological history of "economy", with the introduction of
"entrepreneurship" in the CED, and with the late 20th century developments in the
psychology of culture. Section 3.6 deals with the culture - nature or man - environment
dichotomy, the other, but related, route of figure 2.4. Section 3.7, finally presents some
critical comments on the analysis of the CED. (The next chapter attempts to intensionally
map and reconstruct the 'conceptual field' (see § 2.7.2).)
3-2-reason, passion and civilisation
The end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th were revolutionary times. A
number of strongly interrelated revolutions changed the world and how we see it. These
revolutions include the industrial revolution, the French revolution and the conceptual
revolution that Koselleck (1979; 1987) refers to as the Sattelzeit, and Foucault (1966) as an
epistemic transformation (see also § 2.4.1 and Heilbron, Magnusson & Wittrock (eds.)
1998; therein especially Wokler 1998). The French revolution and similar political turmoil
in other countries brought about a conceptual novelty that can hardly be overestimated: the
invention of 'the social'. In feudal and earlier times, philosophers and scientists did not
recognise 'the social' as a distinct sphere of reality. There was no society; only the state and
its subjects (either households or individuals). (Hence, Thatcher's famous claim that '[t]here
is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families' (in
Woman's Own 31 October 1987), is a truly medieval point of view.) What we would call
"society" now was part of the property of a ruler and was studied as such. 'Pre-social social
science' was mainly a normative science of the management of the state as a very large
household.
Political change at the end of the 18th century gave the state's subjects a voice of their own.
Moreover, the Jacobinian destruction of the state in France necessitated the formation and
legitimisation of a new state. This resulted in the introduction of a new category besides the
traditional state - subject (individual or household) dichotomy: society (see § 3.2.2). Before
the invention of 'the social', earlier forms of the CED referred to individuals and individual
behaviour rather than to social phenomena. Core concepts in these earlier forms were
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"reason" and "passion". The concept of "culture" itself was not yet part of the dialectic: it
referred to a process of individual development and education (see § 3.3.1).
The subsections below deal with the birth and development of the CED in these
revolutionary times. Subsection 3.2.1 focuses on the reason - passion dialectic and a small
number of related concepts ("will" and "habit" especially). Subsection 3.2.2 deals with the
rise of the social sciences and the transition of the earlier forms of the CED into a dialectic
of theories of social reality.
3-2-1-reason, habit and passion
Human behaviour is often considered to be the result of some kind of dialectic of reason
and passion. It is difficult to say exactly when this notion was first proposed, but it was
already implicitly present in myths and legends thousands of years old (for example in the
myth of the Mother god; see § 2.5.1). The first explicit statements on this dialectic can
probably be found in Greek Antiquity. For most of the Greek philosophers (but not all!),
reason was the highest faculty of man. Plato (Phaedrus) likened reason to a charioteer
dominating his unruly horses (the passions). The Stoics condemned all passion(s) in favour
of reason.
In Medieval philosophy, man was considered to be a rational being. According to
Augustine, the human soul is a rational substance made to rule the body. Thomas Aquinas
asserted that God has endowed man with reason, which implies that reason has a function
and that man is obliged to God to perfect this function. Contrary to Stoic philosophy, the
passions were not (completely) rejected. Augustine distinguished two passions, two
mutually exclusive drives of human behaviour: self-love and love of God. The latter − of
course − being good and producing desirable effects such as virtue or pity.
Generally, reason was awarded the dominant role in the dialectic. Reason should (and
could) control the passions. Spinoza, Kant and Hegel claimed that "freedom" means 'acting
according to reason' and that acting according to the passions is unfree. In a letter to an
anonymous critic, Spinoza (1674) explained his position:
This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in
the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby
that desire has been determined. Thus an infant believes that it desires milk freely; an angry
child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance, a timid child thinks he wishes freely to run
away. Again a drunken man thinks, that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words,
which afterwards, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid. So the delirious, the
garrulous and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their
mind, not that they are carried away by impulse. As this misconception is innate in all men,
it is not easily conquered. (pp. 390-1)
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Although 'man is necessarily always a prey to his passions' (Spinoza 1677, p. 194), free and
virtuous men are 'led solely by reason' (p. 232); freedom comes from understanding your
passions. Hence, while reason should guide our behaviour, it often does not. Hume (1740)
took a further step by claiming that the passions not only control reason but that they should
control it: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend
to any other office than to serve and obey them' (§ 2.3.3 / p. 462).
Passion (or the passions) was (were) not the sole enemy of reason, neither was it the only
concept on the 'cultural side' of these early forms of the CED. Reason was also opposed to
habit, tradition and authority. For example, by Descartes (1637), who pointed out that habit
and example are generally more convincing than knowledge or reason. As a result thereof,
there is nothing so outrageous or absurd that some people do not accept it as a standard; and
nothing so implausible that some philosopher did not believe in it and assert it. Descartes
wanted to free himself from these imprints of habits, traditions and examples by the means
of reasonable (radical) doubt. (e.g. Gellner 1992)
The Enlightenment is sometimes dubbed 'the Age of Reason'. Indeed, "reason" was one of
its core concepts. The philosophers of the Enlightenment strongly believed in the powers of
human reason. They were, however, less clear about the nature of reason. Particularly after
Kant − who used the concept of "Vernunft" (reason) with a variety of meanings − did the
concept become increasingly unclear. However, within the context of the CED, two main
lines of thought regarding the meaning of the concept of "reason" can be distinguished. The
first relates reason to self-interest, the second to logic.
The notion of self-interest or interest is historically related to Augustine's passion of self-
love. Augustine's term "self-love" was replaced by "self-interest" because the first was a
religious term. The term "self-interest" appeared for the first time in the work of
Guicciardini (1512/30), who noted that human behaviour is driven more by self-interest
than by reason or morals. The notion was further elaborated in the 16th and 17th centuries
in political theory, natural law and moral philosophy. In natural law theory, two competing
theories existed. According to Grotius, men are inclined to social life, while Hobbes and
Pufendorf (separately) claimed that men are driven by amour-propre (self-interest). In the
16th and 17th centuries, moral philosophers and political theorists asserted that men are
driven by passions and interest (see also § 3.2.2 on moral philosophy). Before the end of the
16th century, "interest" became one of the central concepts in political theory (Heilbron
1998). The rise of the concept of  "self-interest" in moral and political philosophy, the
predecessor of social science (see § 3.2.2) is explained by Heilbron (1998):
The notion of "interest" (…) gained intellectual prominence (…) by suggesting a more
realistic conceptualization of human nature and human action; and (…) by providing a
conceptual basis for new forms of political, social and economic theory. (p. 77)
In the 17th and 18th centuries, self-interest increasingly became part of reason. Spinoza's
free man acts (reasonably) in his self-interest. Similar ideas can be found in, for example,
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Hume (1740), Voltaire and the developing economic literature of the (late) 18th century,
eventually resulting in the invention of homo economicus, whose behaviour is fully
determined by reasonable self-interest:
Ceux qui ont dit que l'amour de nous-mêmes est la base de tous nos sentiments et de toutes
nos actions, ont donc eu grande raison dans l'Inde, en Espagne, et dans toute la terre
habitable (…) (Voltaire 1764, p. 62)
Like, Spinoza, Voltaire regarded rational self-interest as virtuous: 'C'est l'amour-propre bien
dirigé qui fait les hommes de bon sens véritablement vertueux' (1770 p. 440).
Interestingly, self-interest developed from a passion into an aspect of reason. It is, however,
nothing more than an aspect of reason and moreover, an aspect that can be missed. Self-
interest alone does not define reason, and reason can be interpreted and/or defined without
reference to self-interest. There are, however, few explicit definitions of "reason".
Implicitly, "reason" is generally related to logic. According to Hume, reason is
mathematical and logical reasoning, and to Kant, reason refers to understanding
(Rotenstreich 1985). One of the most thorough analyses of the concept of "reason" in this
tradition is Miró Quesada's (1963) Apuntes para una teoría de la razón. Miró Quesada
defines reason as 'la facultad del conocimiento lógico-mathemático'  (p. 208). Interestingly,
Miró Quesada shows that this definition, to some extent, undermines the Enlightenment
belief in the absolute authority of reason. Miró Quesada explains that 'el conocimiento
racional se manifesta así como un dinamismo coordinado entre la intuición y la
formalización' (p. 315). This process (dinamismo coordinado) moves asymptotically in the
direction of (reason as) logico-mathematical formalisation (or formalisability). The process
is necessarily asymptotical, because Gödel's (1931) theorem implies that reason as a formal
logico-mathematical 'system' cannot be complete. Hence, reason is limited; there will
always remain an intuitive element. (Some two centuries earlier Rousseau (1762) also
reached the conclusion that reason is limited. In his opinion, however, the gap was to be
filled with sincerity (e.g. Melzer 1996).)
A final key concept in the pre-social history of the CED is that of "will", which is generally
understood as referring to the product of the sum-total of drives and motives that determine
human behaviour. In a sense, will is an intermediate between drives and behaviour and the
different theories about the relationship between reason and the passions are theories about
the formation of will. Will is produced by habits, passions and reason. Will is irrational or
at least partially irrational, but reason without will is pointless. Reason alone cannot
determine a goal for action; will can and does. Hence, every rational choice is ultimately
grounded in (irrational) will. (Kant 1788; 1790; Rotenstreich 1985)
Kant's (1790) interpretation of "will" as the faculty of desire and as the ultimate source of
action strongly influenced Fichte and Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's (1818/44) will
however, is completely devoid of reason. "Will" is a mindless, aimless and non-rational
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urge that is both the foundation of all our drives and of the world itself. Schopenhauer's
most important student Nietzsche (1872/86) explained ancient Greek culture in terms of a
dialectic of (Schopenhauerian) will and reason as creative forces. Originally, Greek culture
was Dionysic since it was based on will. However, the Appolonic reason slowly took over.
According to Nietzsche, a healthy culture is characterised by a balance between the two
forces.
Traditionally, reason is opposed to a number of irrational co-determinants of human
behaviour: the passions, habit, tradition, authority, example, and will. While the exact
nature of the conception of this dialectical relationship and the dominant factor therein has
changed over time, the dialectic itself seems to be rather universal. With the invention of
'the social' in the last quarter of the 18th century, the dialectic was applied to a new subject:
rationality and irrationality of and in society.
3-2-2-social science, Enlightenment and "civilisation"
While the concept of 'the social' was invented at the end of the 18th century, the term
"society" has an older conceptual history and society; likewise, though society became an
object of study only in the 19th century (e.g. Wagner 2001), social science has some
predecessors as well. Seventeenth century science was divided into natural philosophy,
moral philosophy or morals, and politics. Natural philosophy encompassed what we now
would call physics, chemistry, biology, and so forth; moral philosophy or morals could be
compared to the whole of economics, politics, anthropology and sociology; and politics
dealt with laws and all things official. Moral philosophy and politics together covered the
whole of social reality. In the 1760s the term "moral and political science" was used to
cover the whole of these fields. The term "social science" was coined only in the 1790s in
circles around Condorcet (Head 1982).
Moral philosophy and moral and political science were, however, not social sciences as we
now conceive these. These fields were normative sciences of behaviour and management.
French Moralistes asked the question how one should behave. Most importantly, moral and
political philosophers studied the management of households in general and of the state as
the supreme household in particular. Moreover, moral philosophy could not be a social
science in the modern sense, as the (modern) concept of 'the social' itself was still missing.
The onomasiological history of "society" starts at the end of the 18th century. The
semasiological history, however, starts at a much earlier date, as the term "society" was
widely used before. Before the 18th century the term "society" was applied only to small
institutional units between the state and the household. Societies were social circles or
(legally instituted) associations. In the middle of the 18th century the term was used in
combinations such as "political society" and "civil society" to refer to the state as an
aggregate of people with a common goal. "Society" in this sense was more or less the
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equivalent of the state from the viewpoint of contract-theory. Only at the end of the 18th
century was "civil society" increasingly regarded to be something distinct from the state
(and the individual or household) (e.g. Wagner 2001). In the same period, technological and
socio-economic change enabled societies in the traditional sense, as social circles, to grow
considerably. The term society, therefore, was used to denote ever-larger groups of people.
This, combined with the concept of "civil society", was almost enough for the conception
of 'the social'; it just needed a catalyst. The political changes at the end of the 18th century
were this catalyst. (e.g. Wokler 1998; Wagner 2001; see also § 3.2 above)
Political change at the end of the 18th century not only necessitated the introduction of 'the
social' as a new category, but also the study thereof: social science. New political
conditions demanded a science that delivered more than suggestions for good management
of the state as household. There was a fundamental need to understand society and the
effects of policies and politics (Wagner 1998). As a result, there was a transition from
moral and political science to empirical social science.
The development of social science and the invention of 'the social' were closely linked to
the 18th century Enlightenment. Most of the important philosophers and scientists of the
Enlightenment were concentrated in France and Scotland. The Enlightenment was built on
the foundations of Natural Law and experimental or natural philosophy (early natural
sciences; see above). Its core concepts were "reason" and "civilisation". From Natural Law
(e.g. Pufendorf, Hobbes, Mandeville) the Enlightenment inherited the supposition that
human nature is the same, whatever the circumstances, and that therefore, there is a 'natural
order'. The French Physiocrats (early economists) argued that this (natural) order, the
structure of social reality, should and could be explained by application of the methods of
the natural sciences (experimental philosophy). This methodological position, however,
gave birth to two distinct, but not completely independent, approaches in social science: a
strongly rationalist approach, focusing on deductive theorising based on generalisation,
logic and mathematics; and a more empirical approach. The first of these flourished in
economics, the second was the origin of sociology, but also − to a certain extent − of the
Counter-Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment was characterised by an unshakeable belief in progress and the power of
reason. These were combined in the concept of "civilisation", which can be regarded as the
battle cry of the Enlightenment. In the beginning of the 18th century the concept of
"civilisation" appeared simultaneously in both French and English. The term was coined
independently by Adam Ferguson, a predecessor of sociology from the Scottish
Enlightenment, and the Marquis de Mirabeau, a French Physiocrat (early economist).
However, the casual use of the term by Ferguson and Mirabeau suggests that the concept
had been introduced in spoken language earlier. (Febvre 1930; Benveniste 1953; den Boer
2001b) "Civilisation" came from the Medieval Latin civilitas, meaning (a.o.) political
community, humanity, citizenry, city life, or something similar.. The concept of
"civilisation", however, developed a far broader meaning. At the end of the 18th century, it
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was used to refer to (1) the Enlightenment views of man and society; (2) to (a desirable
stage in) the development of societies; and (3) as a comprehensive term for the Christian or
Western world.
"Civilisation" in the first sense refers to the Enlightenment view of society as a social
structure that is not based on virtue but on 'organised exchange among self-interested
individuals' (Heilbron 1998, 95). It is rational self-interest (see § 3.2.1) on a social scale. In
this sense, "civilisation" is the social equivalent of reason. In its second sense, civilisation is
either a process or a stage therein. Civilisation as a process or project is the Bildung
(education) of humanity or society as a whole (Reill 1998). It is in this meaning of
"civilisation" that the influence of the belief in progress is most clear. In its last sense,
"civilisation" does not refer to a stage in this process, but to the part of the world that is on
its highest stage: the West. It is the first meaning, that of civilisation as the social equivalent
of reason that is most interesting here. Civilisation in this sense would later be opposed to
the social equivalent of tradition, example, the passions, will, and so forth (see § 3.2.1):
"culture".
As mentioned before, the Enlightenment inherited from Natural Law a 'universalist' view of
man and society. In this view, man is a rational being and all men world-wide are alike. In
other words: human nature is universal. Likewise, society is a kind of universal natural
order (or at least, it should be). These are the views covered by the Enlightenment concept
of "civilisation". These are also the views that became the foundations of classical (and
neo-classical) economics. The science of economics was born, with the concept of
"civilisation", in the 18th century Enlightenment (e.g. Skinner 1990). Scientific
specialisation, however, was rather unusual until far into the 18th century. Scholars tended
to occupy themselves with numerous aspects of nature and society at the same time. Early
social scientific thought was strongly normative, more art than science. Only late in the
18th century did the normative nature of early social science slowly change into a more
explanatory approach. At the same time, specialisation started and the first social sciences
arose.
The foundations of classical economics were laid by the Scottish moral philosopher Adam
Smith in his Wealth of nations (1776), a synthesis of earlier work by mainly the Physiocrats
(Winch 1978; Wittrock, Heilbron & Magnusson 1998). As it was with the Enlightenment in
general, Smith's methodology was influenced by both Natural Law and natural philosophy.
He used both empirical analyses of historical data and rationalistic arguments based on
universal and rational man. After Smith, economics was pushed into a strictly rationalistic
direction by his major students Ricardo and Senior. Economics became a science of logical
and mathematical constructions on an empirically shaky foundation of universal and
rational man: homo economicus. Mill (1844) tried to return economics to a broader
Smithian methodology, but he had very little success. (e.g. Landreth & Colander 1994)
Extreme rationalism still dominates economics.
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While economics grew from the rationalist strand in the Enlightenment and slowly became
an extreme case of rationalism and universalism, sociology, on the other hand, started of as
an empirical investigation of society. The most important predecessor of sociology is
Montesquieu, who combined normative and descriptive elements in his famous De l'esprit
des lois (1748). Although some other scholars attempted to empirically investigate aspects
of social behaviour in the 18th century (e.g. Mandeville 1714; Ferguson 1767; see Barnes
1917 for an overview of pre-19th century 'sociology'), sociology became an independent
science only in the 19th century in the work of (a.o.) Saint-Simon, Comte and later Marx
and Durkheim. As a predecessor of sociology, however, Montesquieu is of great
importance, not just for sociology, but for Enlightenment itself, and especially for the
reaction thereupon: the Counter-Enlightenment.
Montesquieu's De l'esprit des lois was an empirical study of the interrelationships between
social and natural phenomena, morals, habits, social institutions and (most importantly) the
laws within different societies. Montesquieu distinguished a number of different types of
societies. This type or nature of a society is the result of (a.o.) physical geography,
psychological nature of the people, cultural patterns, history, religion and economic mode
of being. Al these factors are part of a nation's culture or character. The equilibrium of the
parts in this cultural whole determines the legal and political shape of the society. Hence,
the character (l'esprit) of a nation determines – to a large extent – the nature of its laws (des
lois). Montesquieu's empirical work dismissed the universalistic view of man and society,
which dominated Enlightenment thought. Strongly influenced by Montesquieu, James
Steuart started his An inquiry into the principles of political economy (1767) with: 'Man we
find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of
self-interest, expediency, duty, or passion. In this he is alike, in nothing else' (quoted in
Whitaker 1940, p. 731). At a first glance, this may seem to be a middle position between
universalism and anti-universalism or even a defence of universalism, but Steuart claimed
that the (combinations of) motives of men are so varied that there can be no such thing as a
universal man.
Far less influential (at first), but no less important, was the work of the philosopher of
history Giambattista Vico. His major work, Scienza nuova (1725/44), was written in Italian,
which seriously hampered the initial spread of his ideas. (Later, he greatly influenced early
comparative social science and linguistics, cultural psychology and sociology; e.g. Olson
1993.) Vico (1725/44) concluded from an abundance of (empirical) historical data, that
history is subject to a number of laws:
The order of ideas must follow the order of institutions. This was the order of human
institutions: first the forests, after that the huts, then the villages, next the cities, and finally
the academies. (§§ 238-239)
For the nations will be seen to develop in conformity with this division, by a constant and
uninterrupted order of causes and effects present in every nation (...) (§ 915)
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Societies develop according to a fixed scheme in which each stage involves different
problems. Hence, in each stage societies, develop the institutions, values and habits to deal
with the problems that are characteristic for that stage. According to Vico, there is no such
thing as universal human nature: 'the nature of man is not, as has long been supposed, static
and unalterable or even unaltered (…) it does not so much as contain even a central kernel
or essence, which remains identical through change (…)' (Berlin 1976, p. xvi). (In fact,
Vico thought that men are similar across cultures in only a very small number of respects.
He suggested, for example, that all men bury their dead (§ 333). Of course the fact of the
matter is that even in this respect there is no universal man.)
The Enlightenment ideal of progress, which was especially strong in France and Germany,
was reflected in the philosophy of history of (a.o.) Vico, Condorcet, Turgot, Hegel and
Herder. The empirical confirmation of this ideal − as theory − by Vico and Montesquieu,
however, implied a rejection of the (strongly related) univeralism of the Enlightenment. In
other words: early (empirical) social science dismissed the idea of universal man. The
social and human diversity observed by (a.o.) Vico and Montesquieu was later named
"culture" (see § 3.3.1). The Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism would make "culture"
their core concept. As a reaction to the Enlightenment, the passions were prioritised over
reason. Similarly the Enlightenment worldview of universal and rational civilisation was
replaced by irrational, traditional and diverse culture. Lovejoy (1941) summarises
Romanticism as three ideas: (1) an organic relationship between individuals and the wholes
they are part of; (2) the primacy of process (and struggle) over (final) states; and (3) a
positive valuation of diversity in opinion, taste, life style, and the like.
The Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism produced new heroes and new ideologies.
The new heroes were passionate warriors rather than rational scientists (see for example the
works of Nietzsche) and the new ideologies (nationalism, fascism and conservatism)
favoured tradition, passion and authority rather than reason. In the 20th and 21st centuries,
the Romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment would result in the Second World War,
fundamentalist terrorism (both Christian and Muslim) and post-modernism in science.
Chesterton's (1901) claim, that 'civilization itself is (…) the most romantic of rebellions' (p.
122), quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is a nice − but also a bit overblown (!) −
illustration of the tension between Enlightenment and its reaction. Enlightenment and the
belief in civilisation were a rebellion indeed, a rebellion against Christian dogmatism,
traditions and irrationality. Confusingly, Chesterton describes this rebellion as romantic
("utopian" might have been a better term). Note, however, that there is no capital R. The
Enlightenment rebellion may have been a romantic rebellion in the sense that its belief in
universalism and rationality were hardly realistic; it certainly was not a Romantic rebellion
(with capital R). Romanticism itself was the rebellion against the rebellion, a dismissal of
reason and civilisation, a return to 'a chaotic world' and 'the children of chaos' (Chesterton
1901, p. 123).
RETHINKING THE CULTURE – ECONOMY DIALECTIC
98
3-2-3-summary
Reason was traditionally opposed to the passions. Together they determined behaviour.
With the introduction of 'the social' and the concept of "society" and the rise of the social
sciences in the late 18th century, the concept of "reason" was lifted to this new level and
gave birth to "civilisation". Civilisation was the social equivalent of the Enlightenment
ideal of reason. Reason was the Enlightenment's sword; civilisation was its battle cry.
Culture, on the other hand, was (and is) the social equivalent of reason's enemies: habit,
authority, passion, etc.:
Reason appears as a method, and in effect as the only method, of procuring truth. At the
same time, Reason is a means of escaping those dread enemies of truth, custom and
example. It brings liberation from mere non-rigorous and hence error-prone, error-
perpetuating accretion and accumulation of ideas, from an unfastidious involvement in, and
corruption by, the world; in brief, from indulgence in mere culture, a set of ideas that is
contingent and bound to specific communities and periods. Reason is purification. By
contrast, culture is corruption-on-earth. (Gellner 1992, p. 55)
While Enlightenment and its counterpart, Romanticism, may seem diametrically opposed,
there are, nevertheless, interesting similarities. Both are strongly utopian, as illustrated by
Chesterton above, and in both "nature" is a key concept. The perceptions of nature,
however, are radically different. While the Enlightenment focuses on nature as regulated by
laws that can be discovered by man, the Romantic perception of nature is aesthetic rather
than scientific. The Enlightened nature is structured and reasonable, while Romantic nature
is lush, chaotic and completely unreasonable.
The next section (§ 3.3) focuses on the conceptual history of "culture". Section 3.4 deals
with the culture - civilisation dialectic as a stage in the historical development in the CED.
3-3-conceptual history of "culture"
The concept of "culture" was introduced at the end of the 18th century in the Counter-
Enlightenment to describe the diversity of beliefs, rules and practices among peoples as
found and described by some of the predecessors of social science (see § 3.2.2). "Culture"
became the opposite of "civilisation" as 'social reason', "culture" came to denote social
unreason, it was the social equivalent of tradition, example, passions, will, and so forth (see
§ 3.2.1). The history of the concept of "culture", however, started well before the Counter-
Enlightenment.
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Conceptual historians have been researching the conceptual history of "culture" for a long
time. Important contributions include Niederman (1941), Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952);
Williams (1959); Perpeet (1976); Fisch (1991) and den Boer (2001b) (see also O'Hear
1998; Schweder 2001). The onomasiological history of "culture", however, remains largely
ignored. Generally, the only concept related to "culture" that is dealt with by conceptual
historians is "civilisation". Nevertheless, there are some strongly related concepts that must
be investigated to derive at a full(er) picture of the conceptual history of "culture". Hence,
this section deals both with the semasiological history of "culture" (§ 3.3.1) and its
onomasiological history (§ 3.3.2) (see also § 2.4.1).
3-3-1-the semasiology of "culture"
Contrary to "civilisation", "culture" is not a new word. Its earliest (known) form is the Latin
cultura, meaning tilling. In English, this meaning of "culture" subsists in "agriculture" and
"cultivation". Besides the literal agricultural meaning of the word, it was also used
metaphorically in cultura animi (e.g. in Cicero's Tusculan disputations) as an individual
process of intellectual development. This metaphorical use of cultura resurfaces in the 17th
century in the work of (a.o.) Hobbes and Bacon. Interestingly, "culture" is not the only
agricultural analogy related to learning and intellectual development. The verb to "learn"
itself comes from old-Germanic leis and/or Latin lira, both meaning furrow. One of the
nicest examples of these agricultural analogies can be found in Bacon's The advancement of
learning (1605), wherein he uses the phrase 'the Georgics of mind', referring to Vergilius
Georgica, an ancient handbook on (types of) agriculture (den Boer 2001b).
Throughout the 17th and 18th century, the concept of "culture" was used mainly as an
abbreviation of cultura animi, as an alternative to German Bildung (in the 19th and 20th
century it was sometimes still used in this sense). "Culture" in this sense was an individual
process of intellectual development, but could also refer to accomplishments in this
process. A "cultured man" was a well-educated, erudite man.
According to Guadarrama González (1999), 'a partir de Kant el concepto de cultura (…) se
manejaría fundalmente como liberación de la necesidad natural' (p. 61). Indeed culture as
Bildung can be interpreted as such, but this concept is essentially similar to cultura animi
which predates Kant by nearly two millennia. Moreover, even the traditional agricultural
meaning of the concept could be interpreted as a liberación de la necesidad natural. While
Guadarrama was wrong pointing at Kant as a dividing line, he is right in his assessment that
culture has been interpreted as liberation from natural necessity. This includes the late 18th
century introduction of "culture" as a social category. As such, the concept was originally
an analogy to Bildung or cultura animi. It was the application of these labels for individual
development, for the individual liberation from natural necessity to the − recently
discovered − social world (see § 3.2.2).
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The introduction of culture as a social category in the end of the 18th century may,
however, have been a reintroduction. The very first use of cultura as a social category is
traced by Hirsch (1925) to Pufendorf (1672). In later German sources (e.g. Niederman
1941; Fisch 1991) this is reproduced uncritically. However, Pufendorf used the concept
only in a very limited number of occasions and without any emphasis. Moreover, as
Pufendorf's work predates the invention of 'the social' (see § 3.2.2), he can only be credited
for the introduction of culture as a social category if he is credited for the introduction of
the idea of a separate social world as well. Pufendorf's concept of cultura is more political
institutional than social, however. He used it to refer to more modern rather than primitive
or 'natural' states (or political institutions in general). Furthermore, as it was not the Latin
version of his work, but the French translation, in which Pufendorf's dichotomy cultura -
statu naturalis was translated as société civile  - état naturel, which was widely read (in the
far less influential German translation, cultura was translated as Bürgerlicher stand),
Pufendorf had no influence whatsoever on the genesis of "culture" as a social category
(Den Boer 2001b).
The first influential use of "culture" as a social category can be found in the work of the
German philosopher of history Herder (1784-91), who was strongly influenced by
Montesquieu (e.g. Spitz 1955). "Culture" was a key concept in Herder's thought. According
to Herder, different peoples have different cultures, which only blossom in the area where
that people (that culture), 'belongs'. Cultures develop in stages as 'eine Kette der Kultur' (p.
408), but not as a calm stream, 'sondern vielmehr [wie] den Sturz eines Waldwassers von
den Gebirgen' (p. 410). This development can neither be stopped, nor return to its origins:
'Wir schwimmen weiter; nie aber kehrt der Strom zu seiner Quelle zurück, als ob er nie
entronnen wäre' (p. 413). It is an inevitable and irreversible process of development to a
common higher Humanität. Interestingly, in this utopian perspective, the Enlightenment
belief in progress returns. Nevertheless, Herder was one of the founding fathers of the
Counter-Enlightenment and of nationalism.
The concept of "culture" in the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism referred to a
worldview based on difference, tradition and irrationality rather than universalism and
reason. The resulting dialectic of culture and civilisation as worldviews and spheres of
social reality is the subject of section 3.4. The terms of "culture" and "civilization" were,
however, not universally regarded as referring to completely distinct 'things'. In 1871,
Tylor, for example, published the most widely quoted definition of "culture" (see also §
3.4.2):
Culture or Civilisation, taken in its ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society. (p.1)
Most later definitions, operationalisations and interpretations seem to be special cases or
elaborations of Tylor's definition (see § 4.2); at least, they do not deviate fundamentally
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from the Tylerian definition (e.g. Peterson 1979; Brumann 1999). Even fashionable variants
of the concept such as "mass culture" and "organisational culture" all seem to be special
applications of "culture" in a more or less Tylorian sense.
Besides the use of the concept to refer to an individual's intellectual development (cultura
animi) or to 'that complex whole' (Tylor), it has also been used to refer to the (fine) arts.
"Culture" in this sense is the whole of the artistic repertory of a society. Although this
branch of the conceptual tree sprung of the same stem, that of cultura animi, it is
completely unrelated to the interpretation of "culture" as a social category. Confusingly,
however, the field of cultural economics deals with the economics of culture and the
'cultural industry' in this sense, not with the relationships between culture as a social factor
and the economy. Similarly, several scholars wrote on economic threats to culture as 'the
arts'. These writings and cultural economics, however, are not part of the CED, neither is
the concept of "culture" as the (fine) arts relevant to the conceptual history (and analysis in
general) of the CED.
Some adherents to traditional interpretations of "culture" as a process of individual
intellectual development or as the most profound achievements (in their opinion) of a
society (including the arts) are appalled by the modern anthropological notion of "culture".
Fairly recently, for example, Lasky (2002), in a hilariously elitist defence of the traditional
view on "culture", attacked Tylor's notion of "primitive culture":
Culture by very definition could not be primitive; it was among the highest achievements of
mankind. It was not merely descriptive but prescriptive; it was evaluative, judgmental. It
called attention to standards of tested excellence in art, music and literature, and even to
humanist aspirations in social behavior. (p. 74)
Recently, Busche (2000) distinguished four basic meanings (Grundbeduetungen) of
"culture": (1) 'das formgebend veredelnde Bearbeiten und Pflegen natürlicher Anlagen' (p.
70) as in the classical interpretation; (2) culture as the product of (good) education and
personal development ('Kultur, die man hat'; p. 76); (3) culture as the characteristic
traditions, institutions, ways of life and thought in which peoples and periods are different
from each other ('Kultur, in der man lebt'; p. 77); and (4) culture as the products of arts,
philosophy and science, that can be created and worshiped. Some five decades earlier, Eliot
(1948) attempted to reconcile the different interpretations of "culture". He regarded
development to be the key aspect of "culture" and distinguished three senses of the concept
depending on whether it refers to 'the development of an individual, of a group or class, or
of a whole society' (p. 21). "Culture" in the traditional sense refers to the first of these,
while Herder's concept of "culture" refers to the latter. The different senses of culture are,
though irreducible, not completely independent: 'the culture of the individual cannot be
isolated from that of the group, and (…) the culture of the group cannot be abstracted from
that of the whole of society' (Eliot 1948, p. 24) (see also Sapir 1924).
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Until the 1880s in Germany and the 1910s in English-speaking countries (e.g. Stocking
1968; Kalmar 1987), "culture" was never used in the plural. Culture was considered to be a
more or less singular process of development or as a stage therein. Gradually the
evolutionary or developmental aspect of the concept eroded, leaving a bewildering variety
of "cultures", all of equal value to the modern anthropologists (see § 3.4.2).
3-3-2-the onomasiology of "culture"
While semasiology points out unrelated and often non-relevant concepts with the same
label, such as "culture" as the (fine) arts, onomasiology researches concepts with a more or
less similar meaning but a different label. There are (at least) four such concepts in the
history of "culture". These are the Medieval Latin concepts of gens and natio and the 19th
century derivative thereof: "race"; and the 19th century German concept of Volksgeist.
The concepts of gens and natio were used widely since the early Middle Ages. Both were
translated as (a.o.) race, nation, people, tribe, family − sometimes even in the space of a
single work. The concepts of gens and natio were associated with (or even defined as)
descent, customs, language and law. While descent was essential in Medieval thought on
gens and natio, there was an important and consistent emphasis on the socio-cultural
aspects of the concepts and on the influence of environment thereon (see § 3.6.1). (Bartlett
2001). With the replacement of Latin with the native language of scientific writers, the
terms gens and natio had to be translated. As there were no obvious candidates in most
languages, this was a slow and messy process. Several alternatives were used, including
"people", "nation" and "race" (e.g. Sommer 1984). In the 16th century this led to phrases
such as the "Christian race" and the "race of good men" (Sommer 1984, p. 141). After the
introduction of "culture", these terms were still used, mainly because they all developed
different connotations (including the concept of "culture" itself, which was closely linked to
the Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism and to (German) nationalism).
Not withstanding these different connotations, the concept of "race" was in the 19th century
widely used to mean a range of things similar to that what the concept of "gens" was used
to denote before. The concept referred to (a.o.) people, mankind, class, or any other kind of
social group (e.g. Schank 2000). In 1839, for example, the newly founded French Sociétié
Ethnologique distinguished the following elements of the study of race(s): 'l'organisation
physique, le caractère intellectuel et moral, les langues et les traditions historiques' (quoted:
Conze 1984, p. 157). The concept of "race" was (still) only rarely used in the modern
biological (genetic) sense. The concept's closest modern relative is "culture". Indeed, the
19th century concept of race could be best described as 'culture plus descent', in which
descent, moreover, seems to be optional.
Ignoring the fact that the meaning of concepts like "race" change results in strange (but
often understandable) misconceptions. Moore (1974), for example, concluded that Marx
was a racist on the basis of a small number of wrongly interpreted quotes and fragments
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including Marx's claim (in volume three of Das Kapital) that race co-determines the
structure of society (see § 3.4.1). A quick comparison with the terms used in more or less
the same claim in other writings of Marx and Engels shows that the concept of "race" was
used by Marx in the traditional 19th century sense, as an equivalent of culture. (Possibly
Marx used "race" because he wanted to avoid the Romanticist and (German) nationalist
connotations of "culture". Of course, he could not foresee the direction in which the
concept of "race" would further develop and the misunderstandings that could rise
therefrom.) (See also § 3.4.1 and Paul 1981.)
Slowly, the concept of "race" became a biological category. In the work of Nietzsche at the
end of the 19th century it still had its traditional meaning (Schank 2000). Thirty years later,
Hitler (1925) wrote: 'Die Rasse aber liegt nicht in der Sprache, sondern ausschließlich im
Blute' (p. 342). This complete victory of the biological interpretation of "race" and its
political counterpart in racism made the concept rather unpopular in social science. At the
end of the twentieth century the concept was not just unpopular, but also proven (nearly)
irrelevant to social science, as it seems to be the case, that the biological concept of "race"
is inapplicable to human beings (e.g. Latter 1980; Zuckerman 1990):
Many studies have demonstrated that roughly 90 percent of human genetic variation occurs
within a population living on a given continent, whereas 10 percent of the variation
distinguishes continental populations. In other words, individuals from different populations
are, on average, just slightly more different from another than are individuals from the same
population. (Bamshad & Olson 2003, p. 52)
Much earlier, Goldenweiser (1924) argued that most of the peculiarities that are considered
to be the effect of race 'are likely to be resolved into purely historical or cultural
determinants' (p. 129). Nevertheless, "race" was abolished in social science in favour of the
more politically correct "culture" only fairly recently (e.g. Teillet Roldán 1997) and seemed
to experience a revival in American anthropology in the 1990s (Wade 2002). (This should
not come as a surprise as the United States are, and always were, obsessed with race and
racial differences. However, in the United States, "race" and "culture" are continuously
confused. In many surveys, for example, answering categories on the question of the race of
the respondent include "Latino" or "Hispanic", which are clearly cultural, ethnic or
linguistic rather than (biological) racial, besides more obvious categories such as "white",
"black", "Asian", etc. (e.g. Betancourt & Regeser López 1993).)
Despite the fact that the biological interpretation of the term "race" became dominant in the
20th century, the older and broader meaning of group in general is far from extinct. After
making insulting public statements on Islam and/or the Arabic world, French writer
Houellebecq (in 2001) and English TV-presenter Kilroy-Silk (in 2004) were accused (a.o.
by Muslim groups) of being racist, which seems to imply that a religion is a race. For
historical reasons, the most amusing use of the term "race" comes from a 2003 letter to
Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant in which a concerned mother writes that, unfortunately, the
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nazis are not an 'extinct race' (Verhoeven 2003). (On the history of the concept of "race"
see also Malik 1996; on the relationship between culture and biology in the history of
science see also Delisle 2000.)
The concept of Volksgeist was introduced by Lazarus and Steinthal in the 1860s and was
based on (or, at least, inspired by) the philosophy of Herder (e.g. Spitz 1955). Lazarus and
Steinthal founded Völkerpyschologie, a predecessor of cross-cultural psychology (see §
3.5.2 / 5.2.1). Volksgeist was a very modern concept in the sense that it did not refer to a
teleological process of development of nations or persons (see § 3.3.1) but to the law-
governed behaviour and development of inner activity (Lazarus & Steinthal 1860).
Volksgeist included language, thoughts, convictions, mythology, religion, cult, oral
literature, writing, built structures, industrial products, and art forms (Lazarus & Steinthal
1860; Lazarus 1865). 'With only minor adjustments it would be quite easy to turn this [the
concept of Volksgeist] into a thoroughly modern view of culture as an interpretive,
symbolic system' (Kalmar 1987, p. 679).
3-3-3-summary
The concept of "culture" developed from tilling through the metaphorical cultura animi,
meaning individual intellectual development, into its modern usage referring to a condition
or state of a society. "Culture" as a social category is relatively new, but some similar
concepts have been used before. These include gens, natio and Volksgeist. The first two
were used in medieval Latin and can be translated as 'culture plus descent'. In the 19th
century they were often translated as "race", which at that time was also used as 'culture
plus descent'. The 19th century German concept of "Volksgeist" was nearly synonymous
with the modern concept of "culture".
3-4-culture, civilisation and economy
The relationship between the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" in the 19th and early
20th century was not just one of dialectical opposition. As mentioned in subsection 3.3.1, in
some interpretations the concepts were (almost) synonymous or overlapped at least. During
the 19th century, there was a gradual shift in the meaning and connotations of the concept
of "civilisation", especially. This shift made the concept increasingly worse-fitting as a
label in the 19th and 20th century forms of the CED. Hence, it had to be replaced. One
option for replacement was the use of neologisms such as Marx's "base" and
"superstructure", but the changing meaning of the concept of "economy" provided a more
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acceptable candidate. Around the turn of the century, "economy" started to replace
"civilisation" in the CED. However, contrary to "civilisation", "economy" was (like
"culture") not a neologism, but a term with a history of its own.
This section describes the development of culture - civilisation dialectic (§ 3.4.1); the
merger of "culture" and "civilisation" and the introduction of economy in evolutionary
anthropology in the second half of the 19th century (§ 3.4.2); and the semasiological history
of "economy" (§ 3.4.3).
3-4-1-culture versus civilisation
The culture - civilisation dialectic that appeared at the end of the 18th century was initially
a conflict of worldviews. On one side, there was the Enlightenment view of man and
society, based on universalism and reason; in the opposing camp, there was the Counter-
Enlightenment of (a.o.) Vico and Herder, which was strongly anti-universalistic (and
mostly anti-rational). The Enlightenment slogan of progress, rationality and universalism
was summarised in the concept of "civilisation". The Counter-Enlightenment, on the other
hand, used "culture" as its catchword for tradition, diversity, 'natural' development, and the
like. In the 19th century, however, the dialectic would radically change in character. It was
no longer a dialectic of worldviews or theories of social reality. Instead, it referred to
phenomena, aspects or parts of social reality itself. The culture - civilisation dialectic,
however, is far more complex than a simple dichotomy. Whether the concepts were
opposed, juxtaposed, overlapping or even synonymous was dependent on their context and
− most of all − on their connotations.
As described in subsection 3.2.2, the concept of "civilisation" was − more or less − the
social equivalent of reason in the Enlightenment. After the heyday of the Enlightenment,
the concept's meaning began to change slowly into a number of interrelated directions. It
was most commonly used in a number of ways:
(1) to describe a process of the social and intellectual development of nations;
(2) as a label for the stage therein reached by the Western world during the
Enlightenment, hence as a label for the institutions, values and practices most
common in the West;
(3) as a label for the Western world itself; and
(4) to describe the aspects of social reality, most closely associated with reason:
technology, economy, and the products thereof.
The distinction between the normative interpretation of the concept (as in 1 and 2) and its
more descriptive form (as in 4) is not a very hard one. In most of the attempts to determine
what constitutes a civilisation, hence, in the discussion on the application of the normative
concept, aspects of civilisation as a descriptive concept play a central role:
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Trousers and Bibles − these surely are unmistakable indices of civilization! They are only
two, however, of a very long list that could be put together; and each index would reflect, in
part at least, the culture in which it was proposed. Among these indices one would find an
extraordinary variety, including language, literacy, law, soap, paper, the wheel, money,
government, religion, science, agriculture, the city, commerce, print, the domestication of
animals, the breeding of cattle, the use of milk, the digging stick, the use of the fork,
plumbing, dental caries, and even the dry martini. Another list would contain such moral
virtues as kindness, charity, compassion, order, discipline, toleration, and the emancipation
of women. Stendhal identified civilization with the invention of love: 'On ne trouve qu'un
amour physique et des plus grossiers chez les peuples sauvages ou trop barbares.' Still
another list would accent, in reverse, the absence of such vices as war, cruelty, violence,
dogmatism, fanaticism, ignorance, and superstition. The sociologist Edward Cary Hayes
remarked in one of his books that 'Three meals a day are a highly advanced institution.
Savages gorge themselves or fast.' A contemporary historian also prefers to date the dawn
of civilization from the time when men first learned to make provision for the future, when
they learned to remedy a situation that had hitherto been either feast or famine. (Bierstedt
1965, pp. 488-9)
To the list Bierstedt himself adds:
a simple and yet I think objective criterion that can serve as an index of civilization. It has
to do with sophistication in a sophisticated sense of the word. It concerns the self-reflection
and self-criticism and other-awareness in which it can be said that the members of a
civilized society indulge. (…) an uncivilized society has art but no aesthetics, religion but
no technology, techniques but no science, tools but no technology, legends but no literature,
a language but no alphabet (or ideographs), customs but no laws, a history but no
historiography, knowledge but no epistemology, and finally a Weltanschauung but no
philosophy. (p. 490)
After its introduction in the end of the 18th century, the concept of culture was generally
used in three (or four − if the third is split up) different, but related, ways:
(a) as a label for pre-Enlightened stages in the development of nations;
(b) as a label for non-Western institutions, values and practices; and/or
(c) to describe the aspects of social reality most closely associated with spirit rather
than reason, the aspects generally considered to be (at least partially) irrational
and/or traditional:
(c1) 'ways of life', habits and customs, practices and (traditional) norms and
values; and/or
(c2) the fine arts.
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These different interpretations and connotations of the concepts suggest a number of
dichotomies or dialectics of the concepts, which indeed can be found throughout the 19th
century and onwards:
(i) the Enlightened world versus the pre- (or Counter-) Enlightened world (or society
based on reason vs. society based on passion and tradition) (2 vs. a);
(ii) the West versus the rest (3 vs. b);
(iii) the rational vs. the spiritual aspects of society (4 vs. c): economy and technology
versus tradition and passion; economy versus the fine arts; etc.
Besides these − more or less − dichotomous relationships, there have been (and are) others.
One of the most widespread non-dichotomous conceptualisations, exemplified in the first
quote from Bierstedt (1965) above, makes use of (c1) and (2). In this view culture is a way
of life, while civilisation is a specific level in the development or evolution of this way of
life. The difference between this non-dichotomous view and (i) is that in the former,
civilised nations have culture too, while in the latter, in (i), nations have either culture or
civilisation.
Although the three dialectics mentioned are strongly interrelated, not all of them are
relevant to the development of the CED. The first and second are side-tracks rather than the
main road. The same is true for the economy - fine arts dialectic (see also § 3.3.1). The
main road connects the reason - passion dialectic of the Enlightenment with the modern
CED and the modern concepts of culture and economy. This road is that of the dialectic of
civilisation as (4), the rational aspects of social reality, and culture as (c1), the spiritual,
irrational, traditional, and so forth aspects thereof. This 'main road', however, was a
winding road, at many place connecting to the side-tracks and often plagued by conceptual
confusion. (Although most of the side-tracks slowly disappeared into the void, sometimes
they suddenly reappear. In Kockel (2002b), for example, a variant of (i) (2 vs. a) can be
found in the claim that 'peripheries are rich in culture (whereas centres tend towards
civilisation)' (p. 234).)
Throughout most of the 19th century, these dialectics, however, were rarely the subject of
empirical research or theory formation. There is an extensive literature on the negative
influences of the economy on the fine arts, but that is of little interest here. There seem to
be three important theoretical developments in the CED in the 19th and early 20th century,
all of them German. The first was Marx's and Engels's 'historical materialism' in the middle
of the 19th century. The second was late 19th and early 20th century German Romanticism.
The third was the publication of Weber's (1905) Die Protestantische Etik und der “Geist”
des Kapitalismus. The first two of these are dealt with in this subsection, Weber's and
similar works are the subject of subsection 3.5.1.
The dominant usage of the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" in Marx's times were (a)
or (b) and (2) or (3) respectively. In other words, "civilisation" mostly referred to (the stage
of social and intellectual development of) the West and "culture" to (the stage of
development of) the rest. In the Manifest der Kommunistische Partei (Marx & Engels 1848,
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p. 466) "civilisation" is used in this sense and Mill, for example, used the term more or less
as a synonym to "industrialisation" (e.g. Williams 1959). To Marx and Engels,
"civilisation" was more or less synonymous to "capitalism", which is nicely illustrated by
Engels's (1884) claim that: 'die Grundlage der Zivilisation [ist] die Ausbeutung einer Klasse
durch eine andere Klasse' (p. 171). Because of this dominant use and connotation of
"civilisation", and the related use and connotation of the concept of "culture", these terms
were hardly applicable in a theory on interaction between economy and other aspects of
society. Hence, in their theory of historical materialism, Marx and Engels introduced new
terms: "base" and "superstructure".
Historical materialism was the first grand theory of the CED (Weber's was the second; see
§ 3.5.1). It grew from Montesquieu's Esprit des lois (1748; see § 3.2.2); Hegel's dialectics
(1812-6; 1817/30) and philosophy of history (1807; 1837) (itself strongly influenced by
Herder); and Saint-Simon's (1817) claim that the development of the means of production
determines the political development (e.g. Kolakowski 1976). Montesquieu distinguished a
number of (interrelated) aspects of society in what Hegel (1807) later would call a 'totality'.
This totality, the nation's character (esprit), determines its legal and political shape. Marx
elaborated on this idea in his historical materialism (not his term). The first statement of
historical materialism can be found in the first and second chapter of the Manifest der
Kommunistische Partei:
Bedarf es tiefer Einsicht, um zu begreifen, daß mit den Lebensverhältnissen der Menschen,
mit ihren gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen, mit ihrem gesellschaftlichen Dasein, auch ihre
Vorstellungen, Anschauungen und Begriffe, mit einem Worte auch ihr Bewußtsein sich
ändert? Was beweist die Geschichte der Ideen anders, als daß die geistige Produktion sich
mit der materiellen umgestaltet? (Marx & Engels 1848; p. 480)
According to historical materialism, societies develop through a complex pattern of
successive stages into a utopian final state (which is a clear reflection of the rather utopian
notion or ideal of progress that was central to both the Enlightenment and (parts of) the
Counter-Enlightenment (such as in Herder's 'Kette der Kultur', see § 3.3.1)). This
development takes place through adaptation to technological and economic changes.
Hence, economic and technological change drives socio-cultural change, or in other words:
civilisation (or base) determines culture (or superstructure):
In der gesellschaftlichen Produktion ihres lebens gehen die Menschen bestimmte,
notwendige, von ihrem Willen unabhängige Verhältnisse ein, Produktions-verhältnisse, die
einer bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe ihrer materiellen Produktivkräfte entsprechen. Die
Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische struktur der
Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt,
und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen entsprechen. Die
Produktionsweise des materiellen lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und geistigen
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Lebensprozeß überhaupt. Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern
umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt. (Marx 1859, pp. 8-9)
Because economy is the driving force in historical materialism, it is often understood as a
form of economic determinism. However, this is a gross oversimplification of Marx and
Engels's thought. The core of Marx's philosophy was dialectical materialism (not his term
either). Marx's materialism, although strongly influenced by Feuerbach's more traditional
materialism, did not (primarily) refer to matter in a physical sense, but to social reality. In
traditional materialism, the material was primary and the ideal (the mind) secondary, a
product of the primary matter; in Marxian (historical) materialism, economy (as social
matter) is primary (base), and politics, culture, etc. (superstructure) is its (secondary)
product. Thus far, this seems to coincide with economic determinism. However, Marxian
materialism is dialectical, which implies that there is some kind of reciprocal relationship
between the material (base) and the ideal (superstructure):
Der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen Materialismus (den Feuerbachschen mit eingerechnet)
ist, daß der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit nur unter der Form des Objekts oder
der Anschauung gefaßt wird: nicht aber als sinnlich menschliche Tätigkeit, Praxis, nicht
subjektiv. (Marx 1845/88, p. 5)
Die materialistische Lehre von der Veränderung der Umstände und der Erziehung vergißt,
daß die Umstände von den Menschen verändert und der Erzieher selbst erzogen werden
muß. (Marx, 1845/88, pp.5-6)
Although indeed the material (matter, base, civilisation) determines the ideal (mind,
superstructure, culture), this is not one-way traffic: the ideal also influences the (experience
of the) material. In its socio-historical adaptation: economy (civilisation / base) determines
culture (superstructure), but culture also determines how a society deals with its economic
circumstances and changes. 'Es ist nicht, daß die ökonomische Lage Ursache, allein aktiv
ist und alles andere nur passive Wirkung' (Engels 1894, p.206; see also Engels 1890). A
number of more concrete clues to the influence of culture (superstructure) on economy
(civilisation / base) can be found in the works of Marx and Engels. For example, race as a
19th century equivalent of culture (see § 3.3.2) (Marx 1894, p. 800; Engels 1894, p. 206)
and cultural differences in entrepreneurship play important roles in the economic
development of a nation:
Es ist ein sonderbarer Übergang von den Staaten nach Kanada. Erst kommt's einem vor, als
wär' man wieder in Europa, dann meint man, man wäre in einem positiv zurückgehenden
und verkommenden Land. Es zeigt sich hier, wie notwendig zur raschen Entwicklung eines
neuen Landes der fieberhafte Spekulationsgeist der Amerikaner ist (kapitalistische
Produktion als Basis vorausgesetzt) (...) (Engels 1888, p. 93)
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Marx has had a great influence on social science. Historical materialism, however, has been
understood in very different ways. The orthodox codification by Plekhanov and Lenin lead
to a purely mechanical interpretation in which the relation between base and superstructure
was seen as a strict mechanical causality in which the base determines the superstructure. A
number of (mostly Western) Marxists pointed emphatically at the dialectical character of
historical materialism. (In section 7.2 historical materialism will be further analysed.)
Contrary to historical materialism, the use of the terms "culture" and "civilisation" in late
19th century and early 20th century German Romanticism posed no problem. In the
Romantic view, these concepts were part of a dialectic that combined (i) and (iii) (see
above). In other words: "culture" referred to a 'natural', traditional and passionate way of
life (and those who lived such lives) unspoiled by "civilisation", technology, science,
economy and other products of the Enlightenment. This was hardly a new idea. Rousseau
(1755), for example, claimed one-and-a-half centuries earlier that Enlightened society
deformed human nature and alienated people from each other and themselves.
Romanticism was extremely influential in 19th century German thought. Its influence is
obvious in Marx's social philosophy, which aims at the dissolution of alienation rather than
inequality (as is usually assumed). Alienation, was the result of the transfer from culture to
civilisation in the Romantic interpretation of these terms:
Die Bourgeoisie, wo sie zur Herrschaft gekommen, hat alle feudalen, patriarchalen,
idyllischen Verhältnisse zerstörst. Sie hat die buntscheckigen Feudalbande, die den Mensen
an seinen natürlichen Vorgesetzten knüpften, unbarmherzig zerrissen und kein anderes
Band zwischen Mensch und Mensch übriggelassen als das nackte Interesse, als die
gefühllose 'bare Zahlung'. (Marx & Engels 1848, p. 464)
At the end of the 19th century, the dichotomy became much stronger under the influence of
German nationalism. The letter C in "culture" was replaced with K in order to make the
term (Kultur) look more German, and gradually an ideology was constructed that idolised
passionate heroes (see e.g. the works of Wagner or Nietzsche), the countryside, and das
Völkische (literally: 'the popular'; the concept refers to traditional folk culture). Civilisation
and the things associated with it, such as cities, science and reason, on the other hand, were
rejected. After the First World War, this ideology culminated in two important books:
Spengler's (1918-23) Untergang des Abendlandes and Hitler's (1925) Mein Kampf. The
latter is the more illustrative (and the more interesting) of the two.
Hitler (1925) used the term "civilisation" less than ten times, while he used "culture" more
than a hundred times. He rejected civilisation in favour of culture as the 'true level of spirit
and life':
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Eine der ersichtlichsten Verfallserscheinungen des alten Reiches war das langsame
Herabsinken der allgemeinen Kulturhöhe, wobei ich unter Kultur nicht das meine, was man
heute mit dem Worte Zivilisation bezeichnet. Diese scheint im Gegenteil eher eine Feindin
wahrer Geistes- und Lebenshöhe zu sein. (p. 282)
As typically representative of German (nationalistic) Romanticism, Hitler rejected cities,
science and reason (in one word, Enlightenment) in favour of das Völkische:
Der völkische Staat muß dabei von der Voraussetzung ausgehen, daß ein zwar
wissenschaftlich wenig gebildeter, aber körperlich gesunder Mensch mit gutem, festem
Charakter, erfüllt von Entschlußfreudigkeit und Willenskraft, für die Volksgemeinschaft
wertvoller ist als ein geistreicher Schwächling. (p. 452)
The first Romantic rebellion resulted in the introduction of the concept of "culture" by
Herder. It also gave birth to nationalism and conservatism. The second Romantic rebellion
combined these and resulted ultimately in national socialism and the Second World War. In
recent decades, the social sciences experienced a third Romantic rebellion in the form of
post-modernism. The similarities between the three rebellions are clearly visible: a focus on
difference rather than universalism and a strong distrust of the products of the
Enlightenment, most of all of reason and/or modern science and technology. (A very
interesting comparison of German fascist and post-modernist views of science can be found
in Holton (2000).)
Outside Germany the distinction between "culture" and "civilisation" was far less sharp. In
scientific writings the concepts were often considered to be more or less synonymical,
although there were very different connotations corresponding to the different meanings at
the beginning of this section. Very briefly put, "civilisation" was associated more with the
rational aspect of social reality (economy and technology), while "culture" was associated
more with the spiritual aspect (values, passions and traditions) (e.g. Merton 1936; den Boer
2001b). The concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" were used most prominently in the
rising field of anthropology.
3-4-2-culture and civilisation in evolutionary anthropology
The Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment reached a synthesis in 19th century
anthropology. The antithesis of Enlightenment universalism and Counter-Enlightenment
difference was dialectically aufgehoben (see § 2.5.2) in the notion of evolution or
development, itself related to the utopian (or eschatological) belief in progress in both
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. According to evolutionary anthropology, the
development of civilisation was universal; different nations or cultures (often also labelled
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"civilisations"; see § 3.3.1) are merely in different stages of this universal development or
evolution. The early anthropologists Lubbock, Tylor, and Morgan, in forwarding this
theory, were strongly influenced by similar ideas on universal development presented
earlier by some philosophers, especially Vico (1725/44) and Herder (1784-91), both
representatives of the Counter-Enlightenment.
The main works of evolutionary anthropology (e.g. Lubbock 1870; Tylor 1870; 1871
Morgan 1877) were all published within two decades after the publication of the other
important influence on the field: Darwin's, the origin of species (1859). The evolutionary
anthropologists, however, were no strict adherents to Darwinian evolution. They preferred
the term "development" over "evolution" and were more inspired than influenced by the
theory of biological evolution. Only Lubbock referred to Darwin in rare occasions. It seems
that Darwin's main contribution to evolutionary anthropology was the fact that he made
public opinion ripe for other evolutionary theories (Murphree 1961). The other great
theorist of evolution, Spencer, on the other hand, wrote extensively on the evolution of
culture and institutions (e.g. 1876), but only after the important works of evolutionary
anthropology were published. In this respect Spencer was probably influenced by
evolutionary anthropology more than he influenced it (see also Tylor 1877).
Evolutionary anthropology was based on the convictions that all men are biologically and
psychologically the same and that all cultural groups are subject to the same evolutionary
development, which cannot be reversed. To the evolutionary anthropologists, progress was
inseparable from cultural evolution (Murphree 1961). This was nicely summarised by
Lubbock and Tylor:
[D]ifferent races in similar stages of development often present more features of
resemblance to one another than the same race does to itself, in different stages of its
history. (Lubbock 1870, p. 7)
[T]he wide differences in the civilization and mental state of the various races of mankind
are rather differences of development than of origin, rather of degree than of kind. (Tylor
1870, p. 372)
In evolutionary anthropology, "culture" and "civilisation" were synonymous. As the field
was heavily influenced by Enlightenment universalism, the concept of "civilisation" was
widely used to describe the whole of practices, values, institutions, and so on of different
nations or societies. Tylor's definition of "culture" and/or "civilisation", quoted before in
subsection 3.3.1, describes these synonymous concepts as 'that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society' (1871, p.1).
Of the evolutionary anthropologists, Morgan is by far the most important in the history of
the CED. Morgan claimed that the 'complex whole' of culture was built on an economic
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foundation. In Ancient society (1877), Morgan described how economic circumstances
determine cultural development. The economic circumstances themselves were mainly
determined by technological development; hence, in the end, technology drives cultural
progress. Morgan explained the introduction and evolution of forms of government, the
family and (private) property all as consequences of economic and technological changes.
Morgan strongly influenced Engels, who more or less rewrote Ancient society in historical
materialist terms as Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats (1884).
In the late 19th century, the evolutionary anthropologists' use of the terms of "culture" and
"civilisation" as synonyms became standard practice in Western science (except in
Germany). Hence, "civilisation" as the catchword of the rational aspect of society, as
culture and economy, had to be replaced. "Economy" was an obvious candidate. However,
"economy" has a semasiological history of its own, which shows that it gained its current
(dominant) meaning only fairly recently.
3-4-3-the semasiology of "economy"
According to Say (1803), classical antiquity was utterly ignorant of the nature, origin,
distribution and effect of wealth. More to the point, classical antiquity lacked the concept of
"economy". The term "economy", however, os used since the 4th century BC at least, but
its meaning has changed considerably in the almost two-and-a-half millennia thereafter.
The term was introduced in Greek Antiquity as "οRκονοµbα", a contraction of the noun
"οRκος", meaning (a.o.) house, room, family and household, and the verb "ν`µειν",
meaning (a.o.) to organise, distribute, manage and use (e.g. Finley 1973; Spahn 1992). (It is
often wrongly assumed that the last part of the term comes from the noun "νcµος",
meaning habit, custom, tradition or rule (and often translated as law), which is obviously
wrong as the Greek οRκονοµbα was used to refer to the management (ν`µειν), rather than
to the rule (νcµος), of households (οRκος).)
Zenophon used a variant of the term: "οRκονοµικcς", usually translated as household, as a
book title in the middle of the 4th century BC. This book was a guide to the gentleman
landowner about the proper management of his estate. Similarly, the book oeconomica that,
although written by two of his students was included in the 1921 edition of the works of
Aristotle, consisted of two parts: the first dealing with the establishment and management
of a household (including tips on how to pick a wife), the second dealing with (a.o.) the
management of the state (Whitaker 1940). "Economy" then meant management or
organisation. The concept was applied to the household and the state, the only two levels of
social organisation recognised (see § 3.2.2). The application to the management of the state,
however, was (still) relatively rare. The part on economy in this sense in the pseudo-
Aristotelian oeconomica, for example, was only six paragraphs long (Finley 1973).
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Throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the concept of "economy" was used almost
exclusively to describe good management and/or organisation of the household (e.g. Finley
1973; Oexle 1992; Burckhardt 1992). The concept was, however, sometimes also used as a
general synonym for "organisation". In the church, for example, the concept was used to
refer to the order or organisation of hymns and psalms during a mass, and Quintilian used it
to refer to the plan (or organisation) of a poem. Both these meanings of "economy"
persisted. In 1736 Quesnay published his Essai physique sur l'économie animale on the
organisation of the animal kingdom. In 1742 Hutcheson published his Short introduction to
moral philosophy (the English translation was published in 1747). Book 3 hereof, 'the
principles of oeconomics and politics', dealt with marriage and divorce, the obligations of
parents and children, the management of a household or family in general, and with
politics. The topics of property, contracts and money were discussed in book 2, 'Elements
of the law of nature', and clearly had nothing to do with "oeconomics" (Finley 1973).
(Interestingly, Quesnay later became a physiocratic economist and published a book titled
Tableau économique in 1758 and Hutcheson was probably the most important teacher of
Adam Smith.)
The first use of the term "economy" as the management or organisation of the state after the
six paragraphs in the − before mentioned − pseudo-Aristotelian oeconomica, was in 17th
century France. It was, however, solely used in the compound term "political economy" and
referred to the political organisation of the state only. Influenced by the growing literature
on trade, money and national wealth, in the second half of the 18th century the term
"political economy" came to mean something more specific: the management of state
affairs regarding money and wealth. (e.g. Finley 1973; Burckhardt 1992)
Under the influence of the late 18th century social, political and conceptual revolutions (see
also §§ 3.2 and 3.2.2), the invention of 'the social' specifically, the concept's meaning
evolved further in the nineteenth century. "Political economy" no longer primarily referred
to the management of the state, but to the economic institutions and organisation of society.
Say (1803) was probably the first to state that politics and political economy are
independent sciences with different subjects. Only at the end of the 19th century, however,
the adjective "political" was dropped. (Later, the compound "political economy" became
more or less a synonym of Marxism.) The first influential use of "economy" in this sense
was Marshall's (1890) Principles of economics. Nevertheless, the 19th century
interpretation of "economy" as a specific part of the institutional arrangement of society
remained dominant until the Second World War:
The word "economy" has become one of the most elastic in the vocabulary of science. It
means the whole system of industry and business whereby a modern population sustains
existence. It means the production and distribution of wealth. It also means the total
phenomena of wants and satisfactions. (Giddings 1903, p. 449)
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In modern usage the term "economy" rarely refers to this 19th and early 20th century
meaning as institutions regarding production, consumption and distribution (a division of
the economy first proposed by Say (1829)), it is mostly used to refer to the whole of
productive, consumptive, and so forth behaviour (or in case of "the economy", to the set of
actors that can execute these types of behaviour). Most obvious expressions of "economy"
in this modern sense can be noted in the fact that the size of an economy is measured by
GDP, and an economy's growth by the growth of GDP. GDP itself is defined in the System
of national accounts (SNA) as 'the final result of the production activity of resident
producer units' (ISWGNA 1993, 2.171). SNA implicitly defines "economy" as aggregate
monetary transactions or behaviour.
Mitchell (1998) describes the last stage in the conceptual evolution of "economy". It started
with the introduction of terms as "economic society" (Keynes 1936), "economic life" and
"economic community" (Tinbergen 1937) to refer to the complex whole of relations,
networks and types of behaviour related to production, consumption, and so forth. From
these new terms, in the 1940s and 50s the new concept of "economy" evolved. Most
important catalyst therein was the Second World War. After the war, nations needed a new
way to grow. As the territory of the world was completely divided, territorial growth was
impossible without military conflict, which was (more or less) banned. A new notion of
"economy" solved the problem: nations could grow economically. This, however, required
the reconceptualisation of "economy". The economy as institutional organisation cannot
grow; the economy as aggregate productive (and consumpitve) behaviour can.
The new notion of "economy" had profound influence on politics. In the millennia before
the Second World War, kings, lords and politicians were primarily concerned with political
power; the first two with their own, the last also with their nation's. After the war, the
economy became the prime concern of the politicians. Politics was and is no longer
primarily about national (political) power, but about national wealth and the increase
thereof by means of economic growth.
The development of "economy" from synonym of "organisation" to its modern meaning(s)
slowly made it a much more fitting label for the rational side of the CED. In the 19th
century, "political economy" still referred to the institutional organisation of a part of
society. Hence, Marx, for example, could not use the concept in historical materialism, the
first grand theory of the CED. Instead, he used the neologism "base". Nevertheless, as the
science of "political economy" was built on Enlightenment universalism and rationalism
(see § 3.2.2), this institutional organisation was considered to be the product of reason.
Hence, the (political) economy was part of civilisation.
With the change in meaning of "civilisation" in social science (see § 3.4.2), it moved away
from its Enlightenment origins and from its meaning of the rational part of social reality.
"Economy", on the other hand, evolved in the opposite direction, especially after the
Second World War. Already in the 19th century it was heavily influenced by rationalism,
but after the war, "economy" became almost synonymous with 'aggregate (rational)
productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour'.
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3-4-4-summary
In the 19th century the concepts of "culture" and "civilisation" developed from opposites to
near synonyms. In the beginning of the century, the CED was interpreted in a number of
ways ranging from the West against the rest to the rational or material versus the spiritual
parts or aspects of society. The latter interpretation gave rise to the first grand theory of the
CED: Marx and Engels's historical materialism. The most basic (but not the only) claim of
historical materialism is that the economic institutions determine the political institutions
within a society.
In the second half of the 19th century, the concepts started to grow together, especially in
English-speaking countries and in scientific language. In the CED a new concept was
introduced: "economy". This concept developed from "organisation", through "political
economy", meaning organisation of the state (regarding national wealth), to the modern
concept of "economy" as the aggregate of productive, consumptive and distributive
behaviour.
3-5-entrepreneurship and dimensions of culture
The beginning of the 20th century was a time of rising interest in the figure of the
entrepreneur and in entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship and the CED were quickly
connected in theories and studies on cultural influences on entrepreneurship. This section
deals with the introduction of theories of cultural influences on entrepreneurship and
economic growth and the history of the concepts of "entrepreneur" and
"entrepreneurship"(§ 3.5.1); and with the introduction of 'dimensions of culture' into the
CED in the late 20th century (§ 3.5.2).
3-5-1-culture and entrepreneurship
The second grand theory of the CED and the locus classicus for the influence of culture on
entrepreneurship was Weber's (1905) Die Protestantische Etik und der “Geist” des
Kapitalismus. Most of Weber's book is on Protestant theology and the concept of "Beruf"
(profession) and its etymological relation (in German and Dutch) to rufen and berufen (to
call or to appeal). According to Weber, Protestant asceticism favours a rationalist and
systematic approach to life. Moreover, a Beruf (profession) is an assignment from God.
(More or less similar in etymology and meaning are the English concepts of "vocation" or
"calling".) This resulted in the Protestant work ethic and a strong inclination to self-
employment and entrepreneurship.
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Tawney (1926) argued that it was not Protestantism, but individualism that produced the
'spirit of capitalism'. Individualism, not Protestant doctrine, led to the rationalisation of
industries and markets. Tawney's rather than Weber's theory seems to be confirmed by the
historian Macfarlane (1978). Thirteenth century sources suggest that the English were much
more individualist than the people(s) on the European continent. It was this individualism,
which produced English wealth and ultimately the industrial revolution. The Reformation
did not take place in England until the 16th century. Hence, Protestantism, like capitalism,
seems to be a product of individualism rather than its cause. (On Weber, Tawney and
similar theories, see also § 7.3.)
After Weber, the concepts of the "entrepreneur" and "entrepreneurship" became central
concepts of and in the CED. As is the case with "culture" and "economy", there are no
universally accepted definitions of these concepts, but there is a long and complex
conceptual history  (e.g. Jaeger 1990). The French noun entreprendre was already used in
the 12th century and from it, in the 15th century, the concept of "entrepreneur" evolved. In
the 16th century an entreprise usually was some kind of violent or war-like action. Hector
and the Trojans were called "entrepreneurs" (Hoselitz 1951; Jaeger 1990). In the late 16th
and early 17th centuries the term gained new meaning as 'a person who entered into a
contractual relationship with the government for the performance of a service, or the supply
of goods' (Hoselitz 1951, p. 194). An important aspect of this newer use of "entrepreneur"
was that it was used to refer to someone whose activities imply some kind of risk (to
himself). This notion of risk became the key aspect of Cantillon's concept of the
"entrepreneur" in the early 18th century (Redlich 1949; Hoselitz 1951). Cantillon was also
the first to divide the population into entrepreneurs and employees (gens à gages) (Redlich
1949).
In English, a number of alternative translations of "entrepeneur" coexisted. Most widely
used were "undertaker" and "projector", but "adventurer" or "merchant adventurer" was
also often used (Hoselitz 1951; Jaeger 1990). Before the industrial revolution, people we
would now call entrepreneurs were mostly called "projectors". Projectors were regarded to
be adventurers, schemers, cheats or speculators and were widely distrusted. However, this
started to change at the end of the 17th century (Redlich 1949; Hoselitz 1951). In the 18th
century "undertaker" became the more common concept to refer to a businessman (Hoselitz
1951). Adam Smith (1776), for example used the concept to refer to investors of capital.
(Nowadays the English concept of "undertaker" is used almost exclusively for the arrangers
of funerals, while the originally French term "entrepreneur" took its place in English.)
Theorists of entrepreneurship have distinguished a number of aspects of the "entrepreneur",
which were differently emphasised by different theorists (e.g. Casson 1982; 1987; Gartner
1990; Morisson 1998; van Praag 1999). Three of those − risk, profit and management −
clearly derive from its conceptual history: entrepreneurs took risks in order to get profit and
entrepreneurs were managers. What they did manage, however, changed considerably: war-
like actions in the 16th century, building projects in the 17th century and businesses in the
18th century and later. Smith (1776) added the use or investment of capital as a further
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characteristic. A fifth aspect of entrepreneurship, the creative or innovative aspect, is often
attributed to Schumpeter (1926), but was already present in the late 18th century writings of
Jeremy Bentham (e.g. Redlich 1949). It seems, that for any combination of these five
aspects of entrepreneurship, there is at least one theorist who claims that these are its basic
characteristics.
3-5-2-dimensions of culture
The two grand theories of the CED, historical materialism and the influence of religious
ethic on entrepreneurship, provided the starting point for an explosion of theories of the
CED, especially after post-modernism (the third Romantic rebellion; see § 3.4.1) and its
focus on diversity rooted in social science. The resulting late 20th century 'cultural turn'
made it fashionable to point at culture whenever traditional theories and explanations failed
(for an overview, see chapter 7). What needs to be explained here is the 'final' development
of the concepts of the CED, especially of "culture".
The most influential late 20th century theories and research on the CED are based on
Hofstede's (1980) measurement of cultural differences between fifty-three (groups of)
countries. These measurements themselves are based on the conceptualisation of "culture"
in cross-cultural psychology as basic values. Inkeles and Levinson (1954), for example,
discuss three dimensions of culture: (1) self-image, which is about both male - female and
individual - group relationships; (2) how people deal with authority; and (3) how people
deal with conflict and emotion. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) distinguish five
dimensions: (1) human nature orientation; (2) man - nature orientation; (3) time orientation;
(4) activity orientation; and (5) relational orientation. In his empirical research, Hofstede
(1980) found and constructed (how much he found and how much he constructed is open
for debate) four dimensions, which seem to be most similar to Inkeles's and Levinson's: (1)
power distance; (2) individualism; (3) masculinity; and (4) uncertainty avoidance. Later,
Hofstede (1991) added a fifth: (5) long-term orientation. (See § 6.2.1 for a more extensive
review of the history of and dimensions proposed and measured by cross-cultural
psychology.)
Whatever the number of dimensions distinguished, the basic idea stays the same: culture is
a relatively small set of basic value orientations that can be measured and mapped. This
interpretation is interesting for at least two reasons. First of all, it is far more restrictive than
the anthropological definitions of culture, that, like Tylor's (quoted above) seems to cover
(almost) everything. Because it is more restrictive, it is also far less ambiguous. Secondly,
the interpretation of culture as basic values opens up a whole new way to interpret the CED.
The CED then is no longer just about the rational versus the non-rational aspects of social
reality: it is or may be also about actual behaviour (remember that "economy" can mean
aggregate productive and consumptive behaviour; § 3.5.1) versus the values, rules, and the
like that guide behaviour. Section 5.2 further investigates this idea.
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3-5-3-summary
Rising interest in entrepreneurship gave birth to the second grand theory of the CED: that of
cultural influences on entrepreneurial behaviour. In the second half of the 20th century
especially, empirical research herein grew quickly under the influence of new ideas on the
measurement of culture. These ideas and measures originated from cross-cultural
psychology. The best known and most widely used were (and are) Hofstede's measures of
four dimensions of culture in fifty-three (groups of) countries. These 'dimensions' are −
according to cross-cultural psychologists − the most basic characteristics of culture.
3-6-culture, nature and geography
In Houellebecq's (1998) novel les particules élémentaires one of the two main characters,
not coincidentally with the same first name as the author, Michel, suggests that
(…) prise dans son ensemble la nature sauvage n'était rien d'autre qu'une répugnante
saloperie; prise dans son ensemble la nature sauvage justifiait une destruction totale, un
holocaust universel – et la mission de l'homme sur la Terre était probablement d'aclompir
cet holocauste. (pp. 47-48)
What disgusts Michel about nature is its complete lack of reason. Like his creator, Michel
believes in reason and Enlightened civilisation and he is repulsed by the lack thereof in
nature, in the quotation above, or in religious fundamentalism, in Plateforme (Houellebecq
2001).
Houellebecq's quotation clearly links the culture - nature dichotomy to the 19th century
culture - civilisation dialectic. However, the terminology is completely different. "Culture"
here refers to 'that complex whole' as in anthropology (§ 3.3.1 / § 3.4.2), but its focus is not
on the spiritual, the traditional, the irrational but rather on the practical, material and/or
rational aspects. "Culture" is used here as in Barth (1897) as the domination of man over
nature, and hence, it explicitly includes economy and technology. The culture - nature
dichotomy is a dialectical opposition of two sets of terms or concepts, some more
ambiguous than others:
| cultureman (-kind)
society
} vs. | natureenvironment }
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Terminologically different versions of this dialectic (or dichotomy) are used in different
fields, but all refer to the same basic distinction: that of "nature" as the non-human (or
untouched by man), non-rational world that surrounds us, and that of "culture" as the world
of man. The field that more than any others made the dialectic of culture and nature, of man
and environment its prime subject is (human) geography. In classical geography, there was
no room for the CED as "man" or "culture" covered both sides. One could argue that the
CED is a minor dialectic within a man - environment (or culture - nature) dialectic
(hereafter abbreviated MED). However, in the 20th century the geographical mainstream
forgot its intellectual history, forgot about the man - environment dialectic and became a
sterile discipline about abstract space(s). The late 20th century cultural turn re-introduced
culture in geography. This time, however, the CED conquered the field and the traditional
man - environment dialectic (MED) became its subordinate at best.
This section deals with the development of thought on the MED from Classical Antiquity
until classical (with a lower case c) geography in the 19th and early 20th century (§ 3.6.1)
and with the recent (re-)introduction of "culture" and the CED in geography (§ 3.6.2).
3-6-1-the two histories of geography
Textbooks on the history of ideas in geography (e.g. de Pater & van der Wusten 1996;
Sutcliffe 1999; Holt-Jensen 1980/99) all reveal an almost complete lack of actual
(theoretical) ideas (which rather contradicts the term "history of ideas") until the beginning
of the 19th century. The history of geography as a discipline is represented as one of
exploration and description of other countries and regions, not as a history of theoretical
ideas. Often regarded as the first geographer, Strabo wrote his Geographika, an
encyclopaedic description of the rituals, means of survival and military strength of all the
known peoples in and outside the Roman Empire around the start of the Christian era.
Other early predecessors often mentioned include Erathostenes, Chang Ch'ien and Ptolemy
(e.g. Sutcliffe 1999). After Classical Antiquity, the history of geography continues with
explorers such as Al-Idrisi (12th century), Ibn Battuta (14th century) and dozens of
European explorers in the 15th and 16th centuries (e.g. Sutcliffe 1999). Only in the early
19th century did there seem to awake some theoretical thought in human geography (in
physical geography, theory took off in the 17th century) in the work of Ritter (1817), who
claimed that the environment determines man, but that man can struggle out of nature's
grasp. What the textbook writers (usually) ignore is that Ritter's theory had many
predecessors.
There seem to be two histories of geography. The first is the textbook history of explorers
and encyclopaedic descriptions of countries and regions, which Ptolemy called
'chorography'. This is the history of geography as an art more than as a science. The second
is the often neglected history of ideas and theories on the relationship between man
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(people) and his (their) environment, between culture and nature. This is the history of the
MED. This is the true history of geographical ideas.
The first (known) theorists of the MED, probably were Hippocrate (5th century BC) and
Aristotle (4th century BC). Hippocrate (Airs, waters and places) and Aristotle (Politics)
believed that the physical geography of a place determines the characteristics, the way(s) of
life, of the people in that place (e.g. Bartlett 2001). Hippocrate wrote that 'in general you
will find assimilated to the nature of the land both the physique and the characteristics of
the inhabitants' (quoted in Bartlett 2001, p. 45). This was the birth of physical (or
environmental) determinism that would dominate the MED until the end of the 19th
century. Hippocrate, often credited to be the father of medicine, therefore, could also be
credited to be the father of scientific (as opposed to descriptive) geography.
Physical determinism influenced Medieval Christian and Islamic thought. In the 7th century
Isidore of Seville (Etymologiae) claimed that 'human beings vary in appearance and colour,
in size of body and quality of mind, according to the skies above them'; and Albertus
Magnus wrote in his De natura locorum (13th century), one of the first systematic treatises
on the MED, that 'everything generated in a place derives its natural properties from that
place' (both quoted in Bartlett 2001, p. 47). The general idea in Medieval Christianity was
that the natural environment determined the gens (see § 3.3.2 on the concept of gens).
Although some early Medieval Christian scholars, such as Isidore of Seville, wrote on the
MED, the main historical route from Antiquity to more modern times goes through
Medieval Islamic philosophy, especially the works of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Kaldun
(e.g. Goldenberg 1999). Many of the works of Greek Antiquity, including those by
Aristotle, were unknown to the early Medieval Christian world. Only in the times of the
crusades and through the dissemination of Spanish Islamic philosophy did Europe learn
about these. This strongly influenced Western philosophy and gave birth to empiricism and
ultimately the Enlightenment. On the Islamic Enlightenment, on the other hand, the
crusades had a severely negative impact. (The downfall of Islamic civilisation cannot be
attributed to the impact of the crusades alone, however, but was also caused by internal
events such as Al-Ghazali's (1095) influential attack on philosophy and rationalism.)
During his travels through Arabic countries Chardin (1680/6) came in contact with Ibn
Kaldun's (14th century) thought on the MED. He wrote about it on his journal, which was
published in 1680 (second revised edition 1686). Montesquieu read this and was strongly
influenced by it (Goldenberg 1999). As explained in subsection 3.2.2, Montesquieu in his
De l'esprit des lois (1748) forwarded the theory that the nature or spirit of a society (or
culture) is the result of (a.o.) physical geography, psychology, traditions, history, religion
and the economic mode of being. Several chapters of his book are devoted to the influence
of, for example, climate and soil on the character of the people living in these climates and
on those soils.
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Physical determinism was well established in 18th and 19th century thought. There is no
reason to assume that Ritter read Montesquieu, Aristotle or any of the other earlier theorists
of the MED. (He was, however, strongly influenced by Herder (e.g. Birkenhauer 2001),
who did read Montesquieu; see § 3.3.1.) He did not have to; the influence of the natural
environment on man was obvious to every learned man. Ritter, however, was not a physical
determinist in the strict sense. Indeed, he claimed that man is 'ein lebendiger Spiegel der
Natur von welchem ihre Geheimnisse zu seines Gleichen noch einmal wiederholt und
verständlicher ausgesprochen werden' (1817, p. 19), but he also wrote that civilisation
makes man ever more independent from nature:
So ergeben sich diese und andre Resultaten über den innigsten zusammenhang der
Völkergeschichten mit der lebenden Natur, indem von der einen Seite eine unabwendbare
Abhängigkeit von derselben sich zeigt, die um so fesselnder, je näher der Mensch noch dem
bewußtlosen Zustande steht und die Völker als Horden leben. Von der andern Seite dagegen
zeigt sich ein immer fortschreitendes Freiwerden der Culturvölker von den in gleicher
Progression immer mehr und mehr zurücktreenden Bedingungen der vaterländischen
Naturen. (pp. 18-19)
Sixty-five years after Ritter, Ratzel (1882), the founder of modern geographical physical
determinism, almost literally copied the determinist element of his thought. Culture,
according to Ratzel, is a reflection of nature in the human mind (or spirit). However, in the
second half of the 19th century, increasing industrial pollution gave birth to the opposite of
physical determinism. Marsh wrote man and nature (1864) as 'a little volume showing that
whereas [others] think that the earth made man, man in fact made the earth' (quoted in
Lowenthal 1964, p.ix). In his book, Marsh described the enormous influence of man on the
face of the earth:
But it is certain that man has done much to mould the form of the earth's surface, though we
cannot always distinguish between the results of his action and the effects of purely
geological causes; that the destruction of the forests, the drainage of lakes and marshes, and
the operation of rural husbandry and industrial art have tended to produce great changes in
the hygrometric, thermometric, electric, and chemical condition of the atmosphere, though
we are not yet able to measure the force of the different elements of disturbance, or to say
how far they have been compensated by each other, or by still obscurer influences; and,
finally, that the myriad forms of animal and vegetable life, which covered the earth when
man first entered upon the theatre of a nature whose harmonies he was destined to derange,
have been, through his action, greatly changed in numerical proportion, sometimes much
modified in form and product, and sometimes entirely extirpated. (p.18)
Although Marsh had some influence, for example on the geographer Réclus (1869), by the
turn of the century physical determinism dominated geography. Ratzel's most important
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students were Semple and Huntington. Semple (1911) asserted that people are a product of
their environment and Huntington (1915) researched the influence of climate on a people's
level of civilisation.
Rejecting physical determinism, Hettner (1907) claimed that environment or nature does
not determine man but offers him possibilities. This idea was elaborated on by (a.o.) the
historian Febvre, who coined the term "possibilism":
Et ce dogme, c'est un dogme ratzélien: “Si l'espace considéré est limité et peu différencié, le
type physique et la civilisation qui s'y rencontrent sont monotones.” − Nous disons, nous,
tout différemment:
Cadres régionaux, au sens large du mot, soit. Mais, dans l'ensemble de conditions physique
qu'ils représentent, ne voyons que des possibilitées d'action. Et, ajoutons-le tout de suit,
pour prévenir une objection qui se présente d'elle-même: ces possibilités d'action ne
constituent pas une sorte de système lié: elles ne représentent pas dans chaque région un
tout indissociable: si elles sont saisissables, elles ne sont pas saisies par les hommes toutes à
la fois, avec la même force dans le même temps: autrement, à quoi tendrait le procès que
nous prétendons instituer contre le déterminisme? et, sous une autre forme, la valeur
déterminante des régions géographiques n'apparaîtrait-elle point comme tres réelle? − En
fait, dans ce domaine comme ailleurs, la veille formule leibnitzienne est utile à retenir − que
tous les possibles ne sont pas compossibles. (1922, pp. 206-207)
Possibilism replaced determinism by reciprocity. Hettner (1927) and Vidal de la Blache
(1921) argued that man and nature cannot be separated. 'Zur Eigenart der Länder gehören
Natur und Mensch, und zwar in so enger Verbindung, daß sie nicht von einander getrennt
werden können' (Hettner 1927, p. 126). To Vidal de la Blache these strong reciprocal ties
between man and environment or nature were especially relevant in relatively small
regions: pays. Each region has a personalité géographique, a specific and characteristic
pattern of culture, mentality, means of subsistence and landscape, which is the product of
centuries of reciprocal relations between a group of people and their environment. The
genre de vie of this group determines which of the possibilities offered by the environment
is chosen. This choice in turn influences the landscape (and the genre de vie itself):
Un genre de vie constitué implique une action méthodique et continue, partant très forte, sur
la nature, ou pour parler en géographe, sur la physionomie des contrées. (Vidal de la Blache
1911, p. 194).
One more geographer (besides Hettner and Vidal de la Blache) took part in the possibilist
turn of early 20th century geography: Sauer, who was strongly influenced by Schlüter,
introduced 'cultural landscape geography' (1925). The key concept thereof was the "cultural
landscape", the product of reciprocal relations between man and nature:
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The cultural landscape is fashioned from a natural landscape by a culture group. Culture is
the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape the result. Under the
influence of a given culture, itself changing through time, the landscape undergoes
development, passing through phases, and probably reaching ultimately the end of its cycle
of development. With the introduction of a different – that is, an alien – culture, a
rejuvenation of the cultural landscape sets in, or a new landscape is superimposed on
remnants of an older one. The natural landscape is of course of fundamental importance, for
it supplies the materials out of which the cultural landscape is formed. The shaping force,
however, lies in the culture itself. Within the wide limits of the physical equipment of area
lie many possible choices for man, as Vidal never grew weary of pointing out. This is the
meaning of adaptation, through which, aided by those suggestions which man has derived
from nature, perhaps by an imitative process, largely subconscious, we get the feeling of
harmony between the human habitation and the landscape into which it so fittingly blends.
But these, too, are derived from the mind of man, not imposed by nature, and hence are
cultural expressions. (Sauer 1925, p. 343)
Interestingly, in these early 20th theories of the MED, not only the MED itself but also the
CED is dissolved. In Vidal de la Blache's "genre de vie" and Sauer's "cultural landscape",
culture and economy are merged into a single concept. Most explicit is Sauer's claim that
the cultural landscape 'is the geographic version of the economy of the group, as providing
itself with food, shelter, furnishings, tools, and transport' (Sauer 1941, p. 358).
Taking the "genre de vie" and the "cultural landscape" back apart and combining them into
a single framework may either result in two dialectics in which the CED is a dialectic
within the "man" or "society" aspect of the MED (with entrepreneurship somewhere in the
middle; see § 3.5.2) or in a trichotomy of economy, culture and environment (or nature).
Figure 3.1 can (and may) be interpreted in both these ways.
figure 3.1: a triangle of combined dialectics
environment
society
entrepreneur(ship)
economy culture
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In 1953, Schaefer's article 'exceptionalism in geography' was published posthumously. It
was an attack on the regional geography or chorography (see above) that grew from the
works of (a.o.) Vidal de Blache and Hettner and a call for a more 'scientific' (here meaning
more nomothetic rather than ideographic) approach in geography. Economic geography
especially was heavily influenced by Schaefer's criticism. New approaches, such as
regional science and spatial analysis, constructed mathematical models of the influence of
distance on location, for example. Space was conceived of as an isotropic plane and man
was replaced by homo economicus. There was no more place for the traditional key
concepts of geography, "landscape", "environment", "culture", and so forth. In fact these
new approaches had very little to do with geography (or with classical geography at least).
The geographer no longer needs to ponder whether he should study human phenomena just
as thoroughly as physical phenomena, but increasingly he will be faced with a question just
as ridiculous. One can foresee the time when a geographer who thinks in terms of the
landscape and the real earth's surface will be considered very old fashioned. With the
increasing interest in horizontal interaction, in systems, in spatial relationships, and the use
of models and mathematics to analyse them, the landscape is becoming just a nuisance to
some new geographers. Many of the hypotheses, simple models and even complex formulae
will only apply to a flat, featureless surface. Time and again an isotropic surface is
postulated at the beginning of the work. (Minshull, 1970, pp.55-56)
3-6-2-the CED in modern geography
In the 1970s, criticism on the non-geographical geographies of the 1950s and 60s grew
steadily. Under the influence of Marxism and humanism, and later post-modernism, new
approaches in geography arose. "Culture" was re-introduced in geography. However, with
it came the CED. Traditionally there was no strong line of demarcation between culture and
economy in geography. The distinction was irrelevant and hence ignored. The re-
introduction of "culture" in geography was not a return to classical geography, however.
Instead it was heavily influenced by theories and philosophies from outside geography.
One of the strongest influences in the 1970s (e.g. Crang 1997) and especially one of the
most important theoretical foundations of the CED in modern geography came from
Marxism. In the following decades Marxist approaches (often called "political economy")
almost took over the field: 'By 1990 political economy was the dominant discourse of
human geography influencing debate, research and the very sociology of the discipline'
(Barnes, 1995, p.423). And 'political economy became hegemonic; it became human
geography's official culture' (p. 424). With Marxism, historical materialism, the first grand
theory of the CED, entered geography; with it came the associated conceptual framework.
Within a few decades, geography experienced two conceptual revolutions. The first reduced
environment (the "E" in the MED) to an isotropic plane, effectively removing it from the
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MED; the second divided "man" (the "M" in the MED) into "culture" and "economy".
Hence, although classical geography was mortally wounded in the 1950s, it was Marxism,
which delivered the final blow.
The founding father of Marxist geography was Harvey, who developed a geographical
version of historical materialism in which, besides culture (in general), places, landscapes
and regions are the products (or superstructure) of the economic base of society (Harvey
1982, 1989). Initially, Harvey's work (1973) was purely Marxist, but slowly this changed.
In later work (1989; 1996) his philosophy became increasingly post-Marxist. (Harvey's
later dialectics, for example, was no longer based on Marx and Hegel but on Leibniz and
Whitehead (Harvey 1999).) Similarly, Soja (1989) developed from Marxism to post-
Marxism, which in his case is an attempt to mix Marxism and post-modernism. In the
1990s, post-Marxism, as a mix of post-modernism and Marxism, was the main source of
inspiration for a new approach in economic geography, alternatively named the cultural
turn (Crang 1997), the new economic geography (Thrift & Olds 1996), or the Californian
school (Sunley 1996). Some of these names are rather misleading. The first also refers to a
far broader development in social science that, moreover, started well before the 1990s. The
second is better known as a field in economics based on the work of Krugman (1991;
1995). Krugman's new economic geography is nothing but a return to 1950s spatial
analysis. Hence, it has little to do with geography. It is a nice example of economic
imperialism (e.g. Caldwell 1986) and is heavily criticised by (some) geographers (e.g.
Martin 1999).
Post-Marxist economic geography's influences are wider than just Marxism and post-
modernism. A third major influence that should be mentioned involves heterodox currents
within economics such as institutional and evolutionary economics (e.g. Brons &
Pellenbarg 2003). Especially influential was Granovetter's (1985) notion of
"embeddedness" (see also § 7.5.1). Scott and Storper (1992), for example, argue that the
economy is embedded in a socio-cultural context. Other key concepts include "learning"
(e.g. Florida 1997; Morgan 1997; Storper 1997) and "network" (e.g. Saxenian 1994).
Marx's historical materialism was not the only grand theory of the CED that entered
geography after the rejection of spatial analysis. The second grand theory, that of the
influence of culture on economic development, slowly established itself in the discipline,
but has hardly been empirically researched. This may be related to the fact that "culture" as
an explanative factor of regional differences in entrepreneurship is only called for when
more traditional explanations fail. On one of the last pages of a geographical study on new
firms, Bleumink et al. (1985), for example, suggest that less tangible factors, such as
mentality, might be important. Almost twenty years earlier Tamsma (1967) claimed that
cultural differences play an important role in the (re-) production of regional economic
differences.
Regional differences in entrepreneurship in the Netherlands have been studied since the
beginning of the 1980s. Wever (1984), for example, studied regional differences in the
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number of new entrepreneurs, while Kleinknecht and Poot (1990) focused on regional
differences in innovation. In both cases and in later studies on the same subject (e.g. van
Praag 1996; Bruins et al. 2000; see also § 7.4.2) traditional explanations were insufficient.
Brons (2002; 2004) was probably the first attempt to empirically verify cultural influence
on entrepreneurial behaviour in the Netherlands. This study, however, resulted in more
questions than it answered.
3-6-3-summary
Figure 2.4 (§ 2.5.3) showed that the CED is closely linked to the culture - nature or man -
environment dialectic (MED). The latter is the defining question of the field of (human)
geography. From Greek Antiquity until well into the 19th century it was generally assumed
that environment or nature determined gens, national character, culture or society. Only at
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th did this change. Possibilism
asserted that there is a complex reciprocity between man and his environment that − more
or less − comprehends the CED.
In the 1950s and 60s geography became explicitly abstract, mathematical and non-cultural.
This started to change in the 1970s and led to the 'cultural turn' of the 1990s. This cultural
turn, however, was not a return to the traditional conceptual and theoretical framework of
(classical) geography; instead geography adopted the framework of the other social
sciences and with this, adopted the CED.
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chapter 4
INTENSIONAL MAPPING
Culture is the suggestion, from certain best thoughts, that a man has a range of affinities
through which he can modulate the violence of any master-tones that have a droning
preponderance in his scale, and succor him against himself. Culture redresses this
imbalance, puts him among equals and superiors, revives the delicious sense of sympathy,
and warns him of the dangers of solitude and repulsion.
Ralph Waldo Emerson 1910, p. 136
It [culture] includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a people: Derby Day,
Henley Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the
dart board, Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar,
nineteenth-century Gothic churches and the music of Elgar.
T.S. Eliot 1948, p. 31
4-1-introduction
The preceding chapter described the history of the main concepts of the CED and their
onomasiological predecessors. In terms of the methodology proposed in section 2.7, the
sections 3.2 to 3.5 described iculture and ieconomy and section 3.6 described the history of
the related man - environment dialectic (MED). This chapter continues the mapping of
"culture" and "economy" but changes the focus to t, the set(s) of concepts
onomasiologically and semasiologically related to "culture" and "economy" respectively.
Specification of t is specification of the different forms, interpretations, definitions, and so
forth of the concept within different contexts. This is more problematic for one pole of the
CED, for the concept of "culture", than for the other. While "economy" is a relatively (!)
straightforward concept, "culture" is extremely ambiguous and has been defined in a
myriad of ways. 'Almost anything human could be, and at some point has been used as the
basis for a definition of culture' (Bohannan 1973, p. 358).
The following sections deal with definitions of "culture" and elements, parts or aspects
thereof (§§ 4.2 and 4.3); the intensional mapping of "culture" (§ 4.4); the definition and
mapping of economy (and other concepts of the non-cultural pole of the CED) and the
(intensional) relationships between the concepts within the CED (§ 4.5); and, finally, some
notes towards the conceptual reconstruction in the next chapter (§ 4.6).
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4-2-"culture": definitions and interpretations
The concept of "culture" has been debated throughout the 20th century. The most important
discussion probably took place in the 1930s and 1940s and culminated ultimately in
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952). Later discussions (e.g. White & Dillingham 1973; Smith
2000; Hofstede 2001; see also O'Hear 1998; Schweder 2001) have had far less scientific
impact and most of the interpretations of "culture" were already put forward in the 1940s or
earlier. Hence, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) seems to be the most appropriate starting
point for the analysis of "culture". Kroeber and Kluckhohn provided a brief description of
the history of the concept, a list and analysis of the most important definitions, and
commented on the most important theoretical statements on (the concept of) culture. They
described approximately 35 interpretations of "culture" in the historical section of their
book and listed 176 definitions and 130 statements on the meaning of the concept of
culture. Some of the most important definitions quoted by Kroeber and Kluckhohn are
repeated below and some more (mainly newer) are added. This chronological list of
definitions and interpretations is the raw material for an analysis of aspects of the concept
of "culture". (Of course this list is not an arbitrary sample of definitions of culture or even
intended to be; it is merely intended to show the variation in interpretation of the concept.)
concepts of "culture"
C1 Culture is the application of skilled human activity to transform non-human, non-cultural
nature. (agriculture, horticulture, etc.; see § 3.3.1)
C2 Cultura animi, culture or Bildung is a process of individual development and education. (see §
3.3.1)
C3 A gens is a social group bound together by customs, language, law and descent. (see § 3.3.2)
C4 The spirit of a society arises from the interrelationships between social phenomena, morals
habits, social institutions and laws. (Montesquieu 1748; see also § 3.2.2)
C5 Culture is a process of development of nations. (Herder 1784-91; see § 3.3.1)
C6 Culture is a pre-Enlightened stage in the development of nations. (see § 3.4.2)
C7 Culture is a label for non-Western practices, values and institutions. (see § 3.4.2)
C8 The superstructure of a society includes the legal and political institutions; the social, political
and spiritual processes of life; social being and social consciousness. (Marx 1859; see § 3.4.2)
C9 The concept of Volksgeist refers to the law-governed behaviour and development of inner
activity. Volksgeist includes language, thoughts, convictions, mythology, religion, cult, oral
literature, writing, built structures, industrial products, and art forms (Lazarus & Steinthal
1860; Lazarus 1865; see § 3.3.2).
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C10 'Culture or Civilisation, taken in its ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by
man as a member of society.’ (Tylor 1871, p.1)
C11 The evolutionary anthropologist regarded culture to be a 'cumulative social legacy'. (Murphree
1961, p. 278; see § 3.4.2)
C12 Culture is man's domination of nature; culture includes economy and technology. (Barth 1897)
C13 'the total equipment of technique, mechanical, mental, and moral, by use of which the people
of a given period try to attain their ends' (Small 1905, p. 344)
C14 'That which distinguishes men from animals we call culture.' (Ostwald 1907, p. 510)
C15 'a culture is a definite association complex of ideas' (Wissler 1916, p. 197)
C16 Culture is the whole of the arts, philosophy and religion. (Spengler 1918-23)
C17 'the socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that determines the texture of our
lives' (Sapir 1921, p. 221)
C18 'Culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks.' (Sapir 1921, p. 233)
C19 'culture is technically used by the ethnologist and culture-historian to embody any socially
inherited element in the life of man, material and spiritual. Culture so defined is coterminous
with man himself' (Sapir 1924, p. 402)
C20 Culture is 'individual refinement'. (Sapir 1924, p. 403)
C21 "Culture" 'aims to embrace in a single term those general attitudes, views of life, and specific
manifestations of civilization that give a particular people its distinctive place in the world.'
(Sapir 1924, p. 405)
C22 '"culture" (…) is what remains of men's past, working on their present, to shape the future'
(Myres 1927, p. 16)
C23 'the sum of men's adjustments to their life-conditions' (Sumner & Keller 1927, p. 46)
C24 'that part of the environment which man has himself created and to which he must adjust
himself' (Willey 1927, p. 500)
C25 'the sum of all activities, customs and beliefs' (Dixon 1928, p. 3)
C26 'Culture is the sum total of all that is artificial. It is the complete outfit of tools, and habits of
living, which are invented by man and then passed on from one generation to another.' (Folsom
1928, p. 15)
C27 'that complex whole which includes all the habits acquired by man as a member of society'
(Benedict 1929, p. 806)
C28 'the mode of life followed by the community or the tribe' (Wissler 1929, p. 341)
C29 'Culture is the sum total of the ways of doing and thinking, past and present, of a social group.'
(Bogardus 1930, p. 336)
C30 'the artificial objects, institutions, and modes of life or of thought which are not peculiarly
individual but which characterize a group' (Wallis 1930, p. 9)
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C31 'culture includes all the activities which develop in the association between persons or which
are learned from a social group, but excludes those specific forms of behavior which are
predetermined by inherited nature' (Hiller 1933, p. 3)
C32 'Culture is the dissipation of surplus human energy in the exuberant exercise of the higher
human faculties.' (Carver 1935, p. 283)
C33 Culture is a 'system of "institutions" and "ideas"' about traditons and the assimilation thereof in
a group. (Thurnwald 1936, p. 394)
C34 'the sum total if what an individual acquires from his society (…) as a legacy from the past'
(Lowie 1937, p. 3)
C35 'Culture is to society what personality is to the organism. Culture sums up the particular
institutional content of a society.' (Katz & Schanck 1938, p. 551)
C36 'culture is a man-made or superorganic order, self-generating and dynamic in its operation, a
pattern-creating order, objective, humanly useful, cumulative, and self-perpetuating' (Panunzio
1939, p. 106)
C37 'The term culture is used to signify the sum-total of human creations, the organized result of
human experience up to the present time.' (Reuter 1939, p. 191)
C38 'Culture includes everything that can be communicated from one generation to another. The
culture of a people is their social heritage' (Sutherland & Woodward 1940, p. 19)
C39 'the way in which the people in any group do things, make and use tools, get along with one
another and with other groups, the words they use and the way they use them to express
thoughts, and the thoughts they think' (Sears 1940, pp. 78-9)
C40 'Culture consists of traditional ways of solving problems.' (Ford 1942, p. 555)
C41 'Culture consists of common and more or less standardized ideas, attitudes, and habits which
have developed with respect to man's recurrent and continuous needs.' (Young 1942, p. 35)
C42 'Culture is all behavior mediated by symbols.' (Bain 1942, p. 87)
C43 'culture in general as a descriptive concept means the accumulated treasury of human creation:
books, paintings, buildings, and the like; the knowledge of ways of adjusting to our
surroundings, both human and physical; language, customs, and systems of etiquette, ethics,
religion, and morals that have been built up through the ages' (Kluckhohn & Kelly 1945, p. 96)
C44 'The culture of a society is the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas and habits
which they learn, share, and transmit from generation to generation.' (Linton 1945b, p. 203)
C45 'Culture is (…) a set of ready-made definitions of the situation which each participant only
slightly retailors in his own idiomatic way.' (Kluckhohn & Kelly 1945, p. 91)
C46 'the organized repetitive responses of a society's members' (Linton 1945a, p. 5)
C47 'A culture is any given people's way of life, as distinct from the life-ways of other peoples.'
(Kluckhohn & Leighton 1946, p. xviii)
C48 'Culture may be said to be the common use and application of complex ideas by the members
of a social group.' (Feibleman 1946, p. 73)
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C49 'the mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values (…).
Culture is the special and exclusive product of men, and is their distinctive quality in the
cosmos' (Kroeber 1923/48, p. 8)
C50 'Culture is the man-made part of the environment.' (Herskovits 1948, p. 17)
C51 Culture 'includes all the characteristic activities and interests of a people: Derby Day, Henley
Regatta, Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the dog races, the pin table, the dart board,
Wensleydale cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot in vinegar, nineteenth-century
Gothic churches and the music of Elgar.' (Eliot 1948, p. 31)
C52 'I would define culture as the individual's or group's acquired response systems.' (Henry 1949,
p. 218)
C53 'La culture, c'est la manière de vivre du groupe.' (Maquet 1949, p. 324)
C54 Culture is cultural behaviour. Cultural behaviour is 'all human functioning that conforms to
patterns learned from other persons.' (Haring 1949, p. 29)
C55 'The culture of a people may be defined as the sum total of the material and intellectual
equipment whereby they satisfy their biological and social needs and adapt themselves to their
environment.' (Piddington 1950, pp. 3-4)
C56 'Culture is generally understood to mean learned modes of behavior which are socially
transmitted from one generation to another within particular societies and which may be
diffused from one society to another.' (Steward 1950, p. 98)
C57 '"A culture" refers to the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete "design for
living".' (Kluckhohn 1951, p. 86)
C58 Culture consists of symbols, value orientations and convictions regarding the physical world.
(Parsons & Shills 1951)
C59 'Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted
by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their
embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically
derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the
one hand, be considered as products of action on the other as conditioning elements of further
action.' (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952, p. 181)
C60 'the concept of culture refers to certain of the qualities displayed by classes of social events
which are similar with respect to those qualities' (McNitt 1958, p. 71)
C61 In cross-cultural psychology, culture is regarded to be a set of basic value orientations. (see §
3.5.2)
C62 'Culture is not generally considered actual behavior itself, nor need the actual products or
artifacts of culture be considered as culture itself. Culture is that which is constructed by
inference from behavior and artifacts.' (Sykes 1963, pp. 256-257)
C63 A cultural system is 'a system of symbols'. (Schneider 1968, p. 1)
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C64 Culture is best seen as 'a set of control mechanisms − plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what
computer engineers call "programs") − for the governing of behavior.' (Geertz 1968, p. 150)
C65 Culture patterns are 'organized systems of significant symbols'. (Geertz 1968, p. 150)
C66 Culture is shared; culture is about communication. Culture is the means by which social order
is perpetuated. Culture is both about difference and sameness. Culture is both material and
ideal. (Boon 1973)
C67 'an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate,
and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life' (Geertz 1973, p.89)
C68 'culture is coded in memory, in behavior, in materials, in language, in art, writing, and
computers, and (…) the most important thing about culture is that it is always encoded twice −
once within the human being, in electrical and chemical form, and once outside the human
being in some other form' (Bohannan 1973, p. 357)
C69 'A culture is the total socially acquired life-way or life-style of a group of people. It consists of
the patterned, repetitive ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are characteristic of the
members of a particular society or segment of a society.' (Harris 1975, p. 144)
C70 'Culture consists of four kinds of symbols: values: choice statements that rank behavior or
goals; norms: specifications of values relating to behavior in interaction; beliefs: existential
statements about how the world operates that often serve to justify values and norms (…); and
finally, expressive symbols: any and all aspects of material culture, from stone axes to
swastikas, from the Kula ring to constitutions and cockfights' (Peterson 1979, pp. 137-138)
C71 'learned systems of meanings, communicated by means of natural language and other symbol
systems, having representational, directive and affective functions, and capable of creating
cultural entities and particular senses of reality' (D'Andrade 1984, p. 116)
C72 'Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented,
but by shaping a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct
'strategies of action'. ' (Swidler 1985, p. 273)
C73 'Culture is a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society
and transmitted from generation to generation. While human nature is biologically innate and
universal, culture is learned and may vary from one society to another.' (Inglehart 1990, p. 18)
C74 'Culture (…) is the sharing and transmission of memory, ideology, emotions, life-styles,
scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols.' (Iriye 1990, p. 100)
C75 Culture is 'the software of the mind'; culture is 'the collective programming of the mind which
distinguishes the members of one group or cetagory of people from another' (Hofstede 1991, p.
5).
C76 'The core of culture (…) is formed by values' (Hofstede 1991, p. 8).
C77 'a shared set of ideas, held to be valid simply because they constituted the joint conceptual
banks of custom of an ongoing community' (Gellner 1992, p. 18)
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C78 'Culture is a set of human made objective and subjective elements that in the past have a)
increased the probability of survival, b) resulted in satisfaction for the participants in an
ecological niche, and thus c) become shared among those who communicate with each other
because they had a common language and lived the same timeplace.' (Triandis et al. 1993, p.
219)
C79 'Culture is the socially transmitted knowledge and behavior shared by some group of people.'
(Peoples & Bailey 1994, p. 23)
C80 'the systems of shared meanings which people who belong to the same community, group, or
nation use to help them interpret and make sense of the world' (Hall 1995, p. 176)
C81 'The two primary aspects of culture are institutions and technology. Under technology is tools
and tool using and warranted or scientific knowledge, instrumental logic. The technological
heritage is based upon an instrumental system that is derived from tools and skills. Under
institutions is myths, legends, and traditions, and ceremonial or ideological knowledge,
ceremonial logic. The institutional heritage is based upon a ceremonial system that is derived
from myths, legends, and traditions.' (Bowles et al. 1999, p. 407)
C82 'the clusters of common concepts, emotions, and practices that arise when people interact
regularly' (Brumann 1999, p. S1)
C83 Culture can be defined by twelve features: (1) culture consists of ideals, values, and
assumptions about life that people widely share and that guide specific behaviour; (2) culture
influences the environment; (3) culture is transmitted from generation to generation; cultural
values tend to exist for long periods in a society; (4) culture is  based on / learned by childhood
experiences; (5) culture is not widely discussed; people rarely talk about cultural influence on
their own behaviour; (6) cultures may clash; norms and values from one culture may be
inconsistent with the norms and values of another; (7) culture helps people to make sense of
reality; (8) cultural values persist even when they became unpractical; (9) people react
emotional when cultural norms are violated; (10) cultural norms and values change over time;
people may have different attitudes to norms and values in different situations; (11) fast change
is difficult; (12) a culture can be summarised in sharp contrasts. (Brislin 2000)
C84 Culture is man's faculty to use representation(s) to give form, sense and meaning to reality.
(e.g. Ankersmit 2001)
C85 'Culture is a shared interpretive scheme.' (Douglas 2001, p. 3147)
C86 ''culture' refers to community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient'
(Schweder 2001, p. 3153)
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4-3-aspects of "culture"
The definitions and interpretations of "culture" above can be analysed and compared as sets
of aspects, elements or components (of "culture"): 'The majority of the definitions in
Kroeber and Kluckhohn's volume see culture as a set consisting of identifiable elements
and use a noun followed by "of" and an enumeration of the elements to define it (…)'
(Brumann 1999, p. S4). Analysing the definitions and interpretations as such shows that −
while modern definitions do not deviate fundamentally from the Tylorian definition (e.g.
Peterson 1979; Brumann 1999) − different weights are assigned to the different elements of
culture by different approaches, in different contexts, and in different times (Peterson
1979). A number of aspects of "culture" keeps returning throughout the list. Some of these
seem to be more obvious than others. The majority of the definitions on the list, for
example, interpret culture as a condition of a social group. This, however, is a relatively
modern interpretation (see § 3.3). A small number of concepts (C2, C20, C52) are about
individuals rather than social groups and a slightly larger number focussed on processes
rather than conditions (C1, C2, C5, C20, C32, C74). Other aspects that keep returning in the
list above are:
(1) culture is human (§ 4.3.1);
(2) culture is socially learned (§ 4.3.2);
(3) culture is or guides behaviour (§ 4.3.3);
(4) culture is or provides meaning (§ 4.3.4);
(5) culture is about the products of the mind (§ 4.3.4).
Besides these more common aspects of "culture", there are a few rarer ones dealt with in
subsection 4.3.5. Subsection 4.3.6, finally, discusses the classification of aspects
distinguished in this section.
4-3-1-culture is human
Nearly all dictionaries of quotations on the Internet contain an early 19th century quote
from Fitzroy James Raglan: 'culture is roughly anything we do and the monkey don't'.
Unfortunately, none of these specify the source of the quotation. Nevertheless, it illustrates
a general feeling among theorists of culture: culture is 'possessed only by human beings'
(Case 1927, p. 906).  This view is, however, contested by a number of scientists who
describe animal culture. Hart and Pantzer (1925) see culture in birdsong; Vogel (1999), de
Waal (2001) and van Schaik et al. (2003) find culture with apes (chimpanzees and orang-
utans); and Rendell and Whitehead (2001) describe culture in whales and dolphins. What
all of these have in common is that they interpret (or define) culture as socially learned (or
otherwise transferred) patterns of behaviour that are specific to groups of animals, but not
to the species as a whole. Wynne (2004) on the other hand, explains that animals do not
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need culture to come up with similar solutions for similar problems in similar
circumstances.
Whether animals can and do possess culture is a difficult question that may be more about
concepts than about humans and animals. There is, however, a further and more
fundamental argument against the exclusivity of culture to humanity. This argument is
beautifully summarised by Geertz (1968) as: 'men have birthdays, but man does not' (p.
151). The point is that there is no 'mental Rubicon', no sudden break in hominid evolution
when man (or one of its predecessors) 'as a member of society' suddenly became able to
acquire 'knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom', etc. (see C10 above). It took man over
a million of years to develop, slowly and gradually, something that could be called culture
(e.g. Geertz 1968). (Moreover, it becomes increasingly clear that men and apes are far more
similar than often assumed; see e.g. Wildman et al. 2003.)
The human appropriation of culture is strongly related to the culture - nature dichotomy.
The same boundary that distinguishes culture from nature, distinguishes humans from
animals. Geertz's argument, however, not only undermines the exclusivity of culture to
humans but also the culture - nature dichotomy. Cultural evolution was strongly related to
genetic, biological evolution. 'Our central nervous system grew up in great part in
interaction with culture' and, hence, 'without men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and
more significantly, without culture, no men' (Geertz 1968, p. 152).
Although many theorists of culture feel that the notions of animal culture or early hominid
culture 'are needlessly depriving us of our proper domain' (Holloway 1969, p. 47), there
seems to be no good reason to restrict culture to humans. The phrase 'culture is human',
therefore, is no proper part of a definition of culture.
4-3-2-culture is socially learned
The application of the concept of culture to animals described above is mainly based on
definitions of culture as socially rather than genetically transmitted behaviour. Indeed, the
social transmission of culture seems to be one of its key aspects. Twenty-eight of the
definitions and interpretations above state that culture − in some way − is socially learned
(see box 4.1).
box 4.1: culture is socially learned
C10 C22 C33 C44 C59 C73 C79
C11 C26 C34 C49 C66 C74 C82
C17 C27 C38 C54 C67 C77 C83
C19 C31 C40 C56 C71 C78 C85
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Again, this aspect of culture reflects the culture - nature dichotomy. Cultural behaviour is
not natural in the sense that it is not determined by biology, but is learned in and from the
social group. While not explicitly mentioned in all definitions, the social transmission of
culture is probably the only undisputed aspect of the concept's definition. It is probably also
the only aspect that was used in a formal definition:
D4.1 "culture" =def { α | ∃x,y  [ x learns α from y  ∧  x ≠ y ] }  ,
in words: culture is the set of all things learnable (by x from y) (Anderson & Moore 1962;
Brownstein 1995; formula adapted to notational standards as specified in § 1.3.2).
4-3-3-culture and behaviour
The relationship of culture to behaviour is a complicated one. Peterson (1979) claims that
while culture 'was once seen as a map of behavior it is now increasingly seen as a map for
behavior' (p. 159). Whether indeed such a development took place is, however, doubtful. It
seems that both interpretations of culture have coexisted. The difficulty is that the concept
of "culture" has to steer free from the Scylla and Charybdis of behaviourism and idealism.
A strictly behaviourist interpretation of culture claims that culture is behaviour and ignores
everything that determines this behaviour. A strictly idealist position would entail that
culture is some metaphysical entity above and determining our actual behaviour. The
relationship of culture and behaviour, hence, is related to the ontological status of culture
(see also § 4.2.2). Most definitions and interpretations do not go very deeply into the murky
waters of metaphysics. Thirty of the definitions and interpretations above, however, give
relatively explicit answers on the question whether culture is behaviour or meta-behaviour,
that which guides behaviour (see boxes 4.2a and 4.2b).
box 4.2a: culture is behaviour
C9 C28 C39 C47 C69
C18 C29 C42 C53 C78
C25 C31 C46 C54 C79
box 4.2b: culture is meta-behaviour
C17 C55 C61 C66 C72 C78
C36 C57 C62 C70 C75
C52 C59 C64 C71 C76
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Even if culture is defined as behaviour, the concept refers primarily to the way a group does
things. "Culture" is not about (behavioural) events themselves, but about the characteristics
of these events (McNitt 1958). Culture in this sense, is interpreted as patterns of behaviour.
Culture as meta-behaviour refers to the rules and institutions that co-determine or guide
behaviour (e.g. Cushner & Brislin 1986/96). Patterns, rules and institutions are referred to
in many of the definitions and interpretations on the list (see boxes 4.3a to 4.3c).
box 4.3a: patterns (ways of doing things: customs, habits, practices, etc.)
C3 C18 C29 C44 C54 C69 C82
C4 C25 C30 C46 C57 C72
C7 C26 C39 C47 C59 C74
C10 C27 C41 C49 C62 C78
C17 C28 C43 C53 C68 C79
box 4.3b: rules (incl. values, norms, attitudes, roles, structures etc.)
C4 C10 C43 C59 C67 C73 C78
C7 C21 C49 C61 C70 C75 C83
C9 C41 C58 C64 C71 C76 C86
box 4.3c: institutions (formalised / codified rules, patterns and structures)
C3 C7 C10 C33 C59 C81
C4 C8 C30 C35 C64 C86
The distinction of the three categories in general may be one of degree of formalisation (or
institutionalisation) similar to Polanyi's (1958) distinction of tacit and codified knowledge
(see figure 4.1). The main difference between a habit and a norm, for example, is that the
latter is more explicit, more formal. Nevertheless all 'levels' are forms of meta-behaviour:
customs are tacit meta-behaviour, while laws (institutions) are extremely formal meta-
behaviour. Tacit meta-behaviour is difficult to transfer and difficult to change; while formal
meta-behaviour can be enforced and is relatively easily changed. (Note that more formal
meta-behaviour is not necessarily more powerful in the (co-)determination of actual
behaviour.)
It is not behaviour itself, which the theorist of culture is interested in, but the patterns of and
rules for behaviour: the way of doing things rather than the doing itself. Hence, culture is
meta-behaviour. (Section 5.2 deals with the notion of meta-behaviour more extensively.)
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figure 4.1: levels of formalisation of meta-behaviour
4-3-4-meaning, ideas, products of the mind
Of the eighty-six definitions and interpretations listed above forty-nine refer in some way to
meaning and/or ideas. Many theorists claim that culture has to do with language and
concepts or with beliefs and convictions (see boxes 4.4a and 4.4b).
box 4.4a: categories (language, concepts, meaning, etc.)
C3 C42 C58 C66 C71 C78 C84
C9 C43 C59 C67 C74 C80 C85
C13 C45 C63 C68 C75 C82
C39 C48 C65 C70 C77 C83
Culture is often associated with the products of the mind, both material and spiritual. These
products not omly include knowledge and theories (see box 4.4b), but also literature,
buildings, tools, skills, and many more (see boxes 4.5a and 4.5b).
box 4.4b: beliefs (knowledge, ideas, theories, convictions, etc.)
C8 C17 C32 C43 C59 C74 C86
C9 C18 C33 C44 C67 C77
C10 C21 C37 C48 C68 C79
C13 C25 C39 C49 C69 C81
C15 C29 C40 C55 C70 C83
C16 C30 C41 C58 C73 C84
box 4.5a: tools and skills
C1 C12 C23 C39 C43 C55 C72
C10 C13 C26 C40 C49 C59 C81
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box 4.5b: artefacts (objects, texts, the arts etc.)
C9 C16 C37 C51 C62 C74
C10 C30 C43 C59 C68
Although material artefacts like books and buildings are often regarded to be part of
culture, specific reference to this material culture is relatively rare (C1; C9; C19; C51; C55;
C66). More common is the reference to the spiritual or intellectual aspects of culture (see
box 4.6).
box 4.6: spiritual and intellectual aspects of culture
C2 C32 C9 C19 C51 C66
C20 C8 C16 C48 C55
4-3-5-less common aspects
Besides the relatively common aspects described above, there is a small number of
relatively rare aspects. C3 (gens), for example, includes descent; C6 and C7 refer to the pre-
Enlightened and/or non-Western aspects of early 19th century interpretations of culture (see
§ 3.4.2); and 8 definitions include a reference to culture as the transformation and/or
domination (by man) of nature  (see box 4.7).
box 4.7: culture as the transformation and domination of nature
C1 C23 C43 C55
C12 C24 C50 C83
Although this latter aspect is not often mentioned explicitly, the domination of nature may
have been one of the key aspects in the development of the concept. It is, moreover, in this
aspect that "culture" seems to be most closely related to the traditional (normative) concept
of "civilisation" as societal development. Guadarrama González (1999), for example,
defines culture as a level of domination or control:
La cultura expresa el grado de control que posee la humanidad, en una forma histórica y
determinada, sobre sus condiciones de existencia y desarrollo. Ese dominio se ejecuta de
manera específica y circunstanciada, por lo que puede ser considerado de manera auténtica
cuando se corresponde con las exigencias de diverso carácter que una comunidad histórica,
pubelo o nación, debe plantearse. (p. 66)
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4-3-6-classification and meta-classification
The aspects distinguished in the preceding subsection are a classification of definitional
elements in the list of definitions and interpretations of "culture" presented above. Of
course other classifications are possible. Above, it was shown, for example, that there are
no crisp boundaries between patterns, rules and institutions; neither are there between
patterns and skills or between beliefs and some immaterial artefacts.
Classifications are dependent on concepts or categories and are therefore cultural
themselves. Moreover, as conceptual frameworks or languages co-determine the perception
of reality (see § 2.1.1), these may be related to (almost) all other definitions of "culture".
However, some classification of aspects is necessary to analyse such a large and diverse set
of concepts. The classification presented here seems to capture most of the intensional
diversity of "culture".  The aspects of "culture" (the set of aspects .) distinguished in the
preceding subsections are:
A1 human;
A2 A2a process / development;
A2b condition / stage in development;
A3 A3a social / group / national;
A3b individual;
A4 transformation / exploitation / domination of nature;
A5 socially learned / transmitted;
A6 descent;
A7 patterns (ways of doing things: customs, habits, practices, etc.);
A8 rules (incl. values, norms, attitudes, roles, structures etc.);
A9 institutions (formalised / codified rules, patterns and structures);
A10 categories (language, concepts, meaning, etc.);
A11 beliefs (knowledge, ideas, theories, convictions, etc.);
A12 tools and skills
A13 artefacts (objects, texts, the arts etc.);
A14 pre-Enlightened / non-Western;
A15 spiritual / intellectual;
A16 behaviour;
A17 meta-behaviour.
These aspects are a classification, but can be classified themselves as well. The aspects are
of different types: some relate directly to the real world counterparts of the concept of
"culture"; others seem to be higher-level aspects that point at, for example, the transfer or
goals of these real world counterparts. It seems there is a meta-classification of aspects of
"culture" in which two levels or classes must be distinguished. First-level aspects are the
aspects that determine what kind of things, actions, events, etc. the concept of "culture"
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refers to. These function − more or less − as the nouns in definitions of culture. The set of
aspects of "culture" . contains two different subsets of first-level aspects: .11 and .12. .11
is {A7, …, A13}; .12 is {A16, A17}. These two subsets classify more or less the same
things, but .12 uses less and far more general terms. The set of second-level aspects .2 can
be regarded as (the) adjectives in the definitions. .2 is {A1, …, A6, A14, A15}. These
aspects give additional information by restricting the first-level aspects by kind (A14, A15),
goal (A4), transfer (A5, A6) or temporal context (A2). All definitions of culture include
(although not necessarily explicitly) at least one first-level aspect. Second-level aspects
may or may not be included to further restrict the definition. A definition of culture as
socially transferred habits (C27), for example, is the set {A4, A6}. In other words: this
definition is constructed as aspect A6 (patterns) restricted by aspect A4 (social transfer).
Table 4.2 at the end of this chapter presents a matrix of eighty-six cases (the concepts C1 to
C86) and eighteen variables based on the list of aspects above. The first aspect (human) is
not included for two reasons: (1) it is implicitly assumed in nearly all definitions and
interpretations and (2) it was shown in the subsection 4.3.1 that it is not a proper part of a
definition of culture. The number of variables in the table is eighteen rather than sixteen
because aspects 2 and 3 have two variants that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This
matrix is the starting point for an attempt to distinguish clusters of similar definitions and
interpretations in section 4.3.
4-4-mapping "culture"
This section tries to answer two questions: (1) are there clearly distinguishable groups or
clusters of concepts of "culture"; and (2) if so, do the boundaries between these groups or
clusters coincide with disciplinary boundaries? 'Mapping' culture could be taken quite
literally. The objective is to draw a map of the conceptual field of culture. This can be done
by formal means, as will be attempted below, but it is also possible to draw a − more or less
− geographical map as in map 4.1. This map shows cities of varying sizes: the aspects
identified above, the elements of . (aspects mentioned more often are represented as bigger
cities; aspects more often mentioned together are nearer to each other on the map); roads
connecting aspects that are (very) often mentioned together; and regional boundaries for
definitions as clusters of aspects. In case of map 4.1 only two regions are drawn: 'the Land
of Tylor' (C10) and 'Cultura Animi' (C2). Adding more of the eighty-six concepts / regions
of the list in the preceding section would quickly make the map incomprehensible.
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map 4.1: mapping culture, literally…
While map 4.1 may be helpful to imagine the conceptual field of "culture"; it is of limited
use in finding structure therein. Formal methods may be more fitting here. As explained in
subsection 2.6.2, two formal methods for mapping the intensional structure of a concept (or
set of related concepts) are (readily) available: cluster analysis and formal concept analysis
(FCA). The first is relatively easy but comes with a major disadvantage: it does not take the
(possible) genus - species relationships between different concepts into account. FCA does,
but is far more complicated and far more difficult to interpret.
4-4-1-cluster analysis
Figure 4.2 graphically represents the results of a (hierarchical) cluster analysis of the
eighty-six cases based on the distance between all eighteen dummy variables (absolute
Euclidean / furthest neighbour linkage). (See below for further explanation.)
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figure 4.2: intensional clusters: dendrogram
ant 192   C18   ─┬───────────┐
ant 197   C69   ─┘           ├─────┐
ant 199   C79   ─────────────┘     │
ant 194   C47   ─┐                 ├───┐
soc 194   C53   ─┼───────────┐     │   │
ant 192   C28   ─┘           ├─────┘   ├───┐
soc 194   C54   ─────────────┘         │   │
soc 193   C29   ─────────────┬─────────┘   ├─────┐
soc 194   C46   ─────────────┘             │     │
ant 192   C25   ───────────────────────┬───┘     │
soc 194   C39   ───────────────────────┘         ├───────┐
soc 192   C26   ───────────────────┬───────┐     │       │
ant 194   C49   ───────────────────┘       ├─┐   │       │
ant 192   C27   ─────────────┬─────────┐   │ │   │       │
ant 199   C82   ─────────────┘         ├───┘ ├───┘       │
ant 192   C17   ─────────────┬─────────┘     │           ├───┐
soc 194   C44   ─────────────┘               │           │   │
psy 199   C78   ─────────────────────────────┘           │   │
ant 197   C68   ───────────────────────┬───────────┐     │   │
his 199   C74   ───────────────────────┘           │     │   │
phi 199   C77   ─────────────┬─────────┐           │     │   │
soc 200   C85   ─────────────┘         ├─────┐     ├─────┘   │
ant 192   C19   ───────────────────┬───┘     │     │         │
ant 197   C66   ───────────────────┘         │     │         │
ant 196   C63   ─┬───────────┐               ├─────┘         │
ant 196   C65   ─┘           ├─────┐         │               │
phi 190   C14   ─────────────┘     ├───────┐ │               │
soc 194   C42   ───────────────────┘       ├─┘               │
soc 193   C31   ───────────────────┬───────┤                 │
ant 193   C34   ───────────────────┘       │                 │
ant 194   C45   ─────────────┬─────────┐   │                 ├───┐
soc 199   C80   ─────────────┘         ├───┘                 │   │
phi 178   C5    ─────────────┬─────────┘                     │   │
phi 195   C60   ─────────────┘                               │   │
ant 187   C10   ───────────────────┬───────┐                 │   │
ant 195   C59   ───────────────────┘       ├─────────┐       │   │
ant 194   C43   ───────────────────────────┘         │       │   │
soc 195   C58   ─────────────┬─────────────┐         ├─────┐ │   │
soc 197   C70   ─────────────┘             ├─┐       │     │ │   │
soc 190   C13   ───────────────────┬───────┘ ├───────┘     │ │   │
ant 194   C48   ───────────────────┘         │             │ │   │
psy 186   C9    ─────────────────────────────┘             │ │   │
ant 195   C57   ─────────────┬─────────┐                   │ │   │
soc 198   C72   ─────────────┘         ├───┐               │ │   │
soc 193   C36   ───────────────────┐   │   │               │ │   │
psy 196   C61   ───────────────────┼───┘   │               ├─┘   │
ant 194   C52   ───────────────────┘       ├─────┐         │     │
soc 189   C12   ─┬───────────┐             │     │         │     │
soc 192   C23   ─┘           ├─────────┐   │     │         │     │
psy 192   C24   ─────────────┘         ├───┘     ├───┐     │     │
com 182   C6    ───────────────────┬───┘         │   │     │     │
psy 193   C35   ───────────────────┘             │   │     │     │
ant 195   C55   ─────────────────────────────────┘   │     │     │
soc 193   C30   ───────────────────┬───────┐         ├─────┘     │
soc 193   C37   ───────────────────┘       ├───────┐ │           │
phi 185   C8    ───────────────────────┬───┘       │ │           │
soc 193   C33   ───────────────────────┘           │ │           │
ant 192   C21   ─────────────┬─────┐               ├─┘           │
soc 200   C86   ─────────────┘     ├───────┐       │             │
soc 194   C41   ───────────────────┘       │       │             │
ant 197   C67   ─────────────┬─────────────┼───────┘             │
psy 200   C83   ─────────────┘             │                     │
soc 193   C38   ─┐                         │                     │
ant 195   C56   ─┤                         │                     │
ant 187   C11   ─┼─────────────────┐       │                     │
his 192   C22   ─┘                 ├───────┘                     │
soc 199   C73   ───────────────────┘                             │
phi 174   C4    ───────────────────┬─────────┐                   │
com 182   C7    ───────────────────┘         ├───────┐           │
com 100   C3    ─────────────────────────────┘       │           │
ant 196   C64   ─────────────┬─────────┐             │           │
psy 199   C76   ─────────────┘         ├───────────┐ ├───────────┘
ant 198   C71   ───────────────────┬───┘           │ │
psy 199   C75   ───────────────────┘               │ │
ant 191   C15   ─────────────┬─────────┐           ├─┘
phi 200   C84   ─────────────┘         ├─────────┐ │
soc 194   C40   ───────────────────┬───┘         │ │
soc 199   C81   ───────────────────┘             ├─┘
phi 191   C16   ─────────────┬─────────────┐     │
his 194   C51   ─────────────┘             ├─────┤
soc 196   C62   ───────────────────────────┘     │
com 000   C1    ───────────────────┬───────┐     │
soc 194   C50   ───────────────────┘       ├─────┘
com 000   C2    ─┬─────────────────┐       │
ant 192   C20   ─┘                 ├───────┘
soc 193   C32   ───────────────────┘
ant = anthropology; com = common usage; his = history;phi = philosophy; psy = psychology; soc = sociology
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All eighty-six cases are identified by case numbers (C1 to C86) and a code that refers to
two parts of the context of that case. The first three letters are an abbreviation of the
scientific field the definition is from, the next three figures refer to the decade when the
definition was published or used: "ant 193", for example, means that that definition was
published in an anthropological book or journal in the 1930s. The question that needs to be
answered is whether this dendrogram reveals or (clearly) suggests any clustering or
grouping of concepts. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The dendrogram only
illustrates the bewildering variety of notions of "culture". Only rarely definitions from the
same field and period are grouped at an early stage and there is no obvious clustering at all.
4-4-2-formal concept analysis
As mentioned above, FCA is far more difficult. It is nearly impossible to draw a lattice
based on a formal context of eighty-six objects (the cases) and eighteen attributes (the
aspects) without the help of specialised software. However, even with help of such software
(ConImp v4.09 and Diagramm v2.12), the resulting lattice, which is drawn in figure 4.3, is
impossible to interpret. There simply is too much information and too much diversity (see
also § 2.6.2).
figure 4.3: computer generated FCA lattice based on all attributes
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Stepwise, the number of attributes was decreased until a lattice could be drawn that was not
just a black cloud of lines and dots (as in figure 4.3), but that is interpretable, although the
complexity of "culture" still makes this very difficult. Figure 4.4 presents the lattice based
on a subset of attributes, the set of first-level aspects .11 distinguished in subsection 4.2.2:
(1) patterns (ways of doing things: customs, habits, practices, etc.); (2) rules (incl. values,
norms, attitudes, roles, structures etc.); (3) institutions (formalised / codified rules, patterns
and structures); (4) categories (language, concepts, meaning, etc.); (5) beliefs (knowledge,
ideas, theories, convictions, etc.); (6) tools and skills; and (7) artefacts (objects, texts, the
arts etc.).
figure 4.4: FCA lattice based on a subset of attributes
Although the lattice in figure 4.4 is redrawn to minimise the number of empty concepts
(hollow dots), lines and knots (crossings of lines), the figure is still extremely complex. It is
a map of the intensional diversity of the definitions and interpretations of "culture"
institutionspatterns tools categories rules beliefs
C27
C28
C46
C47
C53
C54
C57
C35 C51 C1
C12
C23
C42
C45
C63
C65
C66
C80
C85
C61
C76
C15
C32
C82
C17
C18
C25
C29
C44
C69
C79
C26
C72 C62
C16
C37 C64
C71
C75
C21
C73
C8
C33
C40
C55
C48
C77
C84
C3
C4
C7 C78 C41 C86
C58
C67
C70
C83
C81 C13
C30
C68
C74 C49 C9 C39
C10 C43
C59
C2 C5 C6 C11 C14 C19 C20 C22 C24
C31 C34 C36 C38 C50 C52 C56 C60
artefacts
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presented in the preceding section. Lines connecting the dots on the map represent
relationships between different intepretations of culture. For example, C64 is composed of
the aspects of rules and institutions. C86 adds beliefs to C64.
Figure 4.4 shows that Tylor's definition (C10) and Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952)
synthetic definiton (C59) are two of the broadest interpretations of culture, but the figure
does not reveal what it was intended to reveal: there is no clear clustering of concepts of
culture (which was also concluded from the cluster analysis above), although the lower
levels of the figure suggest that there may be two broad groups of definitions, the first
including institutions (C10 and above), the second excluding it (C43 and above).
Nevertheless, any definition (or group thereof represented by a black dot) of the thirty-four
in the lattice can be reached from any other definition within a very small number of steps.
For any two definitions, there are a number of intermediate definitions. Disciplinary
boundaries (and/or period) do not make the picture any clearer. From both cluster analysis
and FCA, there is only one conclusion possible: the intensional structure of culture is a
bewildering mess.
4-5-civilisation, economy, anti-culture
Contrary to "culture", "economy" is a relatively straightforward concept. However, while
hundreds (if not thousands) of definitions of "culture" have been put forward, definitions of
the concept of "economy" are extremely rare. Generally, dictionaries and encyclopaedias of
economics do not have an entry on the concept that describes their subject matter:
"economy". Nevertheless, the preceding chapter supplies sufficient information to map the
concept of "economy". The most important aspects of "economy" seem to be:
(1) reason;
(2) creation of wealth;
(3) production, consumption and distribution (PCD)
(4) behaviour;
(5) institutions.
Different concepts of "economy" and the related "civilisation" are different combinations of
these aspects as shown in table 4.1. Three concepts of "economy" are distinguished in this
table. E18 is the 18th century concept of economy as the political organisation and
institutions for the creation of national wealth; E19 is the late 19th and early 20th century
concept of economy as the institutions of (or related to) production, consumption and
distribution (PCD); and E20 is the late 20th century concept of "economy" as aggregate
productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour (see § 3.4.3).
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table 4.1: concepts and aspects of "economy"
re
as
on
w
ea
lth
PC
D
be
ha
vi
ou
r
in
st
itu
tio
ns
civilisation X X
E18 x X X
E19 x X X
E20 x X X
The 18th and 19th century concept of "civilisation" referred specifically to the rationalised
institutions that arose (or should arise) from the Enlightenment. Reason was and is an
important aspect of the concept of "economy", but does not belong to the key aspects as it
did in the case of civilisation (hence, the smaller Xs).
Drawing a FCA lattice based on table 4.1 is relatively easy, but still comes with a problem:
the relationships between attributes (aspects) and objects (concepts) must be dichotomous.
Hence, the small 'x's in the table have to be replaced by big 'X's or removed. The first
option was chosen here, which resulted in figure 4.5:
figure 4.5: FCA lattice of "economy"
Table 4.1 and the lattice in figure 4.5 can be expanded easily to include a small number of
concepts of culture. Adding "rules" to the list of attributes and seven concepts of "culture",
all possible combination of behaviour, rules and/or institutions coded CS1 to CS7, results in
figure 4.6.
reason
E18
institutions
PCD
wealth behaviour
E19 E20
civilisation
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figure 4.6: FCA lattice of "culture" and "economy"
Figure 4.6 shows the relationships between a number of basic concepts of "culture" and
"economy". Economy as E19, for example, is a specific part or form of civilisation (in
terms of the graph: there is a line segment connecting E19 upwards to "civilisation"), which
in its turn is a specific part or form of culture as CS1. Similarly, economy as E20 is a
specific part or form of culture as CS2 and (possibly) overlaps with culture as CS4, CS6 or
CS7. Hence, in several cases the CED would be a conceptual rather than a real-world
relationship.
4-6-notes towards conceptual reconstruction
If this section makes anything clear, it is that the concepts of the CED, "culture" especially,
are in a state of complete and utter chaos. "Culture" can, and in fact does, mean (almost)
anything (e.g. Geertz 1973), which makes it a rather useless concept. The other pole of the
CED, "economy" is less problematic but can also mean a number of very different things.
Moreover, depending on their definition or conceptualisation, the poles of the CED may
overlap or one pole may be a part or subset of the other. Hence, conceptual reconstruction
is necessary. To investigate the possible relationships between culture and economy and the
theories about these relationships, a common language that avoids the problems presented
in this section is needed. This common language should provide rules for translation of the
different concepts; not their final definitions. The next chapter presents an attempt to
construct such a language.
PCDreason institutions
wealth
behaviour rules
civilisation
E18 E19 E20
CS2 CS3CS1
CS6CS5CS4
CS7
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table 4.2: data matrix for intensional mapping of "culture"
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C1 X X X
C2 X X X
C3 X X X X X
C4 X X X X
C5 X X
C6 X X X
C7 X X X X
C8 X X X X X
C9 X X X X X X X X
C10 X X X X X X X X X
C11 X X X
C12 X X X X
C13 X X X X X
C14
C15 X
C16 X X X
C17 X X X X X X
C18 X X X X X
C19 X X X
C20 X X X
C21 X X X X
C22 X X X
C23 X X X X
C24 X X X
C25 X X X X
C26 X X X X X
C27 X X X X
C28 X X X X
C29 X X X X
C30 X X X X X X
C31 X X X
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table 4.2 − continued
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C32 X X X
C33 X X X X
C34 X
C35 X X X
C36 X X
C37 X X X X
C38 X X X
C39 X X X X X X X
C40 X X X
C41 X X X X X
C42 X X
C43 X X X X X X X X X
C44 X X X X X
C45 X X
C46 X X X
C47 X X X X
C48 X X X X X
C49 X X X X X X X
C50 X
C51 X X
C52 X X X X
C53 X X X X
C54 X X X X X
C55 X X X X X X X
C56 X X X
C57 X X X X
C58 X X X X
C59 X X X X X X X X X X X
C60 X
C61 X X X X
C62 X X X
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table 4.2 − continued
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C63 X
C64 X X X
C65 X
C66 X X X X X
C67 X X X X X X
C68 X X X X
C69 X X X X X
C70 X X X X X
C71 X X X X
C72 X X X X X
C73 X X X X X
C74 X X X X X X X
C75 X X X X
C76 X X
C77 X X X X
C78 X X X X X X X X
C79 X X X X X X
C80 X X X
C81 X X X
C82 X X X X X
C83 X X X X X X X
C84 X X
C85 X X X
C86 X X X X X
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chapter 5
CONCEPTUAL
RECONSTRUCTION
Abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered, they are only moments dipped out from the
stream of time, snap-shots taken, as by a kineotoscopic camera, at a life that in its original
coming is continuous.
William James 1909, p. 235
Die Bedeutung der Sprache für die Entwicklung der Cultur liegt darin, daß in ihr der
Mensch eine eigne Welt neben die andere stellte, einen Ort, welchen er für so fest hielt, um
von ihm aus die übrige Welt aus den Angeln zu heben und sich zum Herren derselben zu
machen. Insofern der Mensch an die Begriffe und Namen der Dinge als an aternae veritates
durch lange Zeitstreden hindurch geglaubt hat, hat er sich jenen Stolz angeeignet, mit dem
er sich über das Thier erhob: er meinte wirklich in der Sprache die Erkenntnis der Welt zu
haben.
Friedrich Nietzsche 1878, §I.11
5-1-introduction
The second stage in the method of conceptual analysis proposed in section 2.7 is conceptual
reconstruction (CR). CR is necessary to re-categorise the conceptual field for which
analysis was needed. The goal of CR and, therefore, of this chapter, is to clean up concepts
and − if needed − introduce new ones in order to be able to express the same meanings,
refer to the same 'things', but without the ambiguity that characterised the concept(s) before
analysis. More specifically, this chapter, aims at the construction of a new conceptual
framework that (as) rigorously and unambiguously (as possible) categorises the field(s) and
that can be used as a lingua franca of the theories of the CED as presented in chapter 7. As
explained before (in § 2.7) CR does not necessarily aim at new definitions as this is often
impossible or impractical (for example in the case of essentially contested concepts; see §
2.4), but at translation rules that make comparison between the theories using different
variants of the concept possible. This goal 'is furthered best by designing primarily a mantle
definition in which particular conceptions can be encompassed as special cases' (de Groot
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& Medendorp 1988, p. 261). The 'mantle definition' terms proposed in this chapter are
"behaviour" and "meta-behaviour".
The breadth of meaning of the concept of "culture" especially may make CR, in the specific
case of the CED, a rather more requiring task than in many other cases of conceptual
analysis. In fact, as many definitions of culture comprehend all or nearly all of social
reality, a CR of the CED may entail a re-categorisation of social reality, in other words: CR
of the CED is an exercise in social ontology.
5-1-1-social and representational ontologies of the CED
As explained (briefly) in subsection 2.6.1, social ontology is the specification and/or
description of the ultimate constituents of social reality. Social ontology specifies the basic
categories or primitives that form the foundation of our perception of, and (scientific)
thought about, the social. It is, however, not just social ontology that is relevant here, but
descriptive ontology as well. It is not just the concepts of "culture" and "economy" we are
interested in, but the relationships between the corresponding phenomena and their
theoretical contexts as well. What is needed here are both an ontology of social categories
and an ontology of relationships. The first is social ontology, the second is not aimed at a
full classification of some part of reality, but at a 'specification of a conceptualisation'
(Gruber 1993, p. 200), at a list of variants of types of relationships and is, therefore, a form
of representational ontology (see § 2.6.1).
While the basic 'objects' of such a representational ontology are implied by its label, "an
ontology of relationships", these are not that obvious in the case of social ontology. In
principle, the same basic entities of existential ontology in general can be the basic 'stuff' of
social ontology. Throughout the history of philosophy a number of basic entities or
ontological primitives have been proposed. Leucippus and Democritus, for example,
introduced the first atomic theory in the 5th century BC. Everything was ultimately
composed of unchanging, indivisible and material atoms. In Greek antiquity in general,
reality was considered to be composed of some kind of material things or objects.
Ontologies of objects became − more or less − the standard. Whether these were material as
in materialism or mere perceptions or figments of the mind as in idealism, ontology was
usually a science or philosophy of the ultimately constitutive things.
As mentioned, there are some alternatives. Most of these gained (some) prominence in the
20th century only. Whitehead (1926; 1929) and Russell (1924) proposed an ontology based
on events. In such an ontology, events are the basic constituents of reality, not objects.
Wittgenstein (1922), on the other hand, claimed that reality consists of facts (or true
propositions). Similarly, Searle (1995), in what is probably the most famous recent study in
social ontology, took social facts as the basic constituents of social reality. The 'bundle
theory' (e.g. Russell 1940; Goodman 1951/66), finally, argues that all things are sets of
properties − hence, properties are the most fundamental constituents of reality − or, in the
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version of van Cleve (1985), that individual 'things' emerge from bundles of properties, but
are not identical with these bundles.
There are some important rules and pitfalls in ontology one has to be aware of. Subsection
2.6.1 already dealt briefly with methods of ontology. The most important rules mentioned
were Ockham's razor (do not postulate more (kinds of) entities than necessary) and the
advice to formalise in order to avoid ambiguity: 'wherever possible, logical constructions
are to be substituted for inferred entities' (Russell 1914, p. 115; quoted in 2.6.1). Pitfalls in
ontology have to do with the misleading nature of language. As Nietzsche points out in the
quote at the beginning of this chapter, concepts are often considered to be aternae veritates.
They are not, however, eternal truths, but mere fashions (see § 2.4.2). Our ordinary,
fashionable language to a large extent determines the categories of our thought, and hence,
may limit ontological theorising: 'Die grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen
meiner Welt' (Wittgenstein 1922, 5.6; see also § 2.1.1). In ontological research it is
necessary to cross the boundaries of our ordinary language and − if necessary − to introduce
new categories and concepts. Formalisation may be useful in this process, unless it is used
only to enforce another equally limited language (see also § 2.3.3).
Secondly, 'there are many abstract words which do not stand for single universals – e.g.
triangularity and rationality. In these respects language misleads us both by its vocabulary
and by its syntax. We must be on our guard in both respects if our logic is not to lead to a
false metaphysic' (Russell 1924, p. 168; see also § 2.2.3). Especially in the conceptual
framework of social science, concepts that do not simply refer to objects, events, or
phenomena but to theories or ideas are abundant. Unfortunately, these abstract concepts,
including "culture" and "economy", are often regarded ontological primitives (e.g. Castree
2004). Postulating these abstract concepts as basic entities is obviously absurd (e.g. James
1909; see quote at the beginning of this chapter), but often it is not entirely clear whether a
specific concept or category refers to an actual (simple) event or object or to a complex
theoretical construction (of multiple events and/or objects).
5-1-2-this chapter
As the following sections are on the ontologies of the CED, they have to deal carefully with
the problems and pitfalls sketched above. As mentioned, two different ontologies are
relevant to the CED: social ontology and a representational ontology of relationships.
Social ontology, the ontology of basic categories of social reality, of the concepts of and in
the CED, is the subject of the following section. The main goal of section 5.2 is the
conceptual reconstruction of "culture" and "economy". This, however, does not imply that
the section aims at new, final definitions for these concepts, but at a common language in
which the existing definitions, especially as they are applied in the CED, can be translated.
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Section 5.3 deals with the ontology of relationships (between the poles of the CED); and
section 5.4 presents a brief summary of the conceptual framework, the ontologies proposed
in this chapter.
5-2-"culture", "economy" and social ontology
To reconstruct the concepts of "culture" and "economy", their definitions have to be
rewritten in some common (and rigorous) language. This means that the elements that make
up the definitions of these concepts have to be reduced to a (preferably small) set of
ontological building blocks. These building blocks, moreover, have to be less ambiguous
than the concepts that are built with them (e.g. Quine 1968; see § 2.2.3). In subsection 4.3.6
two sets of 'first-level aspects' of definitions and interpretations of "culture" were
distinguished: .11 and .12. The latter contains "behaviour" and "meta-behaviour"; the first
contains seven basic aspects of culture:
(1) patterns (ways of doing things: customs, habits, practices, etc.);
(2) rules (incl. values, norms, attitudes, roles, structures etc.);
(3) institutions (formalised / codified rules, patterns and structures);
(4) categories (language, concepts, meaning, etc.);
(5) beliefs (knowledge, ideas, theories, convictions, etc.);
(6) tools and skills
(7) artefacts (objects, texts, the arts etc.).
This section focuses on the building blocks of social ontology, the relationship of these
aspects of "culture" and similar aspects of "economy" (see § 4.4) to these building blocks
and the reconstruction of the concepts of "culture" and "economy". Social ontology is the
starting point of the section.
The most basic question in any ontology is that about its fundamental building blocks or
primitives. A number of alternatives were mentioned in subsection 5.1.1. These alternatives
can be evaluated in a social ontological context. First, assume that (some kind of) objects
are the final constituents of social reality. The question that immediately springs to mind is:
What kind of objects? Surely, artefacts do not make up social reality and the only
alternative seems to be people. However, social reality is not about people themselves, but
about what they do and why they do these things, about their actions and motivations.
Hence, social reality is composed of behavioural events.
Alternatively, Searle (1995) claims that the fundamental building blocks in social ontology
are facts of the form 'X counts as Y in context C'. (Much earlier, in the preface to the 1901
(second) edition to Les règles de la méthode sociologique (1895), Durkheim also claimed
that social reality is constituted out of social facts.) Searle points at the meaning of events
and objects in social contexts, at categories, rules and concepts, and takes these to be the
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final constituents of social reality. The difference between the event-based ontology and
Searle's social ontology − more or less − coincides with the behaviour - meta-behaviour
dichotomy of subsection 4.3.3 (and .12). The event-based ontology is an ontology of
behaviour while Searle's is an ontology of meta-behaviour.
The 'bundle theory' could be a special case of an event-based ontology. It would define all
events as sets of properties. The plausibility of the bundle theory hinges on the question
whether an object or events is or has a set of properties. This question links the event-based
to Searle's ontology since a property is the application of a (meta-behavioural) category to
an event. The question one could and should ask is whether the event is composed or
merely categorised by the property. This is the question about the ontological status of
meta-behaviour which will be dealt with in subsection 5.2.3.
The basic ontological assumption of this section is that the building blocks of social reality
are both actual behavioural events and meta-behavioural categories, rules, etc. Subsection
5.2.1 analyses the 'first-level aspects' of "culture" .11 listed above in these terms.
Subsection 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 deal with the nature of meta-behaviour and the ontological
relationship between behaviour and meta-behaviour respectively. Subsection 5.2.4 presents
a reconstruction of a selection of interpretations of "culture" and "economy"
5-2-1-behaviour, meta-behaviour and aspects of "culture"
Individual human behaviour is determined, as graphically represented in figure 5.1, by the
interaction of reason, will and habit. It is, however, not individual human behaviour as such
that is of interest here, but the cultural influence thereupon. Culture influences behaviour
through the formation of will, habit and the input (of information) for rational decision-
making (reason). (Note that there may be external constraints unknown to the decision
maker at the time of the decision that hamper the execution of a choice for action.)
figure 5.1: a model of (individual) behaviour
mental event / choice for action
actual behavioural event / action
will
reason
habit
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An individual's will, his preferences and desires, is partly determined by a common human
hunger for sex (Freud), power (Nietzsche) and/or money (Marx) (there may be more of
these basic drives and there may be differences between men and women, but that is of
little relevance here) and partly by culturally different ideals and taboos. Spiro (1954)
pointed out that the distinction between innate and social (cultural) drives cannot properly
be maintained and is fruitless. In other words, will may be a product of natural or innate
drives and culture, but these components of (the creation of) will cannot be distinguished.
The formation of individual habits is influenced by individual experience, social rules and
reason. Habits may be reasonable at the time of formation, but mostly they are copies of
some rule, norm or social standard. Even when they become habits, not all rationality is lost
as it may be rational, or more efficient at least, to copy known successful behaviour in
similar occasions rather than rationally consider the options each time.
Although reason may influence habit and will, the latter are generally far stronger in
determining our actions than reason, and through them, culture co-determines our
behaviour. Reason more often is used to justify our actions afterwards, than to determine
what action should be taken beforehand. (Similarly, individual values and attitudes are
often adapted after and to actual behaviour.) Moreover, reason itself is not independent of
culture. The idea of rationality and what is considered to be rational behaviour differs
among socio-cultural groups (e.g. Zukin & DiMaggio 1990; Peet 1997). This may be a
matter of conceptual confusion rather than actual cultural influence on reason, but even if
reason is defined as the faculty of logical thought and knowledge (see § 3.2.1), the process
of rational deliberation is influenced by culture (e.g. Elster 1989; Rabin 1998). This
influence, although indirect, is of fundamental importance.
Rational choices for action are based on a consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of alternative actions. Culture influences this process of choice in (at least)
two ways. Firstly, by pre-selecting the options for consideration. There are always options
for action that are not considered, not even thought of, simply because we (and the socio-
cultural group we are part of) just do not know these options exist. Secondly, the
deliberation itself is based on the input of information through (different kinds of)
perception. Perception, in turn, is transformed by our concepts, categories and ideas. We
perceive the world and categorise and remember our experiences in the terms provided by
our language (see also § 2.1.1).
Figure 5.2 (below) graphically summarises the above, but needs some further explication (a
less elaborate version of the figure was proposed by, for example, Coleman 1990). Culture
as concepts, categories, ideas, patterns, rules and institutions co-determines our choices for
action and hence, our behaviour. The sum of all actions, of all behavioural events, is social
reality. Social reality, in turn gives shape to (and includes) culture. Patterns are repeated
actions in similar situations, the habits and customs of the group. Rules and institutions are
formed if patterns are transformed into norms, if they are codified or if they are forbidden.
Concepts and categories are the labels we apply to (and by which we classify) our actions,
the results thereof and the things that influence them. Ideas and beliefs specify what actions
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have been successful in the past or not, what kind of actions are preferable in what kind of
situations and what kind of actions are taboo. Rules, patterns, ideas, concepts, and the like
cannot be separated (from each other) easily. Rules and institutions are conceptual
constructions, whereas ideas and beliefs generally include rules or institutions. Indeed,
culture (or meta-behaviour) is a 'complex whole' (e.g. Tylor 1871; see also § 4.2).
figure 5.2: a model of social behaviour
Culture co-determines behaviour (e.g. Cushner & Brislin 1986/96; see also §§ 4.3.3 and
5.3). Hence, culture is meta-behaviour. The prefix "meta-" is mostly used to denote
something that transcends what is followed by the prefix. "Meta-physics" is what lies
beyond (or before) physics; it is some supposed deeper, more fundamental reality that
cannot be investigated by the normal tools of empirical science. Similarly, "meta-
behaviour" is what lies beyond actual behaviour. As meta-physics is some kind of 'deeper
reality' that determines our world, meta-behaviour co-determines actual behaviour. And like
meta-physics, meta-behaviour cannot be seen or investigated directly but only through the
world or behaviour it produces.
The concept of "meta-behaviour" was introduced in subsection 4.3.3 as a comprehensive
term for all aspects of culture that transcend actual behaviour. Meta-behaviour includes the
'things' that (relatively) directly guide our behaviour such as rules, habits and laws, but it
also includes the 'things' that influence our behaviour indirectly by determining our
perception of reality: language, concepts, theories and beliefs. Meta-behaviour is the ever-
changing set of rules, concepts, etc. that our forefathers developed in an evolutionary
process of adaptation to an ever-changing world and that we keep developing and adapting
to our needs. Meta-behaviour, therefore, is both contingent and path-dependent.
mental event / choice for action
actual behavioural event / action
will
reason
habit
actor 1
actor 2
actor n
social reality
concepts, categories and ideas
perception
patterns, rules and institutions
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Whether a definition of culture as meta-behaviour, as suggested above, is sufficient (as a
definition) depends on two questions: (1) are there meta-behavioural 'things' that are not
cultural; and (2) are there cultural 'things' that are not meta-behavioural? The first question
can be answered by looking at figures 5.1 and 5.2. These show that behaviour is determined
by reason, will and habit. Reason is explicitly not an aspect of "culture"; reason and culture
are nearly contradictory (see § 3.2). Culture is the enemy of reason (e.g. Gellner 1992). The
next question then, obviously, is: Is reason (a type of) meta-behaviour? The answer to that
question would be positive if meta-behaviour is interpreted as everything that determines
behaviour, but that is not what is intended here nor in earlier sections (§ 4.3.3 mainly).
Similarly, individual habits and will may be formed by culture, but that does not make them
cultural. The clue is in the adjective "individual": culture is not an individual, but a social
phenomenon. The definition of meta-behaviour as 'that which guides behaviour' (§ 4.3.3)
must be amended: meta-behaviour is everything social (-ly shared, learned, transfered,
formed, etc.) that influences or determines behaviour. This solves the problem as reason,
will and (individual) habit are individual phenomena, but (some of) the influences
thereupon are not. (Note that learned behaviour is generally socially learned − it is learned
by people from people − which implies that learned pathways for behaviour are social (or
non-individual) influences on behaviour and, therefore, by the definition presented above,
are meta-behaviour.)
The second question on sufficiency of the definition of culture as meta-behaviour was
whether there are 'things' cultural that are not meta-behavioural. This question can be
answered by considerating the most important elements or aspects of (in) definitions of
"culture", the list of first-level aspects .11 presented in subsection 4.3.6 and repeated above.
(Obviously, .12 is not relevant here.) Patterns, rules and institutions have been dealt with
above and in subsection 4.3.3. Patterns are the ways people do things: customs, habits,
practices etc. Patterns are not just repeated action, but provide pathways for action. At some
point patterns may become rules. Rules are normative patterns. Rules are combinations of
patterns and associated norms or values (e.g. Kunkel 1965). Roles are (a kind of)
conceptually identified patterns or rules and skills are rules in which the value is more
practical than normative. Institutions, finally, are codified or formalised rules or patterns.
(see also Schlicht 1993; 1998, § 4.3.3 and figure 4.1)
Categories and concepts are the labels we apply to things, events, patterns, and so forth. By
means of these labels we classify and experience reality. Categories and concepts co-
determine perception and the way it is used in and for thought. Thought is further
influenced by beliefs, ideas and convictions (and hence, by knowledge as 'justified true
belief'). While patterns, concepts and beliefs are clearly examples of meta-behaviour, tools
and artefacts seem to be more problematic. Tools and artefacts are often, but not necessarily
(as in the case of texts), material objects. However, what makes them a tool or artefact is
not their materiality but their meaning or intended use. What makes an object a tool or an
artefact is a rule for its use (although that is not necessarily still in effect). Hence, tools and
artefacts are meta-behavioural. (Note that many artefacts are tools as they are or were often
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intended for a specific use with a specific goal. These uses and goals may, however, not be
considered rational or useful by (relative) outsiders.)
The above shows that culture can be defined as meta-behaviour, as everything social that
influences or determines behaviour, indeed. However, the concept of "meta-behaviour"
itself is not entirely ontologically unproblematic as meta-behaviour is both pre and post
behaviour: it is both a reflection and a determinant of actual behaviour. This problem will
be dealt with in subsection 5.2.3 after a brief excursion on social primitives and formal
symbols in the following subsection.
5-2-2- primitives, symbols and meta-behavioural entities
The basic constituents or primitives of social reality are behavioural events and/or meta-
behavioural entities (e.g. rules, concepts). Social reality, then, consists of the set of
behavioural events / and the set of meta-behavioural entities :. (See box 5.1 for an
explanation of the symbols introduced in this chapter.) Figure 5.2 also includes mental
events d, which could be aggregated in a set 1. Mental events, however, are psychological
rather than social entities and the aggregate 1 is non-existent or meaningless at least. Social
reality consists of actions and rules and ideas (etc.), not of individuals' decisions.
/ can be indexed: /x. These indexes represent subsets, conceptual categorisations or
classifications of / and are, therefore, meta-behavioural. For example, the between
economy as behaviour related to production, consumption and distribution /PCD and
behaviour in general only makes sense because of our conceptual distinction between
productive, consumptive and/or distributive behaviour and other kinds of behaviour. As all
(possible) subsets of / are bound either conceptually or trivially, they are contingent.
Moreover, events (members of /) themselves are distinguished from the larger process they
are part of only because they can be classified. Like subsets of events, events are
conceptually and, therefore, meta-behaviourally bound. Hence, actual events are dependent
on meta-behavioural entities (see also § 5.2.3).
Similarly (to the distinction of conceptually different indexed subsets of /), subsection
5.2.1 showed that different types of meta-behavioural entities m, different subsets of :, can
be distinguished. Figure 5.3 presents a formal taxonomy of these types of m or subsets of
:. The descriptions of the classes in figure 5.3 introduce new symbols (before the ↔
symbol) and the conditions for the application of these new symbols, their definitions (after
the ↔ symbol), such that D↔YWYZ(m,x) is shorthand for: ∀m[m=D↔∃x[YWYZ(m,x)]],
which should be read as: 'for all m, m is a D if and only if there is an x such that m
represents x' or, shorter, as: 'D is defined as an m that represents an x', in which x is an
unspecified type of entity and can, hence, be replaced by 'something'.
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figure 5.3: a formal taxonomy of meta-behavioural entities
The top-level distinction of the taxonomy distinguishes representations or descriptions D
(YWYZ(m,x): 'm represents x') from patterns p (YSPM(m,ϕ,b): 'm is a pattern of the form: 'in
case of (or if) ϕ, then b'). The first type of meta-behavioural entities can be subdivided
further in concepts d, which are representations (YWYZ) of entities (phenomena, objects or
events) ϕ; and theories, ideas and beliefs T, which are representations of relationships R
between (two or more) entities ϕ.
Patterns are relationships (YSPM) between an actual entity (event, object or phenomenon) ϕ
and a behavioural event b of the general form: 'in case of (or if) ϕ, then b'. As all entities ϕ
are either behavioural events b or non-behavioural physical objects or events, YSPM(m,ϕ,b)
is a special type of YSPM(m,ϕ,ϕ), which is itself a special type of relationship R (formally:
∀m[(YSPM(m,ϕ,b)→YSPM(m,ϕ,ϕ))∧(YSPM(m,ϕ,ϕ)→m=R)]). Hence, a meta-behavioural
entity of type T (e.g. theory, idea, belief) may be a representation of another meta-
behavioural entity of type p (pattern). (Note that the distinction between behavioural events
and physical objects or events is similar, but not completely identical, to the distinction
between institutional and brute facts (Anscombe 1957; Searle 1969; 1995) and that the
meaning of several terms, including "patterns", is more restricted here than in earlier
sections.)
Within the set of patterns =, a number of subtypes can be distinguished depending on the
applicability of two further predicates: ]HSK and JO^S. The first distinction is that between
rules u and customs h. Rules are valued (]HSK) patterns (see § 5.2.1); customs are not. The
second distinction is that between institutions i and non-institutionalised rules n. The
defining characteristic of institutions is that these can be changed by an act of will (JO^S)
(see also § 4.3.3).
m
D ↔ YWYZ(m,x)
d ↔ YWYZ(m,ϕ) T ↔ YWYZ(m,R)
p ↔ YSPM(m,ϕ,b)
u ↔ ]HSK(p)
i ↔ JO^S(u)   
h ↔ ¬]HSK(p)
n ↔ ¬JO^S(u)
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box 5.1: behavioural and meta-behavioural entities: formal symbols
ϕ an actual entity (event, object or phenomenon) (ϕ ∈ Φ); there are two kinds of ϕ:
behavioural events b, and physical objects and events
Φ the set of actual entities
b an (actual) behavioural event (b ∈ /)
/ the set of (actual) behavioural events (remember that / ⊂ Φ)
/x a set of (actual) behavioural events bounded by x such that /x ⊂ /
d a mental event
m a meta-behavioural entity (m ∈ :)
: the set of meta-behavioural entities
:x a set of meta-behavioural entities bounded by x such that :x ⊂ :
D a representation or description (type of m)
d a concept or category (type of D)
0 the set of concepts or categories (0 ⊂ :)
T a theory, idea or belief (type of D)
A the set of theories, ideas and beliefs (A⊂ :)
p a (behavioural) pattern (type of m)
= the set of (behavioural) patterns (= ⊂ :)
u a rule (type of p)
v the set of rules (v ⊂ =)
h a custom (type of p)
i the set of customs (i ⊂ =)
i an institution (type of u)
j the set of institutions (j ⊂ =)
n a non-institutionalised rule (type of u)
o the set of non-institutionalised rules (o ⊂ =)
The taxonomy presented in figure 5.3 seems rather straightforward. Reality, however, is
not. Subsection 4.3.3 briefly explained that the boundaries between types of patterns (e.g.
customs, rules, institutions) are fuzzy rather than the crisp boundaries suggested by the
formulas in figure 5.3. The difference between rules and customs, in practice, is not that the
first are valued patterns while the latter are not, but that the first are valued more strongly
and more explicitly than the latter. There is a continuous range in which ]HSK(p) and
¬]HSK(p) are the extremes. The same is true for the distinction between institutions and
non-institutionalised rules. The difference is not absolute but one of degree of
institutionalisation, in this case: the degree to which it is possible and/or feasible to change
a rule by an act of will. Therefore, in short, v and i, respectively j and o (see box 5.1),
are overlapping subsets of : with fuzzy membership. Moreover, the distinction between
concepts, theories and patterns too is not as hard as suggested in figure 5.3. As explained in
subsection 2.1.2 and 2.4.2, concepts are theories themselves (or theory laden at least).
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Moreover, Wittgenstein (1953) argued that a concept (or its meaning) is a rule for its use
(see § 2.2.1). Hence, a concept is a rule as well. Rules in turn, if interpreted
utilitarianistically ('it is useful to do b in case of ϕ'), are theories. And finally, theories are
ordered sets of concepts.
It might be useful to illustrate the above with an example: the event of John buying a loaf of
bread at the bakery. As an individual actual event this is a b, but it can also be
deconstructed into a series of bs: John entering the bakery; John ordering a loaf of bread;
John receiving a loaf of bread; John paying; etc. These behavioural events in turn can de
divided and subdivided ad infinitum. The event, of course, cannot be described without
meta-behaviour. Indeed the classification and description of the events themselves is meta-
behavioural (conceptual, to be more precise). "Ordering", "buying", "loaf of bread", and so
on are all meta-behavioural entities of the type d. Moreover, the classification and (sub-
)division of events is, in practice, dependent on the availability of concepts to label and
describe the classes.
As it is busy in the bakery, John awaits his turn, conforming to an unwritten rule (n) or
custom (h). The banknote John uses to pay for his bread is an artefact; it is an actual
(physical) object (ϕ) that is used in conformity to an institution (i). John's decision (d) to
pay, rather than steal the bread, may have been formed in a rational process in which John
evaluated the advantages and benefits of buying versus stealing. The latter is punishable by
the institution (i) of law, which is a risk John chooses not to take. On the other hand, buying
it may be just a habit that is formed in John's education as the effect of some kind of rule
(u). Of course, John does all of this because he believes that his actions have certain
(desirable) effects. He believes that ordering a loaf of bread will result in him receiving it;
similarly, he believes that the baker will accept his money in return for the bread. These
beliefs are examples of the theories, ideas and beliefs (T) that influence our actions.
Like any classification, the ontological taxonomy presented here is an arbitrary
classification of a reality that is continuous. Concepts and categories 'are only moments
dipped out from the stream of time' (James 1909, p. 235; more fully quoted above).
Although class boundaries are defined as unarbitrarily as possible, they are arbitrary
nevertheless. This implies that definition in terms of this framework, although far less
ambiguous than the definitions presented in section 4.2, is not completely unambiguous. To
make matters even worse: even the distinction between behavioural and meta-behavioural
entities is problematic. Meta-behaviour : both (co-)determines and classifies behaviour /.
The two sets seem to be inseparably bound together. The phrase that meta-behaviour
classifies behaviour, however, suggests that behaviour is more fundamental or primitive
than meta-behaviour. The next subsection deals with the ontological status of meta-
behaviour.
CONCEPTUAL  RECONSTRUCTION
167
5-2-3-on the ontological status of meta-behaviour
The ontological status of meta-behaviour concerns the existence of meta-behaviour :
independently of behaviour /. Do rules, institutions, categories, concepts, and so forth exist
independently of the actual (behavioural) events that are categorised by them or are they
just that: categories or classifications? In other words: does culture exist independently of
(culturally influenced) behaviour? This is the Medieval problem of universals with a slight
twist.
One of the most important philosophical problems of the Middle Ages was the question
whether universals are 'things' or just words. Universals are concepts referring to kinds
rather than individuals (particulars). "Tree", for example, is a universal; "the tree in my
backyard" is not. "Man" is a universal; "Socrates" is not. ("The tree in my backyard" and
"Socrates" are particulars.) (On universals see e.g. Moreland 2001.) The first answers to the
question on the existence on universals were realist. Plato and Aristotle defended different
kinds of realism. According to Plato, universals are real and exist completely independently
of the things they refer to. Particulars are nothing but inadequate imitations of universals
(ideas). Aristotle, on the other hand, argued that universals exist in concrete things.
Universals make things what they are. Medieval realists, including Thomas Aquinas and
Duns Scotus, mostly (but not exclusively) followed Aristotle. The opposite to realism is
nominalism, according to which universals are just words. Universals only exist in the mind
as names for actual things. Nominalism flowered in the 12th and 14th centuries in the
works of Abelard (although he is sometimes referred to as a conceptualist, which is held to
be some kind of middle position between nominalism and realism) and William of
Ockham. The problems of universals returned in 20th century analytical philosophy.
Wittgenstein (1953), for example, concluded that the application of a single term
(universal) does not necessarily mean that all instantiations of that term have a common
essence (see § 2.2.2 and §2.2.3) and, therefore, refuted Aristotle's position.
The problem here is a bit wider than that of universals, however. It is not just the
relationship between concepts and their instantiations that is questioned, but also the
relationships of customs, rules and institutions to the behavioural patterns they pre- and/or
de-scribe. The nominalist position would be that meta-behaviour is nothing but a
classification of actual behavioural events and : can be reduced to /. Realism, on the other
hand, denies this reduction and claims that there are elements of meta-behaviour that are
present in actual behavioural events. The problem is that both claims seem to be true.
The main argument against realism is Ockham's razor (see §2.6.1). Arguments against
nominalism are generally of a less formal nature. A major problem of nominalism in this
specific case is that it seems to be incompatible with many theories of the CED (which
would either refute nominalism or these theories). How could a rule m co-determine a
behavioural event b if m is nothing but a label for b? The label should at least exist as a
pathway or template in the mind of the actor that chooses to do b.
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Moreover, the reduction of : to / is not the only reduction possible. Actual events can be
reduced to meta-behavioural entities as well, as the distinction of an event from the 'stream
of time' (James 1909) is dependent on the existence of an appropriate concept (see also §
2.1.1). We perceive reality in terms of our concepts, and the event of paying for a loaf of
bread at the bakery, for example, is an event only because we conceptually (hence, meta-
behaviourally) distinguish the event of paying from the continuous process that is our
world. In other words, a b is a b only if there is an m describing it.
Like most (if not all) philosophical problems, the problem of universals may be a
conceptual one: it may be more about what it means to 'exist' than about universals. Clearly,
if universals or meta-behavioural entities exist, they exist in a way that is fundamentally
different from their instantiations. That, however, does not necessarily deny their existence.
/ and : both exist, but not in the same way, not in the same sphere of social reality, not in
the same of Popper's (1972) three worlds. Hence, there are (at least) two spheres of reality:
(1) the sphere of actual entities Φ (remember that /⊂Φ); and (2) the sphere of meta-
behavioural entities :. The first is the sphere of brute facts, the second that of institutional
facts (Searle 1969; 1995). The first contains rocks, bricks and the actual event of
bricklaying; the second contains the concepts of "rock" and "brick" and the rules, theories
and ideas associated with bricklaying.
5-2-4-"culture" and "economy" as ontological categories
The goal of this section, of course, is to rewrite the concepts of "culture" and "economy" in
less ambiguous terms. Section 4.2 showed that there are many definitions of both "culture"
and "economy" (but of "culture" especially). These definitions can be translated in terms of
behaviour and meta-behaviour. Tylor's (1871) definition of culture as 'that complex whole
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and
habits acquired by man as a member of society' (p. 1) can be translated easily. The first half
of his definition specifies a number of examples of meta-behaviour, while the second points
at the social aspect of culture, which is also implicit in the concept of "meta-behaviour"
(see § 5.2.2). Hence, Tylor's "culture" (C10) is meta-behaviour : (although it could be
argued that, as Tylor did not explicitly include language, his definition of culture should be
translated as =∪A).
Although most concepts of culture can be translated as meta-behaviour, there seem to be
some exceptions. A number of scholars (mainly from an anthropological background)
define culture in terms of behaviour rather than meta-behaviour. In subsection 4.2.1, it was
shown, however, that what is intended in these definitions are types or patterns or
behaviour rather than (actual) behaviour itself. Hence, these concepts too identify culture
with meta-behaviour.
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The majority of the definitions specified in section 4.2 interpret culture as a subset of :.
Most of these coincide with the subsets distinguished in subsection 5.2.2. However, some
definitions are more specific. The classical definition (C1) of culture as the application of
skilled human activity to transform non-human, non-cultural nature (as in agriculture etc.),
for example, refers to a very specific subset of meta-behaviour: the skills and behavioural
patterns related to the transformation of nature: =trans.nat.
Among the definitions (presented in § 4.2) that can be translated simply in terms of the
subsets presented in subsection 5.2.2 nearly every combination of these subsets seems a
candidate for a definition of culture. For example, C35  defines "culture" as institutions j.
On the other hand, C43 defines "culture" as everything except institutions: :−j. Some
further examples illustrate the variety of definitions: "culture" as a way of life as in C4,
C47, C53 and C57, for example, is =; C27 is i; C15 is A; C78 is (=−j)∪0; C41 is
A∪i∪o; C59 is :; C61 is o; C63, C65 and C80 are 0; and C82, finally, is 0∪i∪o.
(See § 4.2 on the codes used to identify definitions of "culture".)
Despite this bewildering variety of interpretations, as mentioned in subsection 4.3.2, there
seems to be one characteristic that, more than all others, divides the definitions of culture
into two groups. This is the subset of institutions j. A number of theorists explicitly
interpret "institutions" as different from "culture". Their concept of "culture" is :−j or a
subset thereof. The competing interpretation sees institutions as part of culture and hence,
defines "culture" as : (or a subset (including j) thereof). The first of these interpretations
seems to be slightly more common among institutionalists (mainly economists and
sociologists), the second slightly more common among anthropologists.
The only concept of "culture" on the list (in section 4.2) that cannot be translated as meta-
behaviour or a subset thereof is cultura animi (C2 and C20). Cultura animi is culture of the
individual rather than society. It is the education and 'individual refinement' (Sapir 1924, p.
403; C20) of individual people. It has relatively little to do with culture as a social category
and is of very limited relevance to the (history and/or theories of the) CED and will,
therefore, be further ignored.
Translation of the concept of "economy" in terms of behaviour and meta-behaviour is
slightly more complicated than translating "culture". The most common (modern) definition
of "economy" is aggregate productive, consumptive and distributive (PCD) behaviour:
/PCD. "Economy" as implied in the phrase "economic growth" is more or less synonymous
to "wealth". It is the aggregate monetary value of productive, consumptive and distributive
behaviour: w(/PCD). (w is a function such that w(/PCD) =def. Σ ]HS\L(bPCD).)
These are, however, hardly the only interpretations of the concept. A translation of the late-
19th century concept of "economy" would be jPCD as it was then interpreted as the
institutional organisation of production consumption and distribution. Still earlier, in the
late 18th century, "economy" was the institutional organisation related to national wealth:
jnat.wealth. (see also § 3.4.3 and § 4.4) (Note that if "economy" is defined as jPCD, it is a
subset of "culture" defined as either j, v, = or :.) The concepts of "economy" most
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important in the CED are /PCD, jPCD or :PCD, and/or some combination thereof, such as
{/PCD,jPCD}.
No final definitions of "culture" and "economy" are provided in this section. Such final
definitions are not the goal of this study (and would, moreover, probably not be very
useful). What was aimed at, and what has been done above, is the construction of a
common language for the translation of the concepts of the CED that is as rigorous and as
unambiguous as possible. Different versions of both "culture" and "economy" and economy
are used in different theories. Most theories on the influence of culture on economic growth
can be rewritten as theories of the influence of :X on /Y; that is, as the influence of meta-
behaviour of type X on actual behaviour of type Y. The formal structure of the (possible)
relationship(s) between :X and /Y, here written as "influence on", is the subject of the next
section.
5-3-the ontology of C-E relationships
The analysis of the CED thus far focused almost exclusively on the polar concepts of
"culture" and "economy". As explained in section 2.7, the CED is not just a pair of
concepts, it is a complex theoretical (and possibly empirical) relationship as well.
Remember that the analysandum was defined as:
D2.12R bCED = **"culture","economy",drelation+,*Rbin.op.,Rtheory++  ,
in which "culture" and "economy" are related both by binary opposition (Rbin.op.) and,
mediated by drelation, in / by theory (Rtheory). The last part, Rtheory, is the subject of chapter 7.
In this section drelation will be analysed. Verbs often used for drelation include "determines",
"causes" and "influences". Causality, however, is not without its problems (see also §
7.1.1). The idea of causation is one of the most difficult and most debated topics in
philosophy (e.g. Humphreys 2000). Ever since Hume (1748) showed that causation is not
an empirical category, philosophers of science argued whether there should be a place for
the concept in empirical science. It may, however, be very difficult do without it.
Generally, varieties of drelation are causal relationships of differing strength and direction. In
its strongest form, A determines B, while in its weakest form there is no more than 'some
influence' of A on B. Nearly all theories of the CED are positioned between these extremes.
Table 5.1 distinguishes a number of possible strengths of relationships (in rows) based on
probability of event B if A or not A. The formula p(B|A) means 'the chance of B happening
if A happened'. The alternatives in the table do, however, have no implications on the
direction of causality; they only show a probabilistic relationship between A and B.
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table 5.1: relationships of varying strengths
p(B|A) = p(B|¬A) =
1 0
1 < 1
< 1 0
> 0.5 < 0.5
> p(B|¬A) < p(B|A)
As the strength of a theoretical relationship is generally not easily measurable or
quantifiable, it is not very useful to distinguish too many classes of strength. Moreover,
most theories are not very specific on the strength of the supposed relationship. It seems,
therefore, enough to distinguish theories of strong and weak causation. The boundary
between these classes, however, is highly subjective. Combining these two classes of
strength with two directions of causality results in eight possible causal relationships:
table 5.2: possible combinations of strengths and directions
w s
w ww ws
s sw ss
The symbols in table 5.2 can be read as in these examples:
A w B A weakly causes (influences) B;
A s B A is strongly caused (co-determined) by B;
A sw B A is strongly caused (co-determined) by B while, the other way around, A
weakly causes (influences) B;
A  B there is a causal relationship between A and B (from A to B) of unknown
strength.
The structure of drelation in the CED is, however, not simply one of event A caused event B
since the concepts of "culture" and "economy" do not refer to (singular) events. It is not
culture and economy themselves that are (directly) causally related, but changes in aspects
or values thereof. (Culture is not an event; as the most general definition of "event" is a
change in something (e.g. Lombard 1991), cultural change is.) An extra symbol is needed
to symbolise this. This extra symbol represents change or difference, but as change (or
difference) may have an explicit direction, two versions of the symbol are needed. These
are ∆ representing undirected change or difference; and ( representing directed change or
difference. Hence  ∆A  ∆B means that a change or difference in A causes a change or
difference in B; and (A  (B means that more A results in more B. (Note that ∀A,B [(A
 (B → ∆A  ∆B].) Meta-behaviour and behaviour in general are, by definition (see §
5.2.1), related such that:
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D5.1 ∆:  ∆/  ,
as this relationship is implied by the concept of "meta-behaviour". However, there also is a
causal relationship in the opposite direction: meta-behaviour not only (co-)determines
behaviour, but is also produced by it (see §§ 5.2.1 and 5.2.3). Hence:
T5.1 ∆:  ∆/  .
The formal structure of theories of the CED is generally more complex than this. Weber's
claim, for example, that Protestant asceticism influences entrepeneurship (1905; see § 3.5.2
and § 7.3) can be formalised as:
T5.2* (oprotestantism w (/entrepreneurship  ,
which can be read as: more Protestant values (non-institutionalised rules) weakly causes
more entrepreneurship (or entrepreneurial behaviour). Similarly, Marx's thesis that 'Die
Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische struktur der
Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt'
(Marx 1859, pp. 8-9; see § 3.4.1) can be formalised as:
T5.3* ∆=production s ∆jlegal/political  ,
which can be read as: changes in the patterns (most importantly: institutions) of production
determine changes in legal and political institutions. Note that Marx's and Engels's theories
of the CED were broader and more complicated than T5.3* suggests (hence, the asterisk).
(In sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively, the Marxian and Weberian theories of the CED will
be analysed more extensively, which will result in more comprehensive formal
translations.)
5-4-summary
The building blocks or primitives of social reality are behavioural events and meta-
behavioural rules, concepts, and so forth. / is the set of (all) behavioural events; : is the
set of (all) meta-behavioural entities. The concept of "meta-behaviour" itself is defined as
everything non-individual that influences or determines behaviour. Within both sets / and
: subsets can be distinguished (see box 5.1 and § 5.2.2). These subsets are bound either
trivially or conceptually. As concepts are meta-behavioural entities, a conceptually bound
subset is a meta-behaviourally bound subset. "Culture" and "economy" can be defined as
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(combinations of) subsets of : and /. Box 5.2 presents the most important interpretations
in these terms:
box 5.2: most important interpretations of "culture" and "economy"
"culture" = :
"culture" ⊂ :
"culture" = :−j
"economy" = /PCD
"economy" = w(/PCD) = Σ ]HS\L(bPCD)
"economy" = jPCD    "economy" ⊂ j ⊂ :
In the CED, culture and economy (or aspects thereof) are related to each other in weaker or
stronger causal relationships symbolised by w for a weak causal relationship
("influences") and s for a strong causal relationship ("(co-)determines"). Different
strengths and directions of these relationships can be combined. A sw B, for example,
means that A is strongly caused (co-determined) by B while, the other way around, A
weakly causes (influences) B. The relationship, however, is not directly between culture
and economy but between changes in aspects thereof. The symbols ∆ and ( represent
undirected change or difference and directed change or difference respectively. Hence.
∆A∆B means that a change or difference in A will cause a change or difference in B,
(A(B means that more A will result in more B. (Note that ∀A,B[(A(B→∆A∆B].)
Combining all types of symbols in an example: ∆:s∆/ is a formal representation of the
thesis that differences in meta-behaviour (co-)determine differences in behaviour.
The next chapter deals with the operationalisation and measurement of a number of the
interpretations of "culture" and "economy" presented in box 5.2.
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chapter 6
OPERATIONALISATION
AND MEASUREMENT
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning
of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science,
whatever that may be.
Lord Kelvin 1883, pp. 73-74
To put matters bluntly, many of us have literally not known what we are talking about, or
have confused our listeners − and ourselves − into thinking that what we are talking about
is directly relevant to the matters with which we are concerned.
Robert Eisner 1989, p. 2
6-1-introduction
One of the main goals of this research project is comparison and testing of theories of the
culture - economy dialectic (CED) (see chapters 1 and 7). For comparison, a common
language is needed. This common language was developed in the preceding chapter. For
testing theories of the CED it is necessary to make this common language operational and
to measure the phenomena referred to by its categories. Hence, this chapter deals with
operationalisation and measurement of culture and economy.
Measurement is associated with a number of philosophical and technical problems (e.g.
Schwager 1988; Suppes 1998; Trout 2000). The most fundamental problem is that a
measurement − as a quantitative representation of a (specific) phenomenon − suggests the
existence and/or relevance of such a phenomenon. Measurements may, however, represent
different things than we think they do, and measurements may be devised (unknowingly) to
measure nothing more than a construct in which case they (generally) have little empirical
relevance. Eisner (1989) pointed at these problems when he said that 'many of us have
literally not known what we are talking about' (p. 2; more fully quoted above) in his
presidential address to the American Economic Association. A second fundamental
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problem is the question of relevant scales (discrete, ratio, interval, ordinal, etc.). Different
phenomena and different measurement procedures require and/or imply different scales.
Categorised events are discrete and hence, can be easily counted. This, however, is not the
case for more complex variables such as length, culture or economic growth.
Especially when measurement of social phenomena is attempted, these problems are
important. Conceptual analysis should always precede measurement to explore what
exactly the measurement should refer to. Questions about scale can rarely be answered by
conceptual analysis alone: they also depend on the measurement procedure. Moreover,
many (supposed) social phenomena cannot be observed or measured directly. These,
however, can sometimes be measured by means of factor analysis (FA) or similar
techniques, although the application thereof comes with problems of its own.
These problems must be dealt with in measuring the phenomena referred to in the CED.
The next two sections deal with measuring culture (§ 6.2) and with economic measures
such as measures of wealth, growth and entrepreneurship (§ 6.3). The final section of this
chapter (§ 6.4) compares the measures derived with the theoretical / conceptual framework
proposed in the preceding chapter.
6-2-meta-behavioural measures
In most definitions of "culture" and in most applications of the concept in the CED,
"culture" is more or less synonymous with meta-behaviour or a subset thereof (see § 5.2.4).
Hence, measuring meta-behaviour is measuring culture. Meta-behaviour, however, cannot
be measured directly (see § 5.2.1). There is no machine that measures values, rules,
concepts and/or institutions. Nevertheless, meta-behaviour can be measured. The concept
was introduced in subsection 4.3.3 as shorthand for the 'things' that guide behaviour and
elaborated on in section 5.2. Meta-behaviour is some deeper structure that is reflected in
actual behaviour. Hence, meta-behaviour can (to some extent) be derived from actual
behaviour:
cultural differences can be measured indirectly; that is, they can be inferred from data about
collective behavior, such as the way a country’s national wealth is distributed over its
population; the mobility from one social class to another; or the frequency of political
violence or labor conflicts, traffic accidents, or suicides. All of these can tell us something
about a country’s culture, but it is not always clear how they should be interpreted.
(Hofstede & Bond 1988, pp. 8-9)
The most obvious technique to do this indirect measurement by inference from (actual)
behaviour is factor analysis (FA), which was introduced a century ago by Spearman (1904)
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to find underlying 'factors' that explain the different test results in a study on intellectual
abilities. The technique was based on the analysis of matrices of correlations. Since then,
FA was further developed into the sophisticated statistical technique it is today, but its basic
objective remains the same: to find a small set of underlying factors to explain a variety of
types of behaviour. This idea of fundamental, unobservable factors underlying observable
indicators, however, is much older (e.g. Hägglund 2001), but FA was the first technique to
measure these unobservable factors with statistical means. As this is exactly what is needed
to measure culture or meta-behaviour indirectly, FA will have an important place in this
section.
Theoretical and quantitative empirical research on the basic 'factors' of culture or meta-
behaviour has been done mainly in cross-cultural psychology (CCP). Subsection 3.5.2 dealt
with CCP and dimensions of culture very briefly. Subsection 6.2.1 will go deeper into the
subject. Subsection 6.2.2 focuses on the measurement of regional culture or meta-behaviour
in the Netherlands. By means of FA, a small number of dimensions of meta-behaviour is
measured for 487 municipalities (two missing). Subsection 6.2.3, finally, compares the
measures derived in subsection 6.2.2 with earlier measures and deals briefly with
alternative and more specific measures of aspects of culture, institutions and/or meta-
behaviour.
6-2-1-cross-cultural psychology and national culture
Cross-cultural psychology (CCP) is rooted in Steinthal's and Lazarus's Völkerpsychologie
(see § 3.3.2), itself strongly influenced, like all comparative sciences of culture, by Vico's
(1725/44) philosophy of history. CCP originated from a cross-pollination of
Völkerpsychologie, psychology of personality and anthropology (e.g. Murphy & Kovach
1928/72). The psychology of personality was especially influential in the new discipline.
Benedict (1935) showed that personality is formed by dominant values and attitudes of the
group or culture one is part of. CCP assumes that these dominant values and attitudes are a
particular social group's answers to a small set of basic problems:
First it is assumed that there is a limited number of common human problems for which all
peoples at all times must find some solution. This is the universal aspect of value
orientations because the common human problems to be treated arise inevitably out of the
human situation. The second assumption is that while there is variability in solutions of all
the problems, it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely variable within a range of
possible solutions. The third assumption (…) is that all alternatives of all solutions are
present in all societies at all times, but are differentially preferred. (Kluckhohn &
Strodtbeck 1961, p. 10)
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In CCP practice, therefore, culture is not defined as the whole of meta-behaviour :, but as
the set of most basic value orientations oCV, which is a subset of o, itself a subset of :
(see § 5.2.2). oCV is the set of core values societies develop in answer to Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck's 'common human problems'. Different psychologists and anthropologists (and
other social scientists) suggested different oCV, but there is considerable overlap.
According to Boas (1911), there are three basic aspects of culture:
(B1) man - nature relationships (note that "man" is used here and below to refer to
people or mankind in general, not to male persons);
(B2) man - man relationships; and
(B3) subjective aspects such as ethics, aesthetics and religion.
Inkeles and Levinson (1954) distinguished three or four key problems:
(IL1) self-image, which can be split up into
(IL1a) male - female and
(IL1b) individual - group relationships;
(IL2) how people deal with authority; and
(IL3) how people deal with conflict and emotion.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) asserted that there are five basic 'orientations':
(KS1) human nature orientation (is man naturally good or evil?);
(KS2) man - nature orientation;
(KS3) time orientation;
(KS4) activity orientation; and
(KS5) relational orientation.
The founder of cultural theory, Douglas (1992) suggested two dimensions of culture:
(D1) group, the extent to which an individual is part of a social unit, and
(D2) grid, the extent to which an individual's life is influenced by externally imposed
rules.
Inglehart and Baker (2000) also proposed a two-dimensional system:
(IB1) traditional - rational and
(IB2) survival - self-expression.
Kasulis (2002) even reduced cultural differences to a single dimension, intimacy - integrity,
that summarises how people deal with relationships. The (opposite) record in distinguishing
cultural factors is probably held by Grondona (2000), who proposed as many as twenty.
Without a doubt, the most influential measurement of dimensions of culture was Hofstede's
(1980; 1991). In fact, Hofstede's dimensions proved to be that popular that they secured his
place in the top 10 of most quoted social scientists ever. Hofstede's dimensions of culture
are based on a survey among IBM personnel in the late 1960s and early 1970s in over 60
countries (see map 6.1) and . His (original) four dimensions:
(1) power distance (PDI);
(2) individualism (IDV);
(3) masculinity (MAS); and
(4) uncertainty avoidance (UAI),
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are very similar to Inkeles's and Levinson's. (See above and table 6.2 in subsection 6.2.2.)
Map 6.2 shows the ranking of European countries (for which data is available) on these
four dimensions.
Later a fifth dimension (based on different research and in a much smaller set of countries)
was added: (5) long-term orientation (LTO) (or Confucian dynamic (CONDYN)) (Hofstede
& Bond 1988; Hofstede 1991). Hofstede's dimensions facilitated an explosion of empirical
research in the CED, including some by himself (e.g. Franke, Hofstede & Bond 1991). A
small selection of Hofstede-inspired research projects will be evaluated with in the next
chapter.
map 6.1: national cultures measured by Hofstede
Dark grey countries included; light grey countries aggregated in three groups (Arab countries; West
Africa; East Africa). Source: Hofstede 1991.
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map 6.2: Hofstede's dimensions (Europe, ca. 1970)
17 countries divided in quintiles (4/3/3/3/4); white countries score lowest; black countries score
highest. Source: Hofstede 1991.
Power Distance Individualism
Masculinity Uncertainty Avoidance
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Hofstede's measurements have been criticised by scientists from different fields and
backgrounds. While Hofstede argues that the quality of his measurements is improved by
the uniformity of the population (IBM employees), because this uniformity minimises all
non-cultural difference, Schwartz (1994), for example, points out that (1) IBM employees
differ significantly from the general population in education and interests; and (2) IBM
employees have a very different (social) background and status in third-world countries
than in Western countries. The first of these points was recognised by Hofstede, who
answered by claiming that because IBM employees from different countries are more
similar to each other than their general populations, the scores of countries on his
dimensions are in reality probably more extreme than measured (Hofstede & Bond 1988).
(See also Harzing & Hofstede 1996 for Hofstede's answer to some of his critics.)
A considerable part of the critique on Hofstede is related to his dimensions, especially to
the dimension of individualism - collectivism (e.g. Voronov & Singer 2002). According to
Hofstede, collectivism is (defined as) a low value on the individualism dimension. Tiessen
(1997), for example, claims that individualism and collectivism are different, independent
dimensions. Yeh and Lawrence (1995) point out that Hofstede's individualism is not the
kind of individualism traditionally associated with independence, competitivity and
entrepreneurship, but a selfish, egotistic and short-sighted kind of individualism. It seems
that there are many types and subtypes of individualism.
Similarly, there seem to be many variants of the masculinity - femininity dimension. The
most obvious aspect of this dimension is the position of women in society, but there are
other aspects that may be completely unrelated. For example, the degree to which typically
male or female values are dominant in a social group, in which case the masculinity -
femininity dimension can be interpreted as, for example, a competition - co-operation
dimension.
Although Hofstede's dimensions are the most influential, they are not the only measures of
culture. Schwartz (1994), for example, distinguishes seven dimensions:
(S1) conservatism,
(S2) affective autonomy,
(S3) intellectual autonomy,
(S4) hierarchy,
(S5) mastery,
(S6) egalitarian commitment, and
(S7) harmony.
Of these seven dimensions, at least three seem to be related to some kind of individualism:
(S2) affective autonomy; (S3) intellectual autonomy; and (S5) mastery.  Nevertheless, the
correlations between these measures and Hofstede's individualism do not seem to be
particularly strong (see table 6.1).
In the 1970s Inglehart proposed a further dimension of culture: post-materialism. Post-
materialist cultures are more focused on self-development and self-expression, creativity,
'belongingness', and so forth (Inglehart 1977; 1990; 1997). It is measured by Inglehart,
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Basañez and Moreno (1998) and also seems to be strongly related to Hofstede's
indvidualism. Post-materialism also seems to overlap with Schwartz's (S2) affective
autonomy; (S3) intellectual autonomy; and (S5) mastery. However, these correlations too
are rather weak (see table 6.1).
table 6.1: correlations between dimensions of culture
PDI IDV MAS UAI
IDV -0.68
MAS 0.06 0.08
UAI 0.23 -0.33 -0.03 Scon Saau Siau Shie Smas Segc Shar
Scon 0.55 -0.57 -0.02 -0.31
Saau -0.49 0.46 -0.08 0.22 -0.74
Siau -0.42 0.54 0.13 0.23 -0.73 0.63
Shie 0.37 -0.54 0.11 -0.10 0.43 -0.24 -0.49
Smas 0.27 -0.17 0.53 0.28 0.00 0.02 -0.33 0.38
Segc -0.42 0.51 -0.26 0.30 -0.72 0.31 0.37 -0.64 -0.20
Shar -0.26 0.22 0.08 0.61 -0.38 0.15 0.57 -0.62 -0.44 0.45
p-mat -0.44 0.53 -0.13 -0.10 -0.57 0.37 0.33 -0.33 -0.33 0.65 0.06
PDI = power distance; IDV = individualism; MAS = masculinity; UAI = uncertainty avoidance.
Source: Hofstede (1991).
Scon = conservatism; Saau = affective autonomy; Siau = intellectual atonomy; Shie = hierarchy;
Smas = mastery; Segc = egalitarian commitment; Shar = harmony. Source: Schwartz (1994).
p-mat = post-materialism. Source: Inglehart Basañez and Moreno (1998).
Number of countries / cases: N(Hofstede-Schwartz) = 22; N(Hofstede-Inglehart) = 26; N(Schwartz-Inglehart) = 18.
While Hofstede's and Schwartz's measures are based on survey research, Inglehart's is
constructed from a wealth of secondary data (indicator variables). Generally, survey data is
available only for relatively small sets of territorial entities (e.g. states; regions). As these
are the cases in statistical testing and significance partly depends on the number of cases,
survey data is often unsatisfactory (if available). Moreover, most survey data is on the
national level, which is not without its problems. Most important are (1) national
differences in measurement procedures and (2) institutional differences between countries
(see also § 6.3). Outcomes of research on the CED on the national level may be influenced
more by these national differences in measurement and institutions than by actual culture -
economy interactions. Moreover, empirical research by (a.o.) Inglehart and Baker (2000)
has shown that, for example, religious differences tend to disappear behind (other) national
differences (see also § 7.4.2).
Alternatively, one could attempt to measure the basic dimensions of culture or meta-
behaviour on smaller spatial scales such as municipalities. This kind of measurement has to
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be indirect, as the required sample size in a survey would raise the costs to astronomical
heights, but it would avoid both problems of the national level mentioned above. Moreover,
the choice for a smaller regional unit may also reveal information on the spatial scale(s) of
the CED. Thus far, cultural differences and their causes and effects are only studied on
(inter-) national scales, while it is entirely possible that different relationships (or none at
all) exist on different spatial scales.
The next subsection presents a measurement by means of FA of five dimensions for 487
Dutch municipalities (2 missing).
6-2-2-indirect measurement of regional culture
Indirect measurement by FA can be based on any territorial scale for which sufficient data
is available. Each variable must be measured in the same way for each territorial unit
(case). An abundance of uniformly measured and rigorously defined data on Dutch
municipalities is freely available at Statistics Netherlands (www.cbs.nl). Hence, the
Netherlands seem to be a good candidate for measuring regional culture. Moreover, there
are two additional reasons to select the Netherlands for this analysis: (1) within the
Netherlands, although it is a rather small country, some very distinct cultural regions such
as the Catholic South and the Protestantenband (Protestants Belt) can be distinguished; and
(2) this research project was carried out by a Dutchman at a Dutch university.
Dutch regional culture has been measured in a number of (very) different ways:
qualitatively, as 'regional nations' within the Netherlands (de Pater 2002), and
quantitatively. Examples of the latter include Serlie (2004), van Leeuwen and Vullings
(2004) and Brons (2002; 2004), an earlier study similar to this one. Serlie (2004) found, for
example, that people from the North of the Netherlands are more introverted and more
emotionally unstable than those from the South. Van Leeuwen and Vullings (2004) mapped
several indicators of regional cultural, political and economic differences including
tradition, social cohesion and religions.
In 2000 Dutch regional culture was measured in an approach similar to what will be done
later in this subsection (Brons 2002; 2004). Both the number of cases and the number of
variables, however, was relatively small. A principal components analysis (PCA; a
technique similar to FA) on eleven variables and forty cases (Corop-regions) resulted in
four dimensions of regional culture, interpreted, with some difficulty, as:
(1) collectivism (COLR);
(2) masculinity (MASR);
(3) anti-conservatism (ANCO); and
(4) tolerance for inequality (INEQ) (Brons 2002; 2004).
Map 6.3 shows the ranking of Dutch Corop-regions on these four dimensions. Ttable 6.2
compares this measurement to both Hofstede's and Inkeles's and Levinson's dimensions.
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map 6.3: regional culture (Netherlands, 1997-1999)
40 Corop regions divided in quintiles; white regions score lowest; black regions score highest.
Source: Brons 2002; 2004.
COLR
collectivism
MASR
masculinity
ANCO
anti-conservatism
INEQ
inequality
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table 6.2: a comparison of dimensions
Inkeles & Levinson (1954)  Hofstede (1980; 1991)  Brons (2002; 2004)
male - female (IL1a)  masculinity (MAS)  masculinity (MASR)
individual - group (IL1b)  individualism (IDV)  collectivism (COLR)
authority (IL2)  power distance (PDI)  inequality (INEQ)
emotion and conflict (IL3)  uncertainty avoidance (UAI)  anti-conservatism (ANCO)
a new measurement
In the measurement presented in this chapter, the number of cases was increased to all 489
Dutch municipalities. However, for two small municipalities (Wijdemeren and Wester
Koggenland) some data was missing. In the first steps of the analysis, all available data that
could in some way reflect culture or meta-behaviour was included. Hence, all data on
phenomena that are (or may be) related to decisions and types or patterns of behaviour
(rules, values, customs, etc.) was included. This implied that there was left relatively little
data unused (excluded variables were related to sickness and death mainly). Hence, the data
selected was related to =, while : = = ∪ 0 ∪ A (see figure 5.3). However, as was
explained in subsection 5.2.1, it is rather difficult to distinguish the effects of the different
parts (=,0,A) of meta-behaviour in the determination of behaviour. Actual behavioural data
used in this analysis is not necessary influenced by = (alone), but may also be the result of
other parts of meta-behaviour.
For each variable, all available data from the period 1997 to 2003 was selected. In this
period, over 100 municipalities merged or changed their borders. Hence, the initial data
matrix was approximately 600 by 400 cells. Averaging all years for the same variables and
recalculating all data to the municipalities of 2003 resulted in the final data matrix of 489
cases and eighty variables (including some interaction effects, composite variables and
variables for testing in chapter 7). These eighty variables are presented in table 6.3.
Election data is weighted to reflect the importance of different elections. Some smaller
parties did not take part in all elections. For this reason, some combined party variables
(P.prog and P.prtt) were added. Table 6.4 specifies the weights for the weighted average
election data. Although most of the variables presented in table 6.3 can be indicators of
aspects of culture, some of them represent aspects of the other pole in the CED and are used
for testing in chapter 7 and for controlling cultural factors measured in this chapter for non-
cultural influences. These variables are marked in the column 'test' in table 6.3. The other
variables, and how these may relate to aspects of culture are, explained below.
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table 6.3: list of variables
abbrev. description F
A PC
A
te
st
1 B.totl average number of life births per inhabitant (1997-2002) X
2 B.aage average age of mothers of newly-borns (1997-2002) (original data in 5-year
classes; calculation by class middles)
X X
3 B.pa25 average number of life births by mothers younger than 25 divided by total
number of life births (1997-2002)
X X
4 B.pa30 average number of life births by mothers between ages 25 and 30 divided by
total number of life births (1997-2002)
X
5 B.pa35 average number of life births by mothers between ages 30 and 35 divided by
total number of life births (1997-2002)
X
6 B.pa40 average number of life births by mothers older than 35 divided by total
number of life births (1997-2002)
X X
7 B.outm average number of life births by unmarried mothers divided by total number
of life births (1997-2002)
X X
8 D.accd average (×1000) number of deaths caused by accidents per inhabitant (1997-
2002) (original data for different years rounded off to multiples of five)
X
9 D.trac average (×1000) number of deaths caused by road traffic accidents per
inhabitant (1997-2002) (original data for different years rounded off to
multiples of five)
X
10 D.murd average (×1000) number of deaths caused by murder per inhabitant (1997-
2002) (original data for different years rounded off to multiples of five)
X
11 D.suic average (×1000) number of suicides per inhabitant (1997-2002) (original data
for different years rounded off to multiples of five)
X
12 E.ainc average standardised income (in 1000s of euros) (1998-2000) X
13 E.strt average (×1000) number of newly founded enterprises divided by the labour
force (2001-2002)
X
14 E.estb average (×1000) number of established enterprises divided by the labour force
(2001-2002)
X
15 E.linc average percentage of households with low incomes (1999-2000) X
16 E.ltli average percentage of households with long term low incomes (1999-2000) X
17 E.hinc average percentage of households with high incomes (1999-2000) X
18 F.mncl percentage of women in municipal councils after 2002 local elections X
19 F.aldm percentage of female aldermen after 2002 local elections X
20 H.avsz average household size (2000-2003) X X
21 H.onep average percentage of one-person households (2000-2003) X X
22 H.1par average percentage of one-parent households (2000-2003) X X
23 H.nmcp average percentage of non-married couples (households) (2000-2003) X
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table 6.3 − continued
24 H.nmnk av. percentage of non-married couples (households) without kids (2000-2003) X X
25 H.nmkd av. percentage of non-married couples (households) with kids (2000-2003) X X
26 H.3kid average percentage of household with three or more kids (2000-2003) X X
27 L.para average total labour participation (1997-2002) X
28 L.parm average labour participation of men (1997-2002) X
29 L.parw average labour participation of women (1997-2002) X
30 L.prrt labour participation sex ratio (L.parm divided by L.parw) X
31 L.lfhe average percentage higher educated in labour force (municipalities larger than
10.000 inhabitants) (1997-2002)
X
32 L.lfle average percentage lower educated in labour force (municipalities larger than
10.000 inhabitants) (1997-2002)
X
33 M.totl average (×1000) number of marriages per inhabitant (1997-2002) X
34 M.aget average age of marriage (1997-2002) (original data in 5-year classes;
calculation by class middles)
X X
35 M.agem average age of marriage of men (1997-2002) (original data in 5-year classes;
calculation by class middles)
X
36 M.agew average age of marriage of women (1997-2002) (original data in 5-year
classes; calculation by class middles)
X
37 M.agrt marriage age difference between sexes (M.agem divided by M.agew) X
38 M.agdf marriage age difference between sexes (M.agem minus M.agew) X
39 M.av25 average (×1000) number of marriages of men and/or women younger than 25
divided by the total number of marriages (1997-2002)
X X
40 M.pm25 average (×1000) number of newly-wed men younger than 25 divided by the
total number of marriages (1997-2002)
X
41 M.pw25 average (×1000) number of newly-wed women younger than 25 divided by
the total number of marriages (1997-2002)
X
42 M.rt25 young marriage sex ratio (M.pm25 divided by M.pw25) X
43 M.pm30 average (×1000) number of newly-wed men younger than 30 divided by the
total number of marriages (1997-2002)
X
44 M.pw30 average (×1000) number of newly-wed women younger than 30 divided by
the total number of marriages (1997-2002)
X
45 M.divr average (×1000) number of divorces per inhabitant (1997-2002) X X
46 P.turn weighted av. of turnout in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights) X X
47 P.cons weighted average of percentages of votes for the Christian conservative party
(CDA) in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
48 P.cnpr conservative protestantism (P.cons × S.pprt) X
49 P.cnct conservative catholocism (P.cons × S.pcat) X
50 P.cnnr non-religious conervatism (P.cons × S.ppub) X
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table 6.3 − continued
51 P.libc weighted average of percentages of votes for the liberal conservative party
(VVD) in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
52 P.libd weighted average of percentages of votes for the liberal democratic party
(D66) in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
53 P.scdm weighted average of percentages of votes for the social democratic party
(PvdA) in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
54 P.sdri social democratic votes not explained by (low) income (residual of P.scdm
after regression on E.ltli)
X
55 P.socl weighted average of percentages of votes for the socialist party (SP) in
elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
56 P.grlf weighted average of percentages of votes for the green party (GroenLinks) in
elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
57 P.prog weighted average of percentages of votes for the progressive / leftist parties
(SP, GroenLinks, Groenen, PvdD, local and regional leftist parties) in
elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
58 P.prt1 weighted average of percentages of votes for orthodox Protestant party,
Christenunie, in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
59 P.prt2 weighted average of percentages of votes for orthodox Protestant party, SGP,
in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
60 P.prtt weighted average of percentages of votes for orthodox Protestant parties
(Christenunie and SGP) in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
61 P.prd1 weighted average of percentages of votes for political reform movement
party, LPF, in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
62 P.prd2 weighted av. of percentages of votes for political reform movement party,
Leefbaar Nederland, in elections in 2002 and 2003 (see below for weights)
X X
63 P.regp percentage of votes for regional parties in provincial elections of 2003 X
64 P.locl percentage of votes for local parties in municipal elections of 2002 X
65 S.pprt av. percentage of primary school students in Protestant schools (1997-2000) X X
66 S.tprt average percentage of (primary and secondary school) students in Protestant
schools (1997-2000)
X
67 S.pcat av. percentage of primary school students in Catholic schools (1997-2000) X X
68 S.tcat average percentage of (primary and secondary school) students in Catholic
schools (1997-2000)
X
69 S.porg average percentage of primary school students in schools with other religious
affiliations (1997-2000)
X X
70 S.torg average percentage of (primary and secondary school) students in schools
with other religious affiliations (1997-2000)
X
71 S.ppub average percentage of primary school students in public schools (1997-2000) X X
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table 6.3 − continued
72 S.tpub average percentage of (primary and secondary school) students in public
schools (1997-2000)
X
73 U.inhb absolute number of inhabitants (2003)
74 U.ppds population density (2003)
75 U.adds address density (2003)
76 U.hsds housing density (2003)
77 U.durb degree of urbanisation (2003); principal component scores after PCA on
U.ppds (loading: 0.94); U.adds (0.96); U.hsds (0.96); U.inhb (0.757); 82,1 %
of variance explained.
X
78 U.imgr percentage of non-Western immigrants (2003)
79 U.rimg share of immigrants not explained by degree of urbanisation: residual of
U.imgr after regression on U.ppds; U.adds; U.hsds; and U.inhb; (R2=0.766)
X
80 X.trsh average quantity (kilos) of household trash (per inhabitant) (2001-2002) X
marked X in column FA = used in factor analysis; ~~ PCA = used in principal components analysis;
~~ test = included for testing (mainly in chapter 7)
table 6.4: weights for weighted average election variables in table 6.3
GR 2002 PS 2003 TK 2002 TK 2003
P.turn 1 1 1
P.cons 1 2 3 3
P.libc 1 2 3 3
P.libd 1 2 3 3
P.scdm 1 2 3 3
P.socl 2 3 3
P.grlf 2 3 3
P.prog 1 2 3 3
P.prt1 1 1
P.prt2 1 1
P.prtt 1 2 3 3
P.prd1 1 2 1
P.prd2 2 1
GR = Gemeenteraad (municipal council); PS = Provinciale Staten (provincial parliament); TK =
Tweede Kamer (national parliament)
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indicators of regional culture
As quoted before, 'cultural differences can be measured indirectly; that is, they can be
inferred from data about collective behavior' (Hofstede & Bond 1988, p. 8). By means of
FA, it might be possible to find the meta-behavioural factors behind the behavioural data. A
question open for debate is what is actually measured by FA. The basic idea of FA is that it
measures some more deeply underlying structure behind the measured variables. Hence, a
FA on behavioural variables is a measurement of the more deeply underlying structure
explaining the behavioural differences, in one word: meta-behaviour :. However, the
approach is linked closely to CCP, which, in practice, defines culture as the set of core
values oCV, a subset of : (see § 6.2.1). It is, moreover, difficult to otherwise interpret the
factors resulting from FA than as dimensions of core value orientations. Hence, while an
FA may measure :, or at least that part of : which is related to the actual behaviour /
which is used as input in the analysis, its results are interpreted as oCV.
To measure culture or meta-behaviour indirectly, specific behavioural variables have to be
identified as indicators of specific cultural dimensions. In a series of tables, Hofstede
(1991) suggested 114 correlates or indicators of dimensions of culture, but many more are
possible. Indirect measurements of culture by means of FA or similar techniques are based
on, or at least interpreted, by means of cross-tabs in which nothing is entirely clear. The
rows are the variables selected, the columns the dimensions of culture, and the individual
cells are the supposed relationships between these. The problem is that there is no
agreement about how many and/or what dimensions of culture there are, and that relatively
little of the supposed relationships between these dimensions and actual behaviour have
actually been researched. Moreover, the nature of these relationships is not entirely clear.
Are they causal or conceptual? Does, for example, individualism lead to postponement of
childbirth or is the latter a kind of behaviour that is conceptually associated with
individualism? If the latter is the case, as is claimed by Winch (1958) and many others (see
§ 2.2.2), empirically researching relationships between aspects of behaviour and meta-
behaviour makes no sense and the relationships between the dimensions and the indicator
variables should be clarified by conceptual analysis. Generally, relationships between
actual behaviour and supposed, hidden, meta-behaviour need repeated confirmation. A
single indicator for a meta-behavioural or cultural dimension is insufficient. Only if several
results point in the same direction, a cultural dimension may be postulated.
In the cross-tabs used for explaining indicator signs and factor interpretation below, seven
dimensions of culture have been selected:
(1) individualism vs. collectivism (I-C; Hofstede 1991);
(2) power distance (PD; Hofstede 1991);
(3) masculine vs. feminine values (M-F; Hofstede 1991);
(4) uncertainty avoidance (UA; Hofstede 1991);
(5) conservatism (CN; Schwartz 1994);
(6) post-materialism (PM; Inglehart 1977);
(7) dissatisfaction (DS; Wildeman et al. 1999).
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This list of dimensions, however, is not all-inclusive; neither are these dimensions
completely independent or uncorrelated. The first four dimensions are those proposed by
Hofstede (1980) and are related to the theoretical dimensions distinguished by Inkeles and
Levinson (1954). The individualism - collectivism dimension (I-C) may be the most basic
dimension of culture. It is the most debated and researched dimension at least.
Theoretically, it overlaps with a number of Schwartz's dimensions (see § 6.2.1), especially
intellectual and affective autonomy and mastery, which are not included. Hofstede's power
distance (PD) is theoretically (but not empirically; see table 6.1) very similar to Schwartz's
hierarchy. The masculine - feminine dimension (M-F) may include several aspects here
(and in the work of Hofstede) combined in a single dimension (see § 6.2.1). Schwartz's
dimension of egalitarian commitment is theoretically (but again not empirically; see table
6.1) related to the feminine pole of M-F and to low PD.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA) is probably the most complex dimension of culture
distinguished by Hofstede. It is about the way people deal with conflict, change, emotions,
fear, and so on. It is related, but not identical, to conservatism (CN), which is also included
mainly because it is more easily interpretable. Inglehart's post-materialism (PM) is included
− although it may be a specific combination of individualism (high I-C), femininity (low
M-F); and low UA − because it seems to describe a current trend in cultural change pretty
well (see also § 7.2). Dissatisfaction (DS), finally, is included because in empirical research
by Wildeman et al. (1999), it proved to be very important as a determinant of
entrepreneurship. DS, may, however, be strongly (and positively) related to UA.
(Wildeman et al. distinguish two kinds of dissatisfaction; due to the limited number of
indicators of this dimension these are combined here.)
Several of the dimensions listed and described here and in subsection 6.2.1 do not reflect a
single, clearly limited type of behaviour. Rather in the contrary, I-C and M-F, for example,
are combinations of many aspects or sub-dimensions of meta-behaviour that are not
necessarily part of the same dimension in every population. Moreover, an indicator variable
may be differently related (positively versus negatively) with different aspects or sub-
dimensions. Therefore, the aspects or sub-dimensions may be regrouped differently in a
new empirical analysis.
Below, the relationships between the variables presented in table 6.3 and the dimensions
described above are explained briefly. The indicator variables are divided in three groups:
(1) demographic indicators (birth, death, marriage and households); (2) political or electoral
indicators; and (3) religious and other indicators. (Note that in all tables used for explaining
indicator signs and factor interpretation, dimensions are in columns and indicators in rows.)
In the tables below, plus and minus symbols are used to indicate strength and direction of
the assumed or expected relationships. For each relationship between an indicator variable
and an aspect or sub-dimension of one of the dimensions, one or two symbols are added;
two symbols if the relationship is particularly strong or important; one otherwise. Hence,
the number of pluses and minuses in the cells reflects the relative strength and importance
of that indicator on that dimension.
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demographic indicators
Although many demographic phenomena are supposed to be related to culture, there is
relatively little empirical research thereon (a notable exception is Sobotka's and Adigüzel's
(2002) study on the influence of religion on demographic behaviour in the Netherlands). It
is generally assumed that women in individualist cultures (high I-C) postpone births and
have fewer children, while women in collectivist (low I-C), conservative (high CN), and/or
uncertainty avoiding (high AU) cultures have many children and start childbearing earlier.
table 6.5: demographic indicators of culture: birth and death
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
B.totl − + + +
B.aage + + − − +
B.pa25 − − + + + −
B.pa30 + +
B.pa35 +
B.pa40 + +
B.outm + −
D.accd + +
D.trac − + +
D.murd + +
D.suic + + +
I-C = individualism (+) vs. collectivism (-); PD = power distance; M-F = masculine (+) vs. feminine
(-); UA = uncertainty avoidance; CN = conservatism; PM = post-materialism; DS = dissatisfaction.
See table 6.3 for abbreviations of indicator variables.
The direct opposite event of birth − death − does not seem to be related to culture, but
causes of death may be. Suicides, accidents (in general and traffic accidents in particular)
and murders all seem related to high UA. In the case of suicides, it is the aspect of fear in
UA that is important; in the other cases, the higher levels of expressiveness and aggression
in cultures with high UA. Suicide is, of course, also related to dissatisfaction.
Like postponement of birth, postponement of marriage is associated with individualism
(high I-C). Larger age differences between newly-wed men and women may be an indicator
of (a kind or aspect of) masculinity (high M-F). The number of divorces is related to (a.o.)
I-C and DS. Of course, variables on household size are strongly related to variables on
birth. Hence, the indicator signs are very similar. Large numbers of one-person households
and unmarried households are indicators of individualism (high I-C) and PM.
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table 6.6: demographic indicators of culture: marriage and households
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
M.totl − + +
M.aget + − − +
M.agem + − −
M.agew + + − − − − +
M.agrt + +
M.agdf + +
M.av25 − + + −
M.pm25 − + +
M.pw25 − − + + + + −
M.rt25 + + +
M.pm30 − +
M.pw30 − +
M.divr + + / − − +
H.avsz − + −
H.onep + + − +
H.1par + + − − +
H.nmcp + − − − +
H.nmnk ++ − − − +
H.nmkd − − +
H.3kid − + + +
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
political indicators
Political or electoral indicators of regional culture have to be analysed with caution. They
can only be meaningful if one assumes that voting behaviour is at least partly determined
by an overlap between the values of the voter and the (perceived values of the) party. In
other words: it is assumed that voters vote for parties they feel are closest to their personal
values. Of course, these personal values are co-determined by the (regional) culture they are
(and/or were) part of − hence, voting behaviour may partly reflect cultural values.
The Christian conservative party, CDA, represents high UA, high CN and, in the form of a
positive valuation of respect, authority, power and punishment, high PD. The CDA was
formed in the 1970s from three parties with (very) different religious, political and cultural
backgrounds. For this reason, three interaction effects were calculated: Protestant
conservatism (P.cons); Catholic conservatism (P.cnct); and not explicitly religious
conservatism (P.cnnr). These three indicator variables have slightly different signs on the
different dimensions of culture.
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There are two liberal parties in the Netherlands: the liberal conservative VVD and the
liberal democratic D66. Both are very strong indicators of high I-C, but differ in other
respects. The liberal democratic focus on environment and democratisation points at low
M-F, low UA, and low PD. The conservatism and market ideology of the liberal
conservatives, on the other hand, represents very high M-F and high CN.
Social democracy and socialist egalitarism reflects (very) low PD and (also very) low M-F.
Voters for the social democratic party from different backgrounds may, however, represent
different cultures. Relatively poor voters may be more collectivist, while the relatively rich
voters (P.sdri) are more individualist and (much) more post-materialist.
The environmentalist party, GroenLinks, is the most post-materialist party in the
Netherlands. Its voters probably also score high on I-C and very low on M-F. Because data
for the environmentalist and socialist parties is not available for all elections, but combined
data is, this is added as well (P.prog).
The orthodox Protestant parties, ChristenUnie and SGP, score very high on UA. The most
important difference between the ChristenUnie and the SGP is that voters for the latter
probably score much higher on M-F than voters for the ChristenUnie (for two reasons: (1)
the SGP does not allow women as party members; and (2) the ChristenUnie more strongly
favours environmentalism and democracy). Because both parties are relatively small, there
is no data available for all elections, but combined data is, and is therefore included (P.prtt).
In the parliamentary elections of 2002, a new political movement in the Netherlands arose.
Its leader, Pim Fortuijn, was killed less than two weeks before the elections in which his
party was the biggest winner (from 0 to 26 seats in the 150-seat parliament). His party, the
LPF, and the ideologically associated (and also new) party LN thrived mainly on
dissatisfaction and a strong aversion of politics and the ruling parties and politicians, which
reflects high UA (to a lesser extent, this is also true for the socialist party (P.socl)). The
nationalism of the LPF (and also of the VVD, see above) points at high M-F.
In regional and local elections, a number of independent regional or provincial and local
parties took part. Regionalism is associated with high M-F and low UA, while voters for the
local parties seem to be more dissatisfied and more averse to the ruling parties (high UA),
but also more regionalist (low UA) and more democratic (low PD). Low turnout, finally,
may reflect DS and an aversion to politics, which is associated to high UA.
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table 6.7: political indicators of culture
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
P.turn − −
P.cons + + + / − + + + + + + −
P.cnpr + + + + + + + + + −
P.cnct − + + − + + + + −
P.cnnr + + + + + + + + −
P.libc + + + + + + + + + / − − + + − −
P.libd + + − + / − − − −
P.scdm + / − − − − − + / − −
P.sdri + − − − − − − + +
P.socl − + / − − − + −
P.grlf + − − − − − + / − − + +
P.prog − − − − + − +
P.prt1 + / − + + / − + + + +
P.prt2 + / − + + + + + + +
P.prtt + / − + + + + + +
P.prd1 + + + + + + / − + + + +
P.prd2 + + + / − +
P.regp + −
P.locl − + / − +
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
religious and other indicators
Religion is often considered to be one of the core aspects of culture. Different religions
have different values and norms. Catholicism is more collectivist and feminine, while
Protestantism is more individualist and masculine. In general, religious people are more
conservative and more uncertainty-avoiding than non-religious people. Unfortunately,
religious affiliation is no longer recorded in the Netherlands (except in surveys, which,
however, does not result in reliable data on the municipal level). However, the religious
affiliation of schools is, and as the number of students in each school is known, this may be
a good proxy. (In regions were there are relatively few adherents to a specific religion,
using this proxy may suggest that all of these adherents are more concentrated than they are
in reality as religious minority schools in these regions generally have students from (much)
more municipalities than the one they are located in.)
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table 6.8: religious indicators of culture
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
S.pprt / S.tprt + + + / − + + + + −
S.pcat / S.tcat − + − + +
S.porg / S.torg + + −
S.ppub / S.tpub + −
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
Some other variables, not in any of the groups above, may shed some further light on
regional culture. A high percentage of female aldermen and women in local councils may
reflect low M-F, while a high ratio of male labour participation and female labour
participation points at high M-F. The quantity of household garbage, finally, may be a
negative measure of environmental conscience, hence high M-F and low PM.
table 6.9: other indicators of culture
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
F.mncl − −
F.aldm − −
L.prrt + + +
X.trsh + −
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
dimensions of culture
As mentioned before, the dimensions selected for tables 6.5 to 6.9 are not completely
independent from each other. To test how much they overlap, their correlations can be
calculated. This is done by subtracting the number of minuses from the number of pluses in
each cell. The indicator variables then are the cases and the dimensions are the variables
between which correlations are measured. The resulting correlations are presented in table
6.10, which shows, as expected, that UA and CN are strongly correlated and that CN is
negatively correlated to PM. None of the correlations, however, is high enough to suggest
that this specific dimension is superfluous. On the other hand, it may be the case in the
analyses below that these dimensions are not specific enough to interpret the factors
derived.
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table 6.10: correlations between dimensions
I-C PD M-F UA CN PM
PD -0.189
M-F -0.011 0.435
UA -0.241 0.403 0.296
CN -0.387 0.377 0.465 0.684
PM 0.151 -0.446 -0.326 -0.488 -0.558
DS 0.237 -0.043 0.085 0.119 0.005 -0.187
I-C = individualism (+) vs. collectivism (-); PD = power distance; M-F = masculine (+) vs. feminine
(-); UA = uncertainty avoidance; CN = conservatism; PM = post-materialism; DS = dissatisfaction.
measurement procedure and results
The measures of regional culture presented below are not derived from a single FA on the
whole data set. The starting point were the sixty-five variables marked X in the column FA
in table 6.3.  In a series of FAs, indicator variables were excluded one after the other if no
factor had a loading over 0.4 for that variable, or if there was a factor that had a loading
over 0.4 for that variable (alone) but below 0.3 for all other variables. Interaction effects
(variables calculated from two or more other variables) were also excluded if their loadings
were almost equal (difference smaller than 0.05) to at least one of the variables they were
derived from (hence, if they added no information), which resulted, in fact, in the exclusion
of all interaction variables.
box 6.1: excluded variables
B.totl D.suic L.parw M.agdf P.cnpr S.tprt
B.pa30 F.mncl L.prrt M.pm25 P.cnct S.tcat
B.pa35 F.aldm M.totl M.pw25 P.cnnr S.torg
D.accd H.nmcp M.agem M.rt25 P.sdri S.tpub
D.trac L.para M.agew M.pm30 P.regp U.inhb
D.murd L.parm M.agrt M.pw30 P.locl X.trsh
There is a number of possible factor extraction methods in FA, differently applicable to
different data sets and different questions. Often mentioned as an extraction technique,
principal components analysis (PCA) is, strictly speaking, not a form of FA, but a related
technique. The main difference between FA and PCA is that in PCA the total variance in all
variables is used in the analysis, while in FA only the variance common in variables is
used. This makes FA more applicable to the first exploratory steps in the analysis and PCA
more applicable for finding the underlying dimensions of the final data set. (The extraction
technique used in the initial exploratory steps was Unweighted Least Squares.)
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After the exploratory FAs, a set of twenty-nine indicator variables was left. A PCA of this
set of variables resulted in five factors (or principal components, actually) or dimensions
(see table 6.11 for variance explained). The rotation method chosen in this final analysis
was Promax (κ=2) (see table 6,12 for factor correlation matrix). This rotation method was
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there is no reason to assume that dimensions of regional
culture are uncorrelated, and hence, orthogonal rotation seems inappropriate. Secondly,
Promax rotation creates a relatively simple structure in the factor loading matrix as it tends
to result in most variables having a strong loading on only one factor.
In the remainder of this subsection these five factors are interpreted and mapped.
table 6.11: variance explained
factor % of variance cumulative %
1 36.4 36.4
2 17.9 54.3
3 12.2 66.5
4 6.8 73.3
5 6.1 79.5
table 6.12: factor correlation matrix
1 2 3 4
2 -0.163
3 0.004 -0.138
4 0.273 0.000 0.145
5 0.170 -0.008 -0.006 0.008
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factor 1
The first factor (or principal component) explains 36.4% of variance. It is, hence, by far the
most important dimension of regional differences in meta-behaviour in the Netherlands.
Table 6.13a shows the relationships between the indicator variables with the highest
absolute factor loadings and the seven dimensions. (In case of negative loadings, pluses and
minuses are reversed.) High scoring indicator variables include the number of one-person
households, votes for progressive parties and the number of children born outside of
marriage.
table 6.13a: factor 1: loadings (>0.5) and indicators
indicator loading I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
H.onep 0.873 + + − +
H.avsz -0.872 + − +
P.prog 0.847 − − − − + − +
P.grlf 0.808 + − − − − − + / − − + +
B.outm 0.770 + −
H.1par 0.746 + + − − +
M.divr 0.745 + + / − − +
H.3kid -0.709 + − − −
P.socl 0.692 − + / − − − + −
P.cons -0.602 − + / − − − − − − − − +
P.libd 0.555 + + − + / − − − −
H.nmnk 0.549 + + − − − +
P.scdm 0.510 + / − − − − − + / − −
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
Table 6.13a shows that the first factor is related to individualism, feminine values, anti-
conservatism and post-materialism. Because the first three of these are typical
characteristics of post-materialism, the latter seems to be the most appropriate interpretation
and label for this dimension. Map 6.4 shows the ranking of Dutch municipalities on this
dimension (or factor). Table 6.13b shows the correlations higher than 0.4 to excluded (see
box 6.1) and secondary variables. Secondary variables are included mainly for testing in
chapter 7 but are also of interest here to determine whether factors are the product of
cultural or other differences. In this case, table 6.13b shows that factor 1 is correlated to the
degree of urbanisation (see map 6.5), the percentage of people with long-term low incomes
and the level of education. The first and third are typically associated with post-
materialism; the second is strongly related to the degree of urbanisation and may therefore
be related to this factor indirectly. The only excluded indicator variable in table 6.13b
(L.prrt) strengthens the interpretation of factor 1 as post-materialism. Therefore, hereafter,
factor 1 will be referred to as post-materialism, abbreviated PMA.
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table 6.13b: factor 1: selected correlations (>0.4) to excluded and secondary variables
variable ρ I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
U.durb 0.680
E.ltli 0.572
L.prrt -0.486 − − −
L.lfhe 0.470
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
As the degree of urbanisation (see map 6.5) and related correlates (or causes) of post-
materialism interfere with regional differences, further analysis is necessary to reveal
possible regional differences in this dimension. Stepwise regression resulted in the
regression model presented in table 6.14. The residual of this regression is abbreviated
PMA-R and is mapped in map 6.6. (As there is no data on L.lfhe for municipalities with
less than 10,000 inhabitants, there are seventy-nine missing cases in map 6.6.)
table 6.14: regression of PMA on U.durb, L.lfhe, and E.ltli
SC sig.
U.durb 0.371 0.000
L.lfhe 0.360 0.000
E.ltli 0.496 0.000
R2 0.715
SC = standardised coefficient; sig. = significance.
Map 6.6 shows a far more distinct regional pattern than map 6.4. Clearly, in map 6.6, there
are lighter coloured (less post-materialist) areas in the (middle) west (the province of Zuid
Holland) and the south-east (part of the province of Noord Brabant), and there is a lighter
coloured 'belt' from the (middle) east to the (middle) north (the provinces of Overijssel and
Friesland).
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map 6.4: factor 1: post-materialism (PMA; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
487 municipalities (2 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. See text on measurement procedure.
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map 6.5: degree of urbanisation (U.durb; Netherlands, 2003)
489 municipalities divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score highest. See
text on measurement procedure.
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map 6.6: residual of factor 1 (PMA-R; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
410 municipalities (79 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. Residual after regression of PMA on U.durb, L.lfhe, and E.ltli.
See text on measurement procedure.
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factor 2
The second factor explains 17.9% of variance and seems to be most strongly related to
religion (Protestantism especially). Other indicators with high factor loadings include
marriage and childbearing at young ages. Table 6.15a shows strong relationships to
conservatism and the related dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to interpret this factor or dimension as Protestant
conservatism (abbreviated PRC; see map 6.7).
table 6.15a: factor 2: loadings (>0.5) and indicators
indicator loading I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
P.prtt 0.935 + / − + + + + + +
S.pprt 0.861 + + + / − + + + + −
P.prt2 0.838 + / − + + + + + + +
P.prt1 0.807 + / − + + / − + + + +
M.av25 0.801 − + + −
S.pcat -0.691 + − + − −
H.nmnk -0.559 − − + + + −
B.pa25 0.552 − − + + + −
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
The correlations to excluded variables presented in table 6.15b reinforce this interpretation.
Especially the low labour participation of women (both absolute and relative to the labour
participation of men) points at the male dominance typical of orthodox Protestantism.
table 6.15b: factor 2: correlations (>0.4) to excluded variables
variable ρ I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
L.prrt 0.509 + + +
P.locl -0.422 + + / − −
L.parw -0.403 + +
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
Map 6.7 clearly shows the 'Protestantenband' (Protestants belt), the black and dark grey belt
from the south west to the north east, and the Catholic (light grey) south.
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map 6.7: factor 2: Protestant conservatism (PRC; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
487 municipalities (2 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. See text on measurement procedure.
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factor 3
The third factor − explaining 12.2%, of variance − has very high loadings on indicator
variables that are related to classical individualism. Hence, factor 3 is interpreted as
individualism and labelled accordingly (abbreviated IND; see map 6.8). The main
difference between this type of individualism and that measured in factor 1 is that the latter
is more associated with self-expression, while classical individualism is more about
personal freedom and is more materialistic and more egotistic. Postponement of birth and
marriage are typical of this kind of classical individualism, as are high percentages of votes
for liberal parties. The latter, however, is also strongly correlated to income.
table 6.16a: factor 3: loadings (>0.5) and indicators
indicator loading I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
B.pa40 0.907 + +
B.aage 0.849 + + − − +
P.libc 0.801 + + + + + + +++ / −− + + − −
M.aget 0.732 + − − +
P.libd 0.647 + + − + / − − − −
B.pa25 -0.543 + + − − − +
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
table 6.16b: factor 3: correlations (>0.4) to secondary variables
variable ρ
E.ainc 0.846
L.lfhe 0.672
E.ltli -0.412
Indeed, table 6.16b shows that factor 3 is strongly correlated to average income and to
education. This influence like the degree of urbanisation in factor 1, can be controlled for
by regression analysis. Stepwise regression resulted in the model presented in table 6.17.
The residual is labelled IND-R and is mapped in map 6.9, which shows that classical
individualism, corrected for income and education, is strongest in the north.
table 6.17: regression of IND on E.ainc and L.lfhe
SC sig.
E.ainc 0.667 0.000
L.lfhe 0.286 0.000
R2 0.746
SC = standardised coefficient; sig. = significance.
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map 6.8: factor 3:  individualism (IND; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
487 municipalities (2 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. See text on measurement procedure.
RETHINKING THE CULTURE – ECONOMY DIALECTIC
208
map 6.9: residual of factor 3 (IND-R; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
410 municipalities (79 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. Residual after regression of IND on E.ainc and L.lfhe. See text on
measurement procedure.
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factor 4
The fourth factor explains only 6.8% of variance, but shows very strong regional effects
(see map 6.10). The highest scoring indicator variables include the number of public (rather
than religiously oriented) schools, votes for the social democratic party and the number of
non-married couples with children. Factor 4 is the most difficult to interpret but seems to be
associated with some kind of egalitarian (low PD) anti-conservatism (low CN) and is,
therefore, abbreviated EAC. It seems to be a weaker version of factor 1 (post-materialism)
and is correlated highest to that factor indeed (see table 6.12). While factor 1 was strongly
correlated to the degree of urbanisation, factor 4 however is not (in fact the correlation is as
low as 0.034). (Neither was there an effect of income or education.)
table 6.18: factor 4: loadings (>0.5) and indicators
indicator loading I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
S.ppub 0.904 + −
P.scdm 0.738 + / − − − − − + / − −
P.cons -0.704 − + / − − − − − − − − +
H.nmkd 0.682 − − − +
S.pcat -0.619 + − + − − +
B.outm 0.599 + −
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
factor 5
The last factor (factor 5) − explaining 6.2% − also shows strong regional effects (see map
6.11) and seems to be related to dissatisfaction (abbreviated DST), both social (votes for
political reform movement and low turnout) and individual (number of divorces). (Contrary
to expectation, dissatisfaction is not related to the degree of urbanisation or income.)
table 6.19: factor 5: loadings (>0.5) and indicators
indicator loading I-C PD M-F UA CN PM DS
P.prd1 0.896 + + + + + + / − + + + +
P.prd2 0.694 + + + / − +
M.divr 0.609 + + / − − +
P.turn -0.603 + +
See tables 6.3 and 6.5 for abbreviations.
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map 6.10: factor 4: egalitarian anti-conservatism (EAC; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
487 municipalities (2 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. See text on measurement procedure.
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map 6.11: factor 5: dissatisfaction (DST; Netherlands, 1997-2003)
487 municipalities (2 missing) divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score
highest. White areas: missing data. See text on measurement procedure.
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6-2-3-comparing meta-behavioural measures
The five dimensions derived in the preceding subsection can be compared theoretically to
Hofstede's dimensions. Furthermore, by aggregating municipalities, Corop-scores can be
calculated (as weighted averages in which municipal population sizes function as weights),
which can be compared to those found in an earlier study (Brons 2002; 2004). Table 6.20
presents both comparisons.
table 6.20: a comparison of measurements and dimensions
Hofstede (1980; 1991) Brons (2002; 2004)
IDV PDI MAS UAI COLR MASR ANCO INEQ
PMA + + − − − − 0.308 -0.401 0.589 0.000
PRC + / − + + + + -0.954 0.007 0.106 0.118
IND + + 0.096 -0.364 0.509 0.563
EAC + − − + / − − − − -0.326 -0.409 0.265 -0.690
DST + + + / − 0.180 0.129 0.417 0.253
PMA = post-materialism; PRC = Protestant conservatism; IND = (classical) individualism; EAC =
egalitarian anti-conservatism; DST = dissatisfaction. See § 6.2.1 and the beginning of this subsection
for other abbreviations.
+ + = strongly positively related; + = weakly positively related; etc.
The right-hand part of table 6.20 is the most interesting and shows some important results.
If the factor interpretations of both this and the earlier study were correct, IND and COLR
should correlate strongly and negatively. Instead, COLR correlates strongly (and
negatively) to PRC. This suggests that the interpretation of this factor as collectivism was
wrong. It should have been interpreted purely religiously. (The importance of religion in
COLR, however, was not unnoticed but only underestimated in Brons (2002; 2004). The 'R'
in 'COLR' refers to the importance of religion in this dimension.)
Most interesting about the dimensions of regional culture derived here is that they group
aspects or sub-dimensions very differently than suggested in the theoretical literature (e.g.
Inkeles & Levinson 1954) or earlier empirical research (e.g. Hofstede 1980). All five
dimensions, for example, seem to be related to some kind of individualism, which suggests
that there is no such single dimension indeed (see § 6.2.1). PMA could be interpreted as a
co-operative, social kind of individualism; PRC as protestant individualism; IND as an
egotistic and materialist kind of individualism; and DST and EAC also seem to represent
certain subtypes of individualism. Furthermore, there are no clear single equivalents of
power distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. The latter two seem to be split up
over three dimensions; the first is important in EAC, but so are most of the other
dimensions. Table 6.21 summarises the dimensions found and the aspects of meta-
behaviour associated with them:
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table 6.21: dimensions of regional culture: summary
high score low score
PMA
focus on self-development / self-expression
co-operative and egalitarian
(very) small households
many votes for progressive parties
environmentally conscious
focus on material wellbeing
competitive and authoritarian
large households
many votes for conservative parties
PRC
predominantly Protestant
early marriage and childbearing
traditional / large households and families
male dominance
predominantly Catholic
little early marriage and childbearing
IND
individual is more important
postponement of marriage and childbearing
many votes for liberal parties
national or collective interests more important
little early marriage and childbearing
EAC
little religious influence
modern households and families
many votes for social democratic parties
egalitarian and co-operative
predominantly Catholic
traditional / married households and families
many votes for conservative parties
authoritarian and competitive
DST dissatisfied with life and society
many votes for political reform movement
relatively little dissatisfaction
PMA = post-materialism; PRC = Protestant conservatism; IND = (classical) individualism; EAC =
egalitarian anti-conservatism; DST = dissatisfaction.
The measures presented in subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 are attempts to capture the whole of
culture or meta-behaviour in a small number of dimensions. There are, however, more
specific measures of certain aspects of cultural or institutional difference as well. Lynn
(1991), for example, presents three dimensions of meta-behaviour that are especially related
to entrepreneurship: (1) work-ethic (measured by Spence and Helmreich); (2)
competitiveness (also Spence and Helmreich); and (3) achievement motivation (Ray and
Lynn). Institutional differences (between countries) measured include political and civil
rights (Taylor & Jodice 1983), economic openness (Dollar 1992), and economic freedom
(Gwartney, Lawson & Block 1996). Most of these measures, however, have no regional
equivalent because these would be either irrelevant (in the case of the institutional measures
mentioned) or impossible to measure because there is insufficient data available for indirect
measurement of detailed aspects of meta-behaviour (and direct measurement would be too
costly).
The next section deals with measurements of the economic components of the CED. The
final section (§ 6.4) compares the measures found in this chapter with the theoretical /
conceptual framework introduced and developed in chapter 5.
relatively
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6-3-measuring the economy
Although "economy" may seem to be a relatively straightforward concept, measuring it is
probably at least as problematic as measuring culture or meta-behaviour. (On the history of
measurement in economics see e.g. Porter 2001.) Robert Eisner (in his presidential address
to the American Economic Association), for example, argued that most of the measures of
economics are so unreliable that he and other economists 'have literally not known what we
are talking about' (1989, p. 2; more fully quoted above). Similarly, Griliches (1994) (also in
a presidential address to the American Economic Association) expressed some concern on
economic measurability:
Imagine a “degrees of measurability” scale, with wheat production at one end and lawyer
services at the other. One can draw a rough dividing line on this scale between what I shall
call “reasonably measurable” sectors and the rest, (…). (…) In the early post-World War II
period (…) about half of the overall economy was “measurable” in this sense. By 1990,
however, the fraction of the economy for which the productivity numbers are half
reasonable had fallen below one-third. (p. 10)
The quantifiable aspects of economy most relevant in the CED are wealth (and growth
thereof) and entrepreneurial behaviour. Wealth is one of the most important variables in the
first grand theory of the CED: historical materialism, modernisation theories and related
theories; entrepreneurship and economic growth are the focal points of the second grand
theory: Weber's Die Protestantische Etik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus (1905) and
related studies on cultural values and economic growth.
Measuring wealth and entrepreneurship comes with specific problems, which will be dealt
with briefly in the next two subsections. Subsection 6.3.1 focuses on measuring wealth and
change thereof; subsection 6.3.2 deals with the measurement of entrepreneurship.
6-3-1-measures of wealth and growth
The most common measure of national wealth is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Its
popularity is mainly caused by the fact that it is measured in a strictly defined way for all
countries. GDP is part of a series of definitions in the System of National Accounts (SNA)
(ISWGNA 1993). GDP is related to both production and consumption. It 'represents the
final result of the production activity of resident producer units' (ISWGNA 1993, § 2.171)
and is 'equal to the sum of final uses of goods and services' (§ 2.173). GDP is defined as
'the sum of gross value added of all resident producer units' (§ 2.172). 'Gross value added is
defined as the value of output less the value of intermediate consumption' (§ 6.4.a) and is,
hence, based on the concept of "value", which is itself defined as 'the price per unit of
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quantity multiplied by the number of quantity units' (§ 16.9). Like "price", "value" is a
purely monetary concept as 'values are expressed in terms of a common unit of currency' (§
4.6).
The definition of wealth as GDP as aggregate monetary value of production minus
intermediate consumption has some interesting implications. First of all, all non-monetary
transactions do not contribute to a nation's wealth. Hence, prostitution is more favourable
for the national economy than marriage. Moreover, if someone marries his cleaning lady,
GDP drops (e.g. Vaury 2003), even if he keeps on paying her for the same work because all
transactions, either monetary or non-monetary, within 'institutional units' do not count in a
nation's GDP. Secondly, some increases of monetary transactions do not increase national
wealth. The September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, for example, were clearly
not good for national wealth. However, they may have been very advantageous for GDP as
removing the rubble and rebuilding lead to increased production. Thirdly, GDP measures a
nation's wealth, not that of its population. It is possible that a nation's GDP rises, while the
modal income of its people drops. In most theories of the CED in which wealth is
important, it is, however, the wealth of people rather than that of nations that is important.
Although GDP as a measure of wealth is far from perfect, it is in international comparison
the best available, mainly because it is available and secondly, because many other
measures are or may be measured differently or not at all in different countries. Economic
growth is the most common measure of the growth of wealth and is defined as the growth
of GDP.
What is available on a regional level is different for each country. In the case of the
Netherlands, an abundance of data is available for different spatial scales. The best measure
of wealth on the spatial scale of municipalities is average standardised household income.
Average standard household income is the municipal average of the income of all resident
households corrected for household size and composition (www.cbs.nl). Map 6.12 shows
that the wealthiest part of the Netherlands is the centre west.
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map 6.12: standardised average household income (Netherlands, 1998-2000)
489 municipalities divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score highest. Data
source: www.cbs.nl.
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6-3-2-measures of entrepreneurship
In subsection 3.5.1, five basic aspects of the entrepreneurship were distinguished: (1) risk,
(2) profit, (3) management, (4) the use or investment of capital, and (5) the creative or
innovative aspect. All definitions and interpretations of entrepreneurship are combinations
of some of these aspects. As there are, therefore, many definitions of entrepreneurship
possible, there are equally many measures of entrepreneurship possible. There are two
measures, however, that seem to cover most of the aspects and therefore, most of the
concept of "entrepreneurship". The first is based on the number of persons that become
entrepreneurs; the second is based on innovation (e.g. Gartner & Shane 1995; Wennekers &
Thurik 1999).
Measurement of innovation can be based either on input (e.g. money invested or people
working in R&D) or on output (e.g. number of patents). International differences in
innovation were measured by Shane (1992) as 'per capita number of inventions patented by
nationals' (p. 36). Measurement of regional differences in innovation is more complicated.
Brouwer and Budil-Nadvorníková (1994) measured innovation in two sectors of the
economy for a selection of forty Dutch Corop-regions in 1988 and 1992. Their data,
however, is based on a relatively small survey (as is similar data by, for example, Statistics
Netherlands − CBS) and is therefore not available (or not equally reliable at least) for all
regions.
Measures of entrepreneurship as innovation cannot be readily used in an analysis of the
CED as the level of innovation differs immensely among industries and firm size classes.
Bergeron, Lallich and le Bas (1998), for example, found that 'innovative activities are
strongly concentrated in a few industrial sectors (...) and in a few areas of technological
knowledge' (p.749). The detailed data on industrial structure of countries and regions
needed to correct measures of innovation is generally unavailable. Therefore, measures of
entrepreneurship as innovation are of limited use in this study.
The measurement of entrepreneurship as the choice to become an entrepreneur, to become
self-employed, to start a firm, on the other hand, is relatively straightforward. The main
problem in this kind of measurement is the difference in point of registration in different
countries. Nationally different laws on the establishment and registration of new firms lead
to very different measures of new entrepreneurship. The later this registration point in the
founding process, the lower the resulting ‘birth rate’ (e.g. Hannan & Freeman 1989;
Baldwin et al. 2002). Even more problematic is the measurement of self-employment in
developing countries or countries with only rudimentary corporate law.
Measuring an entrepreneurial 'birth rate' on a municipal scale in the Netherlands, on the
other hand, is easy. All new firms are obliged to register at the Chambers of Commerce. On
the basis of this registry the Chambers of Commerce publish data on new entrepreneurs per
municipality. Dividing this by the labour force in that municipality results in a decent
measure of regional difference in 'entrepreneurial spirit'. Map 6.13 shows that
entrepreneurship (measured in this way) is concentrated in the centre of the Netherlands.
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map 6.13: entrepreneurship (Netherlands, 2001-2002)
489 municipalities divided in quintiles; light-grey areas score lowest; black areas score highest.
Entrepreneurship measured as the number of new start-ups (by entrepreneurs) divided by the labour
force. Data source: www.kvk.nl.
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6-4-concluding theoretical considerations
In the introduction to this chapter, it was stated that for testing it is necessary to make the
common language developed in chapter 5 operational and to measure the phenomena
referred to by its categories. This final section (of this chapter) is intended to review
whether the measurements derived and/or proposed above satisfactorily measure the
categories of this common language; whether the aspects of behaviour / and meta-
behaviour : relevant to the CED are appropriately measured. This question consists of two
parts: (1) which aspects of / and : are relevant to the CED? and: (2) are these
appropriately measured? The first of these questions can be answered only after thorough
analysis of the theories of the CED in the next chapter. Hence, a preliminary answer has to
suffice here. The breadth and vagueness of many of the theories of the CED suggest that the
whole of : is relevant as the cultural pole. Most relevant to the economic pole, on the other
hand, seem to be wealth and entrepreneurship, specifically self-employment and
innovation.
Concerning the second question (above) it can be concluded that there are satisfactory
measures of wealth and self-employment available on a regional scale, but not on an (inter-)
national scale (see § 6.3). Measuring innovation, however, is problematic on all levels (see
§ 6.3.2). Measures of culture or meta-behaviour seem to be more difficult. Most parts of :
seem to withstand quantitative measurement, for example: how does one measure concepts
0, theories and ideas A or institutions j? The approach to measure culture chosen here is
based on measures of culture as sets of basic values oCV as in cross-cultural psychology
and on the very definition of meta-behaviour (see § 5.2).
Meta-behaviour is the whole of the social (non-individual) influences or determinants on /
of an individual's behaviour. Hence, meta-behaviour is an invisible, deeper structure
beneath visible, actual behaviour. The statistical technique of Factor Analysis can be used
to reveal such a deeper structure. Interpreting it, however, is rather difficult. The limited set
of factors found statistically summarises the whole of meta-behaviour related to the
behavioural categories covered by the original variables. However, whether the factors
represent subsets of 0, A, j or o, etc. is indeterminable. Each factor seems to represent
some complex mix of subsets of all or most of the parts of meta-behaviour :. Each factor
includes theories, concepts, values, and so forth. Each factor is interpreted, however, as an
element of oCV, as a basic value orientation. Mainly because this seems to be the most
practical way to label and explain them.
Although the factors derived measure :, they do not measure all of it for two reasons.
Firstly, only : related to the types of / measured by the initial variables is measured.
Whether adding more initial variables would result in much more or completely different
measures of : can not be determined (mainly because virtually all behavioural variables
available were used). Secondly, the five factors derived, account for only 79.5% of variance
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in the initial variables. Hence, approximately 20% percent of the behaviour measured by
the initial variables is not explained by the factors derived. This does not necessarily mean
that all of this 20% is determined by unmeasured meta-behaviour, but again, how much
remains unmeasured is uncertain. Notwithstanding the problems mentioned, as a
measurement of :, the factors derived in section 6.2 seem to be best available.
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chapter 7
ON THEORIES AND TESTS
Bedarf es tiefer Einsicht, um zu begreifen, daß mit den Lebensverhältnissen der Menschen,
mit ihren gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen, mit ihrem gesellschaftlichen Dasein, auch ihre
Vorstellungen, Anschauungen und Begriffe, mit einem Worte auch ihr Bewußtsein sich
ändert?
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels 1848, p. 480
The really fundamental problems of economic growth are non-economic.
Norman Buchanan & Howard Ellis 1955, p. 405
7-1-introduction
A bewildering number of theories on relationships between (aspects of) culture and
economy have been proposed over the last two centuries. Generally, however, these
theories can be categorised in two classes or types depending mainly on the direction of the
causal relationship: (1) theories on the influence of the economy on culture, and (2) theories
on the influence of culture on economic growth. One of the first − and certainly the most
influential − theories belonging to the first group was Marx's and Engels's historical
materialism (see § 3.4.1). The same position is held in the second group by Weber's theory
on the influence of Protestantism on the development of capitalism (see § 3.5.1). These are
the two grand theories of the culture - economy dialectic (CED).
This chapter presents an analysis of these two grand theories and their offspring. To
summarise, compare and test theories, they are translated into the (formal) conceptual
framework developed in chapter 5 and operationalised by means of the measures proposed
in chapter 6. As the theories of the CED are theories of causal relationships (see § 5.3)
between aspects of social reality (see § 5.2), it is causality that is to be tested.
Not all testing is (or can be) done by means of quantitative techniques. Statistical testing
offers some advantages because it deals with many cases at the same time, but many
theories and sub-theories of the CED postulate relationships between phenomena that have
not been measured in the preceding chapter and often even cannot be measured
quantitatively. In these cases other types of analysis, such as historical analysis, are
necessary. Not all of the test results presented in this chapter are new. In many cases it may
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be sufficient to refer to earlier empirical and historical research. New 'evidence' is added
mainly if a particular (sub-) theory is insufficiently tested (at a particular scale) and if the
available data allows this.
7-1-1-testing for causality
The preceding chapter dealt with the operationalisation and measurement of the C and E in
the CED, but what should be tested is the relationship between C and E. Hence, the final
step required in operationalisation is a testing procedure for the theoretical relationships
between culture and economy. As these relationships are of a causal nature (see § 5.3),
what is needed is a test for causality. That may be difficult, however. This difficulty is
caused by the fact that causality is not an empirical category. This was explained most
influentially by Hume (1748):
Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to
be brought on a sudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual
succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover
anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause
and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never
appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one
instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their
conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of
one from the appearance of the other. (§ V.1.3)
At some point, this person will categorise the observed succession in terms of causes and
effects. There is, however, no empirical justification for this categorisation. 'There is some
other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is Custom
or Habit' (§ V.1.4-5). Causality, therefore, is a theoretical relationship based on custom or
habit, on repeated succession and: 'All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of
custom, not of reasoning' (§ V.1.5).
As causality is a theoretical relationship, empirically testing it is impossible. What can be
tested, however, is the validity of the observation of custom or habit on which the assumed
causality is based. What can be tested, in other words, is a symptom, a cause and
consequence of causality: if there is a causal relationship, there must be some empirically
measurable relationship between the assumed causes and effects. For example, if x and y
are defined as possibly causally related events or phenomena and a, b, and c as points in
time such that:
D7.1 ∀ a,b,c [ WYPZ(a,b) ∧ WYPZ(b,c) ∧ a ≠ c ]  ,
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in which the two-place predicate WYPZ means 'precedes or coincides with', then it is
assumed that:
T7.1 ∀x,y [ xy → ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) ]  ,
in which ρ(x,y) is the Pearson correlation of variables x and y and which may be read as: 'if
x causes y, then older measures of x are correlated more strongly to newer measures of y
than measures of x and y from the same point in time are correlated'. The connector in the
formula, however, is a conditional, not a biconditional, which implies that it cannot be
reversed without alterations. T7.1 implies that:
T7.1a ∀x,y [ ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) → ◊(xy) ]  .
In other words: empirical verification of ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) does not prove xy, it merely
shows that xy is possible, which is not a very helpful kind of result. However, T7.1 is
logically equivalent to:
T7.1b ∀x,y [ ¬( ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) ) → ¬(xy) ]  ,
which means that if  ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) is not empirically true, xy cannot be true. Hence,
by empirical means xy cannot be verified, but can be falsified. Of course, this conclusion
hinges on the assumption presented in T7.1. However, to complicate things even further,
T7.1 is not necessarily true, which is illustrated in figure 7.1.
figure 7.1: correlation of causally related x and y at varying points of measurement (t) of x
Figure 7.1 graphs the correlation (ρ(xt,yp)) of two causally related events or phenomena,
such that x  y. If a = m1 and b = c = p, then ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) and, therefore, T7.1 is true.
However, if a = m2 and b = c = p, then ρ(xa,yc) < ρ(xb,yb) and, therefore, T7.1 is false.
ρ(xt,yp)
t
pm1m2
ρ(xm1,yp)
ρ(xp,yp)
ρ(xm2,yp)
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Hence, by implication, xy can only be falsified by empirical disconfirmation of ρ(xa,yc) >
ρ(xb,yb) if tested for all possible triplets *a,b,c+, which is clearly impossible.
The ideal case for testing for causality would require long data series on the basis of which
causal graphs similar to figure 7.1 can be drawn. However, in many cases, there are only
one or two measurements. As was shown above, in the case of two measurements causality
cannot be falsified, unless the definition of the causal relationship under scrutiny includes a
time lag that corresponds to the two points of measurement. For example, if figure 7.1
represents actual empirical data selected to test a theory that predicts that x  y by a time
lag of p − m2, then ρ(xa,yc) < ρ(xb,yb), and therefore, that specific theory x  y is falsified.
If there only is a single point of measurement testing is even more problematic. The basic
idea is that if x and y are causally related (whatever the direction of this relationship), then
there should be two points of measurement a and b such that x and y correlate significantly:
T7.2 ∀x,y [ ( xy ∨ yx ) → ∃a,b, [ ZPNJVY(xa,yb) ] ]
in which the predicate ZPNJVY means 'correlates significantly'. As was the case in T7.1,
verification of ( xy ∨ yx ) on the basis of T7.2 is impossible. Moreover, falsification is
also impossible because falsification would require proving ¬ ∃a,b, [ZPNJVY(xa,yb) ], which
would require testing for all possible *a,b+. However, in testing for causality between
social phenomena, if a and b are relatively close together (or close to the beginning and end
of the assumed time lag) and there is no correlation between xa and yb whatsoever, causality
is rather unlikely because social phenomena (x and y) tend to change relatively slowly.
Unfortunately, 'unlikeliness' is the best one can do in this kind of testing.
While testing for causality is problematic at least, testing hypotheses on the strength of
causal relationships is even more troublesome. In section 5.3 different strengths of the
causal relationships in the CED were distinguished, but not defined. As was claimed in that
section, the difference between strong and weak causation (s vs. w) is rather subjective.
Nevertheless, one might claim that if ZPNJVY(x,y), x and y may be strongly causally related
if ρ is very high and weakly if ρ is relatively low. The boundary between "high" and "low",
again, is very subjective (although √0.5 ≈ 0.7 seems to be an obvious candidate).
This section can be summarised very briefly as 'testing for causality is impossible'.
However, several ways to show the (im-) probability of supposed causal relationships have
been suggested. First of all, if very little data is available, the lack of a significant
correlation makes a direct causal relationship between social phenomena unlikely. If time
series data is available for at least one of the variables, ρ(xa,yc) > ρ(xb,yb) can be tested for a
range of (but not all) *a,b,c+ and a graph similar to figure 7.1 can be drawn. Again this
does not prove anything, but a causal graph shaped like that in figure 7.1 at least does not
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refute causality. Rather to the contrary, it supports (but does not prove) causality with a
time lag of p−m1.
The methods used for testing the relationships between cultural and economic phenomena
in this chapter are correlation and multiple regression. The latter is both mathematically and
practically very similar to correlation, but is more useful if more than one influence or
relationship is to be tested at the same time or if the independent variable (the assumed
cause) in the tested relationship has to be controlled for another variable. For example,
testing for the influence of cultural values on consumptive behaviour would be
meaningless, even absurd, if (consumer) income is not taken into account.
Of course, more sophisticated statistical techniques are available (such as Structural
Equation Modelling / LISREL), but these do not change the basic fact that only (im-)
probability of causal relationships can be shown, while these sophisticated techniques are
less transparent and often allude social scientists into thinking they are actually proving or
disproving causality.
7-1-2-this chapter
This chapter presents an overview of the most important theories of the CED and their
empirical (dis-) confirmations. The first part, consisting of sections 7.2 to 7.5 deals with the
many theories of the CED and the existing empirical confirmations and refutations thereof.
The first grand theory, historical materialism, and its descendants, such as modernisation
theories, are the focus of section 7.2. Section 7.3 describes the second grand theory,
Weber's thesis on the influence of Protestantism on entrepreneurship, and related theories
of cultural influences on entrepreneurship and economic growth. Section 7.4 presents a
brief review of empirical tests of the two grand theories and their offspring. The distinction
between the theoretical, descriptive sections (§§ 7.2-3) and the empirical section (§ 7.4) is a
bit artificial, however, as several theories of the CED were presented in empirical studies or
reactions thereupon. Hence, some empirical results will be mentioned in the theoretical
sections (§§ 7.2-3).
An overview of a number of theories of the CED that are not (directly) related to the two
grand theories, such as theories on the relationship between culture, institutions and
economic growth, is provided in section 7.5, which closes of the first part of this chapter.
(Some existing empirical confirmations and refutations are included in section 7.5.)
The second part of this chapter, section 7.6, presents some additional statistical tests.
Testing is done partly by means of a brief review of previous empirical research (in § 7.4
and § 7.6.1) and partly by new statistical tests on the regional level (in § 7.6.2).
Operationalisation and measurement of the variables used was explained in chapter 6, the
testing procedure itself was dealt with briefly in the preceding section, but further details
will be specified in section 7.6. Section 7.7, finally summarises the main conclusions of this
chapter.
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7-2-the first grand theory
The first grand theory (GT1) is shorthand for historical materialism (HM) and related
theories on the influence of the state or development of the economy on culture. Historical
materialism was developed by Marx (and to a lesser extent Engels) in the first half of the
19th century. HM strongly influenced much of (late) 20th century theorising on the
relationships between culture and economy, especially in the form of modernisation
theories. The general form of the theories of the type GT1 could be formalised as:
T7.3 ∆{/,:}PCD s ∆(:−:PCD)  ,
in words: the (state of the) economy (as the combination (or interaction) of behaviour and
meta-behaviour related to production, consumption and distribution (PCD)) {/,:}PCD (co-)
determines (non-economic / non-PCD) culture or meta-behaviour (:−:PCD). From T7.3 a
number of 'sub-theories' can be derived. These are theories on causal relationships between
parts or subsets of the variables in T7.3. For example, both ∆/PCD s ∆(:−:PCD) and
∆:PCD s ∆(:−:PCD) are special cases of GT1, such that:
T7.3a ( ( ∆/PCD s ∆(:−:PCD) ) ∨ ( ∆:PCD s ∆(:−:PCD) ) ) → T7.3  ,
but, of course, not the other way around. Although the truth of, for example, ∆/PCD s
∆(:−:PCD) would 'prove' T7.3 (insofar as this is possible; see § 7.1.1); such a 'proof' would
not necessarily make T7.3 a good theory as it would be far broader than evidence suggests.
Hence, the goal of this chapter is not only to empirically verify or falsify T7.3 and other
theories of the CED, but also, wherever possible, to refine them.
The following subsections deal with historical materialism (§ 7.2.1) and modernisation and
stage theories (§ 7.2.2). Section 7.3 focuses on the second grand theory: the influence of
culture on entrepreneurship and economic growth. In (sub)sections 7.4.1 and 7.6 some of
the theories presented in this section are tested.
7-2-1-historical materialism
Historical materialism (HM) was conceived roughly between 1843, when Marx read (a.o.)
Smith's Wealth of nations (1776) and Montesquieu's De l'esprit des loix (1748), and 1859,
when his Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie was first published in Berlin. Of course,
Marx's ideas were not completely new and numerous predecessors and influences have
been suggested by various scholars. (Note that HM is not the most common abbreviation of
historical materialism. It is (or was) often abbreviated as histomat and dialectical
materialism is (or was) often abbreviated by diamat. These abbreviations, however, were
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introduced and used (mainly) in Stalinist Soviet orthodoxy, hence, the preference for
another, less historically burdened abbreviation.)
According to Seligman (1901) HM is rooted in the works and theories of Vico and
Montesquieu. Jakubowski (1936) points at the importance of Hegel and Feuerbach. All of
these influences have been dealt with briefly in subsection 3.4.1. Most important were the
reinterpretation of Montesquieu's interacting and spirit-shaping physical geography,
psychological nature of the people, cultural patterns, history, religion and economic mode
of being as a Hegelian dialectical totality, and the Feuerbachian reversal of Hegelian
idealism into a materialism in which the economic, material base determines the ideal
superstructure (see also § 3.2.2 and § 3.4.1).
One of the most important influences and the most important predecessor of HM at least,
was Saint-Simon (e.g. Taylor 1975; Kolakowski 1976). Before Marx, Saint-Simon
suggested that socialism is not just a hypothetical model of society, but the result of a
historical process. A few decades before the introduction of HM, he argued that the
development of the means of production is the source of all historical changes (e.g. Saint-
Simon 1817). Interestingly, Saint-Simon argued that this process of historical development
is a continuous alternation of organic and critical periods. In organic periods there is
consensus on the principles of science, thought and society. Critical periods are the
inevitable revolutionary transitions between organic periods. One-and-a-half century later,
this part of Saint-Simon's philosophy of history was nearly literally copied by Kuhn (1962).
Other, less obvious, influences on the origins of HM have been suggested. Meek (1967), for
example, argued that HM was strongly influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment. Scientists
and philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment (which include, for example, Hume,
Ferguson, Hutcheson and Smith) generally adhered to a four-stage model of socio-
economic development of nations (savage, pastoral, agricultural, commercial). According
to Meek, this four-stage model was the foundation on which Marx built HM. However, as
mentioned before, Marx read Smith's Wealth of nations (1776) in 1843, but besides that, he
did not read much of the works of the Scottish Enlightenment. Moreover, the lack of
terminological and/or theoretical similarities between HM and the four-stage model
seriously undermines Meek's theory on the influence of the latter on the development of
HM (Levine 1987).
According to Levine (1987), HM is rooted in the German historical school of law, legal
sociology and especially the works of the German historian Bartold Niebuhr (which were
all closely linked to Romanticism). From the latter Marx took his historicist interpretation
of property, the theory that the form of ownership (co-)determines the structure of society.
Marx's and Engels's first statements on HM date back to Die Deutsche Ideologie of 1846,
which was, however, only published in 1932. The first published statements on HM can be
found in Das Elend der Philosophie (Marx 1847) and the Manifest der Kommunistischen
Partei (Marx & Engels 1848; see quotes in § 3.4.1):
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Mit der Erwerbung neuer Produktivkräfte verändern die Menschen ihre Produktionsweise,
und mit der Veränderung der Produktionsweise, der Art, ihren Lebensunterhalt zu
gewinnen, veränderen sie alle ihre gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. Die Handmühle ergibt
eine Gesellschaft mit Feudalherren, die Dampfmühle eine Gesellschaft mit industriellen
Kapitalisten. (Marx 1847, p. 130)
The locus classicus for HM, however, was published a decade later in the preface to Zur
Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (1859):
Die Produktionsweise des materiellen lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und geistigen
Lebensprozeß überhaupt. Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern
umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt. (pp. 8-9; more fully
quoted in § 3.4.1)
After Marx's and Engels's deaths, HM was codified by Plekhanov (1908) and Stalin (1939)
(and to a lesser extent also by Lenin), as a simple mechanism of the economic
determination of society. The Marxist orthodoxy that grew from their work was opposed
(mainly) by Marxists from Western countries including Lukacs (e.g. 1923), Gramsci (e.g.
1929-35) and Bloch (e.g. 1954-9; 1961). (One of the rare critical contributions from within
the Soviet bloc by the East German chemist and philosopher Havemann (1964) was − of
course − published in West Germany only.)
These 'Western Marxists' emphasised the dialectical nature of HM. It is not just the
economic base that determines the superstructure; the superstructure itself can have a
leading role in social development:
A prendre donc les choses en gros, c'est bien l'industrie humaine qui constitue la principale
force motrice de l'histoire. Mais, en faisant cette constatation, les marxistes ne prétendent
pas que ce soit la seule force. Ils ne disent nullement que les facteurs intellectuels et moraux
ne jouent aucun rôle dans l'évolution des sociétés. (Vandervelde 1904, p. 168)
The strong emphasis on the dialectical aspect of HM is not typical just for Western
Marxism, but for Far Eastern Marxism as well. Traditionally dialectical Chinese thought
(see § 2.5.2) strongly influenced Mao's interpretation of HM:
in the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure, the economic base is
the principal aspect; and there is no change in their respective positions. This is the
mechanical materialist conception, not the dialectical materialist conception. True, the
productive forces, practice and economic base generally play the principal and decisive
role; whoever denies that is not a materialist. But it must also be admitted that in certain
conditions, such aspects as the relation of production, theory and the superstructure in turn
manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role. (Mao 1937, pp. 335-336)
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HM was a far more complex theory than the orthodox codification suggests. However, the
fact that Marx never wrote a systematic treatise on his philosophy and that this, therefore,
must be reconstructed from scattered statements and remarks throughout his books, notes
and letters, enabled nearly every interpreter of HM, including Plekhanov and Stalin, to find
the quotes and fragments he needed to support his version. Many versions and
interpretations of HM exist and have existed, even in the works of Marx and Engels
themselves. One could (even) claim that there is no single (consistent) theory of HM.
Nevertheless, Burbelka (1982) presented an attempt to combine and reinterpret theories,
fragments, aspects and versions of HM in a single framework. This framework is presented
graphically in figure 7.2:
figure 7.2: Burbelka's system of HM theories
(figure adapted from Burbelka 1982, p. 227)
Burbelka suggested interpreting HM as a hierarchical system of three different, nested
dialectics. The interaction of material practice and material relations is the base that itself
interacts with superstructure. All of this in its turn is the system of social conditions which
interacts with consciousness. Burbelka's system can be translated in the conceptual
framework developed in chapter 5, as a theory of HM that contains the different smaller,
more detailed theories, ideas and aspects.
The concept of "material" in the Marxian conceptual framework refers to the economic, to
production, consumption and distribution (PCD; a division that was first proposed by Say
(1829)), but to production especially. "Practice" can refer to either actual behavioural
events / or to patterns of behaviour =. Both Burbelka (1982) and Marx's own writings
suggest the latter interpretation: it is the economic way of life rather than actual economic
behaviour that is concerned here. As "material relations" are the rules and institutions of
PCD: vPCD, material practice is =PCD−vPCD = iPCD. "Base" is, according to Burbelka, both
the interaction of material practice and relations: ∆iPCD  ∆vPCD, and the combination
thereof iPCD∪vPCD = =PCD. However, the fuzziness of the boundary between iPCD and
vPCD and the fact that the interaction or reciprocity between the two is of only very minor
importance in HM, it seems to be more appropriate to define base as just =PCD.
In the preface to Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (1859), Marx writes about the 'legal
and political superstructure'. Hence, "superstructure" is the set of legal and political rules
material practice material relations
base superstructure
social conditions consciousness
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and institutions: vleg.pol. This superstructure is (co-)determined by the (economic) base:
∆=PCD s ∆vleg.pol and this interaction, in turn determines consciousness, which may very
well be the most complicated concept in the system. Marx and Engels wrote most
extensively on the concept of "consciousness" in Die Deutsche Ideologie (1846/1932). The
concept seems to refer to the more spiritual parts of social reality: to social traffic rules, to
theories and ideas, and to language:
die Sprache ist das praktische, auch für andre Menschen existierende, also auch für mich
selbst erst existierende wirkliche Bewußtsein, und die Sprache entsteht, wie das
Bewußtsein, erst aus dem Bedürfnis der Notdurft des Verkehrs mit andern Menschen. (p.
30)
"Consciousness" then is culture, is meta-behaviour :, but as subsets of : were already
conceptualised differently, as "material relations" and "superstructure", "consciousness" is
more or less a remainder category: :−(=PCD∪vleg.pol). Combining all of the above in a
single formula results in:
T7.4* [∆=PCD s ∆vleg.pol ] s ∆(:−(=PCD∪vleg.pol))  .
However, in volume three of das Kapital, Marx (1894, p. 800) writes that, under the
influence of natural circumstances, race (or culture; see § 3.3.2) and other 'external'
influences, there can be infinitely many variations of the base. This can be interpreted in
two ways: (1) culture (race) and nature influence the base; or (2) culture (race) and nature
are part of the base. The first interpretation corresponds with the dialectical character of
HM, that was lost in the mechanical codification by Plekhanov and Stalin. However,
Engels's claim that 'die Rasse is selbst ein ökonomische Faktor' (1894, p. 206) strongly
points at the second interpretation. Base then should be redefined as the combination of all
meta-behaviour related to PCD and the set of all actual entities (including natural objects
and events and actual behaviour), similarly related to PCD: {Φ,:}PCD, which would replace
T7.4* by:
T7.5* [ ∆{Φ,:}PCD s ∆vleg.pol ] s ∆(:−(:PCD∪vleg.pol))  .
This still is not the final translation of HM as two more amendments are necessary. In die
Deutsche Ideologie Marx and Engels (1846/1932) wrote that it is not just the legal and
political rules and institutions that are determined by the economic base, but that ideology
as a whole is materially (economically) determined. The concept of "ideology" to Marx and
Engels referred to the whole of (philosophical and scientific) ideas, theories, categories and
beliefs on politics and society. Superstructure can, hence, be interpreted as institutionalised
ideology  (0∪A∪v)leg.pol or even as the whole of legal and political meta-behaviour :leg.pol.
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Secondly, the dialectical character of the causal relationships in HM implies that for each
s there is a weak causal relationship in the opposite direction. The two directions of
causality coincide whith Mao's (1937) distinction between principal and non-principal
contradictions. These two final amendments result in the replacement of T7.5* with:
T7.6 [ ∆{Φ,:}PCD ws ∆:leg.pol ] ws ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol))  .
Many theories can be derived as subtypes of T7.6. Only relatively few of these can be
found in the works of Marx and Engels themselves and should, therefore, be considered to
be part of the core of Marxian HM. The most important theory of HM was that on the
determination of legal and political superstructure and ideology by the means of
production: 'Die Handmühle ergibt eine Gesellschaft mit Feudalherren, die Dampfmühle
eine Gesellschaft mit industriellen Kapitalisten' (Marx 1847, p. 130):
T7.7 ∆:prod s ∆:leg.pol  ,
which was further illustrated by Engels in his der Ursprung der Familie, des
Privateigentums und des Staats (1884; see also § 3.4.2 and § 7.4.1).
The quote at the beginning of this chapter and the phrase that 'ihr gesellschaftliches Sein,
das ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt' (Marx 1859, p. 9) are best formalised as T7.6, but are often
interpreted as:
T7.8 ∆{/,:}PCD s ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol))  ,  or even as:
T7.8a ∆/PCD s ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol)),
which both can be derived from T7.6, but both exclude the intermediate :leg.pol. However,
Marx' and Engels' writings on the subject suggest the influence of :leg.pol on
:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol) is not nearly as important as that of {/,:}PCD and hence, that T7.8 is,
next to T7.7 the most important sub-theory of HM.
The dialectical nature of HM is expressed in the bi-directionality of the causal process. This
implies that next to T7.7 and T7.8 there is a weaker T7.9 in the opposite direction:
T7.9 ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol)) w ∆{/,:}PCD  ,
which can be derived from T7.6 and is a formal translation of Marx's and Engels's scattered
remarks on the influence of culture on the economy (see § 3.4.1).
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7-2-2-stages and modernisation
HM is historically related to stage theories and modernisation theories. Some stage theories
pre-date HM and like HM, suggest that the history of man is a series of socio-economic
stages. Modernisation theories, on the other hand, are mostly (but not exclusively)
interpretations and reinterpretations of T7.8. Whether a stage theory is relevant as a theory
of the CED is dependent on the nature of the stages and on the causes of stage transfer: the
question about what drives the historical process. In this section, some of the most
important stage theories in which the stages are (at least partly) cultural and the system's
engine is (at least partly) economic are dealt with briefly. In addition, some modernisation
theories and other theories (in some way) similar to GT1 are described. Theories are dealt
with in chronological order (mainly).
One of the first influential stage theories that could be interpreted as related to the CED is
Vico's (1725/44; see § 3.2.2). Vico stated that: 'the order of ideas must follow the order of
institutions' (§ 238). Different stages in the history of man are characterised by different
orders of ideas (values, ideas, theories, etc). The process of development through these
stages is driven by changes in the order of institutions. The latter is the way a society deals
with nature and natural resources and with their technological possibilities as a means of
subsistence: =SNT. (Note that both =PCD, as one of many possible definitions of "economy",
and the traditional interpretation of culture as tilling or the transformation of nature =trans.nat
(see § 5.2.4) are subsets of =SNT.) According to Vico, the order of institutions determines
the state of the economy, although he did not and could not use this term (see § 3.4.3),
which in its turn determines the order of ideas, the values, ideas, theories, etc. A∪o of a
society:
T7.10 ∆=SNT s ∆(A∪o)  , or alternatively:
T7.10a ∆=SNT s ∆/PCD s ∆(A∪o)  .
Similar ideas have been expressed by numerous scientists in different ages. For example, in
the 18th century (but after Vico) by Smith (1765) and relatively recently by Harris (1979),
an anthropologist strongly influenced by Marx. In his the theory of moral sentiments, Smith
(1765) wrote that:
Every age and country look upon that degree of each quality, which is commonly to be met
with in those who are esteemed among themselves, as the golden mean of that particular
talent or virtue. And as this varies, according as their different circumstances render
different qualities more or less habitual to them, their sentiments concerning the exact
propriety of character and behaviour vary accordingly. (Smith 1765, p.204)
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Smith's basic idea is very similar to Vico's, but he focuses on values rather than on theories
and ideas. (The difference was probably the result of a difference in focus as Smith was a
moral philosopher and Vico a philosopher of history and culture.) Hence:
T7.11 ∆=SNT s ∆o  .
Vico and Smith can be considered to be part of the prehistory of GT1. To some extent
(however small) influenced by their works, Marx (and Engels) developed historical
materialism in the middle of the 19th century. Only at the end of the century were new
theories forwarded. Many of these, however, were influenced, or at least inspired, by
Marxian historical materialism. Durkheim (1893), for example, argued that the division of
labour (under certain circumstances Φ) can result in anomie, a nihilist decline of social
values and norms in favour of egotism and individualism:
T7.12 ({Φ,=div.lab} s (oanomie  .
A few years later Simmel (1900) claimed that a money-based economy results in a
(stronger) division between business and social life, which results in more personal freedom
and weaker ties between the individual and the group. Hence, the institution of money
promotes individualism, but a egotistic, heartless kind of individualism: 'die ganze
Herzlosigkeit des Geldes spiegelt sich so in der sozialen Kultur, die von ihm bestimmt wird'
(Simmel 1900, p. 468). (Simmel was hardly the first to point at the social influences of
money. Nearly three centuries earlier, Shakespeare (1623), for example, described money
as both god and whore.)
T7.13 (jmoney s (oindividualism  .
Most of the modernisation theories were forwarded in the second half of the 20th century.
One of the first, Lewis (1955), argued that economic growth is both cause and effect of
individualism:
T7.14a (w(/PCD)  (oindividualism  .
This theory, however, was part (or a special case) of a much wider theory of the CED.
According to Lewis, values and norms determine institutions. Together these influence and
are influenced by the state of the economy:
T7.14 ∆/PCD  [ ∆o  ∆j ]  .
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Similarly, but more explicit on the strength of the causality in both directions, Hirschman
(1986) claimed that:
T7.15 ∆/PCD ws ∆o
In The stages of economic growth (1960), subtitled: a non-communist manifesto, Rostow
presented a version of the CED that, nevertheless, seems to be very similar to the Marxian
version. Rostow claims that the development of societies through five socio-economic
stages is dependent on technological and economical possibilities and that social structure
is the product of economic structure, economic limits and the methods of production:
T7.16 ∆{/PCD,(=A)PCD&tech} s ∆:  .
Novack and Lekachman (1964) presented an extremely down-to-earth argument for the
influence of the economy on (aspects of) culture:
As the early twentieth century English economist P.H. Wicksteed put it, “A man can be
neither a saint, nor a lover, nor a poet, unless he has comparatively recently something to
eat.” Of nations it might be said that political enlightenment, social compassion, and
cultural achievement are at least made possible by the attainment of minimal standards of
diet, clothing, and shelter. Social progress is contingent upon economic development. (p. 1)
Hence:
T7.17 (w(/PCD) s (A  .
The effects of wealth on fertility in developing countries were studied by Simon (1974). He
found that increased wealth leads to some increase of fertility on the short term, but to a
much larger decrease on the longer term. There is a time lag between the economic and the
socio-cultural change of approximately two to three decades.
T7.18 (w(/PCD) s −(ifertility  .
Strongly influenced by Marxism, Bell (1974) argued that increasing wealth results in a
decreasing work ethic. Later, Bell (1976) revived the Marxian thesis that capitalism leads to
alienation (see § 3.4.1).
T7.19 (w(/PCD) s −(owork-ethic  .
T7.20 (jcapitalism s (oalienation  .
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Probably the most important modernisation theory (and one of the most influential at least)
is Inglehart's (1977; 1990; 1997), which is partly based on Harris's (1973) anguish of
change. Harris found that people with lower income and lower education are more
conservative and that groups with higher income and more education have less materialist
values and are less focused on economic wellbeing. The latter groups strive for political,
social and ecological change rather than for material wealth. Inglehart (1977; 1990) labelled
this tendency 'post-materialism', but later (1997) he changed this into the more fashionable
'postmodernism' (see also § 6.2.1). Increasing wealth not only leads to increasing post-
materialism, but also deteriorates the social base of religion (Norris & Inglehart 2004).
Religion − or at least the need thereof − is related to poverty. As religion often is a prime
source of conservatism, its deterioration further reinforces the rise of postmaterialism.
Inglehart's explanation of the rise of post-materialism or 'postmodernisation' is remarkably
similar to Novack's and Lekachman's down-to-earth argument briefly quoted above:
The values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on
material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life.
The causes and implications of this shift are complex, but the basic principle might be
stated very simply: people tend to be more concerned with immediate needs or threats than
with things that seem remote or nonthreatening. (Inglehart 1990, p.5)
Postmodernization is a shift in survival strategies. It moves from maximizing economic
growth to maximizing survival and well-being through lifestyle changes. Once
industrialization had become possible, Modernization focused on rapid economic growth as
the best way of maximizing survival and well-being. But no strategy is optimal for all
times. Modernization was dramatically successful in raising life expectancies, but it has
begun to produce diminishing returns in advanced industrial societies. Emphasizing
competition, it reduces the risk of starvation, but increases psychological stress. With the
transition from Modernization to Postmodernization, the trajectory of change has shifted
from maximizing economic growth to maximizing the quality of life. (Inglehart 1997, p.66)
According to Inglehart, post-materialists are a small but growing minority in most
(Western) societies, especially among the higher middle class. The growth of this minority
and their influence on society is determined by the growth of material wealth with a 30-
years time lag:
T7.21 (w(/PCD) s (opost-materialism  .
Interestingly, this theory claims that the wealthier a society is, the less it strives for wealth,
and hence, a further increase thereof is appreciated. It could, therefore, be interpreted as a
special case of Marshallian (1890) marginality.
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Recently, Inglehart and Baker (2000) introduced two new, but related measures of cultural
difference: the traditional - rational dimension and the survival - self-expression dimension
(both are strongly related to post-materialism). These two dimensions, according to
Inglehart, cover the whole of the variety in basic cultural value orientations. Economic
development promotes rationality and self-expression; economic decline causes a stronger
focus on tradition and survival:
T7.21a (w(/PCD) s (oratio/self-ex  .
This, however, does not (necessarily) mean that all cultural difference between social
groups is lost in the process of economic development as 'economic development tends to
push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on
parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages' (Inglehart & Baker 2000, p. 49).
The individualism - collectivism dimension is usually regarded to be one of the most basic
dimensions of culture. Its importance is illustrated in chapter 6 by the five dimensions of
regional culture found, which all seem to be related to some kind or aspect of
individualism, and by the fact that individualism is cause and/or effect in many of the
theories presented in this chapter.
A number of theorists proposed explanations for (national) differences in this dimension.
Above, it was mentioned that Simmel (1900) regarded the institution of money as cause of
individualism, and Lewis (1955) assumed that economic growth was (and is) responsible
for the growth of individualism. More recently, Kim (1994) argued that the level of
individualism in a society is dependent on the way that society deals with nature and natural
resources and with their technological possibilities as a means of subsistence =SNT (see also
Vico above). Berry (1994), on the other hand, asserted that a society's level of
individualism is determined by the methods of production. Hunting and gathering and
agriculture tends to result in collectivism, while industrial societies are more individualist.
T7.22 ∆=SNT s ∆oindividualism  .
T7.23 ∆=prod s ∆oindividualism  .
(Note that as =prod ⊂ =SNT, Berry's theory (T7.23) is more specific than Kim's (T7.22).)
Several scientists studied the influence of the economy on political and politico-economic
institutions. Inglehart (1988) argued that economic growth leads to democratisation.
Douthwaite (1992), on the other hand, showed that past a certain point, the interests of the
economically powerful change and further economic growth leads to growing control of the
state on all aspects of life. The current increase of power of secret services in Western
countries, for example, cannot be explained by the September 11th terrorist attacks in New
York alone; the process started years earlier.
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Inglehart's and Douthwaite's theories are not necessarily contradictory but (may) apply to
different periods and conditions. In earlier stages of capitalism, increasing wealth lead to a
growing and increasingly powerful middle class, which in turn, demanded and supported
democratisation. In later stages powerful multinationals and other large corporations
increasingly prefer(red) security over democracy. This relationship between economic
power and political institutions is one of the most obvious interpretations of HM (and was
indeed suggested by Marx and Engels; see also preceding section).
As Inglehart and Douthwaite both assume economic change affects the political
institutions, the general theory seems to be:
T7.24 ∆{/,:}PCD  ∆jpol  .
Politico-economic institutions are generally supposed to influence the economy. Economic
freedom, for example, is often assumed to promote economic growth (e.g. Dollar 1992;
Sachs & Warner 1995; de Haan & Sturm 2000; see also § 7.5.3). Rather historically
specific, but nevertheless of interest in this respect, was Westermann's (1915) theory on the
causes of the decline of ancient culture: 'it was the loss of economic freedom, even more
than the loss of political freedom, which had such disastrous results upon private initiative
and finally undermined the ancient Graeco-Roman civilization' (p. 743).
Despite the general consensus on causality running from economic freedom to economic
growth, an increasing number of economists and economic historians (e.g. Gerschenkron
1962; Scott 1997; Chang 2002) found the opposite relationship: an increase in wealth
results in an increase in economic freedom:
T7.25 (w(/PCD)  (jecon.free  .
This latter theory seems to be far away from the CED in a more traditional interpretation.
However, if culture is defined such that it includes institutions, it also includes the
institutions related to economic freedom. Hence, due to the possible conceptual overlap of
"culture" and "economy", economic institutions (such as economic freedom) could end up
at both sides of the formula.
7-2-3- summary
The number of possible causes and effects that can be labelled as "economy" and "culture"
respectively is astonishing. In the theories of CED presented in this section there are
thirteen different versions of economy and sixteen interpretations of culture (see table 7.1).
Note that, the labels of "culture" and "economy" were not used by all of the original
theorists (or even could be; see chapter 3) and not all of these theories are, strictly speaking,
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special cases of T7.3 since in rare occasions the economic pole is conceptualised even more
widely than in T7.3).
Although many variants of GT1 have been described briefly in this section, infinitely more
exist and/or can be imagined. Not all possible variants are equally important, however. The
most important, most influential theories (variants of GT1) are (1) the economic
determination of political change (T7.7) and the influence of wealth on cultural values,
specifically individualism (T7.14a) and post-materialism (T7.21).
While the theories above assume that the economy influences or determines aspects of
culture, the next section deals with theories that suggest the opposite relationship: the
influence of culture on economic behaviour and economic development.
table 7.1: concepts of "culture" and "economy" in the first grand theory
economy (cause) culture (effect)
{Φ,:}PCD 1 :
{/,:}PCD 2 :−=PCD
/PCD 3 :−(:PCD∪:leg.pol)
w(/PCD) 4 :leg.pol
:PCD 5 A∪o
=PCD 6 A
:prod 7 o
=prod 8 oindividualism
=SNT 9 opost-materialism
(=A)PCD&tech 10 oratio/self-ex
=div.lab 11 owork-ethic
jmoney 12 oanomie
jcapitalism 13 oalienation
14 jpol
15 jecon.free
16 ifertility
7-3-the second grand theory
The second grand theory (GT2) is a label for the set of theories on the influence of culture
on entrepreneurship and/or economic growth. The classical theorist of GT2 is Weber (1905;
1915), but as is the case with GT1, there is a prehistory as well. In one of his many letters,
Engels (1888), for example, made a rather casual remark about the importance of a
'fieberhafte Spekulationsgeist' (p. 93) for economic development (see § 3.4.1), which
suggests that the idea of a culturally different entrepreneurial spirit was already rather
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common in his days. The bulk of explicit theoretical and empirical studies on GT2,
however, was published in the last three decades
The general, most common, form of GT2 is:
T7.26 (o  (/entrepreneurship  (∆w(/PCD)  ,
or, in words, a specific change in values leads to an increase in entrepreneurial behaviour,
which, in turn, leads to (an increase in) economic growth.
As explained in subsections 3.5.1 and 6.3.2, "entrepreneurship" is not a singular and/or
unambiguous concept. In subsection 3.5.1, five basic aspects of the entrepreneurship were
distinguished: (1) risk, (2) profit, (3) management, (4) the use or investment of capital, and
(5) the creative or innovative aspect. All definitions and interpretations of entrepreneurship
are differently weighted combinations of some of these aspects. Generally, new firm
formation or start-ups and innovation are considered to be the most important effects and
indicators of entrepreneurship (e.g. Wennekers & Thurik 1999).
Many theories on the influence of culture on entrepreneurship are not particularly specific
on what aspect(s) of entrepreneurship is supposed to be influenced. Moreover, different
aspects and indicators of entrepreneurship are (or may be) differently influenced by culture.
The hunger for profit, for example, is related to Inglehart's post-materialism (see § 6.2.1),
and Douglas (1992; see also: Douglas and Wildlavsky 1982), argued that risk is a culturally
determined collective construct.
The focus of this section is on the first part of the theory: the influence of culture on
entrepreneurship:
T7.26a (o  (/entrepreneurship  .
Subsections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 focus on the influence of religion on entrepreneurship as
originally suggested by Weber (1905; 1915) and on the influence of (culturally different)
values on entrepreneurship in general. Subsection 7.4.2 presents some empirical results
related to these theories. The second part of T7.26:
T7.26b (/entrepreneurship  (∆w(/PCD)  ,
the theory that increased entrepreneurial activity results in economic growth, is dealt with
and tested in subsection 7.4.3.
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7-3-1-religion and entrepreneurship
While many of the 19th century scientists and philosophers, including Marx and Durkheim
(see § 7.2), focused on the negative consequences of capitalism, in the early 20th century
the attention shifted towards the historical roots and conditions for capitalism. Weber and
Tawney, for example, sought to explain the rise of capitalism as the result of culture.
Weber was an economist turned sociologist and was strongly influenced by the German
Historical School in economics. This school focused much more on the historical
specificities that influence the economic process and much less on the formal mathematical
models that became fashionable in neo-classical orthodoxy.
Weber was probably not the first to write about the possible relationship between
Protestantism and capitalism or wealth, as the difference in wealth and entrepreneurial sprit
between the Protestant countries of northern Europe and the Catholic countries of southern
Europe had already been perceived by many others. However, Weber (1905) was the first
to systematically analyse this relationship. He argued that, although Protestant theologists
oppose the strive for wealth, Protestant ascetism may lead to economic succes as it
encourages people to rationally and systematically control their (economic) environment.
Protestantism promotes both the entrepreneurial spirit and the work-ethic of employees.
The latter is also due to the fact that Protestant theologists regard a Beruf (profession) to be
an assignment from God (see also § 3.5.1).
Later Weber (1915) widened his analysis to include other religions. He compared Eastern
and Western religions in their capacity to promote economic growth. The values of the
different religions were fitted on a dimension ranging from ascetism to mysticism. In
mystic religions, redemption demands a passive and contemplative way of life. In ascetic
religions, on the other hand, redemption demands an active control of life. It is this ascetism
and not rationality in general that promotes economic growth. While Confucianism and
Protestantism are both rational, the first is mystic while the latter is ascetic. Hence, only the
latter will result in capitalism.
Die radikale Konzentration auf gottgewollte Zwecke, der rücksichtslose praktische
Rationalismus der asketischen Ethik, die methodische Konzeption sachlicher
Betriebsführung, der Abscheu gegen den illegalen politischen, kolonialen, auf dem Buhlen
um Fürsten- und Menschengunst ruhenden, Raub- und Monopolkapitalismus, im Gegensatz
dazu die nüchterne strenge Legalität und die gebändigte rationale Energie des
Alltagsbetriebs, die rationalistische Schätzung des technisch besten Weges und der
praktischen Solidität und Zweckmäßigkeit statt der traditionalistischen Freude an der
überkommenen Fertigkeit und der Schönheit des Produkts beim alten Handwerker, – alle
diese unentbehrlichen "ethischen" Qualitäten des spezifisch modernen kapitalistischen
Unternehmers und: die spezifische Arbeitswilligkeit des frommen Arbeiters: – dieser
rücksichtslose, religiös systematisierte, in der jeder rationalisierten Askese eigentümlichen
Art "in" der Welt und doch nicht "von" der Welt lebende Utilitarismus hat jene überlegenen
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rationalen Fähigkeiten und damit jenen "Geist" des Berufsmenschentums schaffen helfen,
welche dem Konfuzianismus und seiner weltangepaßten, das bedeutet aber: zwar rational,
aber von außen nach innen, nicht, wie beim Puritanismus, von innen nach außen
determinierten Lebensführung letztlich verschlossen blieb. (Weber 1915, p. 475)
Religions are systems of rules, institutions, values, ideas, beliefs and concepts. All parts or
aspects of meta-behaviour are present in religions; hence, all of these aspects can be the
cultural pole of the CED. In Weber's theory, it is a mixture of rules and values o
(asceticism) and theories and beliefs A (theological teachings) that determine
entrepreneurship:
T7.27 ((oA)Protestantism  (/entrepreneurship  .
(Note that T7.27 is not strictly speaking a special case of T26a as it includes A.)
Other studies on the relationship between religion and entrepreneurship usually focus more
strongly on values alone. Most of these studies, however, are not explicitly about
religiously determined values, but about culturally different values in general. Whether
religious teachings, on the other hand, (directly) influence entrepreneurial behaviour or
economic behaviour in general is difficult to say, but does not seem likely.
The most important teachings of Islam, written down in the Quran, for example, seem to be
written for merchants. For many of the rules specified in (mainly) the second Sura, there are
exceptions that seem to be made especially for travelling merchants (which was not an
unimportant source of income in the time and place of the origins of Islam). The Torah, the
most sacred text of the Jews, does not speak negatively of commercial activity (as long as it
is fair); the Bible, on the other hand, does in several occasions. Hence, if teachings were the
primary aspect in religious influence on entrepreneurship (or the economy in general), this
would suggest that Islam and Judaism have high levels of entrepreneurship and Christianity
does not. (Of course religious teachings are not limited to the 'original' sacred text, but
include many more commentaries and other writings. Nevertheless, sacred texts form the
core of these religions and may therefore be used in this example.) Of course, reality is
different. Indeed, Jews in many countries are famous (or infamous in some times and
places) for there entrepreneurial spirit (e.g. Sombart 1911). (The Jewish scientific and
philosophical spirit should not be underestimated as well: at least thirty of the (more
important) theorists mentioned in this book, including Spinoza, Marx, Durkheim, Simmel,
Wittgenstein and Sapir, were of Jewish origin.) However, this may not be caused by their
religion but by the fact that Jews since the Diaspora generally were minorities in alien
societies. Hoselitz (1960; 1964; see also Singer 1977) showed that these kinds of socially
marginal groups often supply (relatively) much more entrepreneurs than their host societies
because self-employment is often the only means to escape low social status and poverty.
In the case of Islam, a similar phenomenon is clearly visible in many European cities. (In
many south-east Asian countries, the Chinese have similar positions as Jewish and Muslim
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minorities in Europe. Indeed, in many of these countries, the Chinese are extremely
entrepreneurial.) However, in Islamic countries entrepreneurship does not seem to be
particularly thriving. According to Kuran (1995; 1997) and Lal (1998) this is not the effect
of Islamic teachings, but of social pressures preventing change in many conservative
societies, and of the etatism and dirigism common to many Islamic societies respectively.
Hence, rules, values and institutions prevent entrepreneurship, not religious teachings.
Similarly, within Christianity different value systems differently promote entrepreneurship.
According to the historian Macfarlane (1978), both Protestantism and capitalism or
entrepreneurship were the effect of rising individualism in England from the 13th century
onwards (see also § 3.5.1). Religious teachings did not influence the economy, but were
adapted, like the economy, to more fundamental cultural change: the growth of
individualism. In this way, Macfarlane affirmed Tawney (1926), one of the first theorists to
explicitly point at the influence of individualism on entrepreneurship and the rise of
capitalism. According to Tawney, individualism promoted the rational organisation of
industry necessary for capitalism, not Protestantism:
T7.28 (oindividualism  (/entrepreneurship  ,
or, more completely:
T7.28a (oindividualism  (orationalism  (/entrepreneurship  (jcapitalism  .
The next subsection deals with studies on the influence of individualism and other value
orientations on entrepreneurship.
7-3-2-values and entrepreneurship
Over the last two centuries, many theories on the determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour
have been proposed. The two classical economists that were most interested in
entrepreneurship, Say (1803) and Marshall (1890), attributed it to personal characteristics,
as did the most important early 20th century theorists of entrepreneurship, Knight (1921)
and Schumpeter (1926).
Schumpeter was strongly influenced by Weber. Both saw the entrepreneur as entering
traditional society and setting it in motion. Both regarded innovation to be the key aspect of
entrepreneurship: 'The changes in the economic process brought about by innovation,
together with all their effects, and the response to them by the economic system, we shall
designate by the term Economic Evolution' (Schumpeter 1939, p. 86). The most important
difference between Shumpeter and Weber is that to the latter, entrepreneurship is a social or
cultural phenomenon, while to Schumpeter, it is purely individual. Schumpeter's
entrepreneurs are motivated by some kind of Nietzschean will to power, not by cultural
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values or ideas (e.g. MacDonald 1965; Kilby 1971). Hence, we'll see 'dasselbe Bild in
seinen Grundzügen auf die Wirtschaftssubjekte ganz verschiedener Kulturen, und wir
können uns darauf verlassen, daß die Bauer sein Kalb ganz so schlau und Rücksichtlos
verwertet wie der Börsenmann sein Aktienpaket' (Schumpeter 1926, p. 118).
With exceptions for Weber and Tawney, theories on the relationship between cultural
values, entrepreneurship and economic growth were mostly published after the Second
World War. One of the first was Lewis (1955), mentioned before in subsection 7.2.2.
According to Lewis, entrepreneurship and economic growth are ultimately caused by
values (especially individualism), beliefs and institutions (which themselves are the product
of the state of the economy) (see T7.14 and T7.14a in § 7.2.2). One of the best known post-
Weberian theories of culture and entrepreneurship is McClelland's (1961). McClelland
argued that entrepreneurship is determined by individual motivation. This individual
motivation, however, is a social product. The key motivation is 'n achievement' or 'need for
achievement, which involves an interest in exercising skill in medium-risk situations and a
desire for concrete signs of successful performance. This need (...) develops in the period of
early socialization, when the child is exposed to self-reliance training and high standards of
performance' (Smelser 1963/76, p.127). Entrepreneurship is associated with innovation,
individual responsibility, the faculty to assess advice, and risk taking (but calculated and
moderate risk, which needs skill to assess, only). All of these are related to n achievement.
McClelland claims that societies with higher n achievement produce more active
entrepreneurs witch produce more and/or faster economic growth:
T7.29 (on-achievement  (/entrepreneurship  (∆w(/PCD)  .
Hagen's (1962) theory is rather similar to McClelland's (1961) in that they both see the
entrepreneur as a creative problem solver interested in practical and technological
problems. According to Hagen, entrepreneurs are driven by a (subjective / perceived) duty
to achieve, which is very similar to McClelland's need for achievement (or n achievement).
In the 1960s and 1970s a number of other social scientists proposed theories on the
relationship between cultural values and entrepreneurship. Most of these theories, however,
were not particularly specific on the exact nature of causes and effects. Cochran (1960;
1965) asserted that entrepreneurship is determined by cultural values, social expectations
and sanctions, and culturally determined education. The behaviourist Kunkel (1965)
suggested that entrepreneurship is the result of social stimuli. Hoselitz (1969) maintained
that cultural values influence innovation. Young (1971) claimed that entrepreneurship is the
product of relationships within groups (social structure). And, finally, Wilken (1979)
argued that entrepreneurship is influenced by economic and non-economic factors. The first
including capital, labour, resources, technology, market and growth; the latter including
ideology and the social status of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs.
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The most important development in the post-Weberian history of the CED was Hofstede's
(1980) measurement of international differences in cultural value orientations. Hofstede
distinguished four dimensions: (1) power distance (PDI); (2) individualism (IDV); (3)
masculinity (MAS);  (4) uncertainty avoidance (UAI) (see also § 6.2.1). These cultural
values, according to Hofstede, explain more than half of the differences in economic
growth between countries (e.g. Franke, Hofstede & Bond 1991). Later, Hofstede (1991)
added a fifth dimension: long term orientation (LTO) or Confucian dynamic. This fifth
dimension quickly became one of the most popular explanations of the fast economic
growth of the East Asian 'tigers' (e.g. Japan, Korea, Taiwan). However, after the 1997
Asian financial crises, these theories experienced quick and silent deaths (e.g. Jones 2003).
Many later theories of culture and entrepreneurship relate the latter to Hofstede's
dimensions. A number of suggestions for these kinds of relationships can be found in
Hofstede's (1991) own work. Low power distance (PDI) and individualism (high IDV), for
example, are associated with initiative, which is an important aspect of entrepreneurship;
similarly, masculinity (high MAS) is related to competition (versus co-operation); and
uncertainty avoidance is related to risk aversion.
Both innovation and new firm formation or self-employment have been related to
Hofstede's dimensions. Shane (1992; 1993) and Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) are examples
of the former; Wildeman et al. (1999) is an example of the latter. Wildeman et al. (1999)
found that self-employment is related to (1) low wealth, (2) high power distance (PDI), (3)
high uncertainty avoidance (UAI), (4) dissatisfaction with society, (5) intolerance for
'abnormal' behaviour, and (6) dissatisfaction with personal existence:
Countries in which people are less satisfied with life as a whole have more self-employed.
These are societies with larger power distance, stronger uncertainty avoidance, more
bureaucracy, more corruption, and which are relatively poor. People in these countries are
less satisfied with the way their democracy is functioning and with their society in general.
Perhaps people in such countries are more easily forced into self-employment, as they
cannot optimally develop themselves within existing structures and organisations. In other
countries, people possibly have more opportunities to find an appropriate job within
existing structures, and, as a result, are less inclined towards starting for themselves.
(Wildeman et al. 1999, p. 41)
Shane (1992) and Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) suggested relationships between
innovation and Hofstede's dimensions. Shane assumed that high power distance (PDI) has a
negative effect on innovation (measured as 'per capita number of inventions patented by
nationals'; p. 36) and individualism (IDV) has a positive effect. Although Shane found that:
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the values of individualism and lack of power distance appear to explain differences in
national rates of inventiveness. Since rates of inventiveness were measured as much as eight
years after values, the causal link appears to run from values to inventiveness, not the other
direction. (Shane 1992, p. 39)
The correlations found by Shane are, as he admits himself, however, hardly significant.
Later, Shane (1992) added more countries and more of Hofstede's dimensions. This study
confirmed the earlier one, but also showed a significant negative correlation between
innovation and uncertainty avoidance (UAI).
Contrary to Shane, the approach chosen by Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) was purely
theoretical. They distinguished two stages of new product development: initiation and
implementation. The success of these two stages is differently related to all of Hofstede's
initial four dimensions: each dimension has a positive effect on one stage and negative on
the other. More specifically: individualism (IDV) positively influences the initiation stage
and negatively influences the implementation stage, while for the other three (original)
dimensions (PDI, MAS, UAI) it is the other way around.
Interestingly, the theories and results proposed and found by Hofstede (1980); Wildeman et
al. (1999), Shane (1992; 1993) and Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) all seem to point at
different directions. All dimensions may be related differently to different aspects of
entrepreneurship. This was confirmed, for example, by Tiessen (1997), who found that on
the individual (micro) level, entrepreneurs are more individualist than others, but that, on
the macro level, both individualism and collectivism may promote entrepreneurship and
economic growth:
Individualism is associated primarily with variety generation, one of the two entrepreneurial
functions. Collectivism contributes mostly to the other, resource leverage. These cultural
orientations are important as they affect how the functions are accomplished. Individualism
drives the founding of new ventures and innovation, and gives rise to contract-based
leverage. Collectivism, in contrast, fosters corporate entrepreneurship and resource
leverage, or “stretch”, by leading to efficient internal and external relations. (Tiessen 1997,
p. 368)
Consequently, summarising these Hofstede-inspired theories in a single formula more
specific than the general theory proposed in T7.26(a) above does not seem to be very
useful.
While Hofstede-inspired research dominated the CED for many years, a number of recent
contributions focus again on the micro level and pay more attention to the characteristics
and motivations of entrepreneurs (as, for example, Schumpeter and McClelland did before;
see above). Thomas and Mueller (2000), for example, define the entrepreneurial profile by
four separate traits: (1) an innovative attitude; (2) risk-propensity and risk-tolerance; (3)
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internal locus of control (belief in the personal influence on one's own life); and (4) energy
level (working long hours). Empirical findings, however, suggest that regardless of culture,
entrepreneurs are innovative and that the other three are culture-dependent, but are not
necessarily related to entrepreneurship.
Begley and Tan (2001) pointed at the importance of the culturally determined social status
of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur, as did Wilken (1979) before (see above). Verheul
et al. (2001) claimed that 'personal attitudes towards entrepreneurship are a 'product' of the
current cultural environment' (p. 68). Beugelsdijk (2003) claims that this entrepreneurial
attitude is related to attitudes towards individual effort and individual responsibility;
government responsibility and government ownership; the unemployed and the causes of
(economic) success (luck and connections vs. hard work and individual effort). The
measure he proposes, however, seems to be a measure of liberalism (or liberal
conservatism; see also § 6.2.2) more than of entrepreneurial attitude, although the two may
be related.
In subsection 7.2.2 Inglehart's (1977; 1990; 1997) theory of rising post-materialism in
industrial countries was briefly described. According to Inglehart, increasing wealth results
in a rise of post-materialist values and an increasing share of post-materialists among the
population. However, with an increase of post-materialism there will be a decrease of
entrepreneurial activity: 'nations with high proportions of Postmaterialists show relatively
low economic growth rates, for Postmaterialists emphasize economic achievement less than
Materialists do, and they emphasize other kinds of achievement more' (Inglehart 1990,
p.176). Hence, T7.21 can be completed as:
T7.21b (w(/PCD) s (opost-materialism  −(∆w(/PCD)  ,
in which the first part reflects GT1 and the second part clearly is a subtype of GT2.
7-3-3-summary
GT2 assumes that either religion or cultural values strongly influences entrepreneurial
behaviour. Values influence both the levels of new firm formation or self-employment and
the rate of innovation. Entrepreneurship in turn is assumed to promote economic growth.
The most important theories of GT2 are (1) Weber's theory on the influence of
Protestantism on entrepreneurship and (2) the many theories on cultural values as similar
determinants. The latter category includes different theories on different values (as causes)
and different aspects of entrepreneurship (effects), such as the influence of individualism
(Tawney), achievement motivation (McClelland) or post-materialism (Inglehart) on self-
employment and/or innovation. The most important innovation in the CED itself was
Hofstede's measurement of differences in cultural value orientations between 53 (groups of)
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counties. This resulted in a much stronger focus on empirical studies in the CED. A brief
overview of these is given in the next section.
Although most of the theories presented are not very explicit on what aspect (or which
aspects) of entrepreneurship is (or are) supposed to be influenced by culture, it generally is
implicitly assumed that entrepreneurship is − more or less − synonymous to self-
employment. In other words, with the exception of theories that explicitly focus on other
aspects of entrepreneurship (such as innovation), GT2 theories assume that some aspect of
culture (some set of cultural values) influences self-employment:
T7.26c (o  (/self-employment  .
7-4-a review of empirical tests
The bulk of empirical tests of the CED is related to the second grand theory (GT2).
Numerous, often contradicting, studies on the influences of cultural values on
entrepreneurship have been published. A selection of these will be presented in subsection
7.4.2. Empirical studies on the first grand theory (GT1) and minor theories are much rarer.
This may be partly caused by the fact that GT1 is associated with Marxism, which went out
of fashion in the late 1970s (except in geography, where Marxists and post-Marxists still
have a near-monopoly on new theoretical developments in the field), and partly by
differences in 'operationalisability'. The phenomena related in many GT2 theories are less
difficult to measure than many of the phenomena related in GT1 theories. It is, for example,
easier to statistically test the influence of masculinity as measured by Hofstede (1980) on
the level of self-employment than to test whether a change in the economic institutions of a
society causes a change in its political and legal institutions. History may suggest the latter,
but it is very difficult to 'prove' statistically (or otherwise).
Easily operationalised subtypes of GT1, however, are the theories on the influence of
wealth on cultural values, such as T7.14a (Lewis 1955) and T7.21 (Inglehart 1977; 1990;
1997). Subsection 7.4.1 briefly deals with some empirical studies on these theories. The
following subsections deal with the two parts of GT2 (T7.26a in § 7.4.2 and T7.26b in §
7.4.3).
7-4-1-wealth and cultural change
GT1 is very difficult to test. Some parts of it may even be untestable and therefore,
unscientific (e.g. Popper 1935; 1957; see also § 8.3). What can be tested, however, is
whether increasing wealth results in cultural change, whether wealthier societies are, for
RETHINKING THE CULTURE – ECONOMY DIALECTIC
248
example, more individualist and/or more post-materialist (see § 7.2.2). Franke, Hofstede &
Bond (1991) found a relationship between national wealth and individualism such that:
T7.30 (w(/PCD)  (oindividualism  ,
which is a unidirectional version of T7.14a and may also be related to T 7.22 and T7.23
(see § 7.2.2). Their evidence, however, is not particularly strong. Similarly, Inglehart (1990;
1997) confirmed his theory that wealth produces post-materialism (T7.21). Furnham (1990)
and Lynn (1991), however, did not find empirical confirmation for Bell's (1974) theory that
increasing wealth results in a decreasing work ethic (T7.19).
Based on data from the World Values Survey (WVS) (which includes 65 societies and 75%
of world population), Inglehart and Baker (2000) found evidence of both cultural change
and persistence. Economic development results in changing values (more rational; more
focused on self-development and self-expression), confirming T7.21a. Culture, however, is
path dependent. The cultural heritage leaves an imprint on values that endures throughout
the process of cultural change. Similarly, Beugelsdijk (2003) found that 'economic
development is an important driver of value change, but there are persistent influences of
cultural heritage' (p. 135).
Yang and Lester (2000) showed that the cultural trait of extraversion is significantly
correlated with unemployment. (Extraversion is one of two factor scores (the other was
neuroticism) based on a Factor Analysis on twelve variables (eighteen industrialised
countries) related to psychosis, food and drugs consumption, suicide, murder, crime, etc.
(all variables are generally considered to be 'negative') by Lynn & Hampson (1977). The
factor labelled "extraversion" had strongest loadings on murder; crime; cigarette
consumption; illegitimacy and accidents.) Strangely, Yang and Lester concluded that
extraversion partly explains unemployment, suggesting a direction of the causality from
extraversion to unemployment, while the opposite direction seems to be much more
plausible (of course neither directions are 'proven' in the study; see § 7.1.1).
Historical materialism (HM), as the source of GT1, is more difficult to test statistically. The
most important theories of HM were summarised above as:
T7.7R ∆:prod s ∆:leg.pol  , and
T7.8R ∆{/PCD,:PCD} s ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol))  .
Modernisation theories such as T7.30 above are a special case of T7.8. Hence, the
confirmation of the former is at least a partial confirmation of the latter (see also § 7.2).
There may, however, be special cases of T7.8 that are less easily tested such as the theory
that the means of production =prod determine the way of life =other of a people. Both =prod
and =other seem to be measurable only as nominal variables. Moreover, the supposed spatio-
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temporal scale of the relationship hardly allows sufficient data of satisfactory quality for
statistical testing.
The same is true for T7.7, which is probably the best known part of HM. The rules,
institutions, values, ideas, and so on of production :prod and the legal and political rules,
institutions, and so forth :leg.pol can both be measured only as nominal variables. Different
configurations can be classified and labelled differently, but can hardly be measured
quantitatively. Moreover, limited data quality and sample sizes do not allow for statistical
testing.
The only viable method for testing HM seems to be historical research. The first attempt to
do just that was Engels's (1884) Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des
Staats, which was basically a HM reinterpretation of Morgan (1877) (although not much
reinterpretation was necessary; see § 3.4.2). In this book, Engels tried to show that all
human civilisations develop through a similar set of stages and that this development is
driven by changes in :prod. Morgan's and Engels's model of development, however, was
easily falsified by later anthropologists (Diamond & Belasco 1980), but this does not
necessarily falsify T7.7. What was falsified was the assumed universal succession of
specific stages, as many exceptions were found. What was not falsified, however, was the
mechanism behind this apparently less universal succession. The development may not be
as universal as Marx and Engels thought, but the claim that it is driven by economic
changes, related to production especially, seems to be well-supported by historical
evidence.
7-4-2-cultural and other influences on entrepreneurship
Although hundreds of books and articles on the relationship between culture and
entrepreneurship have been published over the last decades, few of these systematically
assess more than a single theory. Two exceptions are the studies by Kilby (1971) and Lynn
(1991). Kilby compared and tested seven versions of GT2: Weber (1905), Schumpeter
(1926), McClelland (1961), Hagen (1962), Cochran (1965), Kunkel (1965), and Young
(1971) (see § 7.3), and found that 'none of the theories can be judged to achieve an
acceptable level of empirical verification. On the other hand, none of the theories can be
rejected as demonstrably false' (p.19). Lynn (1991) tested Weber (1905), Schumpeter
(1926), McClelland (1961), and Bell (1974) and also found little evidence for these
theories.
Most of the empirical tests presented below can be divided in two broad categories
depending whether they focus on the micro level of entrepreneurial personality or the
macro level of the cultural environment of entrepreneurship. A recent example of the
former type is Lazear's (2002) theory that entrepreneurs are jacks-of-all-trades that do not
excel in a single skill, but are competent in many. This theory, however, conflicts with
Smith's (1967) notion of the craftsman entrepreneur. Smith distinguished craftsman
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entrepreneurs (CEs) and opportunistic entrepreneurs (OEs). The two types are different in
background, education and have different reasons to become an entrepreneur. While the
second type could be interpreted as a jack-of-all-trades, the first most certainly cannot. CEs
are product oriented craftsmen and engineers; OEs are market-oriented businessmen. The
two types are differently (and to different extents) influenced by culture: the OE is much
more sensitive to socio-cultural aspects (such as social status) of entrepreneurship than is
the CE.
While Smith (1967) only distinguished two types of entrepreneurial personalities, Birley
and Westhead (1994) distinguished many more. There are great differences in reasons to
start a firm, to become an entrepreneur. At least twenty-three reasons are mentioned in the
literature. By means of Principal Components Analysis, Birley and Westhead grouped these
in seven basic motivations (see table 7.2), most of which were already distinguished in
earlier studies by Dubini (1988) and Scheinberg and Macmillan (1988).
Fourhundred-and-five cases (entrepreneurs) were clustered on these basic motivations,
which resulted in seven types of entrepreneurs, or seven types of entrepreneurial
personality. Table 7.2 presents both the typology of motivations and the typology of
entrepreneurs. There was, however, no significant relationship between these typologies
and the size or growth of the new firm. Moreover, there is no clear direct link between these
typologies and culture.
table 7.2: a typology of motivations and entrepreneurs
type of entrepreneur:
type of motivation: in
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need for approval X X X
need for independence x x X x
need for personal development X x
welfare considerations X X
perceived instrumentality of wealth x
tax reduction and indirect benefits X X
need to follow role models X X
number 104 49 169 15 18 49 1
Smaller Xs symbolise less important relationships.
Entrepreneurial characteristics often mentioned and related to culture are risk aversion and
individualism. Tiessen (1997), for example, found that entrepreneurs are more individualist
than others. McGrath, MacMillan and Scheinberg (1992) compared scores of entrepreneurs
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and others on Hofstede's (1980) dimensions and found that entrepreneurs are more
individualist (high IDV), more masculine (high MAS), score higher on power distance
(PDI) and lower on uncertainty avoidance (UAI), which is related to risk-taking. Many
studies confirmed that more risk-averse people are less likely to become entrepreneurs (e.g.
van Praag 1996; Wagner & Sternberg 2004; Sternberg & Arndt 2004).
However, more than half of new start-ups in the US are the work of more than one person
(the average is 2,2) (Reynolds 1991b; 1994), which seems to contradict the supposed
individualist personality. Similarly, the fact that more than two-thirds of aspiring
entrepreneurs in the US have another job at the same time (Reynolds 1994) refines the
image of the entrepreneur as a risk-taker. It is, however, not just the notion of the
entrepreneur as a risk-taker that may be a myth, but the identification of entrepreneurship
with risk itself. As Hamilton noted half a century ago: 'there is nothing with less uncertainty
and risk than modern production' (1956, p. 22).
It may very well be the case that there is no such thing as an entrepreneurial personality,
that entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished from the general population based on
personality, as was shown by, for example, Brockhaus (1980), Sexton and Kent (1981), and
Gartner (1989). Moreover, the success of the new enterprises seems to be influenced more
by the entrepreneur's motivation than by personal characteristics (e.g. Quince & Whittaker
2003). In fact, the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs have little impact on their
businesses (e.g. Uhlaner & Thurik 2004).
The second broad category distinguished above consists of theories on the macro level of
the socio cultural environment of the entrepreneur. This is the area of direct influence of
religion and cultural values on national and/or regional levels of entrepreneurship.
Subsection 7.4.1 briefly dealt with the question regarding which aspect of religion is (or
could be) important in the CED: teachings or values. The latter seemed to be a more
suitable candidate, as the influence of religious teachings seems to have little (direct) effect
on economic behaviour. Inglehart and Baker (2000), however, showed that the difference in
values between members of different religions within a society is much smaller than the
difference in values between countries. In other words: cultural differences between nations
are stronger than those between religions and in cross-cultural research, religious
differences tend to disappear behind the national differences. Therefore, if there is an effect
of religion or religiously determined values, this cannot be found in (empirical) studies on
the (inter-) national level, but only on the regional level.
The relationships between Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of cultural values and
entrepreneurship have been tested in a number of studies. Mentioned before were McGrath,
MacMillan and Scheinberg (1992; see above), Tiessen (1997), Wildeman et al. (1999) and
Shane (1992; 1993; for the latter three, see § 7.3.2). Correlations between Hofstede's
dimensions and entrepreneurship as self-employment are hardly consistent. On the
individual (micro) level both McGrath, MacMillan and Scheinberg (1992) and Tiessen
(1997) found a positive correlation with individualism (IDV), but on a macro level this
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effect was not found. The negative correlation on the individual level with uncertainty
avoidance (UAI) found by McGrath, MacMillan and Scheinberg (1992) was shown to be
positive on the macro level by Wildeman et al. (1999) and Wennekers et al. (2003).
Shane (1993; see also § 7.3.2) tested the relationship between Hofstede's dimensions and
innovation. He found that individualism (high IDV), low power distance (PDI) and low
uncertainty avoidance (UAI) promote innovation. Strangely, in Brons (2002), using some
of the same data, no significant correlations were found (not even remotely). Correlating
Hofstede's dimensions to Hinloopen's (2003) measures of innovation efficiency suggests
that individualism (high IDV) negatively influences innovation efficiency, which also
contradicts Shane's results, while there is a positive effect for masculinity (high MAS). In
other words (and in conclusion), there are no consistent relationships between Hofstede's
dimensions and innovation.
Hofstede's dimensions have been correlated to other aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour as
well. In a study on the influence of culture on entrepreneurial strategies, for example,
Steensma, Marino and Weaver (2000) found that more feminine (low MAS), collectivist
(low IDV) and uncertainty avoiding (high UAI) societies are more inclined to engage in co-
operative strategies.
The variety of studies and results suggests that every possible value (high or low) on any of
Hofstede's dimensions positively influences at least one aspect of entrepreneurship.
Of course, Hofstede's dimensions are not the only cultural variables used in empirical
analyses of GT2. In Brons (2002) it was found that post-materialism is negatively related to
competitiveness and Uhlaner and Thurik (2004) showed that post-materialism is negatively
and strongly related, while satisfaction with life is positively related to entrepreneurship.
The latter finding contradicts an earlier study by Wildeman et al. (1999), which showed
that self-employment is driven by dissatisfaction rather than the opposite (see § 7.3.2).
Dakhli and de Clercq (2004), finally, found a negative relationship between norms of civic
behaviour, defined by Knack and Keefer (1997) as the tendency to co-operate and to
subordinate self-interest to that of society, and one specific measure of innovation: high
technology export (measured as the percentage of high technology exports in total exports).
In subsection 7.3.1 it was mentioned that immigrants tend to have higher levels of self-
employment than their host populations. This was empirically confirmed by (a.o.) Hoselitz
(1964), Bates (1997), Borooah and Hart (1999), and Constant, Shachmurove and
Zimmerman (2003). A recent newsletter of the Dutch Chambers of Commerce (KvK 2004)
mentioned that the number of firms founded by immigrants rose by 44% in the period
1999-2003, while the number of firms founded by non-immigrants rose by only 2%.
Blanchflower (2004), however, showed that not all groups of immigrants have higher self-
employment than the host population and Reynolds (1994) found little difference in self-
employment between different ethic groups in the US (which also seems to contradict the
influence of culture on entrepreneurship in general).
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Besides cultural causes of entrepreneurship, many other determinants have been studied.
Again these can be divided in micro determinants, related to the person of the entrepreneur,
and macro determinants related to the society, region or country. Micro determinants of
entrepreneurship that proved to be relevant in (mostly) recent empirical tests include:
(1) education (at least secondary) (e.g. Reynolds 1991a; 1994; van Praag 1996; Peters,
Cressy & Storey 1999; Blanchflower 2004; Wagner & Sternberg 2004; Sternberg
& Arndt 2004;  Uhlaner & Thurik 2004);
(2) age (most new entrepreneurs are in their mid-thirties) (e.g. Reynolds 1991a; 1994;
Blanchflower 2004; Wagner & Sternberg 2004; Sternberg & Arndt 2004);
(3) sex (men are more than twice as active as entrepreneurs than women) (e.g.
Reynolds 1991a; Wagner 2004; Blanchflower 2004;  Wagner & Sternberg 2004;
Sternberg & Arndt 2004);
(4) (un-) employment and household income (e.g. Reynolds 1994; Verheul et al.
2001; Wagner & Sternberg 2004; Sternberg & Arndt 2004);
(5) parents or other role models (e.g. van Praag 1996; Wagner & Sternberg 2004;
Sternberg & Arndt 2004).
Although much research into the influence of the socio-economic environment of new firm
formation is anecdotal and theoretically weakly founded (e.g. Westhead & Wright 2000),
many macro determinants, mostly on the regional level, have been suggested and tested.
These macro determinants of entrepreneurship include:
(1) urban agglomeration effects (e.g. Keeble & Walker 1994; Reynolds, Storey &
Westhead 1994; Storey 1994; Brüderl & Preisendörfer 1998; Audretsch & Fritsch
2000), especially in case of earlier population growth (Keeble & Walker 1994);
agglomeration effects often mentioned to be relevant include diversity of demand
(e.g. Verheul et al. 2001); availability of capital (Keeble & Walker 1994); labour
market conditions (Georgellis & Wall 2000); and the presence of relevant
entrepreneurial and practical experience and tacit knowledge in the direct
environment (Keeble & Walker 1994; Georgellis & Wall 2000);
(2) industrial and size structure of the population of existing firms (e.g. Keeble &
Walker 1994; Verheul et al. 2001; Georgellis & Wall 2000);
(3) economic and technological development of the region (e.g. Verheul et al. 2001).
(For a more thorough review of determinants of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial
success, see e.g. Schutjens and Wever 2000.)
7-4-3-entrepreneurship and economic growth
The relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth (T7.26b) is often
assumed, but rarely investigated. Schumpeter (1926) argued that entrepreneurship is the
most important cause of economic growth; Porter (1990) claimed that entrepreneurship is at
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the heart of national advantage; and Baumol (1993) argued that economic growth both
influences and is influenced by entrepreneurship and investment in innovation.
Wennekers and Thurik (1999) proposed a framework to research the relationship. In
summary, this framework claims that personal, cultural and institutional conditions
influence the level of entrepreneurship, which, through intermediate linkages such as
innovation and competition, influences economic growth. Their review of the literature on
the relationships between culture, entrepreneurship and economic growth in terms of this
framework ends with a call for research on (a.o.) the impact of entrepreneurship on
economic growth. North and Thomas (1973), on the other hand, suggest that such a
research question would be superfluous as innovation, economies of scale, education,
capital accumulation are not causes of growth; they are growth. In other words, the
relationship is conceptual rather than causal (see also § 2.2.2, and § 8.3)
In a very recent working paper, Karlsson, Friis and Paulsson (2004) presented an overview
of theoretical ideas and empirical studies on the relationship between entrepreneurship and
economic growth. Three aspects of entrepreneurship that could (or should) positively effect
economic growth were distinguished: (1) competition, (2) innovation, and (3) start-ups as a
source of job-creation. Of these aspects, innovation may be the most important, but due to
limited data availability, the research focus seems to be on start-ups. In the subsection of
their paper on the effects of competition and innovation, Karlsson, Friis and Paulsson refer
to only one empirical study on the relationship between competition and economic growth
(Gerolski 1994) and none regarding the economic effects of  innovation. They do however
include several studies on the relationship between competition and innovation, but the
results of these studies are rather inconsistent. In some studies, competition negatively
influences innovation (e.g. Gort & Sung 1999), while in others (e.g. Gerolski 1994) the
effect is positive. Limited data availability and the difficulties of measuring innovation and
competition are probably the main causes of the very small number of studies on their
effects on economic growth. While the effect of new firm creation − in theory − may not be
the most important, the abundance of data available resulted in a truckload of empirical
studies (for the same reason the only measure of entrepreneurship used in new empirical
tests in this study is based on start-ups; see §§ 6.3.2 and 7.6.2). Nevertheless, empirical
'evidence' for the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development is rare
and can often be interpreted in many ways. The economic historian Cipolla (1974/81)
found that:
Entrepreneurial activity is a necessary ingredient, but not a sufficient one. It is the human
vitality of a whole society which, given the opportunity, comes into play and sets loose the
creative responses of history. (p. 120)
Possibly, new firms create new jobs and innovations. Although Birch's (1979) exorbitant
expectations of the job creation process by small firms are heavily criticised by (a.o.) Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), new firms actually may create some new jobs (e.g. van Stel
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& Diephuis 2004). In spite of the fact that less than one percent of all new firms in the
Netherlands show a strong growth in the number of employees (Wever & Schutjens 1995),
new firms create an average 2.3 jobs on the medium-term (Wever 1984) and 1.9 jobs on the
long-term (Wever & Schutjens 1995). On the other hand, in Great Brittain, van Stel and
Storey (2004) did not find a consistently significant relationship. Very recent Portuguese
research by Baptista, Escária and Madruga (2005) shows that in, the long run, new firms
may cause some indirect job creation, mainly by promoting competition and innovation in a
region. Table 7.3 orders a number of studies on the relationship between start-ups and job
creation − including those mentioned − by their results.
table 7.3: studies on start-ups and job creation
positive effects indeterminate no effects
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Birch (1979)
Wever (1984)
Davidsson, Lindmark &
Olofsson (1994)
Baldwin & Picot (1995)
Wever & Schutjens (1995)
Carree & Klomp (1996)
Fölster (2000)
Audretsch et al. (2005)
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Audretsch, Carree &
Thurik (2001)
van Stel & Storey (2004)
,
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Davis, Haltiwanger &
Schuh (1996)
Haltiwanger & Krizan (1999)
Andersson & Delmar (2000)
Bednarzik (2000)
Blanchflower (2000)
The table shows that there is no consistent 'evidence' for the assumed positive effect of new
firm creation on employment growth (or economic growth). Not very informatively,
Karlsson, Friis and Paulsson (2004) conclude that 'both small and large firms might be of
importance for economic growth' (p. 17). Heshmati (2001) found that the empirical effects
and the difference in empirical results in studies on the relationship between growth, size
and age of firms are dependent mainly on the research methods and definitions chosen.
Hence, conceptual analysis may be necessary here.
Whether new firms create significantly more jobs remains open for discussion. Most other
assumed effects seem, however, to be just as indeterminate. Innovation, for example, may
result in job creation as well. Firms with above-average research and development (R&D)
show above-average growth in the number of jobs. Moreover, the social benefits of
innovation are far greater than the private benefits for the innovating firm itself (Mansfield
et al. 1977). These effects, however, are rarely limited to the region, country or place where
the innovative activity was located.
Beugelsdijk (2003) found a positive relationship between 'entrepreneurial attitude' (which
seems to be a measure of liberal conservatism more than of a tendency to entrepreneurial
behaviour; see § 7.3.2) and economic growth. He did, however, not test the relationship of
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entrepreneurial attitude to actual entrepreneurial behaviour; neither did he test the
relationship between actual entrepreneurship and economic growth.
In two very recent studies (van Stel & Thurik 2004; van Stel, Carree & Thurik 2005), it was
found that entrepreneurship may positively influence economic growth, but only under
specific economic conditions. Entrepreneurship may play a different role in different stages
of economic development. A similarly recent study by Fritsch and Mueller (2004) suggests
that there are considerable time lags (of approximately eight years) in the effects of
entrepreneurship on the economy and that the effects may both be positive and negative.
Moreover, indirect effects such as improved competition and supply conditions may be
more important than direct effects such as job creation.
Harvie (2003) suggested that self-employment may contribute to economic growth (in
developing countries) not only by job creation, but also by raising incomes. He
distinguished two types of micro-enterprises in East Asia: (1) livelihood enterprises, which
are an important source of income for poor families, but which do not directly create
employment and do not grow (however, the development and growth of the sector as a
whole does generate more employment and alleviates poverty); and (2) growth-oriented
micro-enterprises. Enterprises of the latter category have the potential to grow into small
and medium enterprises and may become sustainable generators of income and
employment. This second group, however, is much smaller and therefore far less influential
on the economic well-being of the population as a whole.
7-4-4-summary and conclusions
The brief overview of empirical studies presented above shows that some theories of the
CED are more plausible than others. Some theories seem to be empirically confirmed while
others are refuted or no final judgement can be passed. However, none of the tests
presented conforms to the criteria for testing causal direction explained in subsection 7.1.1.
Hence, even if a relationship is (or seems to be) confirmed, this does not automatically
confirm the assumed direction of the causality, and if no relationship was found, this does
not necessarily refute a theory as there may be a time gap between cause and effect
different from the time between their measurement.
Moreover, limited possibilities to make categories operational make some GT1 theories,
especially historical materialism (HM) itself, very difficult to test statistically. There seems
to be historical evidence for Marx's claim that economic institutions (especially those
regarded to the means of production) to some extent determine political institutions (T7.7),
but the nature of the data makes more rigorous statistical testing impossible. Other aspects
of GT1, such as the influence of wealth on individualism (T7.14a; T7.30) and on post-
materialism (T7.21), on the other hand, seem to be empirically confirmed (or very plausible
at least).
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Testing GT2 has proven to be at least as difficult as testing GT1; albeit for different
reasons. The above has shown that there does not seem to be a specific set of values that
consistently promotes entrepreneurship. In fact is seems that every possible cultural value
may promote at least one specific aspect of entrepreneurship. Moreover, the assumed
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth cannot be confirmed as well.
In 7.6 some further test results are explained. These further analyses are added for two
reasons: (1) to investigate whether results described in this section can be improved,
clarified, completed and/or confirmed (especially concerning the direction of causal
relationships); and (2) to test whether similar results can be found at a very different spatial
scale: that of Dutch municipalities. Before turning to these further tests, section 7.5 deals
with some minor theories of the CED.
7-5-minor theories of the CED
This section describes a number of minor theories of the CED. Of course, the term "minor"
here does not imply that these theories do not live up to the same (scientific) standards as
the theories presented before. It only refers to the fact that these theories do not seem to be
related (either theoretically or historically) to the two grand theories and that they had less
impact on the theoretical development of the CED.
Minor theories presented here include theories on embeddedness (§ 7.5.1), culturally
specific conditions for economic growth (§ 7.5.2), and theories on the relationship between
institutions and economic growth (§ 7.5.3), between culture and consumption (§ 7.5.4), and
between geography, culture and economy (§ 7.5.5).
7-5-1-embeddedness
Theories of embeddedness are not theories of causal relationships between culture and
economy, but about the overlap therebetween. The theory was introduced by Polanyi (1947;
1977), who argued that the economy and economic behaviour is embedded in a socio-
cultural environment, and was elaborated most influentially by Granovetter (1985). The
basic idea is that all behaviour is socio-culturally embedded, which is most lucidly
explained by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990):
When we say that economic behavior is “culturally” embedded, we refer to the role of
shared collective understandings in shaping economic strategies and goals. Culture sets
limits to economic rationality: it proscribes or limits market exchange in sacred objects and
relations (...) or between ritually classified groups. (...) culture has a dual effect on
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economic institutions. On the one hand, it constitutes the structures in which economic self-
interest is played out; on the other, it constrains the free play of market forces. (p.17)
The idea is related to, for example, Schlicht's (1998) theory that all economic behaviour and
processes depend on and are influenced by custom (which, as defined by him, is more or
less synonymous to culture) and to the general idea presented in chapter 5, that behaviour is
determined in a complex interaction of culture, nature and reason.
The theory of embeddedness has been adapted and applied in many ways. Behaviour is, for
example, not just culturally, but also politically and economically embedded. Moreover, it
is not just behaviour that is embedded but also − in some interpretations or adaptations of
the theory − the (behaving) actors themselves. While the theory of the embeddedness of
behaviour assumes that behaviour is co-determined by socio-cultural context, the idea of
the embeddedness of actors, of people and organisations focuses on the links that tie these
actors to their environment, to their socio-cultural context.
The two interpretations of the theory, of course, are not wholly independent. Actors are
embedded in a context that co-determines their actions. The socio-cultural context or
environment provides the rules, values, and so forth that are (or become) familiar to the
actor and that guide his behaviour. The socio-cultural context provides a home and a sense
of security for the actor. Beyond the own (familiar) socio-cultural context lay
disembeddedness, fear and disorientation:
Der Durschnittsmensch hat eine fast panische Angst vor dem, welcher von ihm, von seiner
gewöhnlichen Lebensart verschieden ist. Apartheid, nur unter den Seinigen dahinleben, ist
eine widerliche, aber fast organische Trägheit der Seele. (Steiner 2003, p. 39)
The notion of embeddedness of actors rather than of behaviour plays an important role in
firm migration or relocation research. In recent decades, the dominant paradigm in firm
relocation research shifted from neo-classical to behavioural and/or institutional. In the
latter approaches, firms are considered to be embedded in a (a.o.) political, economic,
social and cultural context. A recent overview of the literature (Pellenbarg, van Wissen &
van Dijk 2002) shows that economic (e.g. supplier and customer relationships) and political
(e.g. taxes and subsidies) embeddedness have been taken well into account. The socio-
cultural embeddedness of firms, however, remains mostly ignored. (Although in rare cases
the social networks of firms and/or entrepreneurs play a minor role in the analysis.)
Whenever a firm leaves the socio-spatial context it is embedded in, it has to re-embed in its
new context to function properly after relocation. A move from one economic region to
another often makes it necessary to enter into new supplier and customer relationships,
hence to re-embed in a new economic context. Similarly, migration from one cultural
region to another may require cultural re-embedding. In other words, boundaries (may)
negatively influence relocation. The necessity to re-embed, economically, politically or
otherwise, discourages firms to emigrate from the economic, political, and so forth region it
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is located in. In this way embeddedness strongly influences relocation behaviour of firms.
In Brons (2005) it was tested whether similar effects exist for cultural embeddedness of
firms, whether cultural boundaries have a similar negative effect on relocation as economic
and political boundaries. Empirical results showed that relocating firms tend to stay within
their cultural region, even when controlled for distance. Hence, cultural embeddedness and
cultural boundaries do influence relocation decisions. However, if a firm emigrates to and
re-embeds in a new cultural region, the extent of cultural difference between these two
regions does not really matter.
7-5-2-cultural conditions for economic growth
The group of theories presented in this subsection is closely related to GT2. The essential
difference is that GT2 assumes a direct influence of culture on entrepreneurship, while the
theories below suggest indirect influences only. This kind of theory points at the
importance of specific culturally determined conditions for entrepreneurship and/or
economic growth rather than pointing at direct causes (and are therefore not formalised as
such). Rostow (1953; see also § 7.2.2), for example, argued that economic growth is
determined by a number of propensities, culturally determined value orientations related to
fundamental and applied science, innovation, materialism, consumption, and so on. 'The
propensities summarize the effective response of a society to its environment, at any period
of time through its existing institutions and leading social groups; and they reflect the
underlying value system effective within that society' (p.12).
Probably the most popular conditions for economic development are social capital and
trust. The term "social capital" was introduced by Loury (1977; 1987) to refer to 'the set of
resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organization and that are
useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person' (Coleman 1990,
p. 300). The idea of social capital has been developed most notably by Coleman (e.g. 1988;
1990). In a recent study, Beugelsdijk (2003) found that social capital positively influences
economic development in a number of European regions. De Clercq and Dakhli (2003)
researched the influence of social and human capital on innovation and did not find a
consistent relationship.
One of the most outspoken advocates of the importance of trust for economic development
is Fukuyama (1995), who states that trust is necessary for economic interaction, for markets
and companies to function, and for economies to grow (see also Banfield 1958; Putnam
1993). Without trust, no (capitalist) economy; with little trust, a less effective economy.
Trust, more or less, is the lubricant of the economy. Several scientists point at the
importance of civic culture, a set of value orientations related to (a.o.) life satisfaction,
political satisfaction and involvement, solidarity and trust. Civic culture promotes the
political stability and democracy necessary for economic development (e.g. Inglehart 1988;
Swank 1996; Putnam 1993; see also § 7.2.2).
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Recently, Kockel (2002a) described the importance of the informal or provisory economy
in facilitating economic growth in a number of ethnological studies in rural and urban areas
in Ireland (mainly). Kockel's examples range from community-co-operatives and 'cooring'
to social networks and casual companies. Throughout the book it is repeatedly shown that
these institutions of the informal economy either influence the formal economy directly, by
creating jobs and/or wealth, or indirectly, by facilitating development in the formal
economy. Even in cases where informal economy has only very limited influence on the
formal economy, its social impact is considerable. Although Kockel's Regional culture and
economic development is mostly about the influence of the informal on the formal
economy, the title is not just fashionable. Informal economy, as a specific set of rules,
values, and so forth could very well be interpreted as a subset of culture. Moreover, 'in its
earliest forms culture is an economy; a practical, utilitarian thing. Only in its late
developments does it become a diversion' (Giddings 1903, p. 451); culture 'was the industry
of primitive man' (p. 453). In other words: informal economy is culture.
Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer (2003) pointed at the importance of culture as 'a
framework for collective action and a rationale for social co-operation' (p. 187); and as a
potential source for a positive or negative regional self-image, which influences and is
influenced by economic development, possibly resulting in a vicious cycle. Similarly,
Myrdal (1957) and Rostow (1960) argued that nationalism can promote economic
development.
Culturally determined conditions for entrepreneurship rather than economic growth (or
behaviour) in general were suggested by (a.o.) Porter (1990), Casson (1993) and Florida
(1997; 2002). Porter (1990) pointed at the indirect influence of culture on the chances for
entrepreneurial success:
Social norms and values affect the nature of home demand, for example, as well as the
goals of managers and the way firms are organized. (...) Cultural factors are important as
they shape the environment facing firms; they work through the determinants, not in
isolation from them. Such influences are important ones to competitive advantage, however,
because they change slowly and are difficult for outsiders to tap or emulate. Social and
political history and values create persistent differences among nations that play a role in
competitive advantage in many industries. (p.129)
According to Casson (1993), culture influences both inter-firm relationships (competition
versus co-operation) and intra-firm relationships (organisational behaviour). Culture is an
enforcement mechanism that substitutes internal self-supervision and internal socio-
emotional sanctions for external supervision and legal sanctions. As such, it eases
communication and co-operation between and of people with a similar cultural background.
Casson's argument comes very close to Polanyi's (1958) distinction of tacit and codified
knowlegde; the latter being the more formal rules, knowledge, supervision and sanctions
necessary wherever and/or whenever the former is insufficient. (see also § 4.2.1)
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Polanyi's idea was also elaborated by Florida (1997; see also Morgan 1997), who claimed
that the economic development of regions is (co-)determined by their learning potential, by
the faculty to transfer knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, within a social group and to
build upon this knowledge. More recently, Florida (2002) argued that creativity and social
diversity promote economic growth. Cities (and regions) that better manage to attract the
'creative class' of artists, scientists, etc. have higher innovative potential and much better
chances for economic growth. In a recent empirical study (Lee, Florida & Acs 2004), it was
shown that social diversity and creativity indeed positively influence new firm formation.
7-5-3-culture, institutions and development
A subset of the set of theories on the conditions for economic development focuses
especially on the role of institutions in promoting economic growth. The general theory of
the relationships between cultural values, institutions and economic development is:
T7.31 (o  (j  (∆w(/PCD)  .
Parsons and Smelser (1956), for example, argued that institutions reflect a culture's value
orientations, and according to Greif (1994), culture − through path-dependence −
determines the institutional structure of a society, which influences its economic success.
Baptista (2004) maintains that institutions and government attitudes towards
entrepreneurship are the result of cultural values and needs. Causality does not necessarily
run from left to right alone. Tabellini (2004b), for example, argued that the cultural values
that influence the economy are partly shaped by historical institutions:
T7.31a (j  (o  (∆w(/PCD)  ,
and Orrù (1999) claimed that 'the market, the state, and the cultural system affect and shape
each other' (p. 26). Rewriting T7.31 accordingly would result in something like:
T7.31b [ (o  (j ]  (∆w(/PCD)  .
The first part of T7.31, (o  (j, is studied within a variety of scientific fields including
sociology, history and institutional economics. Hamilton may have been of the most
important theorists of the relationship between culture and institutions.  According to
Hamilton (e.g. 1955), economic thought itself is strongly influenced by political and
religious institutions. The theory of the factors of production (labour, capital and land), for
example, was not so much a theory of actual production, but an argument to legitimise class
structure (workers, capitalists and landlords) and class income (Hamilton 1955).
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Many of our economic institutions are cultural products. Hamilton (1956) showed that
corporations are not the economic necessities they are often assumed to be, but are the
product of our beliefs and ceremonial needs. Similarly, the figure of the entrepreneur is
more of a mythical character than economic reality. The entrepreneur is a 'cultural hero':
ever alert in pursuing the main chance, respond[ing] to the wants by producing goods in just
the quantity and quality that consumers desire them. The Entrepreneur takes on the qualities
of a cultural hero who performs the miracles of production. He is a creative genius and
master of ceremonies. (…) He has a creative role denied to any of the others including
labor. (Hamilton 1957, p. 250)
Probably, it is this near-religious faith in our cultural heroes − rather than economic reality
itself − that leads to the sustained belief in the positive influence of entrepreneurship on
economic growth (see § 7.4.3).
Contributing to the theory of cultural influence on institutions, more recently, Mayda and
Rodrik (2001) argued that (a.o.) values, identities and attachments are important in
explaining differences in preference for (free) trade or protectionism; Semenov showed that
national preferences for systems of industrial finance (Semenov 2000) and stock market
development (de Jong & Semenov 2002) are culturally determined; and Johnson and
Lenartowicz (1998) found a relationship between economic freedom and culture.
Regarding the inverse relationship of (j  (o rather than (o  (j (the grounding of
cultural values in historical institutions), Tabellini (2004b) recently found that:
Historically more backward regions (with higher illiteracy rates and worst political
institutions) tend to have more negative cultural values today: less trust, less respect for
others, less confidence that individual's effort will deliver good results. Moreover, the
component of culture explained by the historical variables is strongly correlated with
current regional per capita income, (...). (p. 3)
The second part of T7.31, (j  (∆w(/PCD), is probably the only aspect of the CED that is
studied by mainstream, orthodox economists. The institutions of subsidies, taxes and
market structure are generally considered to have some (mostly negative) influence on the
economy, which is usually 'proven' by means of a mathematical model. Fortunately some
social scientists have expanded their studies beyond the borders of the mathematical model
into the real world.
Before the birth of economic orthodoxy, Smith (1765) may have been one of the first to
point at the importance of institutions for the economy. He argued that institutions such as
taxes and subsidies (may) limit the market's potential to produce wealth. Moreover, Smith
larded his Wealth of Nations with historical illustrations and examples including an
extensive historical analysis of political and economic institutions and their effects on the
economy from the end of the Roman Empire onwards. The growth of economic freedom in
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some cities was, according to Smith, an especially important cause of their economic
development.
Of all possible institutional determinants of economic development, economic freedom or
openness is suggested most frequently (by far) (e.g. Dollar 1992; Sachs & Warner 1995; de
Haan & Sturm 2000). The theory on the influence of economic freedom on economic
growth is, however, also the one most strongly associated to political ideology. One of the
best known institutes researching economic freedom, the Fraser Institute, for example,
clearly and explicitly adheres to conservative liberalism. (Of course, economic theory itself
is hardly free from political ideology and/or value neutral as was shown by e.g. Myrdal
1929; 1973; Hamilton 1955; Rosenberg 1999; Gandal et al. 2004.) This ideological
background explains the vigour with which the theory is defended, a defence not
unnecessary by the way, since economic historians (and some economists) keep finding the
opposite causal direction in the relationship: an increase in wealth results in an increase in
economic freedom, not the other way around (e.g. Gerschenkron 1962; Scott 1997; Chang
2002; see also § 7.2.2 and T7.25), or they find no discernible link between economic
freedom and economic growth at all (e.g. Rodríguez & Rodrik 1999; Freeman 2002).
The second most popular institutional 'guarantee' of high economic growth probably is
property rights. According to Tabellini (2004a), of all the things governments (could) do,
only one really makes a difference between success and failure in economic development:
(the institution of) the protection of  property rights (see also Acemoglu & Johnson 2003).
Other institutions that are frequently assumed to promote economic growth include:
(1) policies and institutions that encourage (or are at least perceived to do so)
production of output rather than its diversion (through e.g. theft, corruption) (Hall
& Jones 1999);
(2) education (e.g. Higgins 1977; Barro 1991; Wharton 1999), although Easterly and
Rebelo (1993) found no relationship between government spending on education
and economic growth;
(3) strong labour unions (Hicks 1988);
(4) democracy (Adelman & Morris 1973; see also Persson & Tabellini 2003); and
(5) political stability (Alesina et al. 1992; Barro 1991; see also § 7.5.2), which is,
however,  itself the product of wealth (Inglehart 1988).
The economic effects of macroeconomic policy, on the other hand, seem to be negligible
except in the case of extremely bad policies (Easterly 2003), which is a symptom of weak
(or instable) political institutions (Tabellini 2004a).
Generally, institutional explanations of economic differences should be dealt with
cautiously due to the fact that different institutional settings have often been found to be
reasonable substitutes for each other in promoting economic growth (Engerman & Sokoloff
2003). Moreover, many measures of economic institutions (including those by Dollar 1992
and Sachs & Warner 1995) have serious shortcomings and/or biases or are downright
misleading (e.g. Rodríguez & Rodrik 1999).
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7-5-4-the culture of consumption
GT2 refers exclusively to entrepreneurial behaviour, to production and distribution. Hence,
entrepreneurial behaviour /entrepreneurship coincides with (or at least overlaps considerably)
with productive and distributive behaviour /prod.dist, which makes it a subset of economy
interpreted as /PCD. The remaining part then, would be consumptive behaviour /consumption.
GT2 is far more specific than GT1. A more general theory of the influence of culture on the
economy, a  reversal of GT1, would be something like:
T7.32 ∆:  ∆/PCD  ,
which can be decomposed into two more specific theories: ∆:  ∆/prod.dist and ∆: 
∆/consumption. GT2 is an even more specific variant of the former, but a similar special case
of ∆:  ∆/consumption can be imagined:
T7.33 (o  (/consumption  (∆w(/PCD)  .
Although this relationship was suggested by, for example, Porter (1990) and DiMaggio
(1994), there still remains little research regarding it:
The social sciences have been slow to see this relationship, and slower still to take stock of
its significance. They have generally failed to see that consumption is a thoroughly cultural
phenomenon. (...) consumption is shaped, driven, and constrained at every point by cultural
considerations. The system of design and production that creates consumer goods is an
entirely cultural enterprise. The consumer goods on which the consumer lavishes time,
attention, and income are charged with cultural meaning. Consumers use this meaning to
entirely cultural purposes. They use the meaning of consumer goods to express cultural
categories and principles, cultivate ideals, create and sustain life-styles, construct notions of
the self, and create (and survive) social change. Consumption is thoroughly cultural in
character. (McCracken, 1990, p.xi)
Veblen (1899) and Giddings (1903) were probably the first to point at the importance of
culture to consumption. Veblen argued in his The theory of the leisure class (1899) that
competition often takes the form of a competitive use of goods to affirm social status.
Recently, Xu et al. (2004), for example, showed that consumption is not only related to
social status, but also to ethnic or cultural identity, while Minkler & Cosgel (2004) pointed
at the importance of consumption for religious identity.
Whereas McCracken stated that 'consumption is thoroughly cultural' (see quotation above),
Giddings (1903) argued that culture and consumption are nearly synonymous:
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'What men desire and expect in life is an epitome of their race history in social intercourse,
manners, art, amusements and religion. (…) A phenomenon of the diversification of wants
and satisfactions, the standard of living is a fact not of production primarily, but of
consumption. Thus we arrive at the broad economic significance of culture. The evolution
of culture is the evolution of a consumption economy.' (p. 457)
Giddings' conclusion echoes in Howes' (1966) claim that 'it is now thought that the
Industrial Revolution presupposed – and may even have been preceded by – a 'Consumer
Revolution'; hence, the birth of the consumer society is no longer presumed to be explicable
in terms of technological innovation and changes in the forces of production alone' (p. 9).
In other words and contrary to popular belief, the mass-production revolution followed the
increase in consumptive demand, not the other way around.
Although the influence of culture on consumption may be of some importance, the
difficulties inherent to researching the relationship (the lack of useable data mainly) may
not be worth the trouble. To a large extent, consumption is determined by production
(marketing included) and wealth. Moreover, even if consumption is partly influenced by
culture, the economic effects seem to be of no or only minor importance, since it is
generally the types of goods consumed that are culturally influenced and not the level of
consumption, while it is this level of consumption that is (most) economically relevant.
Hence, in the culture - economy dialectic, consumption only seems to play a rather passive
supporting role: 'Le seul élément actif, le facteur révolutionnaire par excellence, c'est
l'industrie humaine' (Vandervelde 1904, p. 167).
7-5-5-geographies of economic growth
Classical and modern geography provided a number of theories on spatial and
environmental effects on the CED. In classical geography (see § 3.6.1), culture and
economy, the poles of the CED, are considered to be part of some wider category ("man" or
"society") that is opposed to the physical environment. Culture and economy are shaped in
reciprocal relationships with the physical environment and with each other:
T7.34 ∆Φphys.environment  [ ∆:  ∆/PCD ]  .
In most of these theories, there is, however, no distinction of the economic and the cultural.
Hence, these are not theories of the CED in the strict sense. However, physical determinist
theories (which assume that the physical environment (co-)determines the social; see §
3.6.1) of cultural and economic development have been important in many theories of the
CED. Although physical determinism slowly went out of fashion in geography in the early
20th century, it remained influential in many other fields. Huntington's Civilization and
climate (1915), for example, while rejected by most geographers, kept inspiring other
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scientists, including Toynbee (1934-61) and Hofstede (1991), who claimed that the cultural
differences he found are partly caused by differences in climate. Other recent contributions
to physical determinist theory include the many studies by Sachs and his co-authors on the
effects of among others mean temperature, distance to the coast, diseases and arable land
(Sachs & Warner 1997; Bloom & Sachs 1998; Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger 1999; Sachs
2000; 2001), and Diamond's Guns, germs, and steel (1997), which claims that Europe got
rich because of the presence or absence of certain types of crops (grains especially),
domesticable animals, infectious diseases and resources. (See also Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson 2002; Easterly & Levine 2003; Olsson 2003; Hibbs & Olsson 2004; Rodrik,
Subramanian & Trebbi 2004.)
In the field of human geography the attention shifted in the 1950s and 60s towards abstract
space and distance rather than the real physical environment. This resulted in numerous,
mostly mathematical theories on the effects of distance, agglomeration and location on the
chances for entrepreneurial success and economic growth. Isard (1956) and his modern
apprentice Krugman (1992), for example, pointed at the importance of agglomeration
effects and the related economies of scale and information density. Even this kind of theory
can be considered as part of (or related to, at least) the CED because agglomeration, for
example in the form of urbanisation, is a (partly) cultural phenomenon.
7-5-6-summary and conclusions
The minor theories presented above are theories of culturally influenced conditions or
catalysts for economic growth and are therefore more similar to GT2 than to GT1. Five
types of theories were described: (1) the theory of the embeddedness of the economy in
(a.o.) culture; (2) general theories on the cultural conditions for economic development;
theories on the influence of (3) institutions and (4) consumption on economic growth; and
(5) theories on the effects of space and the physical environment in or on the CED. Culture
was shown to be important in providing a shared conceptual framework, a body of (tacit)
knowledge and a set of rules that may facilitate co-operation and development in regions or
social groups. Institutions or institutional environments that may promote economic growth
include democracy, political stability and a good educational system. Economic freedom,
on the other hand, seems to be the effect of wealth rather than its cause.
The influence of consumption is more problematic partly because the lack of appropriate
data. Moreover, its relevance in (or to) the CED is not completely clear as consumption
may be determined more by wealth and production (including marketing) than by culture.
Consumption seems to be a more or less passive element in the CED.
Classical geography studied man - environment interactions. In physical determinism, it
was assumed that society, culture and economy are (at least partially) determined by the
physical environment, especially by climate. Some similar theories still persist, but not
within the field of geography. A more recent type of geographical theory that is, albeit not
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closely, related to the CED focuses on the economic effects of agglomerations, which can
be regarded to be the products of culture.
The next section continues testing of the many theories of the CED. The focus, however,
shifts to a re-evaluation of earlier tests in Brons (2002) by means of the causal graphs
proposed in subsection 7.1.1 (§ 7.6.1) and some new tests based on the measurements of
regional cultural and economic differences in chapter 6 (§ 7.6.2). Section 7.7 finally focuses
on the theories of the CED that have not been tested or are untestable and summarises the
main findings of this chapter.
7-6-further testing of the CED
The empirical test results presented in the preceding sections (§ 7.4 mainly) seem to be
rather inconclusive. For many of the theories in this chapter there is either contradictory
'evidence', or no 'evidence' at all. Possibly more and better testing can solve this. On the
other hand, the problem may be more fundamental. The CED may be more conceptual than
empirical, in which case statistical testing is doomed to fail. Nevertheless, this section
presents some new test results, partly based on a reinterpretation of the results of an earlier
study (Brons 2002), partly based on new measurements of regional culture as derived in
chapter 6. Subsection 7.6.1 is a second look at the findings of Brons (2002), mainly by
means of causal graphs that graphically represent the correlation between a time series
variable and a variable measured at a single point in time. Basically, these graphs are
similar to figure 7.1 (§ 7.1.1), albeit that figure 7.1 was purely theoretical and the causal
graphs in subsection 7.6.1 are based on actual data. Subsection 7.6.2 deals with the
explanation of regional differences in new firm formation as an aspect of entrepreneurship
and with other relationships between regional cultural and economic variables.
7-6-1-national culture and causal graphs
In subsection 7.1.1 it was explained that correlations between or with time series data
provides the best possible defence for causal theories. The result can never be more than a
mere 'defence'  however, as causation is fundamentally untestable (see § 7.1.1). In Brons
(2002) a number of measurements of national cultural and institutional differences were
compared to time series data on national wealth measured as GDP. As the (approximately
fifty) cases in this analysis were the countries for which cultural and/or institutional data
was available, these hardly represent an arbitrary sample. Hence, its is not very useful to
speak of significant and insignificant correlations, and the results of the analysis should be
interpreted carefully.
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Figures 7.3 and 7.4 graph the Pearson correlations with Maddison's (1995) GDP time series
for a number of variables, that correlated particularly high (see table 7.4): Hofstede's
individualism (IDV) and power distance (PDI), Inglehart's post-materialism (p-Mat),
economic freedom, civil rights and competitiveness. (Dashed vertical lines in the graphs
represent years of measurement for non-time-series (cultural) data.)
figure 7.3: causal graph of wealth (GDP) and cultural dimensions
correlations to variables marked * are negative.
sources: Pearson correlation coefficients: Brons 2002; original data: individualism (IDV) and power
distance (PDI): Hofstede 1991, measured around 1970; post-materialism: Inglehart, Basañez &
Moreno 1998, measured in early 1990s; GDP: Maddison 1995; UN 1999.
Unfortunately the lines in figure 7.3, with a possible exception for power distance (PDI), do
not even closely resemble the ideal case of figure 7.1. While power distance and GDP are
strongly related, there seems to be no time gap, and hence, the figure does not reveal a
probable direction of the possibly causal relationship.
There are two peaks in the line representing correlations with individualism (IDV): one in
1900 and one in 1980, which seems to suggest that there is a 70-year time gap in the causal
direction from wealth to individualism, and a 10-year time gap for the relationship in the
opposite direction. The results for post-materialism look very similar, but as the
measurement was of much later date, the interpretation is different. Both peaks now were
earlier than the time of measurement of the dependent variable (p-Mat), and hence, there
seems to be a unidirectional causality from wealth to post-materialism (with a very long
time gap).
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1820 1850 1870 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1996
individualism (IDV) power distance (PDI) (-) post-materialism
ON THEORIES AND TESTS
269
figure 7.4: causal graph of wealth (GDP), institutions and competitiveness
correlations to variables marked * are negative.
sources: Pearson correlation coefficients: Brons 2002; original data: economic freedom: Gwartney,
Lawson & Block 1996, measurement for 1990; civil rights index: Taylor & Jodice 1983 (low score =
more civil rights!); measurement for 1980; competitiveness: Lynn 1991, measured by Spence &
Helmreich around 1980; GDP: Maddison 1995; UN 1999.
Like the lines in figure 7.3, those in figure 7.4 do not come close to the ideal case.
Nevertheless, all lines seem to suggest that the respective phenomena are influenced (or
even caused) by wealth with very small time gaps.
The lines in figures 7.3 and 7.4 show some remarkable similarities. All six lines show clear
drops around 1950 and four of the six show a similar drop around 1920. The most probable
explanation hereof is war. The First and Second World Wars seriously affected the
economy of nearly every country in the world (of the countries in the data set, at least). As
different countries were affected differently this would result in lower correlations with
data from later (or earlier) periods. Hence, to correctly interpret the causal graphs, it may be
necessary to control for the effects of war and look at the trends only. Figure 7.5 presents
such an attempt to correct the graphs for the First and Second World War.
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figure 7.5: causal graph of wealth, culture and institutions: trends
1 = individualism; 2 = civil rights*; 3 = power distance*; 4 = post-materialism; 5 = economic
freedom; 6 = competitiveness*. correlations to variables marked * are negative.
Vertical lines represent years of measurement of dependent variables and are in same style as
corresponding correlation lines.
Figure 7.5 is considerably easier to interpret than figures 7.3 and 7.4. Nevertheless, it also
has to be interpreted more carefully because the figure does not represent the actual data.
There may have been small errors or mistakes in brushing out the effects of war that made
the interpretation of the actual data in figures 7.3 and 7.4 that complicated. Based on figures
7.3 to 7.5, a number of conclusions can be drawn.
(1) Individualism and post-materialism may be caused by wealth (GDP), but with
considerable time gaps (of 50 to 100 years).
(2) Power distance may be related to wealth (GPD), such that wealthier societies are
less tolerant for inequality, but the exact nature and direction of this relationship
remains uncertain.
(3) Economic freedom and civil rights may be related to wealth (GDP), such that an
increase of the latter results in an increase or improvement of the former. The time
gap in this relationship seems to be very short (5 to 20 years).
(4) Competitiveness may be negatively influenced by wealth (GDP) with a very short
time gap (approximately 10 years).
As mentioned before, the results should be interpreted with care. The most minimal
conclusion, however, would be that none of the relationships mentioned in the four
conclusions above is falsified (see also § 7.1.1).
The above confirms (or at least seems to do so) parts of GT1, especially a number of
modernisation theories such as Lewis's and Inglehart's (see § 7.2.2). The same data can also
be used to test for possible cultural and institutional effects on economic growth as
proposed in GT2. Correlations with economic growth (percentage of increase of GDP),
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however, are far lower and far more erratic than those with wealth. Hence, causal graphs
seem to be of little use in testing GT2.
Table 7.4 presents the two highest (absolute) peaks and the gaps between these peaks and
the year of measurement of the non-time-series data. Correlation coefficients and gaps are
shown for the first and second (in time) highest peaks. The highest correlations are printed
in boldface.
table 7.4: highest correlations between values, institutions, wealth and growth
ρ wealth (GDP) gaps ρ growth gaps
peak: 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
IDV 0.855 0.787 -70 +10 -0.258 -0.382 +5 +23
PDI -0.686 -0.677 -30 +10 0.161 0.217 +5 +23
LTO -0.827 -0.734 -60 -90 -0.518 0.667 -25 +15
p-Mat 0.711 0.727 -90 -20 0.403 0.333 -65 -45
EF75 0.580 0.605 -35 -15 0.236 0.217 -20 +10
EF90 0.608 0.676 -90 -10 0.191 0.319 -35 -5
EO 0.450 0.454 -140 -50 0.277 0.164 -55 +3
PRI -0.721 -0.799 -160 -10 -0.399 0.314 -35 +13
CRI -0.725 -0.847 -160 -10 -0.405 0.278 -35 +13
SHWE -0.294 -0.218 -130 +10 0.508 -0.306 -35 +5
SHCS -0.573 -0.643 -160 -20 -0.290 0.342 -35 +5
RLAM -0.323 -0.220 -140 0 -0.410 -0.361 -65 -35
sources: Pearson correlation coefficients: Brons 2002; original data: IDV = individualism / PDI =
power distance /  LTO = long term orientation (Hofstede 1991); p-Mat = post-materialism (Inglehart,
Basañez & Moreno 1998); EF75 = economic freedom 1975 / EF90 = economic freedom 1990
(Gwartney, Lawson & Block 1996); EO = economic openness (Dollar 1992); PRI = political rights
index / CRI = civil rights index (Taylor & Jodice 1983); SHWE = Spence's & Helmreich's work ethic
/ SHCS = Spence's & Helmreich's competitiveness / RLAM = Ray's & Lynn's achievement
motivation (Lynn 1991); GDP: Maddison 1995; UN 1999.
gaps: distance in years between year of measurement of variables; negative is measurement of
economic variable before measurement of cultural / institutional variable; positive if measurement of
economic variable after measurement of cultural / institutional variable.
Interestingly, if it is assumed that all correlations represent causal relationships, all cultural
and institutional variables seem to be effects of wealth (GDP), most of them with very long
time gaps. However, some variables are much more strongly correlated than others.
Achievement motivation (RLAM) and work ethic (SHWC), for example, are negatively
correlated to wealth, but these correlations are so low that these hardly support Bell's
(1974) thesis that wealth leads to a declining work ethic. On the other hand, Bell's thesis
cannot be falsified with absolute certainty on the basis of this data either.
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Results for economic growth are very different. In most (but not all) cases, if a causal
relationship is assumed, the direction of this causality seems to be from economic growth to
culture or institutions, but most of the correlation coefficients are very low. Individualism
(IDV) and power distance (PDI) seem to be the exception. Both are weakly correlated to
economic growth such that it seems that, contrary to many theories, collectivism (low IDV)
and high power distance promote growth. However, the correlation coefficients are far too
low to support any theory. Only in the case of long term orientation (LTO) do there seem to
be consistently strong correlations. Strangely, table 7.4 suggests that economic growth
leads to a decline of LTO (with a time gap of approximately 25 years) and that high LTO
results in economic growth (with a 15-year time gap), which would result in a cycle of
periods with high LTO and low growth and periods with low LTO and high growth.
However, in the theoretical literature (e.g. Hofstede 1991) LTO is considered to be an
extremely stable dimension reflecting basic cultural differences between Western and
Eastern cultures. Other relatively high correlation coefficients in table 7.4 suggest that
economic growth leads to (causes) an improved work ethic, more civic and political rights
and a decline of achievement motivation. The latter finding refutes T7.29 (see § 7.3.2).
Table 7.4 seems to reinforce the four conclusions based on the causal graphs presented
above. Regarding most other relationships nothing conclusive was found. One small
adjustment and one further conclusion seems to be justified. Firstly, not only are civil rights
positively influenced by wealth, but political rights are as well (see conclusion 3 above).
And secondly:
(5) The very low correlations between work ethic and wealth and the positive
correlation between economic growth and work ethic seem to falsify (or to make it
rather improbable at least) Bell (1974) / T7.19.
7-6-2-regional culture and economy
There are several reasons to test the CED on the very small spatial level of Dutch
municipalities. First of all, the regional level tends to minimise institutional differences,
which makes it easier to focus on the effects on and of culture. Secondly, many theories of
the CED have been tested and some even confirmed at the international level, others have
been tested on the micro level of the individual. Thus far it remains a mystery, however,
whether similar macro effects can be found on scales smaller than countries. Moreover, in
empirical research, it is often assumed that cultural differences are differences between
countries. This is, of course, obvious nonsense since many countries have strong internal
cultural differences. Moreover, as was explained in subsection 7.4.2, some cultural effects,
such as the influence of religion, might be overpowered by stronger national cultural
differences making the (inter-) national level an inappropriate level to study the CED.
The question whether regional cultural differences are important in explaining regional
economic differences (and the other way around) still remains to be tested. This section,
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therefore, is not only intended to further test theories of the CED, but also to test on which
spatial scales significant relationships between culture and economy can be found.
The most easily tested versions of GT1 are theories of the relationship between wealth and
cultural values (see § 7.4). Preceding sections showed positive correlations between wealth
measured as GDP and individualism and post-materialism, such that an increase in these
two cultural variables is caused by an increase in wealth. In subsection 6.2.2 it was shown,
that some of the measures of regional culture derived are significantly correlated to
different measures of income. Table 7.5 presents a more complete overview of correlations
between the five dimensions of regional culture and a number of measures of income.
table 7.5: correlations between regional culture and income in the Netherlands
E.ainc E.linc E.ltli E.hinc
PMA -0.122 0.548 0.572 -0.364
PRC 0.017 -0.040 -0.033 0.033
IND 0.846 -0.448 -0.412 0.720
EAC -0.112 0.267 0.313 -0.242
DST 0.088 -0.036 0.008 0.033
N = 487
E.ainc = average standardised income (in 1000s of euros) (1998-2000); E.linc = average percentage of
households with low incomes (1999-2000); E.ltli = average percentage of households with long term
low incomes (1999-2000); E.hinc = average percentage of households with high incomes (1999-
2000).
PMA = post-materialism; PRC = Protestant conservatism; IND = (classical) individualism; EAC =
egalitarian anti-conservatism; DST = dissatisfaction (see chapter 6 for measurement procedure).
The very high correlation between individualism (IND) and average income (E.ainc) seems
to reinforce the results presented and found above: wealth leads to (classical) individualism.
However, there is no significant correlation between post-materialism (PMA) and average
income. Rather to the contrary, PMA is correlated to the percentage of households that have
a long-term low income. The effect remains even after controlling for the degree of
urbanisation (see table 6.14 in § 6.2.2). This seems to contradict the theory and earlier
findings on the relationship between wealth or income and post-materialism. There are
however (at least) four (possible) explanations for this deviation.
Firstly, it is very well possible that in a very rich and relatively egalitarian country such as
the Netherlands the differences in wealth are too small to be relevant for the development
of post-materialism. Above a certain threshold, a further increase in wealth may not further
influence the level of post-materialism. The second possibility is that the causality runs in
the opposite direction: in other words, that more post-materialist communities have more
households with relatively low incomes, which could be the result of the fact that post-
materialists value non-material (or non-monetary) achievements more highly. Thirdly, there
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could be a common cause other than the degree of urbanisation explaining the coincidence
of PMA and low-income. Fourthly and finally, PMA could measure something very
different from post-materialism, which considering that all indicators pointed at post-
materialism, seems not to be the most likely option (see § 6.2.2). However, in comparing
further results found in this section and in earlier and other studies on the causes and effects
of post-materialism, it is important to keep in mind that PMA possibly is not completely
identical to post-materialism.
The availability of data on new firm formation by novice entrepreneurs (see § 6.3.2) makes
it relatively easy to test at least part of GT2. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory data on
innovation available on the very small spatial scale used here, which limits the analysis to
just one indicator (or measure) of entrepreneurship (see also § 6.3.2): the average number
of newly founded enterprises divided by the labour force (E.strt).
In testing the effects of cultural values on entrepreneurship it is important to include
possible non-cultural causes (e.g. Granato, Inglehart & Leblang 1996). In a series of
regression models a few of these non-cultural causes were included: the degree of
urbanisation; the size of the existing population of firms; the education of the labour force
and the percentage of migrants in the population (see also § 7.4.2).
Cultural variables included were post-materialism (PMA), PMA corrected for degree of
urbanisation, education and income (PMA-R), Protestant conservatism (PRC), and
dissatisfaction (DST). The other two cultural variables, classical individualism (IND) and
egalitarian anti-conservatism (EAC) did not appear to be related to new firm formation.
Both PMA and PMA-R were included, albeit in different regression models. PMA is a
combination of both regional differences in culture and the effects of urban culture. Hence,
PMA-R was used in models that also included (at later stages in stepwise regression)
degree of urbanisation (U.durb) and the percentage of more highly educated in the labour
force (L.Lfhe). Otherwise, the uncorrected PMA was used in the analysis.
Models 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 were the results of a stepwise regression analysis. Models 3 and 8
were added later to complete the picture. Similarly, models 9 to 13 were the result of a
second stepwise regression analysis.
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table 7.6: regression models of new firm formation in the Netherlands (E.strt)
1 2 3 4
s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig.
PMA-R 0.256 0.000
E.estb 0.359 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.463 0.000
U.durb 0.398 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.404 0.000
L.lfhe 0.115 0.013
R2 0.129 0.282 0.299 0.347
5 6 7 8
s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig.
PMA-R 0.297 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.184 0.000
PRC 0.141 0.001 0.166 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.169 0.001
DST 0.201 0.000 0.257 0.000
E.estb 0.466 0.000 0.451 0.000 0.427 0.000
U.durb 0.396 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.223 0.000
L.lfhe 0.144 0.001 0.223 0.000
R2 0.365 0.381 0.410 0.119
9 10 11 12
s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig. s.c. sig.
PMA 0.442 0.000 0.404 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.418 0.000
PRC 0.191 0.000 0.189 0.000
DST 0.207 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.183 0.000
E.estb 0.486 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.484 0.000 0.486 0.000
U.rimg 0.158 0.000
R2 0.308 0.349 0.384 0.407
13
s.c. sig.
PMA 0.321 0.000
PRC 0.197 0.000
DST 0.222 0.000
E.estb 0.454 0.000
U.rimg 0.166 0.000
L.lfhe 0.173 0.000
R2 0.427
dependent variable: E.strt = average (×1000) number of
newly founded enterprises divided by the labour force
(2001-2002). N = 410.
s.c.= standardised coefficient; sig. = significance.
PMA = post-materialism; PMA-R = PMA corrected for
degree of urbanisation, education and income; PRC =
Protestant conservatism; DST = dissatisfaction (see chapter
6 for measurement procedure).
E.estb = average (×1000) number of established enterprises
divided by the labour force (2001-2002); L.lfhe = average
percentage higher educated in labour force (municipalities
larger than 10.000 inhabitants) (1997-2002); U.durb =
degree of urbanisation (2003) (see table 6.3); U.rimg =
share of immigrants not explained by degree of
urbanisation (see table 6.3).
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In both series of stepwise regression all three dimensions of culture mentioned above were
included and proved to be highly significant in explaining regional differences in new
entrepreneurship. The cultural dimension of post-materialism (PMA), the degree of
urbanisation and the size of the existing population of firms seem to be the most important
determinants. These three variables account for an R2 of 0.347 in model 4 and in the model
most similar in the second series, model 9: an R2 of 0.308.
Interestingly, comparing models 3 and 7 shows that including cultural variables increases
the explanatory power (R2) of the model by 0.111, which is only slightly lower than the R2
of model 8 (0.119) which used cultural variables alone. In the second series of models (9 to
13) the three cultural variables are the first to be added to the model after the existing firm
population size, which further illustrates the importance of culture. Table 7.7 specifies the
increase of R2 after inclusion of the different cultural variables. In case of the second series
of models, the impact of culture seems to be far greater, but this is caused by the fact that
the measure of post-materialism (PMA) used in this series of models is not corrected for the
degree of urbanisation and the level of education.
table 7.7: increase in R2 by inclusion of cultural variables
models 1-8 models 9-13
PMA-R 0,065
PMA 0,179
PRC 0,018 0,035
DST 0,029 0,041
total 0,111 0,255
The relative importance of cultural variables is the same in both series of models. The
effect of post-materialism (PMA) is the strongest, followed by dissatisfaction (DST) and
Protestant conservatism (PRC). The other dimensions found in chapter 6, classical
individualism (IND) and egalitarian anti-conservatism (EAC) did not significantly
influence new entrepreneurship.
Some of the cultural effects found may seem to be somewhat surprising. The effects of
Protestant conservatism (PRC) and dissatisfaction (DST), as expected, (to some extent)
confirm theories and findings by Weber (1905) and Wildeman et al. (1999) respectively,
but the positive influence of post-materialism contradicts Inglehart's (1990) claim that post-
materialists are less entrepreneurially active. Again, this could mean that PMA actually
measures something else, but there also may be other explanations.
The most obvious explanation for the positive influence of PMA on entrepreneurship is that
one of the most important characteristics of post-materialism is self-development or self-
expression. Because this is one reason for many entrepreneurs in the Netherlands and other
Western countries to start firms (e.g. Smith 1967; Birley and Westhead 1994; see also §
7.4.2), there may be a positive relationship between post-materialism and self-employment
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in (very) wealthy countries. While 'Postmaterialists emphasize economic achievement less
than Materialists do, and they emphasize other kinds of achievement more' (Inglehart 1990,
p.176), these 'other kinds of achievements' may still cause higher self-employment rates.
Besides culture, the size of the existing population of firms, the degree of urbanisation and
education seem to be important determinants of entrepreneurship. Models 12 and 13 also
confirm Hoselitz's (1960; 1964) thesis that immigrants (as a socially marginal group) have
higher levels of self-employment (see § 7.3.1 and § 7.4.1).
7-6-3-summary and conclusions
Test results presented in this section confirm both aspects of GT1 and GT2. Wealth seems
to cause individualism and economic freedom, for example, and Protestantism promotes
entrepreneurship (or new firm formation at least). What was also clearly shown, is that the
CED is not only relevant to the individual or micro level and to the (inter-) national or
macro level but also to smaller scale territorial macro levels such as Dutch municipalities.
The most important difference between the findings of this section and earlier sections is
that the regional cultural dimension of post-materialism measured as PMA (see § 6.2.2)
correlates to economic phenomena differently than Inglehart's international measure does.
The latter has negative effects on self-employment for example, while PMA has a positive
effect. This may, however, be caused by differences in motivations for self-employment. It
may be the case that in a rich (and post-materialist) country such as the Netherlands new
firms are founded more for reasons such as self-expression than to make as much profit as
possible. Hence, post-materialism may promote entrepreneurship, but a different kind of
entrepreneurship with a different kind of (post-materialist) entrepreneur.
7-7-conclusions, results, and what remains untested
In this chapter a number of theories and empirical tests were presented. Some theories were
confirmed, others rejected. Some theories were not tested at all or even seemed to be
untestable. Even if a theoretical relationship seemed to be confirmed or refuted by empirical
'evidence', this was not necessarily the case due to the fact that tests rarely deal with the
problems of testing for causality as explained in subsection 7.1.1.
This final section briefly reviews the most important old and new empirical findings that
reached 'reasonable probability' (§ 7.7.1) and the theories that have not been or cannot be
tested (§ 7.7.2). A more extensive review of the theoretical and meta-theoretical
implications of the findings in this chapter is included in the next (and final) chapter.
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7-7-1-a summary of conclusions
Throughout this chapter a number of empirical findings were presented. However, in many
cases empirical results were rather inconsistent. Only a relatively small number of
conclusions seem, therefore, to be justified. Most of these, moreover, are related to GT2.
The main findings are presented here, numbered 1 to 10.
(1) Partly confirming GT1, increasing wealth results in cultural change. The most
important effects found were an increase of (a) individualism; (b) post-
materialism; (c) economic freedom; (d) civil and (e) political rights; and a
decrease of (f) competitiveness. Contrary to theory, no effect of wealth on work
ethic was found. (see §§ 7.2.2; 7.4.1 and 7.6.1)
(2) There does not seem to be a consistent relationship between Hofstede's dimensions
of culture and any aspect of entrepreneurship. Any possible value on any of
Hofstede's dimensions may have a positive influence on any aspect of
entrepreneurship.
(3) Similarly, post-materialism in some studies negatively influences self-
employment, while it was found to have a positive influence in the empirical part
of this study. These different effects of the same cultural dimension on the same
economic variable may be related to the fact that post-materialism is non-atomic.
It is composed of several culturally different phenomena that may have
contradictory effects. The lower valuation of profit and material wellbeing may
negatively influence self-employment, while self-expression and self-development
may promote it. The lack of consistent relationships between Hofstede's
dimensions and entrepreneurship may be caused by the same phenomenon: some
aspects of, for example, individualism have a positive effect on self-employment
and innovation, while other aspects have negative effects (Nakata & Sivakumar
1996; Tiessen 1997; see §§ 7.3.2 and 7.4.2).
(4) The only cultural dimension (if it is one) that seems to have a consistent and
significant positive effect on self-employment is dissatisfaction. (§§ 7.3.2 and
7.6.2)
(5) On the regional scale a positive effect of Protestantism on self-employment was
found, confirming Weber's thesis (§§ 7.3.1 and 7.6.2). On the (inter-) national
scale, however, no such confirmation was found (Kilby 1971; Lynn 1991). This
may be caused by the fact that national cultural differences overpower religious
and other types of difference. In other words, some cultural effects disappear on
the (inter-) national scale.
(6) Therefore, it may be advisable to study the CED (or the effects of cultural values
on behaviour in general) on the regional rather than the (inter-) national scale. (§
7.6)
ON THEORIES AND TESTS
279
(7) Hoselitz's thesis that marginal groups such as ethnic minorities are more
entrepreneurially active than their host populations seems to be sufficiently backed
by empirical evidence.
(8) Contrary to popular belief, there is no consistent evidence for the theory that
entrepreneurship positively influences economic growth.
(9) No consistent direct effects of culture on economy were found. It is often assumed
that individualism promotes economic growth. In this chapter (§ 7.6.1), however,
the opposite relationship was found: collectivism seems to positively influence
economic growth. The evidence for this relationship, however, was not
particularly strong.
(10) Institutions do (or seem to at least) effect economic growth, but often are effects of
economic growth and/or wealth as well. Hence, the direction of causality in this
type of relationships is generally unclear.
7-7-2-what remains untested
Although many of the theories presented in this chapter have been tested, at least as many
remain untested or are only partially tested. The latter is especially the case for the more
general theories that assume relationships between very broad categories (for example, the
set of values and other non-institutionalised rules o as a whole, rather than some specific
and measurable subset), such as the general forms of HM and GT2. Table 7.8 presents the
more general theories for which more detailed or more specific variants were tested:
table 7.8: general and specific theories
general theories related, more specific theories C R U
T7.8(a); T7.10(a); T7.11;
T7.14; T7.15; T7.17
T7.14a; T7.18; T7.19; T7.21(a); T7.30 X X X
T7.22; T7.23 T7.30 X
T7.7; T7.24 T7.25 X
T7.9; T7.26(a) T7.27; T7.28; T7.29; T7.21b; T7.26b X X X
C = (partly) confirmed; R = (partly) refuted; U = (partly) uncertain. Specific theories printed
underlined were empirically refuted.
In addition to the theories that are difficult to test because they are too general, there are a
number of theories that have not been tested for other reasons. T7.12 (({=div.lab,Φ} s
(oanomie) and T7.20 ((jcapitalism s (oalienation) (see § 7.2.2), for example, are untested and
probably untestable for at least two reasons. Firstly, both anomie and alienation are
extremely difficult to make operational, let alone to measure. Secondly, the nature of the
relationships suggested is too unclear to make falsification possible. Many of the theories of
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the CED suffer from similar problems. Often the nature of relationships tends to be very
unclear (often it is assumed that it only holds under certain conditions, without a
specification of these 'certain conditions'), and the categories related are extremely broad
and ambiguous. Sometimes the causes and effects in the theory can only be classified rather
than measured (see § 7.4.1). Sometimes even this is impossible.
The relationships between supposed causes and effects are, moreover, not necessarily
causal, but may be conceptual. Bell's (1976) theory that capitalism causes alienation
(T7.20) may be an example hereof. The Marxian concept of "alienation" refers among
others to the situation wherein labour is a commodity, wherein people are no longer part of
some traditional community but live and work in modern cities and industries, wherein
people produce goods for the market rather than for their own use. It refers to an economy
that is based on the M-C-M-model (use money M to buy commodities C to sell these for
more money M), rather than on the C-M-C-model (sell commodities to buy other
commodities). (see also § 3.4.1) Hence, alienation is capitalism (or at least an aspect
thereof), rather than its effect.
In section 7.5 a number of theories were presented, of which only a small part was tested.
Embeddedness (§ 7.5.1) can be interpreted in at least two ways. Embeddeness of behaviour
is more or less an equivalent of the meta-behaviour - behaviour model. Embeddedness of
actors was illustrated with an example from firm relocation research.
Subsection 7.5.2 dealt with theories on the cultural conditions for economic growth. These
theories could be interpreted and formalised as theories of weak causation, although this,
strictly speaking, would be incorrect because the supposed relationships are not (directly)
causal. Only very few of these theories have been tested.
Theories on the influence of institutions and consumption on economic growth and theories
on the relationship between geography, culture and economy (§§ 7.5.3-5), like the theories
in table 7.8, are far too broad to be tested. A number of more detailed theories were tested,
however. Education, democracy and political stability may positively influence
development. The influence of consumption and the physical environment, however,
remains relatively unclear.
Testability and related problems, such as the question whether CED relationships are of a
conceptual rather than causal nature, are further dealt with in the next chapter. Chapter 8
starts with a more extensive review of the theories and tests presented in this chapter and
then continues with implications and considerations based on the whole of this study.
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chapter 8
CONSIDERATIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS
Κακοi µάρτυρες Oνθρώποισιν Sφθαλµοi καi mτα βαρβάρους ψυχfς Pχόντων.
(Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that do not understand their language.)
Heraclitus of Ephesus 6th century BC, fragment 107
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1922, § 7
8-1-introduction
The empirical tests presented in the preceding chapter can be used to refine the CED, to
determine which theories or aspects can be considered to be (relatively) plausible and
which are not. Not all (possible) theories of the CED have been tested, however, and those
that have been were tested with different methods of varying rigor, and yielding very
different results. The main goal of this study, however, was not to present a final
comprehensive theory on the relationships between culture and economy (a theoretical
synthesis of the CED), but to determine what it means to ask (scientific) questions on these
relationships and why these questions seem to be so important in / to social science (which
could be regarded as a critical synthesis of the CED).
Chapter 1 stated that the goal of this research project consisted of a number of interrelated
parts of which the most important were: (1) a comparison and analysis of the existing
theories of the CED, (2) a review of their empirical (dis-)confirmation, (3) the construction
of some kind of synthesis and finally, (4) to consider the relevance and implications of
these research questions and their answers to social science in general and human
geography in particular (see § 1.2). Most of these parts have been dealt with in preceding
chapters. This final chapter deals with the possibility of synthesis, with meta-theoretical
issues and with implications for social science. Section 8.2 briefly reviews the theories and
tests presented in chapter 7. Some meta-theoretical conclusions based on this review are
presented in section 8.3. This latter section deals with the scientific status of the CED and
the nature of the relationship in CED theories mainly, but also considers (the) synthesis of
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the CED. Sections 8.4 and 8.5 assess the implications for social science hereof and of the
rest of this study. The final section (§ 8.6) summarises this chapter and presents some
closing comments.
8-2-a review of theories, confirmations and refutations
In chapter 7 three groups of CED theories were presented. The first group included
historical materialism, the first grand theory of the CED, and related stage and
modernisation theories. The second group originated from the second grand theory of the
CED, Weber's theory on the 'entrepreneurial spirit', and included theories on cultural
influences on entrepreneurship and economic growth. The third group was labelled "minor
theories" because these were not directly related to either of the two grand theories.
This section reviews these theories and their empirical (dis-) confirmation, insofar as (dis-)
confirmation is possible, of course (see § 7.1.1). Subsection 8.2.1 briefly reviews the
theories and results presented in (sub)sections 7.2 and 7.4.1 (the first grand theory);
subsection 8.2.2 deals with (sub)sections 7.3, 7.4.2-3 (the second grand theory) and 7.5
(minor theories). New empirical tests presented in section 7.6 are integrated in subsections
8.2.1 and 8.2.2. Section 8.3 continues with some meta-theoretical considerations,
conclusions and some notes towards a synthesis based on the review presented in this
section.
8-2-1-historical materialism
The first grand theory of the CED (GT1) was historical materialism (HM), a body of
interrelated theories, ideas and remarks developed by Marx and Engels on the economic
causes of social, political and cultural change. Many versions and interpretations of HM
exist. An integrated version of HM was formulised as T7.6:
T7.6R [ ∆{Φ,:}PCD ws ∆:leg.pol ] ws ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol))  .
The most important theories of HM, 'sub-theories' of T7.6, as developed by Marx and
Engels themselves were:
T7.7R ∆:prod s ∆:leg.pol  , and
T7.8R ∆{/PCD,:PCD} s ∆(:−(:PCD∪:leg.pol))  .
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Neither of these two theories has been statistically confirmed. In case of T7.7 statistical
testing is nearly impossible because the categories or phenomena related seem to be
measurable only as nominal variables. In other words, the causes and effects in these
theories can be classified only (in which a change ∆ would be a change only if it involves a
class boundary crossing, which would imply that change is a conceptual rather than a 'real'
event). Moreover, the spatio-temporal scale of these theories limits the possibilities for data
gathering for statistical analysis. There is, for example, not enough data available to
statistically test whether the introduction of agriculture (∆:prod) lead to changing political
systems (∆:leg.pol) in all or nearly all cases. Nevertheless, historical analysis suggests that
T7.7 may be true.
T7.8 is untestable mainly because its categories are far too broad. It is possible to test
whether particular economic differences are related to particular cultural phenomena, but
not whether the whole of productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour and meta-
behaviour is causally related to the whole of other meta-behaviour. However, T7.8 proved
to be inspirational to many theorists in the 20th century. Modernisation theories are
generally variants of T7.8 and are in some cases more specific and may hence be testable.
Besides these 'children', HM has 'parents' too. Before Marx and Engels, a number of 18th
century scientists and philosophers including Vico and Smith suggested that the values (o:
Smith) or values and ideas (o∪A: Vico) of a society are determined by the way that
society deals with nature and natural resources as a means of subsistence =SNT:
T7.11R ∆=SNT s ∆o  .
This notion of =SNT (Vico's 'order of institutions') is strongly related to the 19th century
concept of "economy" as :PCD. Both =SNT and :PCD are subsets of :SNT, the meta-
behaviour of subsistence, transformation of nature, technology and economy. Combining
strong causality in T7.6 (and, hence, T7.7, T7.8) and T7.11 in a single meta-theory of GT1
would result in:
T8.1 ∆{:,Φ}SNT  ∆(:−:SNT)  ,
in which ΦSNT is the set of all actual entities related to subsistence, (transformation of)
nature, technology and economy of which actual behaviour related to SNT, /SNT, is a
subset that includes the 20th century interpretation of "economy" as /PCD (in formal terms:
/PCD ⊂ /SNT ⊂ ΦSNT). T8.1 can be interpreted as 'natural and other circumstances and the
way societies deal with these to assure their existence determines (or influence at least)
(other aspects of) their culture'.
Like T7.8, T7.11 and/or T8.1 are difficult, if not impossible, to test. Of course more
specific versions of these theories can be tested and confirmed, but a theory that is more
general than its confirmation is hardly a good theory (see also § 7.2) and is in need of
refinement. Falsification of a more specific version, on the other hand, would not refute
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these general theories since they do not claim that there is a causal relationship for every
possible subset of the causes and effects in the general theory.
Figure 8.1 graphically represents a taxonomy of GT1 theories showing the many variants
and versions of the theory. Unfortunately, many of the modernisation theories and other
variants of GT1 developed in the course of the 20th century are just as general as T7.8 or
T7.11 (for example: T7.14; T7.15; T7.16; T7.17; T7.24). Others were more specific but
untestable nevertheless, because their categories were immeasurable or indistinguishable
from other phenomena (for example: T7.12; T7.13; T7.20; T7.22; T7.23).
figure 8.1: a taxonomy of the first grand theory
Weak causality in the opposite direction (from culture to economy) is ignored in this taxonomy.
Theories confirmed empirically are printed boldface; refuted theories are underlined.
The two black dots represent non-formalised intermediate theories; the dot below T8.1: effect =
individualism; the dot below T7.8: cause = wealth.
Only four (groups of) theories were relatively specific and assumed a relationship between
measurable phenomena. Firstly, theories of the effects of some subset of {:,Φ}SNT on the
level of individualism (a subset of o) (the theories connected by lines downward from the
upper black dot in figure 8.1). This group includes T7.14a and 7.30(a), which assume that
individualism is promoted by wealth w(/PCD); T7.13, which assumes that individualism is
caused by money; and T7.22 and T7.23, which assume that individualism is caused by
changes in the way that society deals with nature and natural resources as a means of
subsistence =SNT or by changes in the institutions, rules and customs of production =prod.
T8.1
T7.3 T7.10
T7.10
T7.22T7.23
T7.16
T7.6
T7.7T7.8
T7.12
T7.13T7.14
T7.14a
T7.15
T7.17 T7.18T7.19
T7.20
T7.21(a)
T7.24
T7.25T7.30(a)
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The latter three theories, however, seem to be rather difficult to test. In case of T7.13 this is
mainly caused by the fact that the institution of money seems to coincide with other
economic differences. In case of T7.22 and T7.23 this is because =SNT and =prod cannot be
measured appropriately for statistical testing. On the other hand, the other theory of this
group:
T7.30a (w(/PCD) s (oindividualism  ,
the theory that increasing wealth leads to increasing individualism, is empirically confirmed
repeatedly.
The second group consists of Inglehart's theories on the influence of wealth on post-
materialism, postmodernism, rationality and/or self-expression. All of the latter are strongly
interrelated. Hence, these theories can be summarised as:
T7.21R (w(/PCD) s (opost-materialism  .
Like T7.30a, T7.21 seems to be confirmed empirically although the 'evidence' is not as
strong and the relationship may not be linear.
The third 'group of theories' consists of a single theory, Bell's claim that increasing wealth
causes a decreasing work-ethic (T7.19). There seems to be little empirical evidence for this
theory.
Like the third, the fourth group consists of a single theory, the theory that increasing wealth
results in increasing economic freedom (T7.25), which is closely related to T7.7. T7.25 is
confirmed by both historical analysis and statistical tests. Related theories that were not
included, but nevertheless empirically confirmed, claim that increasing wealth also leads to
more civil and political rights, although Douthwaite (1992) showed that there may be a
limit to this process, beyond which a further increase of wealth leads to a decrease of civil
rights.
8-2-2-the entrepreneurial spirit
The second grand theory (GT2) was introduced by Weber, who claimed that capitalism was
the result of the 'entrepreneurial spirit', which in turn was caused by Protestant asceticism
and rationalism. In most of the Weber-inspired theories, it was assumed that values promote
some aspect or indicator of entrepreneurship (see § 7.3) and that the latter promotes
economic growth. Weber himself, however, assumed that not just values o but also ideas A
influence entrepreneurship. Moreover, not all theorists are equally explicit on the
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth. Therefore, the most general
forms of GT2 are:
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T8.2 (:  (/entrepreneurship  (∆w(/PCD)  ,
of which the first half is the most important (or at least most fertile) part:
T8.2a (:  (/entrepreneurship  .
Nearly all studies in GT2 were special cases of T7.26a ((o  (/entrepreneurship), itself a
special case of T8.2a. The specific values (causes) and the aspect or indicator of
entrepreneurship (effects) differ widely among theorists, however. Among values suggested
to have positive effects are individualism (Tawney), need for achievement (McClelland),
internal locus of control (Thomas & Mueller) and many, many more. Inglehart's post-
materialism, on the other hand, is assumed to have a negative effect. After Hofstede's
measurement of international differences in value orientations, empirical research in the
CED, especially in GT2, skyrocketed. By now every possible value (high / low) on
Hofstede's dimensions has been related to some aspect of entrepreneurship. Figure 8.2
graphically represents a taxonomy of GT2 theories and minor theories of the CED.
figure 8.2: a taxonomy of the second grand theory and minor theories
Empirical confirmation of GT2 is far less strong than that of GT1. Many correlations
between aspects of entrepreneurship (new firm formation or self-employment and
innovation mainly) have been found, but few effects have proven to be consistent.
Individualism and Hofstede's other dimensions may have positive and negative effects; the
same is true for post-materialism. The relationship between values and entrepreneurship is
far more complex than often assumed.
While the confirmation of the first part of GT2 is unclear (and inconsistent), the second part
of GT2, the theory that entrepreneurship promotes economic growth (T7.26b), was shown
to be even more uncertain. There simply is no consistent empirical evidence for this part of
the theory. Neither do there seem to be other strong and/or clear effects of culture on
economic growth. Theories of such 'other effects' haven been labelled "minor theories" in
T7.32
T8.2 minor theories
T7.26aT7.27
T7.28 T7.29
T8.2a T7.26b
T7.21b
T7.33
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chapter 7. These include theories on the influence of institutions, consumption, and
geography, and theories that do not assume that culture causes economic change but may
facilitate it. Some institutions, such as the educational system and democracy, may promote
economic growth; others, such as economic freedom or openness, do not see to have
(measurable) effects.
The possible influence of consumption is more problematic due to the fact that
consumption is strongly influenced by wealth (income) and production (including
marketing as an aspect of productive and distributive behaviour). The relationship is
difficult to test because there does not seem to be useable data available on consumption.
Moreover, the influence of wealth and production may make the cultural impact on
consumption relatively unimportant.
Geography, finally, is important in the CED in two ways. Firstly the system of the CED
itself is always located in a physical environment that limits and guides the possibilities of
both poles. The economic pole, defined as {:,Φ}SNT is clearly related to geography, but so
is culture. Landscape, for example, may be an essential part of cultural identity (e.g.
Matless 1998). Secondly, agglomeration (including urbanisation) as a cultural phenomenon
may strongly influence the economic potential of cities and regions.
8-3-towards a synthetic theory of the CED
Besides the empirical results summarised and reviewed in (sub)sections 7.7.1 and 8.2, some
meta-theoretical conclusions can be drawn from this study. This section deals with
questions on, for example, the scientific status of the CED and the nature of the relationship
(conceptual or causal; see § 7.7.2) in the different types of theories. Hence, this section tries
to present at least part of the answer to the question what it means to study the CED, which
was the impetus for the research project. By reviewing these meta-theoretical issues and
especially by analysing the relationships in the CED, this section also aims at synthesis or
at least at the assessment of the possibility of synthesis.
8-3-1-meta-theoretical issues
The overview of theories and tests presented in chapter 7 and briefly reviewed above
resulted in some theoretical conclusions on the CED summarised in subsection 7.7.1, but
also leads to a smaller number of meta-theoretical conclusions. The three main conclusions
of this type are related to variety, falsificability, and complexity.
Firstly, the body of theories on relationships between culture and economy is characterised
by a bewildering variety of concepts, categories and ideas. There seem, however, to be two
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broad types of theories: (1) very broad and vague theories that are impossible to test; and
(2) very specific theories that are mostly tested but are not always consistently confirmed or
refuted. Most of the theoretical contributions seem to be of the first type. The conclusion
that the CED is reigned by vagueness and conceptual confusion seems to be justified. But
the tremendous variation in theories and empirical results also suggests that there is no such
thing as a single body of theories of the CED. There are many theories, some of these are
related historically, others are related theoretically or conceptually, but there also are many
broken links, loose ends and new starts.
Secondly, many of the relationships within the CED are so complex and/or so vague, that
falsification is virtually impossible. The relationship between post-materialism and
entrepreneurship may serve as an example (another example, that of GT1, was explained in
§ 8.2.1). Inglehart assumes that post-materialism negatively influences entrepreneurship,
which seems to be empirically confirmed. In a new test presented in subsection 7.6.2,
however, the opposite is found: post-materialism positively influences entrepreneurship.
The problem is, that both relationships are easily explained and defended, which implies
that no empirical result can falsify the theory. Hence, this specific theory of the CED cannot
be falsified, which means, according to Popper (1935), who of course has a point, that it is
unscientific.
The problem is not typical only for this specific example, however, but for the whole of the
CED (and possibly even for the whole of social science). The general theories are too vague
to test and (even) the more specific theories often include enough external influences,
loopholes and other escapes to explain why negative test results are not a refutation. Hence,
the CED (and its many theories) are irrefutable and therefore unscientific.
Thirdly, for every increase in detail there is a corresponding increase in complexity. For
every theory there is number of more specific theories, some of which seem to be
confirmed while others are refuted, hence, a claim that ∆/X  ∆:Y may, after testing of
more specific theories (theories on the relationships between subsets of /X and :Y), have to
be replaced by ∆/X1  ∆:Y  ∆/X2 (in which case ∆/X  ∆:Y still would be true, but
not very useful). Similarly, summarising the empirically confirmed theories in a single
theory results in something like:
T8.3 [ ∆{:,Φ}SNT ws ∆(:−:SNT) ] w ∆/entrepreneurship  ,
in words: the category of meta-behaviour, behaviour and (other) actual entities related to
the way a society deals with nature and natural resources and with their technological
possibilities as a means of subsistence influences or (co-)determines and is influenced by
other aspects of meta-behaviour and together these two categories influence the level of
entrepreneurship. However, focusing in on more specific relationships dramatically changes
the picture:
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∆:prod  ∆(0∪A∪o)leg.pol
  ⇓
∆∆w(/PCD)  ∆jT8.4                   ⇓s   ⇑∆{:,Φ}SNT  ⊃|
∆w(/PCD) s
}⊂  ∆(:−:SNT)  ,
∆/entrepreneurship w ∆o
in which }⊂ ∆(:−:SNT) means that the categories before } are subsets (⊂) of ∆(:−:SNT)
and ⊃{ has as a similar meaning but with a reversed (right to left) direction. An increased
focus on more detailed theories would even further complicate the picture. (T8.4 could be
translated in ordinary language, but this would require half a page at least and would not
make it any clearer.)
T8.3 and T8.4 could be interpreted as syntheses of the CED; however, as pointed out above,
a further focus on detail results in a further complicated theory. For every theory, there is a
set of more detailed theories that are not simply copies of the more general theory they are
special cases of. Hence, whether categories are (causally or otherwise) related may be
primarily dependent on what phenomena they comprehend. In other words, whether culture
and economy are related is dependent on what exactly these concepts mean in a theory.
Moreover, as shown before, seemingly causal relationships may in fact be conceptual rather
than causal (see also § 7.7.2).
All of this implies that:
(1) whether there is a relationship between categories is partly dependent on
categorisation, and hence, is a partly conceptual question; and
(2) the nature of the relationship (if there is one) may be conceptual rather than causal;
(3) therefore, studying (theories and/or relationships of) the CED is conceptual
analysis.
Of these points, the second thus far received the least attention. The next subsection deals
with the question which types of seemingly causal relationships are conceptual and how
this affects the CED.
8-3-2-further thoughts on behaviour and meta-behaviour
In this and preceding chapter(s) it was repeatedly suggested that the relationship between
the opposing and interacting elements in different theories of the CED may be more of a
conceptual than of a causal nature. This subsection further investigates this suggestion and
its implications for the CED and the synthesis thereof.
In terms of behaviour and meta-behaviour, the many theories of the CED distinguished,
formalised and tested in chapter 7 are all special cases of three fundamentally different
general forms:
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T8.5 ∆:x  ∆/y  ,
T8.6 ∆:x  ∆:y  , and
T8.7 ∆/x  ∆:y  .
The possible nature(s) of the relationships may differ between these general forms, which
may be illustrated by assessing the different implications of the assumption ξ that x = y.
The first, T8.5(ξ), is true by definition:
D8.1 ∀x [ ∆:x  ∆/x ]  ,
as in chapter 5 meta-behaviour was defined as everything social that influences or
determines behaviour, which was formalised ad D5.1 (∀x[∆:∆/]). D8.1 is D5.1 in
context x. As D5.1 was non-contextual, including context does not change its truth-value,
therefore: D8.1.
The effects of ξ in the second and third cases, T8.6(ξ) and T8.7(ξ), are very different. In
T8.6(ξ) the causal relationship dissolves as cause and effect would be related by identity
rather than by causality. T8.7(ξ), on the other hand, is not fundamentally different from
T8.7. The relationship does not change and neither is there a definition similar to D8.1, but
with reversed causality, to make T8.7(ξ) true by definition.
In conclusion: T8.5(ξ) is a causal relationship that is true by definition; T8.6(ξ) is a
relationship of identity rather than causality; and T8.7(ξ) is a possibly causal relationship
that may be true depending on empirical confirmation. Hence, T8.5(ξ) and T8.6(ξ) are
conceptual and T8.7(ξ) is empirical; or, in Kantian terms (see §2.2.1), T8.5(ξ) and T8.6(ξ)
are analytic and T8.7(ξ) is synthetic.
If it is further assumed that (assumption ζ) all theories of the general forms of T8.5 and/or
T8.6 are necessarily conceptual and if the symbol  is defined such that:
D8.2 ∀x,y [ x y ↔ ( :x⊂:y ∧ /x⊂/y ) ]  ,
then:
T8.5a ∀x,y [ ∆:x  ∆/y → ∃z [ z x ∧ z y ∧ ∆:z  ∆/z ] ]  , and
T8.6a ∀x,y [ ∆:x  ∆:y → ∃z [ z x ∧ z y ] ]  .
In words: if there is a (perceived) causal relationship of the form T8.5, there is a common
core to the related phenomena; and if there is a (perceived) causal relationship of the form
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T8.6, the related phenomena overlap (see also figure 8.3). An example of the latter case
(T8.6a) was given in subsection 7.7.2 where it was explained that the cause and effect of
T7.20 ((jcapitalism s (oalienation) overlap. Alienation is an aspect of capitalism, hence, the
relationship is conceptual rather than causal.
figure 8.3: Venn-Euler diagrams of T8.5(a) and T8.6(a)
T8.5a was not illustrated as explicitly before. D8.1 holds that, by definition, entrepreneurial
meta-behaviour (:entrepreneurship) (co-) determines entrepreneurial behaviour (/entrepreneurship).
In chapter 7 it was repeatedly claimed (see §§ 7.2 and 7.3) and/or found that, for example,
individualism and post-materialism (oindividualism and opost-materialism) are somehow related to
entrepreneurial behaviour. T8.5a then claims that there must be an overlap between
:entrepreneurship and oindividualism and/or opost-materialism, :overlap, and that this overlap causes a
type of behaviour /overlap that is a subset or aspect of /entrepreneurship.
Interestingly, most explanations of theories or empirical findings of the form T8.5 conform
more or less to T8.5a. Inglehart's claim that post-materialism negatively influences
entrepreneurship, for example, is (a.o.) defended by claiming that post-materialists value
profit less, while the aim for profit is a defining characteristic of entrepreneurial behaviour
and meta-behaviour (see box 8.1).
box 8.1: an example of a T8.5a-like argument
Theory θ claims that:
(opost-materialism  −(/entrepreneurship  ,
which is defended and/or explained by:
oprofit-goal ⊄ opost-materialism  , and
oprofit-goal ⊂ oentrepreneurship ↔ / profit-goal ⊂ /entrepreneurship  ,
which are definitional statements and:
oprofit-goal  /profit-goal  ,
which is true by definition (D8.1), and which implies (or at least seems to) that θ is true.
x yz
: :

x y
z z
: /
z z
T8.5(a) T8.6(a)
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The problem with an argument like that in box 8.1 is that other subsets of the supposed
cause and effect may be differently related. In contradiction of θ, it was shown in
subsection 7.6.2, for example, that the self-expression aspect of post-materialism may cause
self-expressive behaviour by means of self-employment, which is an aspect of
entrepreneurship (see §§ 7.6.2 and 8.3.1).
Up to this point, it was assumed that all theories of the forms T8.5 and T8.6 are necessarily
conceptual (assumption ζ). As all examples of these general forms in the preceding chapter
conform to T8.5a and T8.6a, it may be concluded that ζ has been sufficiently verified,
which, nevertheless, does not support the necessity assumed in ζ (necessity is a theoretical
rather than an empirical claim). Whether T8.5 and T8.5 are necessarily conceptual is
dependent on an assessment of not-ζ.
If not ζ, then there must be some (possible) cases ∆:x  ∆/y in which x and y are
completely unrelated. Its seems, however, to be absurd that two phenomena bounded by
completely unrelated x and y respectively are nevertheless causally related. Moreover, it is
quite difficult, if not impossible, to come up with an example because it seems that for
every possible x and y some overlap is conceivable. In conclusion: not not-ζ; therefore: ζ.
While all theories of the first two forms are conceptual, those of the third (T8.7) are not.
T8.7 is a special case of:
T8.7a ∆Φ  ∆:  ,
which claims that meta-behaviour is dependent on the set of actual entities. In other words:
rules, ideas, values, institutions, concepts, and so forth are influenced (if not co-determined)
by (the conditions of) the world or reality they are formed in. Or in evolutionary terms:
changing (or different) natural conditions lead to 'a shift in survival strategies' (Inglehart
1997, p. 66). A more or less similar point was, of course, made much earlier by Vico
(1725/44; see §§ 3.2.2 and 7.2.2). Most examples of T8.7(a) specified in chapter 7 focus on
the influence of wealth on values and institutions.
Rather than T8.3 and T8.4 in subsection 8.3.1, T8.5(a) to T8.7(a) can be regarded the
synthesis of the CED. By implication, the CED is a mix of conceptual confusions (T8.5(a)
and T8.6(a)) and 'shifts in survival strategies' (T8.7(a)). Not surprisingly, it was the latter
part that seems to be empirically confirmed most consistently.
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8-3-3-summary, synthesis
Three strongly related conclusions were drawn in this section. Firstly, it was found that
most theories of the CED (and the CED as a whole) are very broad and vague and allow
many loopholes and exceptions making falsification virtually impossible (even if testing is
possible, negative results generally do not lead to falsification). Hence, the CED is
unscientific.
Secondly, for every increase in detail there is a corresponding increase in complexity.
Every increase of focus on a specific theory reveals a number of 'sub-theories' that may
have very different causes and effects and may even work against each other.
And thirdly, it seems that, broadly speaking, there are two types of theories in / of the CED:
(1) theories that are misunderstood conceptual overlaps (T8.5(a) and T8.6(a)); and (2)
theories on the (external) conditions of (types or aspects of) meta-behaviour (8.7(a)). This
last (third) conclusion may be regarded the synthesis of the CED.
The synthesis implies that empirical findings do not necessarily point at real world facts;
they may be artefacts produced by conceptualisation and measurement. 'Eyes and ears are
bad witnesses to men if they have souls that do not understand their language' (Heraclitus
6th century BC, fragment 107).
8-4-science, society and the CED
In section 2.5 a dialectic was defined as a pair of concepts (or phenomena) that are
conceived to be binary opposites but that do in fact interact and/or overlap. Hence, a
dialectic is a kind of pseudo-dichotomy. The culture - economy dichotomy is a dialectic
because its concepts overlap and the phenomena associated interact. The conceptual
overlap, the fact that there are no discrete and independent spheres of reality labelled
"culture" and "economy" (see chapters 3 to 5), implies that the culture - economy
dichotomy as a dichotomy is a misconception. Moreover, the interactions or
interrelationships seem to be the product of the conceptual overlap rather than of social
'laws'. As shown above (§ 8.3.2), many of the assumed relationships between culture and
economy are conceptual rather than causal.
The birth and development of the social sciences is interwoven with the history of the
culture - economy dialectic (CED) (see § 3.2.2). Moreover, the translation of the CED in
the meta-behaviour - behaviour framework seems to be a subset of (or even coincides with)
social science. In section 8.3, three types of CED relationships were distinguished: T8.5 to
T8.7 (repeated below). These three types of relationships are the same basic problems
studied in most of the social sciences and most social science questions and problems can
be translated as special cases of these three types of relationships or combinations thereof.
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(Note that ∆/x  ∆/y is the only possible combination missing in T8.5 to T8.7. ∆/x 
∆/y, however, is necessarily mediated by some ∆: and is hence a combination of T8.7 and
T8.5 of the form: ∆/x  ∆:z  ∆/y.)
The exception to this rule is classical geography, which studied the man - environment
dialectic (MED). Formalising both directions of the MED as T8.8 and T8.9 (in which Φ−/
is the set of actual physical, non-behavioural entities, the (physical) geographical
environment) and adding these to the list results in the following five types of relationships
studied by social science:
T8.5R ∆:x  ∆/y
T8.6R ∆:x  ∆:y
T8.7R ∆/x  ∆:y
}CED
T8.8 ∆(Φ−/)x  ∆:y } T8.7aR ∆Φ  ∆:
T8.9 ∆/x  ∆(Φ−/)y } MED
The whole of social science studies T8.5 to T8.9. Hence, social science is the combination
of the CED and the MED. The conclusion that the CED is at least partly the result of
conceptual categorisation rather than of real (social) world phenomena (see § 8.3.2) and
other findings of this study may, therefore, have implications for social science. The final
sections of this chapter (and this book) present some considerations on the (probably) most
important implications of this study for social science and its methods.
This section focuses on geography (§ 8.4.1), social science and its methodology (§ 8.4.2)
and the application of social science in public (regional economic) policy (§ 8.4.3). Section
8.5 deals with disciplinary, conceptual and other boundaries, and with the notion of free
choice, which seems to be fundamental to many approaches in social and political science.
Section 8.6, finally, summarises the findings of this concluding chapter and presents some
closing comments.
8-4-1-reinventing geography
In the introduction to this section it was stated that social science studies five types of
relationships: three types of CED relationships and two types of MED relationships. In
practice, however, the man - environment dialectic (MED) receives fairly little attention,
certainly not since the death of classical geography. Social science is dominated by the first
three relationships. Hence, in practice, social science − more or less − coincides with the
CED.
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The MED was the defining subject of (classical) geography (see § 3.6), but was effectively
removed from the discipline by two revolutions. The quantitative revolution of the 1950s
changed geography into a kind of sterile social geometry and the mainly Marxist (counter-)
revolution of the 1970s introduced a new conceptual and theoretical framework. The first of
these revolutions destroyed the MED, the prime subject and defining characteristic of
classical geography; the second removed the rubble (left by the first) and replaced this by
the fashion of the day. Rather than returning the field to its conceptual and theoretical roots,
through (a.o.) Marxism, a new conceptual framework was introduced: the CED.
Classical geography was effectively dead by the 1970s and what replaced it is better
labelled "spatial sociology" and/or "spatial economics" than geography. Since the 1970s
geographers mainly occupied themselves with applying and 'spatialising' or 'regionalising'
sociological and economic theories. Modern geography is no longer concerned with T8.8
and T8.9 but with regionalised versions of T8.5 to T8.7. Original theoretical contributions
to social science by post-classical geographers seem to be extremely rare. In fact, it may be
the case that Harvey's (1989) theory on post-modernism and the socio-spatial effects
thereof is the only − more or less − original geographical theory with some impact
(although one might wonder whether this is really a geographical theory).
Modern (or post-classical) geography seems to suffer from fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence
and limited policy relevance (e.g. Markusen 1999; Rodríguez-Pose 2001). One could,
therefore, be inclined to conclude that for a geographer, there is not much in his or her
discipline to be proud of. If it were not for the centuries of geographical thought before the
two revolutions mentioned above, this conclusion would be justified. However, geography
is a far richer field than the last fifty years of mathematical abstractions and confused
theoretical poverty suggest (see also § 3.6). Geography as the study of the MED includes
many eminent scientists and philosophers such as Hippocrate, Aristotle, Albertus Magnus,
Montesquieu, and Ritter (see § 3.6.1). The research program these scientists and
philosophers contributed to, the MED, however, has experienced little development in the
last half century (see § 7.5.5). There is plenty to be proud of for a geographer as long as one
looks back far enough.
The fact that geography abandoned the MED (T8.8 and T8.9) and focused on the CED
(T8.5 to T8.7) instead implies that a part of social science is now left relatively neglected.
(A few social scientists are still working on the MED (see § 7.5.5), but these rarely come
from a geographical background.) Whether the contributions from modern geography to the
study of relationships of the types T8.5 to T8.7 are very relevant is, moreover, doubtful
(e.g. Markusen 1999; Rodríguez-Pose 2001).
Geographers should choose whether to continue the field as a kind of spatial(-ised)
sociology or economics with little impact and little social (and scientific) relevance, or to
reinvent the field, to reclaim its (proper) domain by returning geography to its theoretical
and conceptual roots: to study how the geographical environment influences and determines
social structure (meta-behaviour) (and how social behaviour changes the environment).
This does not mean that geography should return to theories about the influence of climate
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on cultural development (e.g. Huntington 1915; see also § 3.6.1), although there is − in
principle − little wrong with researching this, but it means that geographers should focus on
how geographical features and differences, how the natural and the socio-spatial
environment, and how distance and space influence institutions, concepts, values, ideas,
and the like and, through these, behaviour. It is, for example, not regional difference itself
that should be studied by geography, but the geographical causes (and effects) of regional
difference.
The MED is an essential part of social science. It is this part of social science that is the
defining subject of classical geography. Geographers, however, have left this part lying
fallow for too long. There is a world to regain for geography.
8-4-2-social science as empirical conceptual analysis
Of the five types of relationships studied by social science, two are conceptual rather than
causal. Hence, T8.5 (∆:x  ∆/y) and T8.6 (∆:x  ∆:y) should be studied by means of
conceptual analysis. The conceptual structure of these relationships was explained in T8.5a
and T8.6a, which claimed that the poles of a T8.5-type relationship have a common core
and that the poles of a T8.6-type relationship overlap (see § 8.3.2 and figure 8.3).
Conceptual analysis involves more than specifying definitions. Fries and Nelson, for
example, argued that conceptual analysis uncovers implicit or hidden presuppositions and
meanings (Yolton 1961; see also § 2.2.2; a more or less similar argument for definitional
analysis was forwarded in Whitehead & Russell 1910-3). Having and using a concept does
not necessarily mean that we can analyse it by theoretical means alone. Empirical analysis
may help sort out the essential from the trivial. Empirical analysis may contribute to the
uncovery of these implicit or hidden presuppositions and hence to conceptual clarification.
The argument presented in box 8.1 may be considered an exemplar for social science
reasoning: some  empirical relationship is found which is explained by assuming a common
conceptual core (or overlap). Only rarely, however, is the scientist concerned aware that he
or she is practising conceptual analysis and only rarely can the analysis pass any standard of
decent conceptual analysis.
Nevertheless, social science could be regarded as a kind of empirical conceptual analysis.
For example, consider the relationship between post-materialism and self-employment:
∆:post-materialism  ∆/self-employment. According to T8.5a, there is some subset :z of :post-
materialism that is by definition D8.1 causally related to some subset /z of /self-employment. The
nature of this subset is, however, not necessarily clear and cannot be revealed by theoretical
analysis alone because none of the sets (or phenomena) mentioned in this example is
internally homogeneous and/or unambiguous. There are many entities and effects and these
may contradict each other.
If z (the link between post-materialism and self-employment) is the aim for profit, post-
materialism should influence self-employment negatively; if z is a preference for
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independence and self-development on the other hand, post-materialism would probably
promote self-employment. The problem is that z is both and much more, and that it is not at
all clear which aspects and effects are more important (in which situations). Empirical
analysis may help to reveal this. In the case of this example, however, it was found that on
the (inter-) national scale the relationship between post-materialism and self-employment
was negative, while it was positive on the regional scale. Hence, empirical analysis did not
result in a final answer.
In many cases, as in this example, relationships are assumed and/or researched between
internally heterogeneous categories, between concepts and phenomena that are too vague
and too broad. As shown above (see § 8.3.1), increasing the level of detail will increase the
complexity of the relationship or theory, resulting in a complex network of contradictory
and/or amplifying effects.
Conceptual and empirical analysis may complement each other in clarifying the categories
and relationships of (or in) the theory. The broader the categories, however, the more
empirical analysis is needed and the more complicated the conceptual analysis will be.
The primary task of social science is to discover (or better: ‘uncover’) patterns and rules
(etc.): the elucidation of meta-behaviour (e.g. Winch 1958). Explaining social behaviour is
specifying meta-behaviour. However, meta-behaviour is not directly observable. The
epistemological argument for behaviourism holds that we can only observe behaviour
(actions or behavioural events) and that, therefore, social science should be a science of
behaviour. Hence, social science is left with no option but to study behaviour to uncover
meta-behaviour that guides behaviour. (see also §§ 5.2.1 and 6.2.1)
Since patterns p were defined in subsection 5.2.2 (see figure 5.3) as:
D8.3 ∀m [ m = p ↔ ∃ϕ,b [ YSPM(m,ϕ,b) ] ]
(a pattern p is a meta-behavioural entity m that suggests or prescribes action / behavioural
event b in case of condition ϕ), the above implies that social science should proceed by
classifying and counting behavioural events b (types of /) and correlating these to data
about the conditions ϕ, the environment and properties of the actors involved. This is an
demographical or epidemiological approach. Applying it to economics or economic
geography could, for example, result in a demography of firms. As a research strategy,
demography of firms involves a theoretical or conceptual and an empirical part. The first,
theoretical or conceptual part focuses on classification and conceptualisation of events and
objects (firms) (e.g. Struijs & Willeboordse 1988; 1995; Brons 2001). The second, more
empirical or practical part models population change (e.g. van Wissen 1997; 2000) and/or
counts, correlates and explains events (e.g. Birch 1979; van Dijk & Pellenbarg (eds.) 1999).
Social science is (and should be) a mix of conceptual and empirical analysis. The two
complement each other. Conceptual analysis without empirical research is sterile and often
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ignores vital information that may result from empirical analysis. Empirical analysis
without conceptual analysis on the other hand often results in ill-conceived
operationalisations, theoretical confusion and misconception, and limited (scientific)
relevance. In other words: conceptual analysis, ontology or statistical classification (which
are similar strategies to solve similar problems; see chapter 2) are (or need to be) an
essential part of social science.
8-4-3-culture, entrepreneurship and regional policy
The social and political relevance of the CED is most obvious in regional policy (RP).
Hence, some of the findings of this study may be relevant to RP. The goal of RP generally
is to improve the economic situation of underdeveloped regions within a country (or group
of countries such as the European Union). The prime focus tends to be on fighting
unemployment. Many theories of the CED assume that entrepreneurship (either self-
employment, innovation, or both) positively influences employment growth (see § 7.3), and
hence, many regional policies attempt to promote entrepreneurship.
Cultural difference may be important in or to RP. Although no consistent relationships
between culture and economy were found, cultural differences, which include differences in
economic practices, institutions, and so forth, may influence the success or failure of a
regional policy. A policy to promote entrepreneurship in a region where this is traditionally
valued negatively, for example, is doomed to fail.
There is a more fundamental problem associated to this kind of policy, however: the belief
that entrepreneurship promotes economic growth may be just that: a belief, a myth rather
than reality. There is no consistent empirical evidence that levels of new firm formation,
self employment and or innovation positively influence economic growth (§ 7.4.3). On the
other hand, wealth does seem to influence the levels of innovation and self-employment.
Hence, an RP that focuses on the promotion of entrepreneurship does not seem to be
particularly helpful. (Unfortunately, what kind of regional policy would work is difficult to
say and the answer surely cannot be found in this book.)
RP is the product of a preference for equality. This preference for equality, however, also
influences the methods of RP. Generally a single policy or a small number of policies are
(equally) applied to very different regions (in the European Union, for example, the same
policies have been applied in parts of Spain, Ireland and Sweden). Fighting inequality by
assuming equality in needs, however, does not seem to be the most obvious solution.
Among many other things, culture influences the economy. The concepts may be
problematic and the relationships may be conceptual rather than causal, but there are
relationships nevertheless. Different regions may have different cultures that may
differently influence different aspects of the economy and respond differently to different
policies. RP should, therefore, be based on difference, rather than similarity. Each region or
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culture has its own strenghts and weaknesses to exploit and to improve upon. Regional
economic policies should take these strengths and weaknesses into account rather than try
to fit a general system to very different regions.
8-4-4-summary
There are five basic types of relationships studied by social science. These are the three
relationships of the CED distinguished in section 8.3 (T8.5 to T8.7) and the two
relationships of the MED (T8.8 and T8.9). The focus, however, tends to be on the first three
relationships.
By implication, a part of social science, the MED, is relatively neglected. The MED was
originally the subject of (classical) geography, but in the second half of the 20th century,
this discipline transformed into a 'spatialised' and/or 'regionalised' sociology and
economics. Geography has contributed very little to social science ever since. The limited
relevance of modern geography and the fact that its original subject is left fallow argues in
favour of a return to the MED, a return to the geographical explanation of regional
difference, a return to the study of relationships between people and their environment(s).
As the study of (social) behaviour, social science attempts to elucidate meta-behaviour.
This means that social scientists study behaviour to uncover meta-behavioural entities that
explain the behaviour studied. This is (and/or should be) done by means of a combination
of conceptual and empirical analysis. Moreover, of the five types of relationships of social
science in general, two are conceptual rather than causal. Hence, these relationships should
be studied by means of conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis in social science should,
however, in many cases be supplemented by empirical analysis to distinguish essential from
trivial characteristics of concepts, categories and phenomena.
Regional policies are at least partly based on social science. Many regional policies are
related to CED theories on culture, entrepreneurship and economic growth. No consistent
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth was found, however.
Moreover, regional policies insufficiently deal with regional cultural difference. Although
culture does not necessarily influence culture directly and/or measurably, it may influence
the success or failure of regional policies.
8-5-boundaries, anarchism and free choice
According to Comte (1830-42), science progresses through three stages: theological,
metaphysical and positive. In the theological stage the world experienced is explained by
reference to supernatural forces. In the metaphysical stage explanation is dependent on
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abstract concepts and speculation. Only in the third and final stage, positive science is
substituted for superstition and metaphysics. Comte claimed that most of the sciences had
advanced to the positive stage. The main exception was sociology, which was founded − as
a scientific discipline − by Comte himself. Comte hoped that the new discipline would
progress through the stages quickly, but more than one-and-a-half centuries later, the social
sciences still do not seem to have passed the metaphysical stage. (Orthodox economics with
its belief in markets as 'invisible hands' seems even to be lingering in the first stage.)
Theories of culture, economy and entrepreneurship, and the social sciences in general are
infested with myths, abstract concepts without real-world counterparts and petrified
contingencies. It seems that many of our beliefs and perceptions are based more on myth
than on reality.
Besides the notions of "culture" and "economy" and many theories of the CED itself, two of
the most persistent (types of) myths are boundaries and the myth of free choice. Boundaries
play an immensely important role in (social) science, in the CED and in our lives. To define
is to delimit, to draw boundaries around the proper usage of a concept (Suppe 2000; see
also § 2.2.3). Boundaries are drawn between 'us' and 'them', between groups, between
cultures and between regions, and between scientific fields. This study dealt with
boundaries repeatedly, although rarely explicitly.
In section 5.2 it was explained that choices (for behavioural events, acts or actions) are
determined in an interaction of reason, will and habit. The latter two are the product of
reason, natural drives and culture; the former is influenced by culture through perception. In
other words, choice is determined by (human) nature, culture and/or reason. If choice is
determined, how can it be free?
This section deals with these two myths. Subsection 8.5.1 focuses on the phenomenon of
boundaries and their effects; subsection 8.5.2 assesses the idea of free choice in relation to
the behaviour - meta-behaviour framework proposed in chapter 5.
8-5-1-against all boundaries: a plea for anarchism
In its most common usage, the concept of "boundary" denotes a dividing line between
regions or countries. As a scientific concept, however, it has far broader meaning.
Boundaries are the dividing lines between or the limits of classes. (Note that regions are
spatial classes.) The first attempt to define "limit" was probably Aristotle's:
'Limit' denotes the last point of anything, i.e. the point beyond which it is impossible to find
any part of it, but within all its parts are found. (…) It is clear, then, that the word 'limit' has
as many senses as 'beginning'; more senses, in fact, for every beginning is a limit but not
every limit is a beginning. (Aristotle 4th century BC, § ∆.17)
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All classes are limited; all classes have boundaries. However, the nature of boundaries
differs between different types of classes. Spatial classes (regions), social classes (groups),
intensional and extensional classes (aspects of concepts; see §§ 2.2.3 and 2.7.1 and figure
4.1 in § 4.4), and mathematical classes (sets) all have very different types of boundaries.
Boundaries can be either fuzzy or crisp (they can have breadth or not). Fuzzy boundaries
imply fuzzy class membership and vice versa and the same is true for crisp boundaries and
crisp class membership. In mathematics, lines and boundaries do not have breadth. In social
reality, however, boundaries (and, therefore, class-membership) tend to be fuzzy. The
fuzziness of spatial (and social) spatial boundaries is often related to conceptual
(intensional and/or extensional) boundaries:
The reason why it's vague where the outback begins is not that there's this thing, the
outback, with precise borders; rather there are many things, with different borders, and
nobody has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them as the official
referent of the word 'outback'. (Lewis 1986, p. 212)
Concepts were defined in subsection 2.7.1 as ordered sets of term u, meaning n, and sets
of related concepts p, t and i:
D2.5R d =def. *u,n,p,t,i+  ,
hence, concepts are classes of classes and therefore are limited by boundaries on multiple
levels. Generally, the boundaries of a concept determine the range of its applicability in
different times and contexts (which are themselves bounded) (e.g. Leibniz 1684; see also §
2.2.1). Like all boundaries, conceptual boundaries can be either fuzzy or crisp. Whether
boundaries of meaning and reference (intensional and extensional boundaries) are fuzzy
depends on the specific concept and the theory of meaning (see § 2.2.3) adhered to.
Intension and extension of classical concepts are crisply bounded, for example, and
intension and extension of prototype concepts are fuzzily bounded. The boundaries of the
sets of related concepts p (linguistically, theoretically and ontologically related concepts),
t (semantically related concepts) and i (historically related concepts) are necessarily
fuzzy as the degree of (fuzzy) set membership in all of these sets is dependent on the
strength of the relationship.
Boundaries, whether fuzzy or crisp, are not given entities but are constructed. The idea of
'the myth of the given' was introduced by Sellars (1963; see also § 2.2.1) to refer to the idea
of an intrinsically basic language. According to Sellars, there is no such thing. There are no
final definitions or translations, no definite boundaries between concepts and no aternae
veritates (Nietzsche 1878; see also § 5.1). Concepts and categories and the boundaries
between them are imposed and contingent classifications of reality: 'We dissect nature
along lines laid down by our native languages. (…) We cut nature up, organise it into
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concepts, and ascribe significances as we do' (Whorf 1956, p. 213; more fully quoted in §
2.1.1; see also Goodman 1972; Davidson 1974; Putnam 1981; and § 2.2.1). Hence,
concepts cannot be true or false, but can be practical or impractical and extremely
misleading. The fact that a certain concept or category bounds a part of reality (or our
perception thereof) does not necessarily mean that this part has any relevance as a distinct
part in reality. The fact that we have a concept for something does not necessarily mean
that this something exists independently, discretely and/or continuously. The fact that we
perceive a boundary between kinds or categories does not deny the existence of borderline
cases.
There are no given distinct spheres of reality and, hence, no boundaries between them.
There is no economy; there is no culture. These are mere concepts applied to 'a life that in
its original coming is continuous' (James 1909, p. 235; see also § 5.1). We perceive,
classify and remember reality through our changing, contingent language. Language
provides the blinkers that guide and limit our thought and perception (see also § 2.1.1).
Like conceptual boundaries, socio-spatial boundaries are not given, but constructed (e.g.
Allen, Massey & Cochrane 1998; Paasi 1999). Regionalisation, like all classification, is a
human activity, not a natural phenomenon:
Boundaries are complicated, historically contingent phenomena that are concomitantly both
contextual social institutions and symbols, and are constituted on various spatial scales in
various institutional practices and discourses. (Paasi 1999, p. 680)
With the exception of administrative boundaries, socio-spatial boundaries are extremely
fuzzy. Many socio-spatial boundaries, moreover, seem to have little social impact in
ordinary spatial experience as boundaries and regions only seem to play a role in spatial
cognition on greater distances (e.g. Norberg-Schulz 1971). Only when actively enforced, as
in the case of many state boundaries, or in case of atypical behaviour, such as long-distance
relocation (see § 7.5.1), boundaries seem to be socially important.
Anthropologists and other social scientists dealing with culture generally assume that there
are distinct and − more or less − bounded cultural groups: cultures. Maps and
measurements of culture, such as (and including) those in chapter 6, however, show that
culture is an extremely heterogeneous patchwork independent of scale. Every seemingly
homogeneous area that could be perceived as a culture shows to be extremely
heterogeneous after more detailed measurement.
Cultures then cannot be characterised by common norms, values, ideas, concepts, etc. There
is no common core. For every norm, value, and so forth in a (cultural) group, there are some
members who do not adhere to that norm, value, etc. Possibly, cultures can be regarded as
family resemblances (see § 2.2.1), although the high level of variation on each socio-spatial
scale does not suggest this. Even family resemblances have some kind of common core (in
the form of a pool of properties) that cultures seem to lack. A more obvious explanation for
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the variation measured is that culture is nothing but the average of individual − but socially
formed − norms, values, ideas, concepts, and so forth of / in a contingently bounded group.
There may be a majority of group members that adhere to this average, but there will
always be deviants that are nevertheless classified as members of the same cultural group.
Hence, membership of a cultural group and cultural boundaries (see also Brons 2005) are
extremely fuzzy. One could even argue that there are no cultural boundaries and therefore
no cultures.
Regional boundaries and boundaries between cultural groups then do not represent actual
real world differences, but are imposed. Boundaries are acts of power. Administrative
(regional) boundaries are imposed by state power; other regional and cultural boundaries
are often imposed by socio-cultural leaders or by scientists (e.g. Kimble 1951).
Just as regional or cultural classification or boundary setting are acts of power, so is
classification in general, although it is often difficult to determine who is in control. In the
case of ordinary language conceptualisations of reality, it is the group of language users as
a whole who unconsciously control the categorisation and boundary setting of their
perception of reality. In social science, on the other hand, it often is the scientist who
controls the boundaries between his categories or classes. The boundaries between culture
and institutions, for example, if drawn, are drawn by scientists, not by social reality.
As many phenomena relevant to the CED were found to be quantitatively immeasurable
and only operationable as nominal variables (see § 7.7.2), these phenomena are dependent
on the boundaries between the categories of these nominal variables. Whether a society is
alienated or not is not a matter of reality, but of definition, of classification, of boundary-
setting.
Social science itself is divided in a number of disciplines. These disciplines and the
disciplinary boundaries therebetween are the result of the historical process from which the
social sciences originated. The boundaries are reinforced by institutions and concepts. The
distinct field of economics, for example, makes sense only if the economy is conceptually
distinguished from the rest of social reality. As mentioned above, such conceptual
distinctions, however, are not reflective of social reality; social reality is not divided into
different (e.g. economic, cultural) spheres. The distinction of economics from sociology (or
vice versa) is based on different perceptions and conceptualisations of reality; not on
different aspects thereof. Or, as Wallerstein (1999) claims, none of our existing modes of
dividing the social sciences into separate disciplines and separate organisations of
knowledge makes sense. Disciplinary boundaries, nevertheless, are sustained (mainly) by
the institutions of and in the different social sciences. Although multi- or inter-disciplinarity
has become fashionable recently, it is more of a buzzword than actual scientific practice.
Boundaries are epistemological mystifications. Boundaries are expressions of power, not of
reality, and should therefore be banned from science (except as an object of study).
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Regional, cultural, conceptual and scientific boundaries do not represent real world
phenomena, but the categories we, by means of our institutions, impose upon it.
In 1975, Feyerabend published his Against method, subtitled: outline of an anarchistic
theory of knowledge. Feyerabend's work, however, argued for anarchy rather than
anarchism in science. The difference may seem subtle, but it is not. Anarchism is not
necessarily against rules; it is against rule (e.g. Carter 2000). Anarchism does not strive for
anarchy (as this concept is usually understood, with a possible exception for some forms of
lifestyle anarchism; see Bookchin 1995), but opposes (differences in) power. An anarchist
approach to science is not without method, but without boundaries (and without authority).
Boundaries are harmful to science in at least two ways. Firstly, they misrepresent reality;
and secondly, they are expressions of power and authority which are among the chief
enemies of reason (e.g. Gellner 1992). Hence, a more anarchist attitude towards science and
reality is needed. Such an anarchist approach to (social) science:
(1) is (really) multi-disciplinary by definition as it does not recognise disciplinary
boundaries;
(2) questions all concepts and categories, which implies that every research project
should start with conceptual analysis;
(3) questions all authority, which throws the anarchist scientist back on radical doubt:
there is no other authority to the anarchist scientist than reason.
8-5-2-the myth of free choice
The second myth to be rethought in this section is the myth of free choice. The main
question here is: If choice is determined (by culture, nature and/or reason), how can it be
free? The answer given by Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Marx and many others is that reason is the
key to freedom (see § 3.2.1).
Choices made under the influence (or even pressure) of cultural norms and values are not
free choices, neither are actions driven by (human) nature the result of free choice: 'the
delirious, the garrulous and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision
of their mind, not that they are carried away by impulse' (Spinoza 1674, p. 391). Contrary
to culture and (human) nature, reason is a conscious, individual process. Hence, rational
choice − and rational choice alone − is free choice.
As 'men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that
desire has been determined' (Spinoza 1674, p. 390), the unhindered pursuit of some
irrational desire is merely pseudo-freedom. Culturally determined behaviour is unfree and
by implication, culture is the chief enemy of liberalism, and "religious freedom" is an
oxymoron.
Free choice is the result of reason alone. However, reason is limited. Miró Quesada's (1963;
see also § 3.2.1) showed that reason as 'la facultad del conocimiento lógico-mathemático'
(p. 208), as a result of Gödel's (1931) theorem, cannot be complete. A rational or logico-
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mathematical argument necessarily contains some 'formally undecidable propositions'
(Gödel) that are supplied by intuition (Miró Quesada). In other words: rational thought
necessarily leaves a gap that is filled with non-rational intuition, which through
expectations and desires, is a product of habit, will, culture, and the like. Hence, choice
cannot be the product of reason alone and therefore, there cannot be (completely) free
choice.
Moreover, the process of rational deliberation is further restricted by the fact that men (1)
are not omniscient and (2) are generally incapable of performing the complex calculations
necessary for a completely rational choice (e.g. Simon 1957; 1959). A related idea was
expressed half a century earlier by Freud in his argument that nothing is irrational from the
actor's point of view (e.g. Wallerstein 1999). Human rationality is bounded by limited
knowledge and limited intellectual capacities (Simon) and what is a rational choice is
dependent on his knowledge and his capacities (Freud). The theory of bounded rationality
reinforces the conclusion that all choice is (necessarily) co-determined by unreason (culture
and nature) and that therefore, free choice is a myth. (Although choice cannot be free, it
could be argued, however, that the more rational a choice, the less unfree it is.)
If choice is necessarily unfree, many theories in social and political science are built on
myth. The extreme example of orthodox economics, in which some kind of Spinozian free
man, the homo economicus, who is perfectly rational, perfectly free and omniscient, serves
as a model for man, immediately springs to mind. There are, however, many other fields,
theories and disciplines in political science and philosophy, in ethics and in law and in the
social sciences which are based on the idea of free (and/or rational) choice. (This problem
is not further pursued here as it would require an extensive research project of its own.)
8-5-3-against culture: summary and conclusion
The two myths dealt with in this section are not completely unrelated as shown in figure
8.4. The problems of boundaries versus anarchism and of determination versus free choice
are strongly related to the culture - reason dichotomy, which is a branch of the same tree the
CED sprung from (see §§ 2.5.3 and 3.1).
figure 8.4: boundaries and choice
Boundaries are inseparably bound to categorisation and are enforced and sustained by
institutions (power). Hence, boundaries are cultural or conversely culture is boundary setting.
By implication, culture leads to a misrepresentation of reality, to epistemological
boundaries
anarchism
determination
free choicereason
culture
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mystification. Therefore, culture hinders science. Moreover, culture is unreason, culture is
unfreedom. Culture interferes with rational thought both indirectly, by misrepresenting reality,
and directly, by influencing decisions. As such, culture is not only harmful for science, which
is dependent on reason, but also for freedom. As Gellner (1992) puts it (somewhat bluntly):
'Reason is purification. By contrast, culture is corruption-on-earth' (p. 55).
However, we cannot do without classification, without language; hence, scientific
anarchism is necessarily limited. Conceptual anarchism as a research strategy (question all
concepts) may be useful, the complete rejection of all concepts, however, would make
science and even communication itself impossible. Like anarchism, reason, and therefore,
free choice, are limited, albeit for different reasons. Hence, we are at the mercy of Gellner's
'corruption-on-earth'. As scientists, we have no choice but to fight unreason, knowing that
this is a fight that cannot be won.
8-6-dissolution
The research project that resulted in this manuscript set out to answer a number of questions
on the history, meaning and implications of the culture - economy dialectic (CED (see §
1.2). The main research question was not so much a question about actual cultural influence
on the economy or vice versa, but about what it means to ask such a question. To answer
this question, a four-part research strategy was proposed consisting of: (1) comparison and
analysis; (2) a review of (dis-)confirmation; (3) synthesis; and (4) an assessment of
implications. Parts 1 to 3, however, required conceptual analysis and the construction of
some kind of common language and/or a set of translation rules. As a consequence hereof,
the CED was studied on three different, but not independent, levels: (1) conceptual
(chapters 3 to 5); (2) theoretical or relational (chapters 3 and 7); and (3) meta-theoretical
(chapters 5 and 8). This final section reviews and comments upon the main findings of
these three levels. Subsection 8.6.1 mainly deals with the conceptual level: with conceptual
history and social ontology. The relational level, focusing on the theories of the CED and
their empirical (dis-)confirmation, is reviewed in section 8.6.2. Methodological,
philosophical and other meta-theoretical issues, mainly dealt with in this last chapter, are
reviewed in subsection 8.6.3. Subsection 8.6.4, finally, concludes this study.
8-6-1-the trialectic
In section 2.5 and chapter 3, a series of dichotomies and dialectics were introduced and
explained. The CED was shown to be related to a number of other pairs of concepts
including "reason" - "passion" (§ 3.2.1), "civilisation" - "culture" (§ 3.4.1), and "man" -
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"environment". Some of these pairs seem to be stages in a development illustrated, in figure
2.4 (§ 2.5.3), ultimately leading to the CED. In this development, the poles of the
dichotomies or dialectics continuously shifted. "Reason" and "passion" were 'socialised'
into "civilisation" and "culture" (§ 3.2.2), but with this change, connotations and theoretical
foundations and implications also changed.
The culture - nature dichotomy or its geographical counterpart, the man - environment
dialectic (MED), was the result of a different branch in the same process. However, in
subsection 3.6.1 these two branches (the CED and the MED) were shown to be connected.
This was illustrated in figure 3.1, which presented environment, culture and economy (in a
triangle) as three separate but related conceptual pairs. It seems that the different
dichotomies and dialectics dealt with in this book are part of a more complex trichotomy or
trialectic.
As was shown in figure 3.1, this trialectic, however, cannot be simply represented as a
triangle because it includes intermediate and/or combinatory concepts. The concepts of
"man" or "society" for example include both culture and economy. Similarly, the concept of
"passion" (see § 3.2.1) seems to be an intermediate between or combination of culturally
induced preferences and natural drives. On this latter level of individual determinants of
behaviour, the trichotomy returned in subsection 5.2.1 as reason, culture and nature.
figure 8.5: the trialectic
Figure 8.5 represents this reason - culture - nature trialectic or trichotomy in a hexagon
shape. This hexagon is basically an expanded triangle to include intermediate or
combinatory concepts. For example, S ("man", "society", etc.) is added as a combination of
culture
meta-behaviour
reason
civilisation
economy
nature
environment
man
society
passion
unreason
Romanticism
S
CR
E
N
UEnlightenment
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and/or intermediate between R ("reason", "civilisation", "economy", etc.) and C ("culture",
"meta-behaviour", etc.). Dashed lines connect these intermediates or combinations (S, U
and E) to the corners of the triangle (C, N, R; elements of the trialectic) they are
combinations of (or intermediates in-between).
There are nine solid lines in the figure representing conceptual pairs, dichotomies or
dialectics. Four of these may be regarded major dialectics, the other five are minor
dialectics or may even be missing in (contemporary) discourse altogether. The four major
dialectics are RU, EU, CR, and SN. RU is the reason - passion dialectic (see § 3.2.1); EU
represents the antagonism between Enlightenment and Romanticism or Counter-
Enlightenment (see § 3.2.3); CR is the CED which originated from the introduction of S in
RU and EU; and SN, finally, is the MED and the culture - nature dichotomy. (Note that in
the culture - economy dialectic (CED) culture is represented by C and in the culture - nature
dichotomy by S. As explained before (in § 2.5.3) these are different concepts of "culture"
with an identical label.)
As mentioned, not all lines represent dialectics of the same (historical) importance. The
minor dialectics are CN, RN, CE, SE and SU. Most dichotomies and theories on the social
level which seem to be examples of RN or CN prove to be cases of SN upon closer
inspection. As independent dialectics, CN and RN are relatively unimportant. However,
they are part of the CNR trialectic (represented by bold lines in the figure) that determines
individual human behaviour (see § 5.2.1). Similarly, CE is strongly related to UE. As
dichotomies, SE and SU, finally, seem to be virtually non-existent. Rather, the introduction
of S in E and U resulted in a Hegelian Aufhebung (see § 2.5.2) of SE and SU or S-EU into
RC.
Figure 8.5 represents the structure of our perception and classification of (a part or aspect
of) reality, but does not represent (that part or aspect of) reality itself. The corners of the
figure do not represent ontological categories, but are mere conceptual classifications.
Castree (2004) argued against theories that make this mistake: 'there are no such things as
"economy" and "culture", ontologically speaking (whether separately or together). Rather,
they are two powerful ideas' (p. 206).
While the trialectic (or parts thereof such as the CED and the MED) structures our thought
and (scientific) theorising, its ontological relevance is limited. Figure 8.5 does not represent
reality (or real-world categories). Hence, theories that are set in these terms may not
represent real-world phenomena very well.
Social reality consists of behavioural events or actions and meta-behavioural entities. The
latter include labels for, theories on, and patterns of behavioural events (see § 5.2.2). The
concepts of the trialectic and the assumed relationships between them are examples of
meta-behavioural entities. The concept of "meta-behaviour" is more or less synonymous to
most interpretations of "culture" (see §§ 4.2-3), but there are no simple equivalents of the
other categories of the trialectic. These categories are conceptually (hence, meta-
behaviourally) bounded sets of physical, behavioural and meta-behavioural entities (see §
5.2.4).
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8-6-2-confirmation and falsification
For comparison, evaluation and testing, most theories of the CED were translated in terms
of specific (typed) sets of behavioural and meta-behavioural entities (chapter 7). It seems
that every possible conceptualisation of culture has somehow been related to every possible
conceptualisation of economy. Just as the concepts of "culture" and "economy" are a
bewildering and incomprehensible mess (see chapter 4), so is the CED.
A review of empirical tests and some new tests resulted in a small number of conclusions
on the theories of the CED. Most tests, however, are based on insufficient data to reach an
acceptable level of (dis-) confirmation of the relationships tested. For the direction of
causality in assumed relations, there was generally even less evidence. (see also § 7.1.1)
For most of the theories of the CED, especially those relating specific cultural traits to
entrepreneurship, no consistent evidence was found. There seems to be only one consistent
relationship between a cultural value and an aspect of entrepreneurship: dissatisfaction
leads to higher self-employment. The influence of wealth on culture, on the other hand, was
empirically shown repeatedly. Multiple test results suggest that an increase of wealth
produces an increase of (a) individualism; (b) post-materialism; (c) economic freedom; (d)
civil and (e) political rights; and a decrease of (f) competitiveness.
While the first grand theory (see §§ 3.4.1 and 7.2) seems to be partly confirmed, there is
very little empirical evidence for the second (see §§ 3.5.1 and 7.3). No consistent effects of
cultural values on entrepreneurship were found, and there does not seem to be a consistent
and significant effect of entrepreneurship on economic growth. It may be the case that the
popular belief in the merits of entrepreneurship is just that: a belief, a myth caused by the
position of the entrepreneur as the 'cultural hero' of our society (Hamilton 1957; see also §
7.5.3).
Another popular belief, at least in some economic circles, is that institutions affect
economic growth. Empirical tests indeed show some relationships between institutions,
such as democracy, the quality of the educational system, and economic freedom and
economic growth, but the direction of the causality is generally unclear. In most cases,
historical and statistical evidence suggested that the level of economic development of a
society determines its institutions (wealth leads to economic freedom; a growing middle
class leads to democratisation; and so forth) rather than the other way around. There may be
effects of institutions on the economy, but it is very difficult to discern these from the −
possibly stronger − effects in the opposite direction.
Interestingly, there were important differences between the findings on the regional scale
and those on the (inter-) national scale. Firstly, on the regional scale a strong and positive
effect of Protestantism on self-employment was found, which seems to confirm Weber's
thesis (§§ 7.3.1 and 7.6.2). On the (inter-) national scale, however, no similar results were
found (Kilby 1971; Lynn 1991). The difference may be caused by the fact that national
cultural differences overpower religious and other types of difference, which results in the
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disappearance of some cultural effects on the (inter-) national scale (Inglehart & Baker
2000). Hence, it may be advisable to study the CED or the effects of cultural values on
behaviour in general on the regional rather than the (inter-) national scale.
Secondly, post-materialism seems to have negative effects on the (inter-) national scale and
positive effects on the regional scale. Both relationships can be and were explained easily
and are not necessarily contradictory. The fact, however, that not just this example, but any
negative (or otherwise unexpected) test result for any theory of the CED can be explained
without rejecting the theory implies that the theories of the CED are generally infalsificable
and therefore, unscientific (see § 8.3.1).
8-6-3-science and meta
Falsificability is not the only meta-theoretical problem of the CED. An analysis of the types
of relationships in section 8.3 (T8.5 to T8.7; see table 8.1) showed that these are more often
conceptual than causal. Hence, many of the theories introduced in chapter 7 should be
studied by means of conceptual analysis rather than empirical research, although the latter
may be a useful instrument in accomplishing the former (see § 8.4.2).
Social science is a study of language as much as it is a study of social reality. Language is
important to social science as social reality, and both the perception thereof and social
behaviour are strongly related to the concepts we have and use. Whether we choose to
perform a certain action is (among others) dependent on whether we have a concept for that
action. The trialectic itself would be irrelevant to most of Japanese thought, as there is no
Japanese equivalent of "culture" (see § 2.1.1). Whether two 'things' are related is often more
dependent on how these 'things' are conceptually bounded than on actual social reality.
By implication, research questions in social science should focus on the concepts used first.
Statistical (or other types of empirical) analysis is useless if the researcher uses measures
and concepts that are ambiguous or otherwise unclear. Social science should proceed by a
three-step methodology:
(1) conceptual analysis / (statistical) classification / ontology;
(2) measurement / operationalisation;
(3) correlation / empirical analysis.
The three types of basic theories or relationships of the CED distinguished in subsection
8.3.2 (T8.5 to T8.7) also are the basic theories (or building blocks thereof) of social science
at large (see table 8.1). Theories in the social sciences can be translated into sets of
relationships that are subtypes of T8.5 to T8.7. Two more basic theories (T8.8 and T8.9,
representing the MED) were studied by classical geography, but seem to be a bit neglected
in contemporary social science, especially since geography itself abandoned the MED in
favour of the CED (see §§ 3.6 and 8.4.1).
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table 8.1: basic theories, relationships and disciplines
theory type of relationship scientific discipline(s)
T8.5R ∆:x  ∆/y
T8.6R ∆:x  ∆:y } conceptual
T8.7R ∆/x  ∆:y
} sociology, economics,post-classical geography, etc.
T8.8R ∆(Φ−/)x  ∆:y } causal
T8.9R ∆/x  ∆(Φ−/)y → possibly both } classical geography
Subsection 8.4.1 argued that geography should return to its roots and refocus on the MED,
on T8.8 and T8.9. Subsection 8.5.1, however, pleaded for scientific anarchism and against
disciplinary boundaries. This may seem contradictory. The point made in the latter section
was that boundaries are epistemological mystifications and are, therefore, harmful to
science. However, without some classification, and hence, some boundaries, science (and
communication itself) are impossible (see § 8.5.3). Conceptual boundaries are necessary to
organise our thought and perception. They may be mystifications, but they are necessary
mystifications. Similarly, disciplinary boundaries may be necessary to organise science.
Hence, disciplinary boundaries are a social rather than epistemological phenomenon; they
are artefacts reflecting the origins and history of the different social sciences.
Scientific anarchism questions boundaries, classifications, concepts, authority, and the like.
How then can geographers both choose to limit themselves to the study of the MED (T8.8
and T8.9) and be scientific anarchists at the same time? The answer is that they should not
limit themselves in this (or any other) way (except by reason). Geography should not be
limited to T8.8 and T8.9 (neither should the other social sciences be limited to T8.5 to
T8.6); the MED should be the focus and starting point of geography, not its blinkers or end.
Sociology studies T8.5 to T8.7, but in the case of economics, things are a bit different.
Mainstream or orthodox economics does not study T8.5 to T8.7, but mathematically models
relationships of the form ∆/x  ∆/y, a combination of T8.7 and T8.5 (∆/x  ∆:z  ∆/y)
in which : is considered universal and therefore irrelevant. Orthodox economics is hardly
a social science because it does not study social reality and shares more characteristics with
political ideology and/or religion (see § 7.5.3) than with the other social sciences.
Heterodox economics (including a.o. institutional, evolutionary, behavioural and
experimental economics), on the other hand, has much to offer, and indeed continuously
transgresses the disciplinary boundaries with geography and sociology.
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If all of economics would study T8.5 to T8.7, how then would it be different from
sociology? Considering the basic types of relationships or theories (see table 8.1) it seems
that there are only two social sciences: sociology (focusing on T8.5 to T8.7) and geography
(focusing on T8.8 and T8.9). The difference between them is merely a difference in focus,
and hence, the boundary between them is extremely fuzzy. All other social sciences are
applications of sociology, and sometimes geography, to specific problems, groups,
environments, and so on but are not fundamentally different in the types of questions they
ask or the types of theories they propose. However, as long as geography continues as a
kind of spatial or regional sociology, social science consists only of sociology and a gap. It
is up to geography to (re)fill that gap.
8-6-4-coda
1.1 The concepts of "culture" and "economy" refer to ideas rather than to the world.
They represent how we perceive and classify reality, not reality itself.
1.2 There are no discrete real-world counterparts of the concepts of "culture" and
"economy".
1.3 There are sets of entities that could be labelled "culture" or "economy", but these
sets are bounded subjectively, contingently and ambiguously.
1.4 Subjectively, contingently and ambiguously bounded parts of reality are irrelevant
in objective real-world (social) processes and phenomena. Therefore, culture and
economy are irrelevant in real-world processes and phenomena.
1.5 What is irrelevant to real-world (social) processes and phenomena is irrelevant to
the study thereof: (social) science. Therefore, (")Culture(") and (")economy(") are
irrelevant to (social) science.
1.6 As scientific concepts, "Culture" and "economy" are misconceptions.
2.1 Whether two phenomena are related is often more dependent on how these
phenomena are conceptualised, operationalised and measured (or classified) than
on real-world relationships.
2.2 Culture and economy seem to be related because "culture" and "economy" are
related, not because culture and economy are related.
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2.3 As "culture" and "economy" have no discrete real-world counterparts, there can be
no real-world relationship between these.
2.4 Theories on the relationships between culture and economy are based on
misconceptions rather than on real-world phenomena.
2.5 Theories on the relationships between culture and economy are misconceptions.
3.1 "Culture", "economy" and relationships between culture and economy are
misconceptions.
3.2 Nothing useful can be said about misconceptions except that they are
misconceptions.
3.3 'Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen' (Wittgenstein
1922, § 7).
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APPENDIX
municipality scores on cultural dimensions
See § 6.2 for measurement procedure and further information.
#M = number of municipality (gemeentenummer).
#C = number of Corop-region (Coropnummer).
PMA = postmaterialism.
PMA-R = postmaterialism, corrected for degree of urbanisation, education and income.
PRC = Protestant conservatism.
IND = classical individualism.
IND-R = classical individualism, corrected for education and income.
EAC = egalitarian anti-conservatism.
DST = dissatisfaction.
#M #C PMA PMA-R PRC IND IND-R EAC DST
Aa en Hunze 1680 7 -0,41 -0,18 -0,46 0,78 0,85 2,70 -0,94
Aalburg 738 34 -1,38 -0,43 2,78 -0,74 -0,20 -1,27 -0,34
Aalsmeer 358 23 -0,26 0,10 -0,16 0,91 0,15 0,11 0,79
Aalten 197 14 -0,45 -0,13 0,04 -0,48 0,44 -0,62 -1,79
Abcoude 305 17 0,15 -0,15 3,20 0,34 -0,56
Achtkarspelen 59 4 -0,37 -0,97 0,81 -1,81 -0,43 0,45 -0,69
Alblasserdam 482 30 -0,03 0,13 1,89 -1,16 -0,42 -0,03 0,27
Albrandswaard 613 29 -0,75 0,04 -0,12 1,49 0,38 0,45 1,90
Alkemade 483 25 -0,89 -0,19 -0,46 0,60 0,45 0,13 0,08
Alkmaar 361 19 2,24 0,60 -0,46 -0,36 0,00 0,89 0,54
Almelo 141 12 1,00 -0,30 0,19 -1,35 -0,19 0,55 0,41
Almere 34 40 1,16 0,50 -0,02 -0,05 0,02 1,88 2,92
Alphen aan den Rijn 484 28 0,82 0,47 0,20 0,16 -0,46 -0,03 0,56
Alphen-Chaam 1723 34 -0,87 -0,79 0,12 -1,45 -0,15
Ambt Montfort 1679 38 -0,29 0,26 -0,93 -0,49 -0,15 -1,45 0,45
Ameland 60 4 -0,48 -0,22 -0,20 0,96 -0,65
Amerongen 306 17 -0,33 1,40 1,00 -0,51 -0,28
Amersfoort 307 17 1,59 0,44 0,07 0,15 -0,57 0,27 -0,49
Amstelveen 362 23 1,35 0,40 0,15 2,47 0,70 0,20 -0,35
Amsterdam 363 23 4,58 -1,02 0,16 0,16 0,06 0,41 -0,04
Andijk 364 18 -0,15 0,39 -0,16 0,14 0,35
Angerlo 199 15 -0,42 -1,04 0,01 0,01 -0,59
Anna Paulowna 366 18 -0,85 -0,18 -0,55 -0,20 0,48 1,10 1,77
Apeldoorn 200 13 0,77 0,28 0,41 -0,06 -0,03 0,36 0,05
Appingedam 3 2 0,84 0,39 0,11 -1,34 -0,04 1,77 0,12
Arcen en Velden 885 37 -0,69 -1,12 -0,22 -1,42 -0,45
Arnhem 202 15 3,09 0,97 -0,31 -0,57 -0,26 0,59 -0,30
Assen 106 7 1,24 0,54 0,50 -0,39 0,17 1,45 -0,84
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#M #C PMA PMA-R PRC IND IND-R EAC DST
Asten 743 36 -0,74 -0,17 -0,89 -0,30 0,17 -1,15 -0,43
Baarle-Nassau 744 34 -0,34 -0,78 0,09 -1,56 0,07
Baarn 308 17 1,03 0,70 0,39 1,13 0,14 -0,20 0,11
Barendrecht 489 29 -0,68 -0,61 0,45 0,80 -0,16 0,36 1,05
Barneveld 203 13 -1,10 -0,24 2,75 -0,69 -0,46 -1,32 -0,53
Bathmen 144 11 -1,38 -0,62 1,81 2,00 -1,56
Bedum 5 3 -0,35 -0,10 0,65 -0,35 0,29 0,55 -2,02
Beek 888 39 0,08 0,23 -0,72 0,11 -0,01 -0,99 0,35
Beemster 370 23 -0,71 -0,61 1,67 1,98 0,06
Beesel 889 37 -0,43 -0,04 -0,85 -0,54 0,14 -0,85 1,06
Bellingwedde 7 1 0,21 -0,10 -0,42 -0,54 0,84 2,39 0,02
Bennebroek 372 21 -0,21 -0,02 3,30 -0,16 -0,77
Bergambacht 491 28 -1,07 1,45 0,06 0,62 -0,13
Bergeijk 1724 36 -1,00 -0,59 -0,77 -0,41 -0,38 -1,20 0,09
Bergen (L.) 893 37 -0,35 -0,48 -0,87 -0,05 -0,37 -0,99 0,37
Bergen (NH.) 373 19 0,53 1,02 -0,52 1,07 1,08 0,26 0,60
Bergen op Zoom 748 33 0,91 0,53 -0,26 -0,52 -0,12 -0,60 1,55
Bergh 207 14 -0,34 0,17 -1,08 -0,35 0,40 -0,83 -0,05
Bergschenhoek 492 29 -1,41 -1,26 -0,09 0,93 -0,39 0,56 1,27
Berkel en Rodenrijs 493 29 -0,82 -0,50 0,36 0,69 -0,37 -0,63 0,20
Bernheze 1721 35 -0,34 0,27 -1,42 -0,73 -0,41 -1,53 -1,08
Bernisse 568 29 -0,95 -0,15 0,01 0,61 0,18 1,01 1,60
Best 753 36 -0,07 -0,21 -0,68 0,09 -0,30 -0,78 0,21
Beuningen 209 15 0,31 0,53 -1,03 -0,05 0,00 0,03 -0,14
Beverwijk 375 20 1,46 1,16 -0,45 -0,69 -0,25 0,60 1,46
Binnenmaas 585 29 -0,69 -0,02 0,65 0,75 -0,03 0,44 0,95
Bladel 1728 36 -0,84 -0,13 -1,13 -0,71 -0,36 -0,90 0,35
Blaricum 376 24 0,27 0,18 3,82 -0,17 -0,17
Bleiswijk 495 29 -1,42 -0,84 0,31 1,04 0,16 -0,48 0,73
Bloemendaal 377 21 0,31 -0,49 0,18 4,67 0,48 -0,28 -0,83
Boarnsterhim 55 4 -0,04 -0,14 -0,63 0,09 0,67 2,68 -1,15
Bodegraven 497 28 -0,70 -0,37 0,82 -0,09 -0,63 -0,60 -0,07
Boekel 755 35 -1,12 -0,52 -1,23 -0,72 0,08 -1,77 -0,93
Bolsward 64 5 0,73 -0,32 -1,06 -0,26 -0,58
Borculo 211 14 -0,78 -0,51 0,54 1,74 -1,04
Borger-Odoorn 1681 8 -0,38 -0,29 -0,19 -0,20 0,67 2,04 -0,49
Borne 147 12 -0,35 -0,18 -0,80 -0,04 0,11 -0,77 -1,15
Borsele 654 32 -0,30 0,51 1,15 -0,64 -0,16 -0,67 -0,38
Boskoop 499 28 -0,47 -0,08 0,56 0,23 -0,34 -0,17 0,15
Boxmeer 756 35 0,29 0,69 -1,06 -0,22 0,04 -1,14 -1,14
Boxtel 757 35 0,85 0,71 -0,94 -0,65 -0,56 -1,11 -0,36
Breda 758 33 1,71 0,37 -0,68 -0,03 -0,28 -0,27 0,43
Breukelen 311 17 0,15 0,61 0,39 1,30 0,23 -0,35 -0,44
Brielle 501 29 -0,23 0,45 -0,22 1,05 0,51 1,13 1,71
Brummen 213 14 -0,32 0,09 -0,48 0,02 0,16 1,39 -0,39
Brunssum 899 39 1,69 0,72 -0,38 -1,27 -0,02 -0,64 1,16
Bunnik 312 17 0,30 -0,06 -0,31 2,19 0,23 -0,40 -1,55
Bunschoten 313 17 -1,37 -0,51 3,40 -1,70 -1,37 -1,65 -1,24
Buren 214 16 -0,88 -0,55 0,43 0,32 0,24 1,44 0,73
Bussum 381 24 1,44 -0,43 0,33 2,42 0,88 -0,48 -0,39
Capelle aan den IJssel 502 29 1,06 -0,75 1,00 0,24 -0,15 0,21 2,35
Castricum 383 20 0,21 0,12 -0,72 1,32 -0,06 0,28 -0,37
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#M #C PMA PMA-R PRC IND IND-R EAC DST
Coevorden 109 8 -0,36 -0,11 -0,21 -0,54 0,36 1,81 -0,65
Cranendonck 1706 36 -0,60 -0,44 -0,92 -0,48 -0,24 -0,91 0,70
Cromstrijen 611 29 -0,66 -0,15 0,77 0,32 -0,17 0,47 0,71
Cuijk 1684 35 0,63 0,46 -0,85 -0,60 -0,03 -0,31 -0,05
Culemborg 216 16 1,13 0,80 -0,09 -0,04 -0,27 0,22 0,27
Dalfsen 148 10 -1,40 -0,88 0,44 -0,32 0,05 -0,63 -1,92
Dantumadeel 65 4 -0,52 -0,97 1,15 -1,17 0,29 -0,03 -1,07
De Bilt 310 17 1,01 0,38 0,35 2,51 0,52 -0,36 -0,97
De Lier 552 27 -1,40 -0,62 0,27 -0,51 -0,77 -1,02 0,62
De Marne 1663 3 0,66 0,27 0,43 -0,84 0,35 1,27 -1,07
De Ronde Venen 736 17 -0,36 -0,08 0,11 0,75 -0,35 -0,14 0,70
De Wolden 1690 9 -1,09 -0,43 0,06 0,39 0,95 1,35 -0,78
Delft 503 27 2,56 0,03 0,10 0,72 0,39 -0,12 -0,58
Delfzijl 10 2 0,64 0,32 0,29 -1,21 -0,07 1,77 0,48
Den Helder 400 18 1,33 1,17 0,58 -0,44 0,58 0,75 2,86
Deurne 762 36 -0,43 0,00 -0,91 -0,71 -0,19 -1,34 0,11
Deventer 150 11 1,64 0,68 -0,50 -0,70 -0,32 1,28 -0,67
Didam 218 15 -0,50 0,33 -0,87 -0,46 0,18 -1,10 -0,06
Diemen 384 23 1,97 0,77 -0,23 1,40 0,34 1,12 1,56
Dinkelland 1774 12 -1,72 -1,13 -1,01 -0,20 0,19 -2,02 -1,77
Dinxperlo 219 14 -0,42 -0,48 -0,83 -0,14 -0,79
Dirksland 504 29 -0,92 2,51 -0,72 -0,30 0,39
Doesburg 221 15 1,57 1,25 -0,68 -0,77 0,00 0,70 -0,44
Doetinchem 222 14 0,98 0,75 -0,34 -0,39 0,02 0,59 -0,39
Dongen 766 34 0,52 0,45 -0,61 -0,95 -0,74 -0,80 -0,13
Dongeradeel 58 4 -0,10 -0,79 0,63 -1,07 0,29 -0,35 -1,39
Doorn 315 17 0,73 0,58 0,96 1,55 -0,42 -0,36 -0,83
Dordrecht 505 30 1,62 0,08 0,74 -0,74 -0,31 0,42 1,59
Drechterland 498 18 -0,95 0,03 -0,91 0,04 0,31 -0,06 0,67
Driebergen-Rijsenburg 316 17 1,01 0,13 0,51 2,00 0,46 -0,42 -1,22
Drimmelen 1719 33 -0,52 0,29 -1,00 -0,26 -0,20 -0,54 0,66
Dronten 303 40 -0,30 0,22 0,62 -0,19 0,29 0,24 0,43
Druten 225 15 -0,17 0,26 -0,96 -0,49 -0,07 -0,09 0,00
Duiven 226 15 -0,11 0,22 -0,73 0,14 0,20 0,22 0,19
Echt-Susteren 1711 38 0,05 -0,06 -0,96 -0,40 -0,04 -0,93 0,24
Edam-Volendam 385 23 -1,00 -0,55 -0,49 -0,78 -0,89 -1,21 1,79
Ede 228 13 0,06 0,00 1,96 -0,48 -0,50 -0,82 -0,34
Eemnes 317 17 0,12 -0,23 1,28 0,16 0,23
Eemsmond 1651 3 0,28 -0,09 0,45 -0,98 0,69 1,30 -1,04
Eersel 770 36 -0,90 -0,13 -1,00 0,16 -0,06 -1,19 -0,31
Eibergen 229 14 -0,62 -0,28 -0,87 -0,21 0,57 -0,03 -1,70
Eijsden 905 39 -0,48 -0,39 -0,74 0,03 -0,52 -1,13 -0,55
Eindhoven 772 36 2,32 0,37 -0,40 -0,57 -0,63 -0,25 0,49
Elburg 230 13 -0,99 -0,19 2,38 -0,96 -0,25 -1,17 -0,95
Emmen 114 8 0,65 0,69 0,02 -1,44 -0,22 1,22 -0,14
Enkhuizen 388 18 1,23 1,24 -0,18 -0,33 0,54 0,86 0,93
Enschede 153 12 1,76 -0,22 0,08 -1,03 -0,05 0,91 -0,14
Epe 232 13 -0,31 0,22 0,53 -0,16 0,02 0,28 -0,28
Ermelo 233 13 -0,17 0,28 1,48 -0,09 -0,42 -1,23 -0,82
Etten-Leur 777 33 0,40 0,26 -0,66 -0,59 -0,44 -0,40 1,21
Ferwerderadiel 1722 4 -0,33 0,23 -0,79 0,33 -1,09
Franekeradeel 70 4 -0,08 -0,99 0,27 -0,65 0,62 1,04 -0,85
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Gaasterlân-Sleat 653 5 -0,88 -0,73 0,08 0,07 0,94 -0,11 -1,00
Geertruidenberg 779 33 -0,06 0,69 -1,19 -0,76 -0,45 -0,07 1,34
Geldermalsen 236 16 -0,73 -0,15 0,89 0,06 -0,14 0,41 0,46
Geldrop 781 36 1,12 0,60 -0,73 -0,48 -0,56 -0,90 0,62
Gemert-Bakel 1652 36 -0,39 -0,26 -1,12 -0,78 0,08 -1,09 -0,09
Gendringen 237 14 -0,53 -0,43 -0,98 -0,98 -0,13 -0,75 -0,41
Gennep 907 37 0,53 1,04 -0,77 0,46 0,67 -0,92 0,25
Giessenlanden 689 30 -1,33 -0,28 1,29 -0,25 -0,42 0,53 -0,41
Gilze en Rijen 784 34 -0,08 0,21 -0,69 -0,71 -0,58 -0,49 0,48
Goedereede 511 29 -1,07 0,02 2,80 -1,05 -0,78 -0,68 -0,01
Goes 664 32 0,96 0,46 0,63 -0,40 -0,04 0,10 -0,55
Goirle 785 34 0,74 0,43 -0,62 -0,47 -0,94 -0,19 0,11
Gorinchem 512 30 0,80 0,19 0,58 -0,46 -0,13 0,73 0,80
Gorssel 239 14 -0,56 -0,06 -0,43 1,85 1,10 1,04 -1,52
Gouda 513 28 1,13 -1,12 0,45 0,14 -0,33 0,23 0,62
Graafstroom 693 30 -1,68 -0,59 2,91 -0,60 -1,00 -1,26 -1,32
Graft-De Rijp 365 23 -0,42 -0,97 0,84 1,16 0,17
Grave 786 35 0,47 0,62 -1,02 -0,15 0,00 -0,47 -0,09
Groenlo 240 14 -0,18 -1,11 -0,94 -0,66 -1,02
Groesbeek 241 15 0,53 0,31 -1,14 -0,46 -0,33 -0,34 -0,85
Groningen 14 3 3,84 0,37 0,07 -0,25 0,22 1,44 -2,17
Grootegast 15 3 -0,74 -0,76 0,73 -0,98 0,19 0,27 -0,81
Gulpen-Wittem 1729 39 -0,28 0,33 -0,86 0,04 0,13 -1,79 -0,87
Haaksbergen 158 12 -0,80 -0,29 -0,93 -0,10 0,18 -0,57 -0,74
Haaren 788 35 -0,75 -0,21 -0,90 0,01 -0,19 -1,47 -0,49
Haarlem 392 21 2,49 0,05 -0,24 0,54 0,26 0,73 -0,16
Haarlemmerliede c.a. 393 21 0,04 -0,70 1,87 0,42 0,59
Haarlemmermeer 394 23 0,14 0,46 0,01 0,88 0,15 0,60 1,38
Haelen 914 38 -0,31 -0,09 -0,95 0,02 -0,06 -1,36 0,59
Halderberge 1655 33 -0,27 0,41 -0,68 -0,48 -0,30 -0,82 1,18
Hardenberg 160 10 -1,01 -0,24 1,05 -1,02 -0,05 -0,18 -1,31
Harderwijk 243 13 0,20 0,17 1,05 -0,50 -0,16 -0,43 0,05
Hardinxveld-Giessendam 523 30 -1,29 -0,55 3,05 -0,99 -0,52 -0,68 -0,78
Haren 17 3 0,70 -0,11 0,30 2,52 0,66 0,77 -2,11
Harenkarspel 395 18 -0,77 -0,22 -1,08 0,06 0,51 0,87 0,90
Harlingen 72 4 1,22 0,61 0,06 -0,77 0,62 1,21 0,52
Hattem 244 13 -0,79 -0,40 1,11 -0,53 -0,64 0,40 -1,86
Heel 1937 38 -0,55 -1,33 -0,05 -1,18 0,36
Heemskerk 396 20 0,86 0,78 -0,32 0,05 0,11 0,01 1,01
Heemstede 397 21 0,75 -0,36 0,10 3,64 1,12 -0,32 -0,75
Heerde 246 13 -0,95 0,07 1,18 -0,84 -0,59 -0,01 -1,18
Heerenveen 74 6 0,76 0,28 -0,20 -0,33 0,25 1,72 -0,46
Heerhugowaard 398 19 0,22 0,18 -0,57 -0,40 -0,12 0,84 1,57
Heerlen 917 39 2,82 1,29 -0,50 -1,77 -0,83 -1,08 1,26
Heeze-Leende 1658 36 -0,84 -0,34 -0,90 0,63 -0,39 -1,15 -0,29
Heiloo 399 19 0,09 0,17 -0,47 1,61 0,55 0,44 -0,57
Helden 918 37 -0,88 -0,31 -1,02 -0,66 0,01 -1,29 0,02
Hellendoorn 163 12 -0,89 -0,17 0,05 -0,59 0,09 -0,91 -1,44
Hellevoetsluis 530 29 0,51 0,48 0,08 -0,20 0,08 1,26 3,15
Helmond 794 36 1,19 -0,17 -0,62 -1,40 -0,71 -0,28 1,76
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 531 30 -0,72 -0,93 1,67 0,08 -0,30 -0,20 0,66
Hengelo (Gld.) 248 14 -0,70 -0,70 0,11 -0,03 -1,02
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Hengelo (O.) 164 12 0,87 0,04 -0,34 -0,53 -0,22 0,00 -0,61
het Bildt 63 4 0,08 -0,60 -0,18 -0,82 0,55 1,13 -0,62
Heumen 252 15 0,37 -0,06 -0,82 1,03 0,08 -0,15 -1,04
Heusden 797 35 -0,14 0,09 -0,89 -0,52 -0,38 -0,61 0,60
Heythuysen 920 38 -0,36 -0,40 -0,99 -0,17 -0,03 -1,57 -0,05
Hillegom 534 25 0,21 0,25 -0,37 0,52 0,28 -0,25 0,94
Hilvarenbeek 798 34 -0,83 -0,13 -1,21 -0,09 -0,05 -0,94 -0,91
Hilversum 402 24 1,71 0,47 0,00 1,11 0,40 0,50 -0,05
Hof van Twente 1735 12 -0,84 -0,72 -0,51 0,36 0,42 0,12 -1,07
Hoogeveen 118 9 0,05 0,14 0,83 -1,42 -0,32 0,31 -0,25
Hoogezand-Sappemeer 18 3 1,28 0,53 -0,01 -1,23 0,08 1,96 0,20
Hoorn 405 18 1,39 0,43 -0,51 -0,25 0,00 1,21 1,17
Horst aan de Maas 1507 37 -0,42 0,34 -1,34 -0,54 -0,25 -1,46 -0,62
Houten 321 17 0,25 -0,03 0,21 1,18 0,13 0,22 -0,44
Huizen 406 24 0,67 -0,39 0,66 1,20 0,14 -0,21 0,39
Hulst 677 31 0,08 0,15 -0,82 -0,79 -0,50 -0,69 0,58
Hummelo en Keppel 256 14 -0,67 -0,61 1,49 1,33 -1,15
Hunsel 925 38 -1,07 -1,14 -0,42 -1,68 0,01
IJsselstein 353 17 0,42 0,34 -0,54 0,10 -0,63 0,75 1,03
Jacobswoude 645 28 -0,97 -0,09 -0,36 0,81 0,31 -0,20 0,29
Kampen 166 10 0,02 -0,64 1,81 -1,35 -0,36 -0,33 -1,30
Kapelle 678 32 -0,78 0,03 1,26 -0,25 0,04 -0,04 -0,65
Katwijk 537 25 -0,58 -0,82 2,36 -1,27 -0,81 -1,56 0,18
Kerkrade 928 39 1,79 0,88 -0,18 -1,48 -0,52 -0,58 1,56
Kessel 929 37 -1,15 -1,16 -0,95 -1,17 0,27
Kesteren 258 16 -1,21 -0,78 2,29 -0,91 -0,43 -0,01 -0,50
Kollumerland c.a. 79 4 -0,44 -1,43 0,72 -1,30 0,24 -0,02 -0,73
Korendijk 588 29 -0,92 -0,51 1,68 0,21 0,11 -0,02 0,56
Krimpen aan den IJssel 542 29 -0,35 -0,92 1,59 0,14 -0,26 -0,12 0,78
Laarbeek 1659 36 -0,51 -0,03 -1,04 -0,77 -0,33 -1,08 -0,01
Landerd 1685 35 -0,50 0,14 -1,42 -0,38 0,11 -1,20 -0,86
Landgraaf 882 39 1,36 0,99 -0,48 -1,25 -0,41 -0,28 0,75
Landsmeer 415 23 0,43 0,86 -0,28 1,69 0,73 1,57 1,35
Langedijk 416 19 -0,61 -0,50 -0,69 0,23 0,10 1,34 1,38
Laren 417 24 0,56 0,28 0,15 3,69 0,57 -0,49 -0,04
Leek 22 3 0,22 -0,06 0,39 -0,07 0,39 1,15 -0,99
Leerdam 545 30 -0,01 0,72 1,52 -1,03 -0,40 -0,26 0,75
Leersum 326 17 0,27 0,98 0,85 0,16 0,07
Leeuwarden 80 4 2,68 0,58 -0,11 -1,02 -0,23 1,37 -0,79
Leeuwarderadeel 81 4 -0,61 -0,21 -0,26 -0,34 0,16 1,97 -1,15
Leiden 546 25 2,94 -0,28 0,02 1,02 0,39 0,54 -1,15
Leiderdorp 547 25 0,60 -0,33 0,20 1,27 -0,22 0,21 0,09
Leidschendam-Voorburg 1916 26 1,11 -0,27 -0,13 1,53 0,26 -0,25 0,58
Lelystad 995 40 1,73 1,24 0,41 -1,02 -0,18 1,55 2,53
Lemsterland 82 5 -0,27 -0,36 -0,16 -0,45 0,45 1,02 0,18
Leusden 327 17 0,16 0,19 0,32 1,35 -0,18 0,01 -0,60
Lichtenvoorde 260 14 -1,01 -0,22 -1,22 0,05 0,70 -0,85 -1,12
Liemeer 1673 28 -1,14 -0,15 0,43 -1,03 0,58
Liesveld 694 30 -1,39 -0,45 1,94 -0,75 -0,67 -0,21 -0,58
Lingewaal 733 16 -0,91 -0,14 0,89 -0,29 -0,11 0,52 0,28
Lingewaard 1705 15 -0,32 -0,20 -1,16 -0,01 0,27 -0,10 -0,03
Lisse 553 25 -0,30 0,09 0,27 0,55 0,30 -0,72 0,57
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Lith 808 35 -0,72 -1,14 -0,87 -1,67 -0,45
Littenseradiel 140 4 -0,46 -0,59 -0,51 -0,21 0,21 1,48 -1,47
Lochem 262 14 -0,15 0,07 -0,25 0,92 0,83 1,02 -1,30
Loenen 329 17 0,16 0,19 2,85 -0,17 -0,13
Loon op Zand 809 34 -0,44 -0,18 -0,59 -0,16 0,06 -0,15 0,23
Lopik 331 17 -1,32 -0,01 0,95 -0,36 -0,22 -0,73 0,26
Loppersum 24 2 0,15 -0,42 0,47 -0,41 0,39 0,97 -1,64
Losser 168 12 -0,84 -0,36 -0,93 -0,59 0,11 -0,69 -0,37
Maarn 332 17 -0,52 0,15 2,46 0,87 -0,84
Maarssen 333 17 0,64 0,29 -0,23 0,80 -0,09 0,46 0,90
Maasbracht 933 38 -0,04 0,07 -0,87 -0,36 0,06 -1,17 0,51
Maasbree 934 37 -1,18 -0,63 -0,99 -0,45 -0,24 -1,09 0,13
Maasdonk 1671 35 -0,89 0,11 -1,20 -1,05 -0,57 -1,79 -0,34
Maasdriel 263 16 -0,72 -0,29 -0,44 -0,11 0,18 -0,46 0,74
Maasland 555 27 -1,72 -0,03 0,72 -0,77 -0,50
Maassluis 556 29 0,44 -0,35 0,84 -0,52 -0,52 -0,01 2,14
Maastricht 935 39 2,47 0,27 -0,35 -0,36 -0,17 -0,80 0,04
Margraten 936 39 -0,56 -0,16 -0,73 0,57 0,11 -1,86 -0,94
Marum 25 3 -0,69 0,05 0,00 -0,31 0,86 1,60 0,01
Medemblik 420 18 0,57 -0,43 -0,54 0,49 2,45
Meerlo-Wanssum 993 37 -0,85 -1,28 -0,45 -1,43 -0,67
Meerssen 938 39 -0,10 0,03 -0,84 0,45 0,14 -1,38 -0,01
Meijel 941 37 -1,44 -1,30 -0,54 -1,46 0,11
Menaldumadeel 83 4 -0,59 -0,58 -0,32 -0,29 0,34 1,50 -1,18
Menterwolde 1987 1 0,48 0,08 -0,52 -1,32 0,10 2,77 0,00
Meppel 119 9 0,48 0,19 0,37 -0,48 0,22 1,16 -0,42
Middelburg 687 32 1,45 0,81 1,13 -0,70 -0,29 0,16 -0,43
Middelharnis 559 29 -0,49 0,20 2,03 -0,55 0,13 -0,20 0,14
Midden-Drenthe 1731 7 -0,47 -0,27 -0,03 -0,17 0,48 1,67 -0,97
Mierlo 814 36 0,03 -0,27 -0,86 0,03 -0,23 -0,95 -0,01
Mill en Sint Hubert 815 35 -0,78 -0,36 -1,26 -0,72 0,18 -1,59 -0,67
Millingen aan de Rijn 265 15 0,49 -1,28 -0,60 -0,14 -0,09
Moerdijk 1709 33 0,15 0,77 -0,59 -0,73 -0,62 -0,34 0,62
Monster 562 27 -0,83 -1,68 0,33 0,47 0,62 -1,07 1,30
Montfoort 335 17 -0,73 0,15 0,27 0,38 -0,30 0,03 0,29
Mook en Middelaar 944 37 0,52 -1,23 1,34 -0,76 -1,07
Moordrecht 563 28 -0,21 0,37 0,43 -0,05 0,58
Muiden 424 24 0,63 -0,30 3,17 0,64 -0,11
Naaldwijk 565 27 -1,38 -0,91 -0,04 0,26 0,15 -0,63 1,17
Naarden 425 24 0,32 -0,12 0,08 3,44 1,06 0,22 -0,57
Nederlek 643 29 -0,92 -0,14 0,70 0,23 0,55 1,23 0,71
Nederweert 946 38 -1,24 -0,33 -0,98 -0,44 0,11 -1,29 0,10
Neede 266 14 -0,68 -0,50 -0,57 -0,23 0,42 0,63 -0,94
Neerijnen 304 16 -1,01 -0,16 0,77 -0,02 0,27 0,86 -0,05
Niedorp 412 18 -0,79 -0,11 -1,12 0,14 0,35 2,06 1,35
Nieuwegein 356 17 1,10 0,63 0,30 -1,30 -1,72 0,19 1,57
Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel 567 29 -0,17 -0,59 0,95 0,40 -0,88 0,28 1,41
Nieuwkoop 569 28 -0,31 0,36 -0,06 0,49 -0,12 -0,34 0,49
Nieuw-Lekkerland 571 30 -1,21 2,91 -0,31 -0,20 -0,67
Nijefurd 104 5 -0,24 -0,77 -0,16 -0,08 1,32 0,50 -1,00
Nijkerk 267 13 -0,68 -0,36 1,23 -0,34 -0,44 -0,77 -0,27
Nijmegen 268 15 4,08 0,90 -0,76 0,02 -0,08 -0,51 -1,97
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Noord-Beveland 1695 32 -0,20 0,36 -0,22 0,82 0,24
Noordenveld 1699 7 0,03 -0,01 -0,04 0,72 0,70 1,87 -0,87
Noorder-Koggenland 529 18 -0,32 0,03 -0,08 0,40 0,40 1,80 1,09
Noordoostpolder 171 40 -0,31 -0,22 0,70 -0,69 0,23 0,07 -0,36
Noordwijk 575 25 0,40 0,57 0,06 1,01 0,49 -0,19 0,62
Noordwijkerhout 576 25 -0,27 0,12 -0,43 1,01 0,79 -0,72 0,80
Nuenen c.a. 820 36 -0,20 -0,25 -0,56 1,34 -0,02 -0,53 -0,15
Nunspeet 302 13 -0,89 -0,34 3,21 -0,57 -0,22 -1,59 -0,68
Nuth 951 39 -0,51 -0,20 -1,04 -0,45 -0,54 -0,86 0,90
Obdam 429 18 -1,21 -1,17 0,08 0,20 0,35
Oegstgeest 579 25 0,53 -0,71 0,22 2,99 0,38 0,15 -1,07
Oirschot 823 36 -1,01 -0,26 -1,09 -0,18 0,01 -1,31 -0,39
Oisterwijk 824 34 -0,03 0,01 -0,84 0,43 0,18 -0,44 -0,29
Oldebroek 269 13 -1,24 -0,13 3,08 -1,31 -0,68 -1,38 -1,00
Oldenzaal 173 12 0,09 -0,75 -0,84 -0,22 0,04 -0,75 -0,96
Olst-Wijhe 1773 11 -0,56 -0,33 -0,68 0,08 0,51 0,93 -1,33
Ommen 175 10 -1,00 -0,39 0,89 -0,03 0,61 -0,62 -1,89
Onderbanken 881 39 0,18 -0,98 -0,58 -0,91 0,63
Oosterhout 826 33 0,51 0,31 -0,55 -0,29 -0,32 -0,29 1,03
Oostflakkee 580 29 -0,48 -0,20 0,95 -1,00 -0,45 0,22 0,93
Ooststellingwerf 85 6 0,26 -0,26 0,08 -0,77 0,27 1,73 -0,42
Oostzaan 431 23 0,10 -0,48 1,49 2,18 1,31
Opmeer 432 18 -1,05 0,09 -0,98 0,12 0,48 0,21 0,91
Opsterland 86 6 -0,06 -0,27 0,09 -0,30 0,56 1,46 -1,37
Oss 828 35 1,84 1,46 -1,25 -1,37 -1,11 -1,35 -0,67
Oud-Beijerland 584 29 -0,31 -0,32 0,99 0,21 -0,20 -0,09 0,82
Ouder-Amstel 437 23 0,81 0,26 -0,35 2,21 0,28 0,78 0,05
Ouderkerk 644 29 -1,12 2,18 -0,42 0,11 0,12
Oudewater 589 17 -0,82 -0,32 -0,11 0,40 -0,02 -0,73 0,02
Overbetuwe 1734 15 0,07 -0,19 -0,26 0,31 0,12 -0,09 -0,47
Papendrecht 590 30 -0,16 -0,35 0,93 -0,29 -0,52 0,51 1,22
Pekela 765 1 1,14 0,58 -0,09 -2,13 -0,27 2,09 -0,16
Pijnacker-Nootdorp 1926 26 -0,98 -0,71 -0,33 1,14 -0,16 0,01 0,44
Purmerend 439 23 1,01 0,13 -0,34 0,06 0,33 1,61 2,43
Putten 273 13 -0,91 -0,02 2,13 -0,62 -0,53 -1,25 -0,35
Raalte 177 11 -0,89 -0,60 -0,90 -0,33 0,17 -0,83 -1,49
Reeuwijk 595 28 -1,03 -0,30 1,19 0,98 -0,56 -0,57 0,32
Reiderland 1661 1 1,22 -0,74 -1,69 2,64 0,28
Reimerswaal 703 32 -0,63 -0,10 3,11 -1,60 -0,83 -0,73 0,62
Renkum 274 15 1,27 1,07 0,04 1,52 0,51 0,13 -1,07
Renswoude 339 17 -1,20 2,02 -0,53 -1,26 -0,03
Reusel-De Mierden 1667 36 -1,43 -0,37 -0,97 -0,96 -0,33 -1,33 0,04
Rheden 275 15 1,11 0,49 -0,07 0,50 0,29 0,68 -0,75
Rhenen 340 17 -0,04 0,10 1,42 0,00 -0,15 -0,36 -0,06
Ridderkerk 597 29 -0,10 -0,31 1,30 -0,38 -0,21 0,37 1,49
Rijnsburg 602 25 -1,12 -1,24 1,77 -0,92 -0,72 -1,26 -0,06
Rijnwaarden 196 15 -0,10 0,60 -1,14 -0,88 0,23 -0,33 0,50
Rijnwoude 1672 28 -0,78 -0,06 0,67 0,19 -0,39 0,11 0,07
Rijssen 178 12 -1,40 -0,90 2,89 -0,83 -0,18 -0,89 -1,54
Rijswijk 603 26 1,11 -0,58 0,02 0,98 -0,04 0,01 1,80
Roerdalen 1669 38 0,09 0,71 -0,80 -0,54 -0,36 -1,40 0,70
Roermond 957 38 1,63 0,26 -0,29 -0,50 -0,01 -0,63 1,69
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Roggel en Neer 1670 38 -0,67 -1,04 -0,50 -1,63 -0,49
Roosendaal 1674 33 0,55 0,33 -0,59 -0,73 -0,45 -0,49 1,51
Rotterdam 599 29 3,04 -1,31 0,99 -0,94 -0,19 -0,01 2,70
Rozenburg 600 29 0,57 0,93 0,59 -0,86 -0,55 0,47 3,53
Rozendaal 277 15 -0,84 -0,14 4,36 1,39 -1,31
Rucphen 840 33 -0,68 0,14 -0,74 -1,25 -0,50 -1,15 2,77
Ruurlo 278 14 -1,20 -0,70 0,74 0,93 -1,03
Sassenheim 604 25 0,11 0,13 -0,04 0,07 -0,56 -0,63 0,54
Schagen 441 18 1,11 0,72 -0,05 -0,21 -0,12 1,28 1,20
Scheemda 39 1 -0,03 0,12 -0,33 -1,11 -0,01 1,91 -1,03
Schermer 458 19 -0,46 -0,48 0,39 1,10 -0,18
Scherpenzeel 279 13 -0,82 2,06 -0,49 -0,46 -0,17
Schiedam 606 29 1,29 -0,86 -0,16 0,32 1,00 0,26 2,03
Schiermonnikoog 88 4 1,44 0,60 0,87 0,92 -1,49
Schijndel 844 35 0,62 1,08 -1,30 -1,29 -1,03 -0,98 -0,03
Schinnen 962 39 -0,15 -0,30 -1,11 0,03 -0,22 -1,25 -0,47
Schipluiden 607 27 -0,81 -0,39 -0,11 -0,51 -1,28 -0,85 -0,62
Schoonhoven 608 28 0,47 0,39 0,43 0,53 0,63 0,30 -0,15
Schouwen-Duiveland 1676 32 -0,32 0,10 0,81 0,55 0,80 0,48 0,32
Sevenum 964 37 -0,80 -1,36 -0,26 -1,32 -1,51
's-Gravendeel 517 30 -0,55 0,57 -0,46 0,91 0,35
's-Gravenhage 518 26 2,63 -1,83 0,33 1,02 1,03 -0,03 1,57
's-Gravenzande 519 27 -1,13 -0,86 0,85 0,05 -0,12 -0,43 1,30
's-Hertogenbosch 796 35 1,50 0,12 -0,96 -0,16 -0,45 -0,37 0,07
Simpelveld 965 39 -0,30 0,10 -0,64 -0,87 -0,38 -0,55 0,77
Sint Anthonis 1702 35 -0,99 -0,39 -1,17 -0,32 0,32 -1,78 -1,54
Sint-Michielsgestel 845 35 -0,39 0,06 -1,02 -0,20 -0,42 -0,85 -0,26
Sint-Oedenrode 846 35 -0,40 -0,04 -1,06 -0,64 -0,22 -1,28 -0,41
Sittard-Geleen 1883 39 1,07 0,10 -0,84 -0,73 -0,30 -0,69 1,11
Skarsterlân 51 6 -0,62 -0,46 -0,30 -0,37 0,27 1,01 -0,93
Sliedrecht 610 30 -0,06 0,20 2,04 -1,29 -0,68 -0,12 0,59
Slochteren 40 3 -0,18 0,39 -0,02 0,03 0,66 2,10 -0,70
Sluis 1714 31 0,27 0,75 -0,15 -0,55 0,15 0,61 0,74
Smallingerland 90 6 0,85 -0,02 0,64 -1,07 -0,23 0,80 -0,94
Sneek 91 5 1,22 0,04 -0,05 -0,70 0,24 1,06 -0,07
Soest 342 17 0,61 0,40 0,49 1,10 0,19 -0,28 0,55
Someren 847 36 -1,03 -0,50 -0,86 -0,49 0,17 -1,53 0,41
Son en Breugel 848 36 -0,22 -0,49 -0,41 0,72 -0,64 -0,39 0,24
Spijkenisse 612 29 0,89 0,28 0,43 -0,63 -0,17 0,79 3,58
Stadskanaal 37 1 0,29 0,03 0,50 -1,41 0,13 0,63 -0,11
Staphorst 180 10 -1,89 -0,76 4,23 -1,09 -0,37 -1,23 -1,68
Stede Broec 532 18 -0,09 -0,06 -0,50 -0,48 0,15 0,36 1,76
Steenbergen 851 33 -0,20 0,52 -0,50 -0,26 0,15 -0,60 1,33
Steenderen 280 14 -1,02 -0,81 0,20 0,33 -1,41
Steenwijkerland 1708 10 -0,06 -0,33 0,42 -0,56 0,55 0,71 -0,63
Stein 971 39 -0,08 0,29 -0,98 -0,76 -0,19 -0,50 0,71
Strijen 617 29 -0,47 0,52 -0,07 0,71 1,05
Swalmen 975 38 0,23 -1,20 -0,67 -1,06 0,62
Ten Boer 9 3 -0,27 0,72 -0,36 1,31 -1,80
Ter Aar 480 28 -1,14 -0,29 0,49 -1,08 0,55
Terneuzen 715 31 0,57 0,59 0,68 -0,88 -0,22 -0,18 0,99
Terschelling 93 4 0,37 -0,27 0,94 2,21 -0,66
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#M #C PMA PMA-R PRC IND IND-R EAC DST
Texel 448 18 0,60 0,96 -0,18 0,47 1,34 0,96 -0,18
Tholen 716 32 -0,68 -0,17 2,46 -0,91 0,00 -0,19 0,58
Thorn 977 38 -0,34 -1,03 -0,08 -1,27 -0,26
Tiel 281 16 0,64 0,47 0,09 -0,88 -0,38 0,49 1,27
Tilburg 855 34 2,19 0,34 -0,80 -0,96 -0,57 -0,52 0,52
Tubbergen 183 12 -2,17 -1,83 -0,98 -0,61 -0,23 -2,34 -1,72
Twenterand 1700 12 -1,22 -0,89 1,09 -1,47 -0,44 -0,85 -1,17
Tynaarlo 1730 7 -0,04 0,23 -0,15 1,43 1,81 -0,94
Tytsjerksteradiel 737 4 -0,53 -0,67 0,12 -0,38 0,11 0,69 -1,45
Ubbergen 282 15 1,16 -1,11 0,98 -0,63 -1,68
Uden 856 35 0,68 0,71 -0,92 -0,65 -0,50 -0,68 0,17
Uitgeest 450 20 -0,31 0,10 -1,20 0,61 -0,05 0,95 0,02
Uithoorn 451 23 0,24 0,47 -0,46 1,30 0,28 0,05 0,65
Urk 184 40 -1,89 -1,58 6,15 -2,61 -1,37 -2,73 -1,73
Utrecht 344 17 3,48 0,47 -0,27 0,12 -0,57 0,45 -1,45
Vaals 981 39 1,09 0,06 -0,34 -0,28 -0,57 -1,06 0,48
Valkenburg 619 25 -1,65 0,62 0,06 0,19 -0,28
Valkenburg aan de Geul 994 39 0,63 0,45 -0,85 -0,19 0,03 -1,25 -0,76
Valkenswaard 858 36 0,47 -0,02 -0,78 0,03 0,01 -0,83 0,56
Veendam 47 1 0,55 0,11 -0,18 -1,26 -0,02 2,31 0,45
Veenendaal 345 17 -0,14 -0,84 2,10 -0,78 -0,55 -0,80 -0,02
Veere 717 32 -0,55 0,20 1,48 0,15 0,38 -0,40 -1,08
Veghel 860 35 -0,42 0,13 -0,76 -0,76 -0,53 -0,97 0,05
Veldhoven 861 36 0,19 -0,12 -0,92 -0,21 -0,49 -0,90 0,43
Velsen 453 20 0,71 0,27 -0,13 0,34 0,24 0,50 1,14
Venhuizen 454 18 -0,86 -0,56 0,82 1,15 0,95
Venlo 983 37 1,05 0,14 -0,42 -0,75 0,01 -0,85 1,24
Venray 984 37 0,18 0,41 -0,77 -0,60 -0,12 -0,81 0,09
Vianen 620 17 0,04 0,40 0,08 -0,48 -0,74 0,38 1,20
Vlaardingen 622 29 1,51 0,02 0,62 -0,88 -0,55 0,00 1,54
Vlagtwedde 48 1 0,14 0,08 -0,43 -1,00 0,48 1,02 -0,19
Vlieland 96 4 0,42 -0,25 1,23 3,76 0,34
Vlissingen 718 32 1,78 1,23 0,47 -1,23 -0,42 0,44 1,55
Vlist 623 28 -1,12 -0,53 0,87 0,14 -0,07 0,19 0,23
Voerendaal 986 39 -0,01 0,27 -0,74 0,62 0,27 -1,83 -0,36
Voorhout 625 25 -0,82 -0,06 -0,51 1,06 0,17 0,17 -0,09
Voorschoten 626 25 0,47 -0,31 0,23 2,53 0,58 -0,45 -0,31
Voorst 285 13 -0,69 -0,20 -0,22 0,62 0,89 0,00 -0,97
Vorden 286 14 -0,64 -0,46 1,00 -0,03 -1,45
Vught 865 35 0,87 0,66 -0,62 1,06 0,16 -0,57 -0,46
Waalre 866 36 -0,13 -0,96 -0,44 1,53 -0,33 -0,94 0,05
Waalwijk 867 34 0,24 0,14 -0,20 -0,72 -0,19 -0,40 1,00
Waddinxveen 627 28 -0,37 -0,18 1,24 0,09 -0,42 -0,36 0,62
Wageningen 289 13 3,14 1,53 0,19 0,71 -0,03 0,22 -3,12
Warmond 628 25 0,22 -0,29 1,81 -0,87 -0,17
Warnsveld 291 14 0,65 -0,15 0,74 0,69 -1,24
Wassenaar 629 26 -0,32 -1,04 0,37 3,69 0,71 -0,76 0,62
Wateringen 630 27 -0,89 -0,99 -0,51 0,75 0,27 -0,55 1,40
Waterland 852 23 -0,14 0,40 -0,47 1,65 0,86 1,13 0,00
Weert 988 38 0,23 0,29 -0,56 -0,34 0,00 -0,70 0,92
Weesp 457 24 1,54 1,29 -0,09 0,68 0,34 0,72 0,34
Wehl 292 14 -1,17 -1,31 -0,34 -1,24 -1,09
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Werkendam 870 34 -1,01 -0,54 1,25 -0,79 -0,84 -0,77 -0,04
Wervershoof 459 18 -1,05 -1,06 -0,12 -0,12 1,17
West Maas en Waal 668 16 -0,70 -0,10 -1,13 0,07 0,42 -0,77 -0,47
Wester-Koggenland 558 18
Westerveld 1701 9 -0,562 -0,084 -0,307 0,57 1,097 2,037 -1,07
Westervoort 293 15 1,088 0,862 -0,456 -0,047 0,447 0,294 0,431
Weststellingwerf 98 6 0,122 -0,228 -0,437 -0,699 0,587 1,534 -0,176
Westvoorne 614 29 -0,804 -0,107 0,139 1,3 0,259 0,978 1,683
Wierden 189 12 -1,49 -0,919 0,605 -0,384 -0,049 -1,43 -1,7
Wieringen 462 18 -0,193 -0,514 -0,285 1,949 1,515
Wieringermeer 463 18 -0,521 0,501 -0,114 -0,22 0,766 0,685 0,995
Wijchen 296 15 0,166 0,077 -1,03 -0,354 -0,371 -0,117 -0,04
Wijdemeren 1696 24
Wijk bij Duurstede 352 17 0,165 0,29 -0,234 0,494 0,063 0,517 0,207
Winschoten 52 1 1,62 0,44 0,252 -1,3 0,185 1,709 0,022
Winsum 53 3 0,397 -0,037 0,188 -0,159 0,318 1,24 -2,04
Winterswijk 294 14 0,041 0,015 -0,303 0,078 1,083 1,358 -0,64
Wisch 295 14 -0,218 0,12 -0,522 -0,419 0,304 0,325 -0,511
Woensdrecht 873 33 0 1,016 -0,654 -0,524 -0,445 -0,921 1,839
Woerden 632 17 -0,048 -0,164 0,261 0,468 -0,299 -0,235 -0,233
Wognum 466 18 -0,959 -1,01 0,294 -0,325 0,142
Wormerland 880 22 0,483 1,494 -0,82 0,599 0,573 1,487 -0,358
Woudenberg 351 17 -0,801 0,042 1,825 0,064 0,079 -0,402 -0,855
Woudrichem 874 34 -0,868 -1,04 1,143 -0,691 -0,232 -0,652 -0,6
Wûnseradiel 710 5 -0,189 0,372 -0,147 -0,2 0,883 0,68 -0,989
Wymbritseradiel 683 5 -0,805 -0,676 -0,119 -0,338 0,447 -0,02 -1,52
Zaanstad 479 22 1,512 0,753 -0,297 -0,406 -0,27 1,186 1,232
Zaltbommel 297 16 -0,362 -0,015 1,538 -0,245 -0,308 -0,273 -0,497
Zandvoort 473 21 1,331 0,7 0,059 1,71 1,481 0,632 2,288
Zederik 707 30 -1,48 -0,817 1,942 -0,221 -0,17 -0,747 -0,979
Zeevang 478 23 -0,471 -0,402 1,733 2,378 0,411
Zeewolde 50 40 -0,552 0,025 0,728 0,539 0,31 0,472 0,687
Zeist 355 17 1,522 0,491 0,389 1,252 0,189 -0,145 -0,26
Zelhem 298 14 -0,88 -0,175 -0,093 0,085 0,699 0,439 -0,757
Zevenaar 299 15 0,774 0,649 -0,562 -0,429 -0,31 -0,364 -0,023
Zevenhuizen-Moerkapelle 1666 28 -1,43 -0,498 1,595 0,383 -0,057 0,288 0,396
Zijpe 476 18 -0,463 0,233 -0,632 0,13 0,278 1,624 0,926
Zoetermeer 637 26 1,325 0,104 0,25 0,645 0,006 0,205 1,456
Zoeterwoude 638 25 -0,148 -0,931 0,347 -0,979 -0,54
Zuidhorn 56 3 -0,183 -0,092 1,019 -0,252 -0,08 0,604 -2,18
Zundert 879 33 -0,796 0,143 -1,11 -0,388 0,015 -1,1 0,546
Zutphen 301 14 2,48 1,32 -0,403 -0,809 -0,296 1,11 -0,742
Zwartewaterland 1896 10 -1,31 -0,696 3,087 -1,71 -0,885 -0,771 -1,39
Zwijndrecht 642 30 0,341 -0,12 1,043 -0,365 -0,224 -0,044 1,534
Zwolle 193 10 1,704 0,694 0,321 -0,759 -0,706 0,818 -1,29
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SUMMARY
Over the past decades, the popularity of culture as an explaining factor in economic
geography, economics, and management and organisation studies has grown steadily.
Slowly it has become more or less common practice to point at culture whenever more
traditional explanations have failed. At the same time the expanding toolkit of cross-
cultural psychology provided an ever-growing data set on (aspects of) culture. Hofstede is
probably the best-known and most influential example hereof. In the 1990s the social
sciences, geography included, experienced what is now called a 'cultural turn'. Increasingly,
culture was used to explain regional and (inter-) national differences in, for instance, wealth
and economic growth. Some twenty years earlier, in the 1970s, Marxist approaches in
social science induced interest in the opposite relationship: the economic 'mode of being' as
an explanation for social and cultural difference.
The concepts of "culture" and "economy" have played a key role in (the development of)
social science and its development. 'In much of twentieth century discourse, "culture" and
"economy" have been represented in juxtaposition, if not indeed as an outright
contradiction of terms' (Kockel 2002b, p. 1). In social scientific theorising especially,
"culture" and "economy" are (nearly) dichotomous concepts. Social reality tends to be
divided into two mutually exclusive categories: culture and economy. The concept
dichotomization and the (conjectured) relationships between culture and economy represent
a dialectic: the 'culture - economy dialectic' (hereafter abbreviated CED).
The CED is at least as old as social science; some (conceptually) related dialectics, often
difficult to distinguish from the CED itself, are much older, however. The history of the
CED as a dialectic of social categories started in the 18th century. Its introduction into
(human) geography is, however, of much more recent date. Only in the second half of the
20th century, did the CED oust the traditional man - environment dialectic, which was a
defining characteristic of classical geography. With the introduction of the CED into
geography and the rising interest in culture in general, geography became increasingly
dependent on fuzzy concepts. The same is also true for the other social sciences, albeit that
in those the conceptual framework of the CED was already present at their 'births'.
"Culture" itself is probably the best example of such a fuzzy concept. There are hundreds of
definitions of "culture", severely limiting useful communication between theorists and
theories of culture and the CED. Nevertheless, many scientists believe that culture (in
general and the CED in particular) is a promising field of inquiry. To fulfil that promise,
however, a thorough analysis of the CED, of its concepts and theories, is necessary. Such
an analysis was the goal of the research project from which this book resulted. The focus of
this research project was on the development of (scientific) thought on the relationships
between the concepts and phenomena of culture and economy. The core question, however,
was not so much on actual relationships therebetween, but on the meaning of questions
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about these relationships and on the apparent importance of these questions in (or to) social
science.
Answering this core question requires first of all an analysis and reconstruction of the
conceptual framework of the CED. To compare, test and/or integrate theories, it is
necessary to (re)write them in a common language. There is, however, no such common
language available. The concepts of "culture" and "economy" have numerous (including
some contradictory) meanings in different theories and different disciplines. Conceptual
analysis and conceptual history may help construct the common language needed, but may
also shed some light on the role of the CED in the 'birth' of and the disciplinary divisions in
the social sciences. Moreover, as many theorists claim that language, concepts and/or
meaning are key aspects of culture, studying culture itself is (a form of) conceptual
analysis.
As is the case with the CED, there is no comprehensive theory of conceptual analysis.
Forms or versions of conceptual analysis are applied in analytical philosophy, linguistics,
artificial intelligence, information and computer science, management and organisation,
social and intellectual history, nursing, and the social sciences. Among many of these
applications, there is no contact whatsoever. Often conceptual analysts even seem to be
unaware of similar approaches in other fields. The first step in this research project,
therefore, was an attempt to integrate the many forms and versions of conceptual analysis
into a single comprehensive theory and a methodology applicable in social science in
general and in the analysis of the CED in particular. The result was a theory of concepts of
sets of sets (of sets) of (other) concepts and relationships therebetween. Conceptual analysis
then means specification of these sets of sets (etc.). Because of the internal structure of
these sets, it seems obvious to first specify conceptual history and then to systematically
map the different meanings, definitions and interpretations. The last step is the
reconstruction of the conceptual field: the introduction of definitions, translation rules
and/or new concepts.
Application of this methodology to the CED requires a number of stages, partly resulting
from the stages in the methodology and partly from the complexity of the CED itself. The
CED as analysandum consists of three concepts and a number of relationships
therebetween. These concepts are "culture", "economy" and an intermediate term usually
pointing at some kind of causality. Therefore, an analysis of the CED requires both the
analysis of the concepts of "culture" and "economy" and of the relationships assumed
therebetween.
The conceptual pair "culture" - "economy" is part of a long tradition of dichotomous
thought. Most theorists assume that this dichotomous thought originated from the man -
woman opposition. Through (a.o.) order - chaos; reason - passion; and civilisation - culture
this opposition developed into (a.o.) the CED. Although it can, therefore, be argued that the
history of the CED starts with the conceptualisation of the opposition between the concepts
of "man" and "woman", the first meaningful theoretical contributions to the development
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were related to the reason - passion dialectic. After the introduction of 'the social' as a
separate category of reality in the late 18th century, the reason - passion dialectic was lifted
to this new social level and transformed into "civilisation" and "culture". These two
concepts summarised two − in many respects − diametrically opposed worldviews:
Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment or Romanticism. "Reason" and "civilisation"
were the catchwords of the Enlightenment; "Passion", "tradition" and "culture" those of
Romanticism.
These different worldviews were − to some extent − related to different approaches in
social science. The scientific ideal of the Enlightenment was both empiricist and rationalist
at the same time. Its starting point was the assumption of universal laws (both in nature and
in social reality). This universalistical and rationalistical approach resulted in economics;
the more empirical approached led to the 'birth' of sociology. It, however, led to three major
results: the dismissal of universalism, the introduction of "culture" as an alternative to
"civilisation", and the rise of Counter-Enlightenment and Romanticism.
In the early 19th century the conceptual  pair "culture" - "civilisation" transformed from an
opposition of worldviews into a dialectic of aspects of social reality. Increasingly, "culture"
was interpreted as the more spiritual (Romantic) aspects of society, and "civilisation" as the
more rational (Enlightened). Both concepts, however, had different connotations and
alternative meanings. "Culture" was often regarded to be primitive, while "civilisation" was
sometimes used as a synonym for the Western world. Those connotations and alternative
meanings made the concepts less useful in scientific practice. Theorists of the CED,
therefore, sometimes introduced new terms. Marx, for example, introduced "base" and
"superstructure". Moreover, in the second half of the 19th century, the concepts of "culture"
and "civilisation" started to grow together until they became − in scientific usage − nearly
synonymous. In the CED, therefore, a new term was necessary. The term that − to some
extent − replaced "civilisation" was "economy".
The substitution of "economy" for "civilisation" could not have taken place much earlier
because the concept of "economy" also experienced considerable changes in meaning.
Originally the concept referred to organisation, to housekeeping, or to the organisation of
housekeeping. In the 18th century it was used in the compound term "political economy" to
refer to the organisation of housekeeping of the state. The concept further developed
through the organisation of the creation of national wealth into the organisation (or
institutions − in more modern terms) of the productive, consumptive and distributive
aspects of society. Only after the Second World War did the concept get its modern
meaning as the aggregate of productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour. In this
development, the concept of "economy" became gradually more similar to "civilisation",
which in its late 19th century form can be translated (in modern terms) as (the institutions
of) economy plus technology. When Marx wrote his base - superstructure thesis, this
development was still in its early stages and, hence, he had to introduce new terms.
In (human) geography the CED has been virtually absent for centuries. Two histories of
geography can be distinguished: the textbook history of exploration and description of other
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countries and regions, and the intellectual history of man - environment relationships. The
latter started in ancient Greece in the form of physical determinism, the theory that social
and cultural arrangements in a group of people are determined by their physical
geographical environment. Physical determinism was picked up by the Arabic scholars and
returned to Europe after the Middle Ages, where it quickly became a more or less common
worldview and where it influenced the first great classical geographer, Ritter. Only in the
century after Ritter were the antithesis of physical determinism, theories on the influence of
man on his environment, and a synthesis introduced in geographical thought.
In this dialectic of man and environment, the CED was virtually absent. The categories of
"culture" and "economy" were dissolved in the broader category of "man". Only in the
second half of the 20th century did this change. First the man - environment dialectic, the
theoretical core of geography, was replaced by an abstract approach based on isotropic
planes and distances. Next, in the 1970s, the (mainly) Marxist and humanist reaction
introduced the CED into geographical thought. Within three decades, geography lost its
original and unique perspective and adopted the social scientific standard view.
Because of the enormous number of definitions and interpretations of especially the
concept of "culture", mapping the different forms of the concepts of the CED is no simple
task. Definitions can be classified by common definitional elements, but these
classifications clarify little. Even within periods and disciplines there seems to be hardly
any consensus on the meaning of "culture". There seem to be far less competing
interpretations of "economy", but the history of the concept and related concepts such as
"civilisation" show that this is not a completely unambiguous concept as well. In both
cases, however, conceptual reconstruction is possible by means of the introduction of basic
(or even atomic) concepts that can be made more specific by adding attributes in a
taxonomic structure. In this way, the different interpretations of "culture" and "economy"
can be translated as different specific subtypes of the basic concepts and can be related to
each other within the formal taxonomic structure.
The construction of such a framework is a form of applied social ontology. An analysis of
the many definitions and interpretations suggests that meta-behavioural entities and actual
behavioural events are the ontological primitives (most basic concepts) of the framework.
All versions of the CED are relationships between subsets of behaviour and/or meta-
behaviour. Meta-behaviour is the set of all social influences on and determinants of actual
behaviour. It includes theories, concepts, institutions, values, norms, habits and (nearly) all
other aspects of "culture" suggested throughout the ages. In nearly all theories of the CED,
the C pole refers to a specific subset of meta-behaviour. The nature of the E pole, however,
is less unambiguous, which is the consequence of the concept's development. The E pole
can be a subset of institutions and, therefore, a subset of meta-behaviour, but it can also
refer to the aggregate of productive, consumptive and distributive behaviour, and hence, to
actual behavioural events. This difference is of great consequence in the analysis of the
CED.
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Theories of the CED can be loosely divided into two groups, which are in this book labelled
the first and second grand theory. The first grand theory is Marx's historical materialism
and (earlier and later) related theories on the influence of the (condition and/or organisation
of the) economy on aspects of culture (or meta-behaviour). The second grand theory is
Weber's thesis on the Protestant work ethic and (later) theories on the influence of culture
on entrepreneurship and economic growth. Besides the two grand theories a number of
minor theories, which are only 'minor' in the sense that they are unrelated to the two grand
theories (and are not 'grand' themselves), are distinguished. Examples of these minor
theories are those on embeddedness, consumer behaviour and institutions.
To facilitate testing of (some of) the theories of the CED, it was attempted in this study to
measure culture or meta-behaviour on the spatial scale of Dutch municipalities. The choice
for this spatial scale was primarily motivated by the fact that there has been abundant
research done on the (inter-) national scale but hardly any on smaller spatial scales and
because there is no clarity on the question of which spatial scales are relevant to the CED.
Measuring culture, however, is not that easy. The most obvious method of measuring
culture is the indirect measurement of meta-behaviour by constructing the deeper factors
behind actual behaviour through the means of factor analysis. It is, however, difficult to
otherwise interpret these factors than as core value orientations, while in the meta-
behaviour they reflect, concepts, theories and institutions are relevant as well. The
statistical analysis presented in this book resulted in five dimensions of regional culture in
the Netherlands: (1) post-materialism; (2) Protestant conservatism; (3) classical
individualism; (4) egalitarian anti-conservatism; and (5) dissatisfaction. Interestingly, all
five seem to be related to some form of individualism. Ten conclusions result from earlier
empirical research and from new tests based on this new data:
(1) Partly confirming the first grand theory, increasing wealth results in cultural
change. The most important effects found were an increase of (a) individualism;
(b) post-materialism; (c) economic freedom; (d) civil and (e) political rights; and a
decrease of (f) competitiveness. Contrary to theory, no effect of wealth on work
ethic was found.
(2) There does not seem to be a consistent relationship between Hofstede's dimensions
of culture and any aspect of entrepreneurship. Any possible value on any of
Hofstede's dimensions may have a positive influence on any aspect of
entrepreneurship.
(3) Similarly, in some studies post-materialism was found to negatively influence self-
employment, while it was found to have a positive influence in the empirical part
of this study. These different effects of the same cultural dimension on the same
economic variable may be related to the fact that post-materialism is non-atomic.
It is composed of several culturally different phenomena that may have
contradictory effects. The lower valuation of profit and material wellbeing may
negatively influence self-employment, while self-expression and self-development
may promote it. The lack of consistent relationships between Hofstede's
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dimensions and entrepreneurship may be caused by the same phenomenon: some
aspects of, for example, individualism have a positive effect on self-employment
and innovation, while other aspects have negative effects.
(4) The only cultural dimension (if it is one) that seems to have a consistent and
significant positive effect on self-employment is dissatisfaction.
(5) On the regional scale a positive effect of Protestantism on self-employment was
found confirming Weber's thesis. On the (inter-) national scale, however, no such
confirmation was found. This may be caused by the fact that national cultural
differences overpower religious and other types of difference. In other words,
some cultural effects disappear on the (inter-) national scale.
(6) Therefore, it may be advisable to study the CED or the effects of cultural values
on behaviour in general on the regional rather than the (inter-) national scale.
(7) Hoselitz's thesis that marginal groups such as ethnic minorities are more
entrepreneurially active than their host populations seems to be sufficiently backed
by empirical evidence.
(8) Contrary to popular belief, there is no consistent evidence for the theory that
entrepreneurship positively influences economic growth.
(9) No consistent direct effects of culture on economy were found. It is often assumed
that individualism promotes economic growth. In this study, however, the opposite
relationship was found: collectivism seems to positively influence economic
growth. The evidence for this relationship, however, was not particularly strong.
(10) Institutions do (or seem to at least) affect economic growth, but often are effects of
economic growth and/or wealth as well. Hence, the direction of causality in this
type of relationships is generally unclear.
Not all theories of the CED have been tested. Some are too vague to make sensible testing
possible, and in many cases, the categories related cannot be measured (or even
operationalised in any other way).
Besides the theoretical conclusions (conclusions on the theories of the CED) above, the
different analyses (conceptual, theoretical, empirical) also resulted in some meta-theoretical
and/or philosophical conclusions.
The body of theories on relationships between culture and economy is characterised by a
bewildering variety of concepts, categories and ideas. There seem, however, to be two
broad types of theories: (1) very broad and vague theories, that are impossible to test; and
(2) very specific theories that are mostly tested but are not always consistently confirmed or
refuted. Most of the theoretical contributions seem to be of the first type. In all of these
theories − and in many of those belonging to the second group as well − the relationship
assumed is so vague or complex that falsification is impossible. The relationship between
post-materialism and entrepreneurship (see conclusion 3 above) may serve as an example.
If theories cannot be falsified they are − according to Popper − unscientific. This seems to
be a problem for the whole of the CED (or even the whole of social science) because even
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the most rigorous theories allow enough external influences, loopholes and other escapes to
explain why any negative test result is not a refutation.
An additional problem is that for every increase in detail there is a corresponding increase
in complexity. For every theory there is number of more specific theories, some of which
seem to be confirmed while others are refuted. Hence, a claim that there is a reciprocal
relationship between aspect of culture X and aspect of economy Y may, after testing of
more specific theories (theories on the relationships between subsets of X and Y), have to
be replaced by: X1 leads to Y leads to X2. In this case the earlier, less detailed, theory
would still be true, but not very useful. As a consequence hereof it may be concluded that
the existence of a relationship is to a large extent dependent on the categorisation of the
concepts or phenomena related, and hence, that the nature of a relationship between culture
and economy − if there is one − is possibly conceptual rather than causal. Therefore, an
analysis of the CED is (to some extent) conceptual analysis.
Whether a relationship assumed between categories is conceptual rather than causal is
dependent on the form of that relationship. All theories of the CED can be constructed out
of variants of three basic forms of theories:
(1) meta-behaviour of type X causes behaviour of type Y;
(2) meta-behaviour of type X causes meta-behaviour of type Y; and
(3) behaviour of type X causes meta-behaviour of type Y.
An analysis of these basic forms of theories shows that (1) is true by definition if there is a
conceptual overlap between X and Y and that (2) is true in the same case, which implies
that (1) and (2) are conceptual rather than causal relationships. The third basic form of
theories, however, is of a different nature: (3) is a causal relationship. The third is a subtype
of a more general basic form (3a): the set of actual entities (the social and physical
environment) of type X causes meta-behaviour of type Y. It seems that, broadly speaking,
there are two types of theories in / of the CED: theories that are misunderstood conceptual
overlaps and theories that concern the (external) conditions of (types or aspects of) meta-
behaviour. This last conclusion may be regarded a (critical) synthesis of the CED. This
synthesis points at the fact that empirical results do not always reflect positive facts, but
may be artefacts of conceptualisation and measurement.
The three basic forms of relationships in the CED described above are also the basic
components of theories in the social sciences in general. Any social scientific theory can be
constructed from these components. Hence, in a sense, it can be argued that the field of the
CED is the field of social science. There is, however, one exception that studied two
additional relationships (basic forms of theories): classical geography. These two additional
basic forms are:
(4) a physical environment of type X causes meta-behaviour of type (like (3) a special
case of (3a)); and
(5) behaviour of type X causes a physical environment of type Y.
Together these two form the before mentioned man - environment dialectic, the theoretical
core of classical geography. In modern geography, however, (4) and (5) are of very limited
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relevance. In practice, modern geography deals with spatial or regional differences in (1),
(2) and/or (3). Hence, in practice, modern geography is spatial or regional sociology or
economics. Only a few social scientists still study the topics of classical geography and they
are rarely from a geographical background. As a consequence, human geography produced
hardly any new and/or original ideas in the last few decades. By now an increasing number
of geographers seem to acknowledge this problem. On a way out of this crisis (which is,
however, rarely recognised as such) there is little consensus. This research project
(especially the meta-theoretical conclusions above) seems to point at an obvious solution: a
reorientation on the core of classical geography: the man - environment dialectic. After all,
in modern social science this dialectic is largely ignored. Geography, therefore, has a world
to (re-)gain.
In social science in general, conceptual analysis should play a far greater role in research.
As mentioned above, many of the relationships assumed in social science are conceptual
rather than causal. Empirical research that insufficiently takes this into account can only
produce trivial results. An obvious methodological approach in social science is, therefore,
a combination of conceptual (or ontological) analysis and demographical or
epidemiological research based on rigorously analysed, defined and measured categories (in
that conceptual analysis).
According to Comte, science progresses through three stages. The first is the theological
stage in which the world experienced is explained by reference to supernatural forces. The
second is the metaphysical stage in which explanation is dependent on abstract concepts
and speculation. Only in the third and final stage, is positive science substituted for
superstition and metaphysics. Comte claimed that most of the sciences advanced to the
positive stage. The main exception was sociology, which was founded, as a scientific
discipline, by Comte himself. Comte hoped that the new discipline would progress through
the stages quickly, but more than one-and-a-half centuries later, the social sciences still do
not seem to have passed the metaphysical stage. (Orthodox economics with its belief in
markets as 'invisible hands' seems even to be lingering in the first stage.) Theories of
culture, economy and entrepreneurship and the social sciences in general are infested with
myths, abstract concepts without real-world counterparts and petrified contingencies. It
seems that many of our beliefs and perceptions are based more on myth than on reality.
One of the most persistent myths is that of boundaries. Boundaries are social constructions,
not external reality. This is true for boundaries between cultures and regions, but also − and
more importantly − for boundaries between scientific disciplines and categories (concepts).
Hence, a more anarchist approach to social science is needed. Such an anarchist approach is
necessarily multi- or inter-disciplinary and includes conceptual analysis as an essential tool
in scientific research.
In the final sections of this book the historical development of the CED and some related
pairs of concepts is reviewed once more. These pairs (dichotomies and dialectics) seem to
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be part of a larger system, a trialectic in which nature or environment is a third pole and in
which there are intermediate concepts between any two corners (poles) of the triangle. Most
of the poles and intermediates are opposed in dichotomies or dialectics and between most
there are theoretical relationships. This trialectic, however, maps only (part of) our
conceptual framework, not reality. The concepts of "culture" and "economy" refer to ideas,
not to the world. They reflect our perception of reality, not reality itself. There are no
(objectively limited) counterparts of "culture" and "economy" in reality. Hence, as scientific
concepts these are relatively useless. Moreover, if there are no culture and economy, neither
can there be relationships therebetween. As a consequence, the concept of such a
relationship (the CED) is scientifically useless as well. Therefore, "culture", "economy" and
the relationships therebetween are misconceptions about which it is better to further remain
silent.
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1Lajos L. Brons
RETHINKING THE CULTURE − ECONOMY DIALECTIC
supplement 1:
BEHAVIOUR, ENVIRONMENT,
AND GEOGRAPHY
The Hague  July 2005
But man is everywhere a disturbing agent. Wherever he plants his foot, the harmonies of nature are
turned to discords. The proportions and accommodations which insured the stability of existing
arrangements are overthrown. Indigenous vegetable and animal species are extirpated, and
supplanted by others of foreign origin, spontaneous production is forbidden or restricted, and the
face of the earth is either laid bare or covered with a new and reluctant growth of vegetable forms,
and with alien tribes of animal life. These intentional changes and substitutions constitute, indeed,
great revolutions; but vast as is their magnitude and importance, they are, as we shall see,
insignificant in comparison with the contingent and unsought results which have flowed from them.
G.P. Marsh 1864, p. 36
S1-1-introduction
In chapter 8 of Rethinking the Culture - Economy Dialectic (Brons 2005; hereafter
abbreviated RCED), five forms of basic theories or relationships were distinguished:
T8.5 meta-behaviour of type x causes behaviour of type y;
T8.6 meta-behaviour of type x causes meta-behaviour of type y;
T8.7 behaviour of type x causes meta-behaviour of type y;
T8.8 a physical environment of type x causes meta-behaviour of type y; and
T8.9 behaviour of type x causes a physical environment of type y.
The first three hereof are the atomic forms of the CED; the latter two are the basic theories
of the man - environment dialectic (MED). In table 8.1, repeated below, some of the
characteristics of these five relationships and their formal structures were briefly
summarised. Figure S1.1 graphically represents the five forms in a single model (T.S1.1 in
the bottom right corner of the figure will be dealt with in the next section).
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table 8.1(rep.): basic theories, relationships and disciplines
theory type of relationship scientific discipline(s)
T8.5R ∆:x  ∆/y
T8.6R ∆:x  ∆:y } conceptual
T8.7R ∆/x  ∆:y
} sociology, economics,post-classical geography, etc.
T8.8R ∆(Φ−/)x  ∆:y } causal
T8.9R ∆/x  ∆(Φ−/)y → possibly both } classical geography
figure S1.1: the structure of theoretical forms
Of the three relationships that make up the CED, the first two (T8.5 and T8.6) were shown
to be conceptual, while the third (T8.7) actually is a causal relationship (see § 8.3.2). It was
pointed out (in §§ 8.3.2 and 8.4) that T8.7 and T8.8 are special cases of a more general
form T8.7a (∆Φx∆:y), which can be described in common language as 'conditions (co-)
determine meta-behaviour'. Hence, 'half' of the man - environment dialectic, the theoretical
core of classical geography, was analysed as a causal relationship. However, the other
relationship, T8.9 was not analysed in RCED because the focus of the book was on the
CED, not on the MED. This supplement deals with the analysis of T8.9 and its possible
implications for geography.
S1-2-behaviour, environment, and the causal - conceptual distinction
In table 8.1, repeated above, it was suggested that T8.9 may be both causal and conceptual.
No argument for this suggestion, however, was offered in RCED. T8.9 is the form of basic
meta-behaviour : nature Φ-/
actual behaviour /
T8.5
T8.6
T8.7
T8.8
T8.9
 T.S1.1
INTRODUCTION
3
theory that states that (a change in) behaviour of type x results in (a change in) the physical
environment of type y. This may seem like a straightforward causal relationship. However,
it is not. The behavioural event of ploughing, for example, may seem to cause a furrow, but
this is hardly an accurate description of the relationship. Ploughing is creating furrows.
Hence, furrows are conceptually implied in ploughing, not caused by it. The difference
between an effect and a conceptual implication is that the first is not necessary for the
concept to apply, while the second is. Creating furrows, ploughing, is intended to improve
the soil quality. Nevertheless, if this improvement fails, you are still ploughing. You can
not plough without creating furrows, but you can plough without the intended soil quality
improvement.
Nevertheless, T8.9 is not a purely conceptual relationship. The problem is that every
change in the physical environment will result in some further changes (no matter how big
or small):
T.S1.1 ∀x ∃y [ ∆(Φ−/)x  ∆(Φ−/)y ]  .
Creating furrows (x) results in changes in the soil quality (y). This is the intended result of
ploughing. Not all changes, however, are intended or known to the ploughman (see the
quote above). There may be ecological effects (or effects of effects), for example, that are
hard to predict.
Combining T.S1.1 with T8.9 results in:
T.S1.2 ∀x,y [ ( ∆/x  ∆(Φ−/)y ) → ∃z [ ∆(Φ−/)y  ∆(Φ−/)z ] ]  ,
in words: for every x and y that are related by form T8.9 (∆/x∆(Φ−/)y ), there is an
environmental effect z that is caused by (intended) environmental change y. While the
relationship x-y (ploughing - furrow) may be conceptual, the relationship y-z (furrow -
changes in soil ecology) is causal. Hence, the relationship between a type of behaviour (/x)
or change therein and its 'total effects' is partly conceptual and partly causal.
However, the classification and delimitation of y and z is conceptual and, therefore,
contingent. It could, for example, also be argued that ploughing conceptually implies
drawing a plough through soil (the x-y relationship) and that drawing a plough through soil
causes the furrow (the y-z relationship). Whether the furrow is an implication (y) or an
effect (z), therefore, dependent on conceptualisation. Hence, the delimitation between
causal and conceptual parts of a relationship of the form T8.9 is conceptual itself. What in
some conceptual framework is regarded an effect is an implication in another. Causality,
then, is dependent on conceptualisation. Consequently, no strict demarcation line can be
drawn between causal and conceptual relationships (see also § 2.2.1 and Quine 1951). The
causal - conceptual distinction proves to be a dialectic rather than a dichotomy.
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S1-3-geography
While the relationship between x and y in T.S1.2 is one between human behaviour and
physical environment, y-z is a relationship between purely natural events or phenomena.
The relationships x-y and y-z, therefore, belong to different scientific fields. The first
belongs to the domain of social science, the second is the domain of natural science. Or, to
be more precise, x-y is part of human geography and y-z is physical geography (in a very
broad sense, including ecology).
The conclusion that the distinction between y and z is conceptual and, therefore, contingent,
however, undermines the schism between human and physical geography. In studying the
effects of human behaviour on his environment, it is impossible to isolate the physical and
environmental changes made by man from their further effects. Such an isolation,
moreover, is not just impossible, it is also undesirable. It is the total effect of human
behaviour geography (and science in general) is (or at least should be) interested in, not just
the direct, conceptual implications.
If human geography would choose to re-focus on the MED, the field would need some re-
integration with physical geography (including ecology). An approach to geography that
strongly focuses on man - environment interaction, that studies the influence of
environments on meta-behaviour on the one hand and of the effects of human behaviour on
the face of the earth on the other, would require a very broad perspective that explicitly
includes nature and parts of natural science:
Zur Eigenart der Länder gehören Natur und Mensch, und zwar in so enger Verbindung, daß
sie nicht von einander getrennt werden können. (Hettner 1927, p. 126)
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